Elizabeth Beal v. Romeo Villa and Astrid Villa ( 2021 )

NUMBER 13-20-00123-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ELIZABETH BEAL, Appellant,
v.
ROMEO VILLA AND ASTRID VILLA, Appellees.
On appeal from the 464th District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras
Pro se appellant Elizabeth Beal appeals from a judgment entered in favor of
appellees Romeo Villa and Astrid Villa following a bench trial on various claims, including
breach of warranty of title. Liberally construed, Beal’s brief on appeal appears to argue
that (1) she was improperly held liable for the Villas’ constructive eviction and (2) the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The underlying dispute in this case concerns an alleged fraudulent conveyance of
real property purportedly owned by South Texas Orion, LLC (Orion)—where Beal served
as president—to the Villas. On August 13, 2015, by and through Beal, Orion executed
and delivered a deed conveying the subject property to the Villas. The deed was a general
warranty deed providing, among other things, that
Grantor, for the Consideration and subject to the Reservations from
Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance arid [sic] Warranty, grants,
sells, and conveys to Grantee the Property, together with all and singular
the rights and appurtenances thereto in any way belonging, to have and to
hold it to Grantee and Grantee’s heirs, successors, and assigns forever.
Grantor binds Grantor and Grantor’s heirs and successors to warrant and
forever defend all and singular the Property to Grantee and Grantee’s heirs,
successors, and assigns against every person whomsoever lawfully
claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof, except as to the
Reservations from Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and
Warranty.
The Villas paid Orion $15,000 cash consideration and signed a promissory note for
$260,000 payable to Orion for the property. The promissory note was secured by a deed
of trust signed by Beal as trustee of Orion.
The Villas allege that, at the time the deed was executed and delivered to them:
(1) Beal “individually and on behalf of Orion represented . . . that Orion was the true,
lawful[,] and rightful owner of the Property in fee simple and that the Property was free
and clear from encumbrances”; (2) “Orion was not the true, lawful, or rightful owner”; (3)
“the rightful owner of the Property was Ronnie Beal, subject to a first lien deed of trust in
favor of Central Pacific Mortgage Company”; and (4) “[i]n reasonable reliance on . . .
Elizabeth Beal’s misrepresentations, [the Villas] were induced to purchase the Property.”
The Villas claimed that they only “became aware that [Beal’s] representations were false
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when[, on November 13, 2017, the Villas] were constructively evicted by notice of
substitute trustee’s sale filed by the successor in interest to Central Pacific.” According to
the Villas, given that the Beals failed to make the required payments on the property, the
property was scheduled to be sold at foreclosure. The Villas claimed that they “yielded to
the superior title holder’s assertion of title, and also stopped payment to [Beal] on the
Promissory Note attached to the deed of trust.”
On April 4, 2018, the Villas filed suit against Beal, Ronnie, 1 and Orion, alleging
causes of action for statutory fraud, common law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, breach
of warranty of title, breach of covenant of seisin, breach of covenant against
encumbrances, and unjust enrichment. Beal filed a counterclaim against the Villas for
“breach of contract, unjust enrichment, negligence, gross negligence, money fraud and
received [sic], common law fraud, constructive fraud[,] and extortion.”
A bench trial commenced on December 4, 2019. On December 11, 2019, the trial
court entered final judgment in favor of the Villas, noting, among other things, that:
Because a jury was waived by agreement of the parties, the Court decided
all fact questions.
....
The Court has considered the pleadings and official records on file in this
cause, the evidence, and the arguments of counsel and is of the opinion
that judgment should be rendered for [the Villas] on their claims, and that
. . . Elizabeth Beal and South Texas Orion, LLC take nothing as to their
claims.
The trial court awarded $84,273.74 in actual damages, $28,000 in exemplary damages,
and $16,535.22 in attorney’s fees, to be recovered by the Villas from Beal and Orion
1 Ronnie was nonsuited during litigation.
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jointly and severally. The trial court also rescinded “the transaction that is the subject to
this proceeding . . . namely the Note dated August 13, 2015[,] between Romeo & Astrid
Villa and South Texas Orion, LLC[.]”
Beal filed a motion for new trial on January 29, 2020, which the trial court denied
the next day. On February 28, 2020, Beal filed her notice of appeal.
II. JURISDICTION
By her second issue on appeal, which we address first, Beal argues that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because “[o]nly a justice of the [p]eace has
[j]urisdiction on possession matters.”
We review de novo whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a
case. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. See
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993).
The Texas Constitution provides that “[j]ustice of the peace courts shall have
original jurisdiction in criminal matters of misdemeanor cases punishable by fine only,
exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred
dollars or less, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 19. Such other jurisdiction includes “original jurisdiction of . . . civil matters in which
exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district or county court and in which the amount in
controversy is not more than $10,000, exclusive of interest.”2 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 27.031(a)(1). Justice courts have jurisdiction over “cases of forcible entry and detainer,”
2 Section 27.031 of the government code was amended effective September 20, 2020, to increase
the amount in controversy limit to $20,000. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031. This suit was filed prior to
the amendment.
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but not of “a suit for trial of title to land.” Id. § 27.031(a)(2), (b)(4).
A district court’s jurisdiction “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original
jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive,
appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by [the Texas] Constitution or other
law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. “A
district court has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in controversy
is more than $500, exclusive of interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.007(b).
