Robert Garcia, Jr. v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-14-00115-CR
    ROBERT GARCIA JR.                                               APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                    STATE
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    FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1321858D
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    A jury convicted Appellant Robert Garcia Jr. of delivery of a controlled
    substance, cocaine, of four grams or more but less than 200 grams, a first
    degree felony, and the trial court assessed his punishment at eighteen years’
    confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(d) (West 2010). In two
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    points, Appellant argues that the trial court erred during final arguments (1) when
    it overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s direct comment on his failure to
    testify and (2) when it overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s striking at the
    defendant over the shoulders of counsel. We affirm.
    The Evidence
    Robert Walsh, a narcotics detective, purchased cocaine from a person he
    met while conducting an undercover “street level” sting operation.        Detective
    Walsh identified Appellant as the person to whom he gave $250 in exchange for
    eight grams of cocaine in a transaction that took place in an Arlington parking lot.
    Argument About Which Appellant Complains
    Both of Appellant’s points are based on arguments made by the prosecutor
    during final arguments.      We present first portions of defense counsel’s
    arguments:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is the height of arrogance to bring one
    officer with no other form of evidence that was possible to be
    brought to you and nothing more and say, this is enough, trust us,
    we’re the government.
    Thereafter, defense counsel returned to the theme of the State’s relying on a
    single witness:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What we do know is that Detective Walsh
    makes his living lying, being an actor, misrepresenting, faking what
    he looks like, faking his voice, persuading people of things that are
    not true. He is trained to persuade you. Trust me, I’m the
    government. How arrogant is it that we don’t have to bring you any
    other evidence?
    2
    So there’s literally no other evidence before you, including
    everything on this rail, for you to consider. I would suggest to you
    just the weight of all this makes it impossible to find the case beyond
    a reasonable doubt. . . .
    It is reasonable to require the government to do its job. It is
    reasonable to require the government to bring you different types of
    evidence so that you can compare the evidence in reaching your
    decision on if they’ve proved their case as to each of those elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The failure to provide you with what is routine investigation and
    evidence in this case is a failure of the government to prove their
    case to you beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s a good thing you’re
    here.
    Defense counsel closed with these remarks:
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s not enough. Protect the citizen who’s
    accused and protect all of our Constitutional rights. Thank you very
    much.
    In the prosecutor’s closing arguments, he made the following arguments that
    form the bases of Appellant’s complaints:
    [PROSECUTOR]: Now, how much is enough? I’ve been doing this
    a long time, and I wish just one time I would come in here to try a
    case and the Defense would say, you’ve got me.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. This is a comment on failure to
    testify. This is also striking at the Defendant over the shoulder of
    counsel. This is a totally improper argument.
    THE COURT: Overruled.
    [PROSECUTOR]: What I’m pointing out, ladies and gentlemen, is
    it’s the Defense’s job to point out supposed inconsistencies.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. This is a lessening of the
    burden. The Defense, as the Court has told the jury, has no job at
    all but to sit and be present.
    3
    [PROSECUTOR]: I’ll withdraw that comment.
    THE COURT: All right.
    [PROSECUTOR]: But, ladies and gentlemen, you heard what the
    arguments were.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me, Your Honor.                  Did you, I’m
    sorry, sustain my objection?
    THE COURT: I did.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So then I must ask for a limiting instruction,
    please.
    THE COURT: The Court will disregard the last argument of [the
    prosecutor].
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The jury shall?
    THE COURT: The jury shall. I’m sorry.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. Then you know I have to ask for a
    mistrial.
    THE COURT: That’s denied.
    Whether the Prosecutor Commented on Defendant’s Failure to Testify
    In Appellant’s first point, he argues that the trial court erred by overruling
    his objection to the prosecutors’ direct comment on his failure to testify.
    The purpose of closing arguments is to facilitate the jury’s proper analysis
    of the evidence so as to arrive at a just and reasonable conclusion based solely
    on the evidence. Barnes v. State, 
    70 S.W.3d 294
    , 308 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2002, pet. ref’d). Permissible jury arguments by the State must fall within one of
    four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction
    4
    from the evidence; (3) answer to the argument of opposing counsel; or (4) pleas
    for law enforcement. Felder v. State, 
    848 S.W.2d 85
    , 94–95 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1992), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 829
    (1993).
    Appellate courts review an allegedly improper argument in the context of
    the entire argument. Mosley v. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 180
    , 183 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1985). When the complaint is that a prosecutor commented on the defendant’s
    failure to testify, we review the language used from the jury’s standpoint. Nowlin
    v. State, 
    507 S.W.2d 534
    , 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).           If the prosecutor’s
    comments are not a direct attack on the defendant’s failure to testify, the
    language used must be such that the jury would have “necessarily and naturally”
    taken it as a comment on the defendant’s election not to testify. Montoya v.
