Zbranek Custom Homes, Ltd. v. Joe Allbaugh, Diane Allbaugh, and Rutilio Albarran Construction, Inc. D/B/A El Paso Framing ( 2015 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00131-CV
Zbranek Custom Homes, Ltd., Appellant
v.
Joe Allbaugh; Diane Allbaugh; and
Rutilio Albarran Construction, Inc. d/b/a El Paso Framing, Appellees
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-10-002006, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Zbranek Custom Homes, Ltd. appeals the trial court’s final judgment rendered on a
jury verdict in favor of Joe and Diane Allbaugh finding that Zbranek’s negligence proximately
caused a fire and extensive damage to personal property in the new home that they rented. Zbranek
complains that the Allbaughs’ claims were barred by both a waiver provision in the construction
contract between Zbranek and the owner-landlord of the home and an “as is” clause in the lease; that
it owed no legal duty to the Allbaughs; that the evidence was insufficient to support causation and
the value of the Allbaughs’ damaged property as determined by the jury; and that the trial court erred
in excluding Zbranek’s expert testimony regarding a demonstration test. We will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Zbranek built the home in which the fire occurred under a contract with the home’s
owner, Bella Cima Developments, L.P. Zbranek, as the home’s general contractor, engaged various
independent contractors to perform different aspects of the construction, including the framing,
stucco, and masonry. Under its contract with Bella Cima, Zbranek was responsible “for performance
of all duties reasonably necessary to complete the Project” and ensuring that the construction
complied “with all applicable laws, codes and ordinances” and was in “substantial compliance with
the plans and specifications” of the architect. The home’s plans called for an outdoor fireplace,
which was the origin of the house fire upon its very first use following construction.
Bella Cima leased the new home to the Allbaughs. On Christmas Eve, the Allbaughs
built a small fire with logs in the outdoor fireplace before the family retreated to the inside of the
home while their adult son, David Birdwell, stayed outside until the fire died down. A few hours
later, Birdwell was awakened by the smell of smoke. Upon investigation, he noticed “the remnants
of a small fire” with virtually no flames in the outdoor fireplace and an “inordinate amount of
smoke” along the “open air roof line that connects the outdoor living area to the house.” After his
attempts to pour water on the embers in the fireplace had no effect on the smoke, he looked inside
the fireplace and noticed “a gap between the stone facing of the fireplace and the actual firebox,”
glowing debris in the “space between the firebox and the fascia of the fireplace,” and “even some
flames in [the gap].” Birdwell woke his family members, and Joe Allbaugh called the fire department.
The fire substantially damaged the large home as well as the majority of its contents. The official
fire investigator with the fire department determined that the outdoor fireplace was the fire’s area
of origin but did not determine a specific point of origin and observed a gap between the firebox
and the framing around it but could not say whether the gap existed before the fire occurred.
The Allbaughs sued Zbranek as well as several of the subcontractors who performed
work during the home’s construction, some of whom were later non-suited or removed from the
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lawsuit by way of summary judgment. In its charge, the jury was asked whether the negligence of
Joe Allbaugh, Zbranek, and five subcontractors proximately caused the occurrence in question. The
jury answered “no” to all parties except for Zbranek and found that it had 100% responsibility for
the negligence causing the occurrence. The jury awarded the Allbaughs damages of $651,396.26
for the “actual value” to them of their personal property, excluding any “fanciful or sentimental”
considerations, and $73,603.74 for the reasonable cost of repairs to their personal property. The
trial court rendered judgment on the verdict in favor of the Allbaughs and ordered that they recover
damages from Zbranek in the amount of $715,420.1 Zbranek filed a motion for new trial and
this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Legal duty of general contractor
Zbranek complains that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s conclusion that Zbranek owed a legal duty to the Allbaughs because “Texas law does
not impose a duty on Zbranek to third parties like the Allbaughs.”2 See Black + Vernooy Architects
v. Smith, 346 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied) (holding that architect’s
contractual duty to homeowner did not extend to third parties because architect had no contractual
1
The court also ordered that the Allbaughs take nothing from Rutilio Albarran Construction,
Inc. d/b/a El Paso Framing, who is not a party to this appeal, and severed the remaining third-party
claims that Zbranek had brought against El Paso Framing and the stucco subcontractor.
2
In its statement of issues presented, Zbranek parenthetically mentions that “this issue
includes the court’s refusal to submit jury instructions relating to control,” but its brief entirely fails
to address this issue or cite any legal authority; Zbranek has, therefore, waived this sub-issue. See
General Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex. Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 n.1 (Tex. 2001)
(appellant’s failure to brief issue on appeal waives that issue).
