Paula Sinclair v. State ( 2019 )


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  • Opinion issued January 15, 2019
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-18-00480-CR
    NO. 01-18-00481-CR
    NO. 01-18-00482-CR
    ———————————
    PAULA SINCLAIR, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 240th District Court
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. 17-DCR-079457, 17-DCR-079458, 17-DCR-079460
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Pursuant to agreements with the State, appellant, Paula Sinclair, pleaded
    guilty to three felony offenses of injury to a child, serious bodily injury.1 In each
    proceeding, the trial court accepted the plea agreement, found appellant guilty, and
    assessed her punishment at confinement for thirty-five years, with the sentences to
    run concurrently. The trial court certified that each case is a plea-bargained case and
    appellant has no right of appeal.2 Appellant filed notices of appeal, stating that she
    was appealing “from the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial.” We dismiss
    the appeals.
    In a plea-bargained case, a defendant may appeal only those matters that were
    raised by written motion and ruled on before trial or after obtaining the trial court’s
    permission to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P.
    25.2(a)(2). Here, the record in each proceeding does not reflect the trial court’s
    permission to appeal or any pretrial motions that could be appealed. And, in each
    proceeding, the trial court’s certification is included in the record and states that the
    case is a plea-bargained case and appellant has no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP.
    P. 25.2(a)(2). Each record supports the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State,
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1), (e); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001.
    2
    The trial court also certified that appellant had waived the right to appeal. A valid waiver
    of appeal—one made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently—prevents a defendant from
    appealing without the trial court’s consent. See Ex parte Broadway, 
    301 S.W.3d 694
    , 697
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Blanco v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 218
    , 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2000) (concluding waiver was valid when defendant waived right to appeal in exchange
    for recommended sentence).
    2
    
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Estrada v. State, 
    149 S.W.3d 280
    , 285 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (explaining denial of
    motion for new trial is not appealable in plea-bargained case without trial court’s
    permission). Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss these
    appeals. See Chavez v. State, 
    183 S.W.3d 675
    , 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court
    of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who
    plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited
    appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); see, e.g.,
    Zendejas v. State, No. 05-16-00848-CR, 
    2016 WL 6078569
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas Oct. 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding
    appellant’s notice of appeal was ineffective to invoke court of appeals’ jurisdiction
    over matters raised in motion for new trial when he entered into plea-bargain
    agreement and waived right to appeal).
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction.3 We dismiss all
    pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Kelly, and Hightower.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    3
    The Clerk of this Court notified appellant that the appeals were subject to dismissal for
    lack of jurisdiction unless she filed a response showing how this Court has jurisdiction over
    her appeals. Cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellant did not respond.
    3