    State, 
    744 S.W.2d 15
    , 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 
    487 U.S. 1227
    (1988).
    The prosecutor’s comment questioning how much was enough was in
    response to defense counsel’s closing assertion, “It’s not enough.” It was from
    that point that the prosecutor launched into other comments. We hold that the
    prosecutor’s arguments were in response to opposing counsel’s arguments. See
    
    Felder, 848 S.W.2d at 94
    –95.
    We also hold the prosecutor’s argument was not a direct comment on
    Appellant’s failure to testify. The prosecutor referred to “the Defense” generically
    and not to Appellant specifically.   His reference to “the Defense” was broad
    enough to encompass defense counsel, as distinguished from Appellant or
    5
    defendants generally.        Appellant asserts that the prosecutor’s subsequent
    comment—“it’s the Defense’s job to point out supposed inconsistencies”—shows
    that the prosecutor “stepped in it again.” We disagree. That comment appears
    to be in response to defense counsel’s argument that it was “reasonable to
    require the government to do its job.” We conclude it was not a comment on
    Appellant’s failure to testify.
    Finally, we hold it was not manifestly intended or of such a character that
    the jury would have necessarily and naturally taken it as a comment on
    Appellant’s failure to testify. The implication that the comment referred to the
    defendant’s failure to testify must be clear. See Bustamante v. State, 
    48 S.W.3d 761
    , 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). That the language might be construed as an
    implied or indirect allusion is insufficient.   See 
    id. The comment
    was not
    manifestly intended to comment on Appellant’s failure to testify. See 
    id. The prosecutor
    was not faulting Appellant for not taking the stand for the purpose of
    admitting his guilt. The prosecutor was telling the jury that no matter how strong
    a case he presented, in a contested trial, “the Defense” was never going to
    concede its case. The jury would not have necessarily and naturally taken the
    prosecutor’s argument as a comment on Appellant’s failure to testify. See 
    id. We overrule
    Appellant’s first point.
    6
    Whether the Prosecutor Struck at Appellant over the Shoulders of Counsel
    In Appellant’s second point, he contends the trial court erred by overruling
    his objection that the prosecutor had struck at him over the shoulders of counsel.
    The “over-the-shoulders-of-counsel” rule protects the defendant from
    improper character attacks on defense counsel. See Coble v. State, 
    871 S.W.2d 192
    , 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 829
    (1994). Character
    attacks on defense counsel are improper because they unfairly inflame the jury
    against the accused. Wilson v. State, 
    7 S.W.3d 136
    , 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
    A prosecutor risks improperly striking at a defendant over the shoulders of
    counsel when the prosecutor refers to defense counsel personally and explicitly
    impugns defense counsel’s character. Mosley v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 249
    , 259
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. denied, 
    526 U.S. 1070
    (1999); Guy v. State, 
    160 S.W.3d 606
    , 617 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). The State may not
    accuse defense counsel of bad faith and insincerity.       Fuentes v. State, 
    664 S.W.2d 333
    , 335 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1984). We review a trial court’s
    ruling on an objection asserting improper jury argument for an abuse of
    discretion. Lemon v. State, 
    298 S.W.3d 705
    , 707 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009,
    pet. ref’d).
    The prosecutor’s comments were directed at “the Defense” generically and
    not at defense counsel personally.      His comments, therefore, attenuate any
    personal impugning of defense counsel’s character.        Nor did the prosecutor
    impugn the character of defense counsel generally; rather, the prosecutor was
    7
    trying to drive home the point that in a contested trial, the defense will not
    concede its case no matter how strong a case the prosecution brings. To the
    extent the prosecutor’s following comment about it being “the Defense’s job to
    point out supposed inconsistencies,” that argument broached accusing defense
    counsel generally of acting in bad faith and with insincerity; however, as noted
    above, this latter comment appears to have been in response to defense
    counsel’s argument that the State failed in its job of presenting sufficient
    evidence.   In any event, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard that
    comment. We overrule Appellant’s second point.2
    Conclusion
    Having overruled both of Appellant’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /s/ Anne Gardner
    ANNE GARDNER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and MEIER, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: October 29, 2015
    2
    To the extent Appellant argues, in conjunction with his second point, that
    the State injected new facts outside the record, this was not Appellant’s objection
    at trial; accordingly, that particular complaint was not preserved for appeal. See
    Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
    8