Lettie Michele Ferguson v. Ashley Self ( 2021 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-21-00279-CV
    ___________________________
    LETTIE MICHELE FERGUSON, Appellant
    V.
    ASHLEY SELF, Appellee
    On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
    Wise County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CV-8632
    Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Lettie Michele Ferguson appealed an order declaring that she was able
    to pay court costs and an appeal bond in her eviction case. 1
    “As a general rule, appeals may be taken only from final judgments.” Sabre Travel
    Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 
    567 S.W.3d 725
    , 730 (Tex. 2019). “Unless a statute
    authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over
    final judgments.” CMH Homes v. Perez, 
    340 S.W.3d 444
    , 447 (Tex. 2011).
    We notified Ferguson of our concern that we lack jurisdiction because the order
    being appealed was not a final judgment, see Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    ,
    195 (Tex. 2001), or an appealable interlocutory order, see generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
    Code Ann. § 51.014(a), and because the rules applicable to eviction suits did not
    otherwise provide a mechanism for appeal of such an order. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 500.3(e),
    510.9; Redlich v. Ranch, No. 02-14-00390-CV, 
    2015 WL 226038
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth Jan. 15, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see also Brown v. Hawkins, No. 05-
    16-01427-CV, 
    2018 WL 1312467
    , at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas Mar. 14, 2018, no pet.)
    (mem. op.). We warned that we could dismiss the appeal absent a response showing
    1
    Ferguson also filed in this court a “Motion to Review denial of statement of
    inability to pay.” “[I]t is a general principle of law that courts consider a motion based
    on its substance not its title.” Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 
    518 S.W.3d 594
    , 604 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.) (internal quotation omitted). Based on
    its substance, Ferguson’s motion appears to be yet another notice of appeal, and we
    construe it as such. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, No. 01-16-00972-CV, 
    2017 WL 976060
    ,
    at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 14, 2017, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
    2
    grounds for continuing the appeal. We received a response, but it did not show grounds
    for continuing the appeal.2
    We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.
    42.3(a), 43.2(f).
    Per Curiam
    Delivered: October 14, 2021
    2
    For example, Ferguson argued, “While most orders are not appealable, I feel
    this one is because certain interlocutory orders can still be challenged in appeal against
    decree on the ground that such orders are of such character as would alter the decision
    of the court on merits and hence, can be challenged.”
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-21-00279-CV

Filed Date: 10/14/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/18/2021