Roderick Dixon v. State ( 2016 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NOS. 02-14-00379-CR
    02-14-00380-CR
    02-14-00381-CR
    02-14-00382-CR
    RODERICK DIXON                                                  APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                    STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NOS. 1352360D, 1352834D, 1352836D, 1376529W
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    Appellant Roderick Dixon entered open guilty pleas to two counts of
    robbery causing bodily injury and to two counts of aggravated robbery with a
    deadly weapon, each alleged in a separate cause.       The trial court found
    Appellant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement on
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    both counts of robbery and on one count of aggravated robbery and to twenty
    years’ confinement on the second count of aggravated robbery, with all
    sentences to run concurrently. In two points, Appellant argues that the trial court
    abused its discretion by admitting photographs and a video depicting extraneous
    offenses into evidence at the punishment phase of the trial. We affirm.
    Background
    On September 14, 2013, J.H. met with a potential buyer of a PlayStation 3
    (PS3) that he had listed for sale on Craigslist. When J.H. placed the PS3 on the
    hood of the potential buyer’s car, the buyer said, “It’s been a long day,” and three
    males, one of whom was Appellant, attacked J.H. One of the attackers, who was
    not Appellant, hit J.H. multiple times in the head. The three males took the PS3
    and drove away.      The lacerations from the attack on J.H.’s face and head
    required stitches.
    On December 1, 2013, J.C. and his son, R.C., met with Tori Bryant, a
    potential buyer of a PlayStation 4 (PS4) they had advertised on Craigslist. While
    Bryant distracted them, Appellant, Jordan Robinson, and Manuel Torres attacked
    J.C. Appellant hit J.C. on the head with a bat while one of the other assailants
    took the PS4 and several videogames from J.C. Appellant swung the bat at R.C.
    but missed. Appellant, Robinson, and Torres fled. As a result of the attack, J.C.
    lost a large amount of blood from a wound on his forehead.
    Appellant, Robinson, Torres, and Gemma Perez went together to pawn the
    stolen PS4. Appellant pawned the PS4, along with four of the games that were
    2
    reported stolen in the robbery.        A detective with the Fort Worth Police
    Department located the PS4 at the pawn shop. Appellant’s name was on the
    pawn ticket, and the pawn shop clerk later identified Appellant in a lineup.
    After the December 1 robbery, Appellant, Robinson, Torres, and Perez
    purchased a Taser and a rubber pellet gun. On December 4, 2013, J.G. and his
    girlfriend met with a potential buyer of a PS4 he had posted for sale on Craigslist.
    Perez drove Appellant, Torres, Robinson, and Bryant to and from the meeting in
    Perez’s sister’s car. J.G. parked next to their vehicle in a mall parking lot, placed
    the PS4 on the car’s hood, and discussed the transaction with Perez. One of the
    males from Perez’s car approached J.G. from behind; tased him on his neck;
    yelled, “You’re getting jacked”; mentioned having a gun; and tased J.G. on his
    left hand. Torres pointed the pellet gun at J.G. and demanded the PS4. Torres
    yelled to Appellant and Robinson to “[g]et the knife.” J.G. surrendered the PS4,
    and the assailants fled in Perez’s sister’s car. J.G. and his girlfriend pursued
    them in his vehicle and called 911. They were able to get the license plate
    number on Perez’s sister’s car. After the 911 dispatcher told J.G. to discontinue
    his pursuit, they returned to the mall, where they met with police officers and
    gave them the license plate number.          Mall surveillance video captured the
    robbery.   The license plate on Perez’s sister’s car belonged to a vehicle
    registered to Perez’s mother.
    On December 5, 2013, the detective who located the PS4 at the pawn
    shop determined Appellant had outstanding warrants and went to the apartment
    3
    where Appellant was living at the time.         S.M.—who identified herself as
    Appellant’s ex-girlfriend2—was at the apartment, but Appellant was not.        The
    detective showed S.M. the pawn shop surveillance video, and she identified
    Appellant as the person pawning the PS4.          She also identified Bryant and
    Robinson.
