Steven Curtis Marez, Jr. v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-20-00132-CR
    ___________________________
    STEVEN CURTIS MAREZ, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    On Appeal from the 355th District Court
    Hood County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CR13859
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Wallach and Walker, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Steven Curtis Marez, Jr. appeals his conviction and 15-year sentence
    for aggravated assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02. Appellant had been placed
    on deferred adjudication community supervision, but he pleaded true to violating the
    terms of his community supervision, and the trial court adjudicated him guilty.
    On appeal from his conviction, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel
    has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion, in
    which counsel has determined, after examining the appellate record, that no arguable
    grounds for appeal exist. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744–45, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    ,
    1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders, which
    requires presenting a professional evaluation of the entire record in the case
    demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 
    Id.,
     
    87 S. Ct. at 1400
    . We
    have independently examined the record, as is our duty upon the filing of an Anders
    brief. See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Penson v.
    Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 82–83, 
    109 S. Ct. 346
    , 351 (1988).             Although provided the
    opportunity to seek a copy of the appellate record and file a pro se response, appellant
    declined to do so. Likewise, the State did not file a response to the Anders brief.
    After carefully reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we have determined
    that $15 should be deleted from the total court costs imposed in the judgment. No
    2
    statute authorizes the imposition of a $15 Motion to Proceed/Revoke Fee.1 Johnson v.
    State, 
    423 S.W.3d 385
    , 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Only statutorily authorized court
    costs may be assessed against a criminal defendant.”). We therefore modify the
    judgment and incorporated funds-withdrawal order to delete $15 from the $396 in
    court costs, so that each imposes a total of only $381 in court costs.2
    Except for this modification to the judgment and incorporated funds-
    withdrawal order, we agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and
    without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals nothing further that
    might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827–28 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 684
    , 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, modify the trial court’s judgment and
    incorporated funds-withdrawal order to impose only $381 in court costs, and affirm
    1
    After the clerk’s record containing a bill of costs showing imposition of this
    fee was filed, the trial court clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record with an amended
    bill of costs showing a balance of $0 for this fee, with no corresponding notation of
    payment (as opposed to other costs listed in the amended bill).
    2
    Counsel identified the imposition of this fee as a potential error but also
    pointed out that if it had been included in the costs imposed in the deferred
    adjudication order, appellant could not now challenge it. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 
    410 S.W.3d 313
    , 320–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Nothing in the record shows that the
    trial court included the $15 fee in the original deferred adjudication order, and the
    record shows the basis for the other costs imposed in that order as well as costs
    subsequently imposed, other than the $15 fee. Additionally, the record also shows
    that appellant had been making payments on the court costs originally imposed.
    3
    the judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bray v. State, 
    179 S.W.3d 725
    ,
    729 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    Bonnie Sudderth
    Chief Justice
    Do Not Publish
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered: October 14, 2021
    4