As evident throughout her brief on appeal, Beal seems to confuse the causes of
action brought against her in the underlying lawsuit. While the Villas argued that they
were constructively evicted from the property, given the filing of a notice of substitute
trustee’s sale, they did not sue Beal for constructive eviction or possession. As noted,
their causes of action are for statutory fraud, common law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure,
breach of warranty of title, breach of covenant of seisin, breach of covenant against
encumbrances, and unjust enrichment. None of the Villas’ causes of action raises a claim
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice courts. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 19; TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031. Moreover, the Villas sought “monetary relief over $200,000.00
but not more than $1,000,000.00.” Such an amount exceeds the maximum amount in
controversy for purposes of a justice court’s jurisdiction and falls within the jurisdiction of
district courts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.007, 27.031; see also TEX. CONST. art. V,
§§ 8, 19.
Accordingly, jurisdiction was proper in the 464th District Court. We, thus, overrule
Beal’s second issue on appeal.
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III. CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
Beal states her first issue on appeal as follows: “Did the trial court err by ignoring
that ‘constructive eviction’ is an illegal act and not allowed by law and no where [sic] in
the pleading nor in the facts did Appellees mention that Appellant was the one who had
constructively evicted Appellees?” Beal continues, “[T]here is no evidence to even hint
that Appellant did any act to interfere with Appellees’ possession and / or ownership of
the property.” See Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship v. Porter, Rogers, Dahlman & Gordon,
P.C., 406 S.W.3d 186, 204 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. denied)
(listing the essential elements of constructive eviction as: (1) an intention on the part of
the landlord that the tenant shall no longer enjoy the premises; (2) a material act by the
landlord that substantially interferes with the tenant’s intended use and enjoyment of the
premises; (3) the act permanently deprives the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the
premises; and (4) the tenant abandons the premises within a reasonable time after the
commission of the act). It is not clear exactly what Beal is arguing, given that she was not
sued for constructive eviction. It is also unclear whether Beal believes there was
insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling or if the trial court erred in its
application of the relevant law. Regardless, as correctly stated in the Villas’ brief on
appeal, Beal “failed to file a record sufficient enough to enable this Court to determine the
issue she presented.”
“We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure.” Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853,
854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d
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181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978)). Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines
the requirements of an appellant’s brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. An appellant’s brief
“must contain a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made” and “a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.” Id. R. 38.1(h), (i). An appellate court has no duty to brief
issues for an appellant. See Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2006, no pet.). The failure to provide appropriate record citations or a substantive analysis
waives an appellate issue. See WorldPeace v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d
451, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
Moreover, an appellate court “should not address the merits of an issue if it has
not been preserved for appeal.” In re E.R.C., 496 S.W.3d 270, 277 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record
must reflect that a “complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection,
or motion that . . . stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from
the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint[,]”
and that the trial court ruled or refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion. TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The “record” for purposes of an appeal “consists of the clerk’s record
and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter’s record.” Id. R. 34.1. “At or before the time
for perfecting the appeal, the appellant must request in writing that the official reporter
prepare the reporter’s record.” Id. R. 34.6(b)(1). “The burden of providing a record
showing error requiring reversal is on the appellant.” Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc.
v. R&G Produce Co., 443 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014,
no pet.). “We must presume that any evidence that the appellant failed to designate for
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the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. (citing Willms v. Americas
Tire Co., 190 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)).
Beal’s first issue on appeal is unclear, does not cite to the record or relevant
authority, and therefore, is insufficiently briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; WorldPeace,
183 S.W.3d at 466. Accordingly, Beal’s first issue is waived on appeal. See WorldPeace,
183 S.W.3d at 466. However, even assuming that Beal adequately briefed her first issue
on appeal, she failed to preserve the issue for appeal at trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
On April 14, 2020, by letter, the Clerk of this Court notified Beal that the reporter’s
record had not been filed and stated “that unless this defect is cured within ten days from
the date of this letter, the Court will consider and decide those issues or points that do not
require a reporter’s record for a decision.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(a)(1), (c) (procedures
for instances when appellant fails to file record). Beal made no subsequent arrangements
to provide this Court with a reporter’s record. Accordingly, our analysis of Beal’s first issue
is limited to the information in the clerk’s record.
The clerk’s record lacks any indication that Beal properly preserved any issue of
constructive eviction for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. The only mention of
constructive eviction in her pleading is raised as a special exception and notes as follows:
4. Defendant presents her special exception in Plaintiff’s Paragraph 19
in that it speaks of constructive eviction, constructive eviction is not
legal, therefore, Plaintiffs should be suing the evictors.
In truth and in fact, Plaintiffs obtained profits from the property. A
notice of Substitute Trustee’s sale does not evict anyone that is an
illegal eviction.
Texas Property Code, chapter 51, states the requirements for
foreclosure and chapter 24 states the requirements for evictions
what Plaintiffs are describing are illegal acts. Defendant can not [sic]
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be responsible for someone else’s illegal acts.
However, there is no indication in the clerk’s record that the trial court ruled on Beal’s
special exception or that Beal objected to the trial court’s failure to rule on her special
exception. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Consequently, Beal failed to preserve the issue for
appeal.
We overrule Beal’s first issue on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed on the
10th day of November, 2021.
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