Joe Henry Garcia v. State ( 2016 )


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  •                              NUMBER 13-16-00003-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    JOE HENRY GARCIA,                                                         Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the 36th District Court
    of San Patricio County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    On February 2, 2015, appellant Joe Henry Garcia pleaded guilty to the offense of
    sexual assault of a child, a second degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011
    (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.), and was placed on ten years’ deferred community
    supervision.    On November 6, 2015, the State filed a motion to revoke probation based
    on numerous violations of community supervision conditions, including that Garcia was
    found guilty of felony driving while intoxicated, see 
    id. §§ 49.04,
    49.09 (West, Westlaw
    through 2015 R.S.), and had been sentenced to ten years in prison. Garcia pleaded not
    true to the probation violations and requested a hearing before the trial court.
    After the hearing, the trial court found five of the six allegations in the State’s motion
    to revoke true and revoked Garcia’s community supervision.          It sentenced him to twenty
    years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division.
    Garcia was granted the limited right to appeal.          Garcia’s court-appointed appellate
    counsel has filed an Anders brief.     See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967).
    We affirm.
    I.      ANDERS BRIEF
    Pursuant to Anders v. California, Garcia’s court-appointed appellate counsel has
    filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record
    yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated.                     See 
    id. Counsel’s brief
    meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation
    demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.              See Stafford
    v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need
    not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds non, but it must provide
    record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal
    authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 340
    , 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus
    Christi 2003, no pet.)).
    In compliance with High v. State and Kelly v. State, Garcia’s counsel carefully
    2
    discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s
    judgment.     See High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978);
    Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).                    Garcia’s appellate
    counsel also notified this Court that he:        (1) notified Garcia that he has filed an Anders
    brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Garcia with copies of both pleadings; (3)
    informed Garcia of his rights to file a pro se response, review the record preparatory to
    filing that response,1 and seek discretionary review if we concluded that the appeal is
    frivolous; (4) provided Garcia with a copy of the appellate record; and (5) informed Garcia
    that the pro se response, if any, should identify for the Court those issues which he
    believes the Court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious
    issues.     See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; 
    Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319
    –20; 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510
    , n.3; see also In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23.                    A reasonable
    amount of time has passed, and Garcia had not filed a pro se response.
    II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW
    Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
    proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous.                 Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80 (1988). A court of appeals has two options when an Anders brief and a
    subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may:                     (1)
    determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds
    1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with
    the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather the response should identify for the
    court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether to
    case presents any meritorious issues.” In re 
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409
    n.23 (quoting Wilson v. State,
    
    955 S.W.2d 693
    , 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
    3
    no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and
    remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel.      Bledsoe v.
    State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).           If the court finds arguable
    grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed
    those issues on appeal.   
    Id. at 827.
    We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found
    nothing that would arguably support an appeal.        See 
    id. at 827–28
    (“Due to the nature
    of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the
    briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals
    met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); 
    Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509
    . There is no reversible error in the record.    Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
    court is affirmed.
    III.    MOTION TO WITHDRAW
    In accordance with Anders, Garcia’s attorney has asked this Court for permission
    to withdraw as counsel for appellant.     See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    ; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408
    n.17 (citing Jeffrey v. State, 
    903 S.W.2d 776
    , 779–80 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
    withdraw from representing the appellant.        To withdraw from representation, the
    appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
    appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw.   Within five days of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send
    a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Garcia and advise him of his right to
    4
    file a petition for discretionary review. 2            See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re
    
    Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412
    n.35; Ex Parte Owens, 
    206 S.W.3d 670
    , 673 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006).
    IV.      CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
    Delivered and filed the
    21st day of July, 2016.
    2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this
    case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
    discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review
    must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or
    timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overrule by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any
    petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R.
    APP. P. 68.3, and should comply with the requirements of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
    5