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right to control construction of defective balcony and did not exercise actual control over its
construction). The existence of a legal duty under a given set of circumstances is a question of law
for the court. Id. at 882-83 (appellate courts review de novo whether legal duty is owed); see also
Lawson-Avila Constr., Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990,
writ denied) (holding that trial court did not err by failing to submit jury question about whether
general contractor retained right to control independent contractor’s performance because evidence
of control was sufficient and because broad-form question inquiring about whether general
contractor was negligent was sufficient and within trial court’s discretion). We conclude that the
record supports the trial court’s conclusion that, under these circumstances, Zbranek owed the
Allbaughs a duty to use reasonable care in the construction of the fireplace.
The supreme court has recently held that “the negligent performance of a contract
that proximately injures a non-contracting party’s property or person states a negligence claim,” as
there is a common-law duty to perform a contract with care and skill, and the failure to meet this
implied standard might provide a basis for recovery in tort under appropriate circumstances.
Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718-19 (Tex. 2014)
(plumbing subcontractor had independent duty not to flood or damage home while performing
contract with builder, and therefore homeowner—who was not party to contract between subcontractor
and builder—could sue subcontractor for common-law negligence); see Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc.,
633 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982) (builder owes duty of ordinary care
in construction of home, duty is not limited to first purchaser of home but extends to subsequent
purchasers, and privity of contract between builder and injured party is not required), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
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This duty applies to general contractors to ensure that their subcontractors perform
their work in a safe manner if the general contractor specifically retains some control over some
portion of the work performed by a subcontractor or actually exercises control over the work.
See Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 791 (Tex. 2001) (sufficient evidence of
control shown where general contractor assigned its superintendent responsibility to inspect safety
equipment of subcontractors, superintendent personally witnessed and approved anti-fall equipment
subcontractors used, and superintendent knew about and did not object to use of system without
lifeline); Abarca v. Scott Morgan Residential, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 110, 124-25 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (holding following evidence sufficient to raise fact issue on general
contractor’s exercise of actual control over subcontractor’s work: general contractor’s superintendent
gave subcontractor “option” of how to acquire scaffold and permission to use its materials on site
to build scaffold; superintendent was present and “supervised job” while subcontractor built scaffold;
and subcontractor’s supervisor gave him suggestions on how to build scaffold while superintendent
was present).
We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s implied conclusion that Zbranek exercised sufficient control over the construction of
the fireplace so as to owe a duty of reasonable care to the Allbaughs. Steve Zbranek testified that
he made the decision to install an Isokern firebox rather than the metal-insert type called for in the
architectural and construction plans and that he did not consult with the architect to make such
change or have the relevant plans re-drawn to so reflect. Evidence showed that he made this change
after the framing subcontractors (El Paso Framing) had already framed for the smaller, metal-insert
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fireplace, following the architectural plans’ specifications for framing (which allowed for combustible
materials, such as oriented strand board (OSB), a type of plywood, to be within 8 inches of the
firebox opening). There was no evidence that, after the Isokern firebox was installed, El Paso Framing
employees returned to re-frame and re-sheath the fireplace with the OSB material, although it is
undisputed that some party did such work. Mr. Zbranek testified that he had no knowledge of who
had re-framed and re-sheathed the fireplace after the Isokern was installed, although he did testify
that he personally inspected and approved of the OSB sheathing, the stucco applied over the OSB,
and the stone veneer on the outside of the fireplace.
Mr. Zbranek further testified that his company supplied all of the raw materials and
framing supplies for the home construction, which would necessarily have included any mortars
required to complete installation of the fireplace after the Isokern unit was delivered and assembled
by the supplier, Fireplace Systems, Inc.—however, he could produce no evidence that any of the
manufacturer’s recommended fireproof mortar was ever purchased or used in the fireplace for
the purpose of sealing gaps between the Isokern surface and the framing materials surrounding it.
Mr. Zbranek testified that he was aware that the combustible OSB was within 8 inches of the
fireplace opening and that he specifically inspected the area above the firebox at the time of
construction because he knew how important it was to not have a “false chimney” (gaps through
which hot flue gases could escape other than through the intended chimney). He admitted that use
of the combustible materials this close to the firebox opening was in violation of the Isokern’s
installation instructions as well as applicable building codes and testified that, nonetheless, he
permitted such construction because he believed that, since stucco is not combustible, it was
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acceptable to use that material to cover the OSB and seal around the firebox unit rather than the
recommended fireproof mortar. There was also evidence that Zbranek was informed on two separate
occasions by representatives of Fireplace Systems of the importance of following their recommended
framing instructions, which included keeping combustible materials farther than 8 inches away from
the firebox opening and sealing gaps between the firebox and the framing materials with the
fireproof mortar, and that Zbranek did not provide the Isokern installation manual to the individuals
who re-framed the fireplace.