    Appellant was arrested at the apartment on December 12, 2013. During a
    consensual search of the apartment, the detective discovered a Taser, along with
    the cap Appellant was wearing when he pawned the PS4. Appellant waived his
    rights and confessed to committing the three robberies, striking J.C. with a
    baseball bat, pawning J.C.’s PS4, and purchasing the pellet gun and Taser with
    Robinson, Torres, and Perez.       The detective obtained a warrant to search
    Appellant’s car and found the bat and its sales receipt inside. Appellant stated
    he was under the influence of marijuana at the time he committed the robberies
    and that he needed the money for food and shelter.
    At the punishment phase of the trial, the trial court admitted into evidence a
    Presentence Investigation Report, which contained, among other things, the
    events set forth above, and heard testimony from the detective, Appellant’s
    stepmother, his father, and S.M. Over Appellant’s relevance objection, the trial
    court admitted into evidence a YouTube video posted on Bryant’s YouTube
    channel and screenshots of Bryant’s YouTube profile page with links to videos
    2
    S.M. testified during the punishment phase of the trial that she and
    Appellant considered themselves boyfriend and girlfriend.
    4
    that she had either commented on or uploaded, which included a link to the
    YouTube video.3 The video showed Appellant, Robinson, Bryant, Randal Bracy,4
    and S.M. having what S.M. described as a “little kick back” in a hotel room, which
    involved “studio time” and smoking and drinking. Appellant was smoking what
    appeared to be “some sort of hand-rolled item,” and the parties were discussing
    drinking codeine, which the detective testified was an illegal drink made by
    “mix[ing] 25 times the amount of codeine cough syrup in with . . . Sprite,
    Mountain Dew, et cetera, to kind of give them a high.” They were also rapping
    and using racial slurs.   The trial court also admitted a screenshot of S.M.’s
    Facebook cover photo in which Appellant appeared to be displaying gang colors
    and flashing a gang sign.5
    Standard of Review
    We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard.    Martinez v. State, 
    327 S.W.3d 727
    , 736 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2966
    (2011); De La Paz v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 336
    , 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As long as the trial court’s ruling falls
    3
    The State explained to the trial court that the purpose of these
    screenshots was to show “how to get to the video.”
    4
    The detective identified Appellant, Robinson, Bryant, and Bracy in the
    video. Bracy was one of the participants in the September 2013 robbery. Bracy,
    Bryant, Perez, Robinson, and Torres were charged for their participation in the
    robberies.
    5
    S.M. testified that Appellant claimed to be part of the Tree Top gang.
    5
    within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm the trial court’s
    decision. 
    Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736
    ; Moses v. State, 
    105 S.W.3d 622
    , 627
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
    Analysis
    In a consolidated argument, Appellant contends the trial court abused its
    discretion by admitting over his relevance objections the screenshots and the
    video because they were not taken in temporal proximity to the offenses and their
    minimal probity, if any, was substantially outweighed by their unfair prejudice.
    See Tex. R. Evid. 401, 403.
    To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
    trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
    for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
    objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Everitt v. State, 
    407 S.W.3d 259
    , 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Sanchez v. State, 
    418 S.W.3d 302
    , 306
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Further, the trial court must have ruled
    on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the
    complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R.
    App. P. 33.1(a)(2); 
    Everitt, 407 S.W.3d at 263
    . A reviewing court should not
    address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v.
    State, 
    305 S.W.3d 530
    , 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Preservation of error is a
    systemic requirement that this court should review on its own motion. Reynolds
    6
    v. State, 
    423 S.W.3d 377
    , 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Gipson v. State, 
    383 S.W.3d 152
    , 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
    When the State offered into evidence a screenshot of S.M.’s Facebook
    cover photo in which Appellant appeared to be displaying gang colors and
    flashing a gang sign, the trial court asked Appellant if he had any objection to the
    exhibit. Appellant stated that he did not. Because Appellant did not object to the
    admission of the Facebook cover photo, he has forfeited any complaint that the
    trial court abused its discretion in admitting it into evidence. See Tex. R. App. P.
    33.1(a)(1); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a).
    As to the YouTube evidence, the State argues that Appellant’s trial
    objection did not preserve his arguments under rule 403. Appellant asserts on
    appeal that the probative value of the screenshots of Bryant’s YouTube channel
    and the video was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See Tex. R.
