in the Estate of Kristy Marie Turnbow ( 2021 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00243-CV
___________________________
IN THE ESTATE OF KRISTY MARIE TURNBOW, DECEASED
On Appeal from Probate Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-PR00999-2-A
Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Shayla Turnbow Dunlap attempts to appeal a probate court order
related to the sale of estate property. But the order that Shayla challenges is not final
and appealable. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
This case concerns the issue of whether Appellee Steve Turnbow should be
compensated for his assistance to the estate of Kristy Marie Turnbow. In his motion
for compensation, Steve explained that he was a licensed realtor and that he had long
managed the entity that was the general partner of the family business, TPS Family
Limited Partnership. Steve alleged that when Dan White became the receiver for TPS,
he tapped Steve to help take care of TPS’s properties because of Steve’s knowledge of
the family’s holdings. One of the projects that Steve helped with, he explained, was
reducing taxes owed on a TPS property in Grand Prairie, Texas. Steve asked to be
compensated $8,204.97 because his efforts had yielded a tax savings of $27,349.89.
Another project that Steve claimed to have assisted with was facilitating the sale
of real property in order to pay off TPS’s loans. TPS was in “dire financial straits,” he
said, and needed to sell one or more of its properties to pay off the loans, or else it
would face foreclosure. As he explained, “Again, Steve, a licensed realtor, stepped up
to the plate with the knowledge and blessing of Dan White, the Receiver, and found a
buyer” for TPS’s Grand Prairie property at a “premium” price. Steve asked the court
to award him a realtor’s commission of $67,500 on the sale.
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According to Steve, White was not opposed to Steve’s requests for relief and in
fact believed that Steve deserved to be compensated. Steve maintained that only Shayla,
the Appellant here, was opposed to his request.
That opposition materialized when Shayla filed an objection to Steve’s motion.
In it, Shayla raised a variety of arguments against Steve’s requested relief.1
After hearing the evidence, the probate court granted Steve’s motion and
awarded him $8,204.97 for assisting with tax matters and $67,500 as a real estate
commission.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Shayla attacks the merits of the trial court’s order granting Steve
compensation. Steve responds that the order in question was not a final judgment, and
thus this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We agree with Steve.
“Except as specifically otherwise provided by law, there may be only one final
judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. 2015). Probate proceedings
present an exception to the one-final-judgment rule. De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d
575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (op. on reh’g). “[I]n such cases, multiple judgments final for
1
Shayla argued that Steve had already been determined to have no right to the
estate’s property; that any compensation to Steve should be offset for damages he had
previously visited upon the estate and its beneficiaries; and that Steve was not a licensed
real estate broker or tax consultant, such that any compensation for his services was
illegal.
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purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
To determine whether an order is final under the Texas Estates Code and
therefore appealable, we apply a two-part test:
If there is an express statute . . . declaring the phase of the probate
proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise,
if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be
considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding
raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is
interlocutory.
Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).
Sales of estate property fall under the first part of this test, because “the
legislature has created a comprehensive statutory scheme to govern this phase of the
proceedings” and its appealability. Okumu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2-09-384-CV,
2010 WL 87735, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 7, 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.
op.). See generally Tex. Est. Code Ann. §§ 356.001–.655. The statute describes the steps
involved in the sales phase of estate administration: the application to authorize sale,
an order authorizing sale, a report of sale, an inquiry by the court into the manner of
sale, and lastly a court decree approving or disapproving the report of sale. Okumu,
2010 WL 87735, at *3 (citing In re Estate of Bendtsen, 229 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, no pet.)). Under the statute, it is the last of these steps that constitutes a
final and appealable judgment: “The court’s action in approving or disapproving a
report under Section 356.551 has the effect of a final judgment.” Tex. Est. Code Ann.
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§ 356.556(c). And because the statutory scheme is comprehensive, this court 2 and other
courts3 have refused to consider appeals of sale-related orders other than decrees
approving or disapproving the report of sale.
The order that Shayla attempts to appeal is not a decree approving or
disapproving the report of sale, and it did not precede any such decree, such that it
would have merged into a final judgment. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of
Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). It is thus “more like a prelude
than a finale.” De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578. We conclude that the order in question is
not a final and appealable judgment. Because no statute authorizes an interlocutory
appeal under these circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Bella
Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020). In light of this holding, we do
not consider Shayla’s issues concerning the merits.
2
See Okumu, 2010 WL 87735, at *3.
3
See Guardianship of Landgrebe, No. 13-20-00476-CV, 2020 WL 7294613, at *3
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re
Estate of Hill, No. 09-13-00022-CV, 2013 WL 6044404, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Nov. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Estate of Bendtsen, 229 S.W.3d at 848.
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III. CONCLUSION
Since the sale and its terms must ultimately be approved by the court, any
appellate complaint is premature under the circumstances. We dismiss the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Delivered: October 21, 2021
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