In light of this evidence of Zbranek’s exercise of control over the construction of the
fireplace, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that Zbranek owed a legal duty
to the Allbaughs. We overrule Zbranek’s third issue.
Waiver clause in construction contract
In its first issue, Zbranek contends that the Allbaughs’ claims are barred by a
waiver-of-subrogation clause in the contract between Zbranek and Bella Cima for the construction
of the home.3 However, it is undisputed that the Allbaughs obtained their own insurance and
were not parties to the construction contract. See Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prime Tempus, Inc.,
No. 03-06-00236-CV, 2009 WL 2902713, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (basic tenet of contract law dictates that contract may not bind non-parties to its terms).
Nonetheless, Zbranek argues that the Allbaughs are either “successors” or “assignees” of Bella Cima,
3
The clause provides: “[Bella Cima] and [Zbranek] waive all rights against each other and
any of their Subcontractors, sub-Subcontractors, agents and employees, each of the other, for damages
caused by fire or other causes of loss to the extent covered by property or casualty insurance obtained
by either Owner or Builder.”
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whom the contract also binds: “[Bella Cima] and [Zbranek] each binds himself or herself, successors,
assigns and legal representatives to the other party and to the successors, assigns and legal
representatives of the other party in all matters related to this contract.” We reject this contention,
as well as Zbranek’s contention that the Allbaughs are third-party beneficiaries of the construction
contract and are subject to its terms under the direct-benefits-estoppel doctrine.4
There is no evidence that the Allbaughs, as lessees of Bella Cima, are its legal
successors or assigns. The term “successor” means, in the context of a business entity, another
entity that becomes invested with the rights and assumes the burdens of the first entity by either
amalgamation, consolidation, or duly authorized legal succession. See Enchanted Estates Cmty.
Ass’n v. Timberlake Improvement Dist., 832 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ); see also Farm & Home Sav. Ass’n v. Strauss, 671 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1984, no writ) (where sales contract bound parties and their successors and assigns, term successor
was “term of art which does not encompass third party purchasers” of the property). The Allbaughs
are not a business entity and did not assume the legal burdens of Bella Cima through any recognized
successor procedure. As for Zbranek’s “assignment” argument, the construction contract provided
that neither party had the right to assign the contract without the written consent of the other. There
is no evidence that Bella Cima assigned the construction contract to the Allbaughs or that Zbranek
gave written consent to Bella Cima to assign the contract to them.
4
Piggybacking on its waiver-clause argument, Zbranek makes the bare assertion (unsupported
by any relevant legal authority) that the Allbaughs, as lessees, “could not have had greater rights than
their lessor.” We will not address this argument because we have already determined that a builder
may owe a duty to non-parties to a construction contract, and Zbranek has cited no authority
supporting its contention that this general duty should not apply to lessees.
8
Nor are the Allbaughs third-party beneficiaries of the construction contract. Texas
courts make presumptions against third-party-beneficiary contracts, and an individual will be deemed
a third-party beneficiary only if the contract clearly and fully expresses an intent to confer a direct
benefit to the third party. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Texas Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652
(Tex. 1999) (third-party-beneficiary status may not be created by implication); Edwards v. Schuh,
5 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (“A contract will not be interpreted as having
been made for a third party’s benefit unless that was clearly the intention of the contracting parties.”).
Even the fact that a person is directly affected by the parties’ conduct does not, without more, make
him a third-party beneficiary; the parties must have entered into the contract directly for the third
party’s benefit. See Black + Vernooy, 346 S.W.3d at 884. There is no evidence that the Allbaughs
were intended beneficiaries of the construction contract.
Finally, Zbranek’s attempt to bring the Allbaughs’ claims under the construction
contract’s waiver-of-subrogation clause by application of the direct-benefits-estoppel doctrine fails.