    Evid. 403. But Appellant only objected to the admission of the screenshots and
    the video on relevancy grounds. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. His trial objection did
    not alert the trial court that he was complaining that their prejudicial effect
    outweighed their probative value. See Bekendam v. State, 
    441 S.W.3d 295
    , 300
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The complaining party must [object] . . . clearly enough
    for the judge to understand and at a time when the trial court is in a position to do
    something about it. . . . We are not hyper-technical . . . but the point of error on
    appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”). Accordingly, Appellant
    has forfeited his complaint that the probative value of the screenshots and the
    7
    video was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. See Sony v. State, 
    307 S.W.3d 348
    , 355–56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (holding relevance
    objection to photographs at trial did not preserve appellate argument based on
    rule 403); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a).
    We now turn to Appellant’s argument that the video and the screenshots of
    Bryant’s YouTube channel were not relevant because “they could not be
    identified to be taken in temporal proximity to the offenses.”          The detective
    testified that he did not know when the video was made and that he did not know
    if the video was associated with the robbery.         S.M. testified that the video
    “happened last year, but it was before any of these robberies occurred.” The
    punishment trial took place on September 5, 2014, and the robberies occurred in
    September and December 2013.            Thus, the video was made, at most,
    approximately nine months before the first robbery.
    Article 37.07, section 3(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment phase of a non-
    capital case. Sims v. State, 
    273 S.W.3d 291
    , 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (West Supp. 2015). Article 37.07,
    section 3(a)(1) provides that
    evidence may be offered by the [S]tate and the defendant as to any
    matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not
    limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general
    reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the
    circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and . . . any
    other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown
    beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by
    8
    the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible,
    regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally
    convicted of the crime or act.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). The definition of “relevant” as
    stated in rule 401 does not readily apply to article 37.07. 
    Sims, 273 S.W.3d at 295
    ; see Hayden v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 549
    , 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
    (“Borrowing from the definition of ‘relevant’ in Texas Rule of Evidence 401 is of
    little avail because the factfinder’s role during the guilt phase is different from its
    role during the punishment phase.”). Evidence is “relevant” to a punishment
    determination if that evidence will assist the factfinder in tailoring an appropriate
    sentence in a particular case. 
    Sims, 273 S.W.3d at 295
    . When a defendant
    requests community supervision—as the Appellant did—a trial court may
    reasonably deem any character trait that pertains to the defendant’s suitability for
    community supervision to be a relevant matter for the sentencer to consider.
    
    Sims, 273 S.W.3d at 295
    .
    Section 3(a)(1) of article 37.07 places no time restriction on punishment
    evidence.    See Thompson v. State, 
    59 S.W.3d 802
    , 808–09 (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07,
    § 3(a)(1). “The provisions of article 37.07 do not address the effects, if any, of a
    statute of limitations for previous criminal offenses nor do they address the
    staleness of bad acts.” Tow v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 546
    , 547–48 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 1997, no pet.). Objections based on remoteness go to the weight, not the
    9
    admissibility, of the evidence. See 
    Thompson, 59 S.W.3d at 808
    (citing Nethery
    v. State, 
    692 S.W.2d 686
    , 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
    Here, Appellant’s conduct and lifestyle, as reflected in the YouTube video,
    were relevant in determining whether his request for community supervision
    should be granted. The time between the events reflected in the video and the
    offenses to which Appellant pled guilty did not make the video so remote as to
    have no probative value.     Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its
    discretion by admitting the YouTube video and the screenshots of Bryant’s
    YouTube channel into evidence at the punishment phase of the trial.
    For these reasons, Appellant’s two points are overruled.6
    Conclusion
    Having overruled both of Appellant’s points on appeal, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    /s/ Anne Gardner
    ANNE GARDNER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: February 18, 2016
    6
    Appellant relies heavily on Blackburn v. State, 
    820 S.W.2d 824
    (Tex.
    App.—Waco 1991, pet. ref’d). Blackburn involved the relevancy of a photograph
    admitted into evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of a trial. After
    reviewing Blackburn, we have determined that it is inapplicable to this case.
    10