We first note that the only Texas cases to apply the doctrine have been in the context of arbitration,
which is not an issue in this case. E.g., Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. 2013) (doctrine
applies to estop non-signatory from simultaneously attempting to avoid contract’s burdens, such
as obligation to arbitrate disputes, and seeking to obtain its benefits); In re Weekley Homes, 180
S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (same); see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,
166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (if valid arbitration agreement exists, doubts
regarding agreement’s scope are resolved in favor of arbitration). Furthermore, the equitable doctrine
does not apply when liability under a plaintiff’s claim arises from general obligations imposed by
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state law, including torts and other common-law duties. See In re Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.,
293 S.W.3d 182, 184 n.2 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re Kellogg Brown, 166 S.W.3d at 739-40
(if non-signatory’s claims can stand independently of underlying contract, then arbitration should
not be compelled under theory).
Through their negligence claims, the Allbaughs were not seeking to enforce the
construction contract or obtain any benefits that stemmed directly from its terms. See In re Kellogg
Brown, 166 S.W.3d at 740. Rather, as we have already discussed, Zbranek owed the Allbaughs a
duty to use reasonable care in the construction of the fireplace, and their claim of breach of that
duty is independent of the underlying contract. See Chapman, 445 S.W.3d at 718-19 (holding that
plumbing subcontractor’s duty to not damage owner’s home while performing its contract with
builder was independent of its obligation under said contract). We overrule Zbranek’s first issue.
“As is” clause in lease
Zbranek next attempts to escape liability by relying on an “as is” clause in the lease
entered into between Bella Cima and the Allbaughs.5 However, Zbranek is not a party to the lease
and, as a general rule, may not enforce its terms. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crow Design Ctrs.,
148 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding lessee’s suit against third party for
negligent maintenance of air-conditioning system was not barred by waiver-of-subrogation clause
in lease between lessee and landlord). Furthermore, Zbranek has not cited any applicable authority
supporting its argument that an “as is” clause in a lease precludes a lessee’s causes of action against
5
The lease provided that “Landlord makes no express or implied warranties as to the
Property’s condition. Tenant has inspected the Property and accepts it AS IS.”
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the manufacturer or builder of the thing leased. Cf. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows,
434 S.W.3d 132, 142 (Tex. 2014) (noting that manufacturers do not escape liability merely because
good has transferred owners, and purchaser of used good may rely on implied warranty created at
time of first sale, while leaving open question of whether as-is clause in sales contract would limit
secondary buyer’s recourse against manufacturer because appellant had not preserved issue for
review); New Tex. Auto Auction Servs., LP v. Gomez De Hernandez, 249 S.W.3d 400, 406-07 (Tex.
2008) (as-is clause in auctioneer’s contract to sell car precluded claim against auctioneer by
purchaser, but court did not address purchaser’s action against manufacturer, as that claim had
been severed). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the as-is clause in the lease
between the Allbaughs and Bella Cima did not foreclose Zbranek’s liability, and we overrule
Zbranek’s second issue.
Evidence of causation
In its fourth issue, Zbranek asserts that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to show that defective installation of the fireplace caused the fire damaging the home and
the Allbaughs’ property. Specifically, it claims that there was an “analytical gap” in the Allbaughs’
expert’s testimony because it did not answer the “crucial” question of whether and how, exactly,
sufficient heat had transferred from the original controlled fire in the fireplace to the combustible
framing materials so as to cause them to ignite. We initially note that causation is a question of fact
for the jury, which has broad latitude to infer proximate cause from the evidence and circumstances
surrounding an event. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank v. Beeson, 835 S.W.2d
689, 698 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied); Figure World, Inc. v. Farley, 680 S.W.2d 33, 36
11
(Tex. App.—Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). While Zbranek correctly notes that the Allbaughs’ experts
did not testify about what the actual temperatures were at the specific locations where they opined
the fire had likely started, there was nonetheless sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-
finder could infer that faulty construction of the fireplace caused the home fire.
There was no dispute among the parties about the origin of the fire (it began in the
outdoor fireplace), and there was competent testimony from the Allbaughs’ experts ruling out all
other possible causes (human, natural, electrical, natural gas) of ignition of the combustible materials
located outside of the fireproof Isokern firebox. There was evidence of the temperature at which a
wood fire burns (1880° F), the auto-ignition temperature of OSB (400-500° F), and the auto-ignition
temperature of the paper backing on the OSB (400° F). There was expert testimony that stucco is
a good conductor of heat and other evidence that there may have been a “false chimney” (the so-
called “gaps” between the firebox and the stucco and framing material) before the fire started, into
which hot flue gases (at as much as 800-966° F) may have escaped. While the Allbaughs’ experts
may not have connected every single dot for the jury as to how, exactly, the fire from earlier in the
evening actually caused combustible material outside of the firebox to ignite, the fact that such
occurrence transpired was a reasonable inference based on all the evidence in favor of the Allbaughs.
On this record, the jury was free to infer that faulty construction of the fireplace caused the fire to
ignite combustible materials located outside of the firebox and then spread to the rest of the
residence. The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding on causation,
and we accordingly overrule Zbranek’s fourth issue.
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Evidence of damages
Zbranek next complains that (1) the evidence of the Allbaughs’ damages is legally
and factually insufficient to support the jury’s award because all of the evidence on this issue went
to replacement value rather than actual value and (2) the Allbaughs’ expert witness on the issue
was not qualified. See Crisp v. Security Nat’l Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. 1963) (proper
measure of damages for damaged or lost personal property is actual worth or value to owner at time
of injury). While the Allbaughs did need to present evidence of the actual value of their damaged
and lost personal property, we conclude that their evidence of its replacement value is sufficient, as
replacement value is one of the factors that fact-finders may consider in making the determination
of actual value. See id. (fact-finders may consider original cost; cost of replacement; opinions of
qualified witnesses, including owner; and use to which property was put in making actual-value
determination). Zbranek has cited no authority for the proposition that the plaintiff must present
evidence on all of these factors or on any more than one of them, and we decline to broaden the
holding of Crisp to so require. Also, the Allbaughs did cursorily testify about the condition of their
property (the items were in “great condition”) and that they planned to use the items for a long time
and pass them down to their children and grandchildren. Furthermore, the jury awarded considerably
less for the actual value of the Allbaughs’ property ($651,396.26) than the total amount of actual-
value damages to which the Allbaughs testified ($1,345,335.68), which difference may be explained
by the jury’s taking into account factors such as depreciation of the property (the Allbaughs’ damages
expert testified that replacement-value estimates do not take into account depreciation, age, or
condition). In determining damages, the jury has discretion to award damages within the range of
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evidence presented at trial. See Gulf States Utils. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. 2002) (also
noting that “[i]t is well settled that a property owner may opine about the property’s value”).
We also reject Zbranek’s argument that the Allbaughs’ damages expert was not
qualified, as there was sufficient demonstration in the record that her years of experience in making
similar valuations qualified her. See Tex. R. Evid. 702 (expert may be qualified by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education). The expert had worked for a company that specializes in
the valuation of property for over eight years, had been a senior project manager for about five
years, and had worked on over one hundred property-loss assessments and inventories in her career.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony. See Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 649-50 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (we
review decision that expert is qualified for abuse of discretion and must uphold evidentiary ruling
if there is any legitimate basis in record to support it). We overrule Zbranek’s fifth issue.
Exclusion of expert’s demonstration test
In its final issue, Zbranek contends that the trial court erred in excluding its expert
witness’s demonstration test attempting to show that the temperatures within the fireplace were
too low to have caused the fire. The Allbaughs respond that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in excluding the test because it was not conducted under “substantially similar” conditions
as the actual occurrence. See Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 281-82
(Tex. 1964) (although conditions need not be identical, there must be substantial similarity between
conditions existing at time of occurrence giving rise to litigation and those in existence at time
experiment is conducted for demonstration purposes for experiment to be admissible); Lincoln v.
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Clark Freight Lines, Inc., 285 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“When
an experiment is conducted out-of-court and in the absence of opposing counsel, there must be a
substantial similarity between the conditions existing at the time of the experiment and the actual
event that is the subject of litigation.”).
In considering whether to admit the test, the trial court considered numerous
depositions, oral argument, and other materials and determined that Zbranek’s fireplace mock-up
and the fire built within it were not substantially similar, “given the huge number of variables at play
in this situation.” Dissimilarities in construction of the two fireplaces included the use of stucco
metal lath without a paper backing in the mock-up fireplace (while the actual fireplace’s stucco lath
had paper backing); the gap between the OSB and stucco framing material in the mock-up fireplace
was sealed with noncombustible mortar, while the gap in the actual fireplace either was unsealed or
was sealed with stucco instead of mortar; the mock-up fireplace was not “cured” (did not sit unused
for a prescribed period of time), while the actual fireplace had cured for over two years; and the
mock-up fireplace was a stand-alone structure in a parking lot, while the actual fireplace was part
of a covered patio connected to the residence. Dissimilarities in conditions included: the ambient
air, outside temperatures, humidity, and the length during which the respective fires burned. On this
record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Zbranek’s expert’s
proffered demonstration test, see Lincoln, 285 S.W.3d at 84, and accordingly overrule Zbranek’s
sixth issue.
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CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
David Puryear, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Field
Affirmed
Filed: November 3, 2015
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