in the Interest of F.H. and I.H., Children ( 2021 )


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  •                In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-21-00190-CV
    ___________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF F.H. AND I.H., CHILDREN
    On Appeal from the 355th District Court
    Hood County, Texas
    Trial Court No. P2020008
    Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed a
    petition to terminate the parent–child relationships between S.B. (Mother) and R.H.
    (Father) and their children F.H. and I.H.1 After conducting a final hearing, the trial
    court granted the petition, terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under
    Family Code Section 161.001(b) based on, among other grounds, endangerment and
    the children’s best interests. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)–(2). The trial
    court awarded permanent managing conservatorship of both children to the
    Department. Mother timely appealed from the trial court’s order of termination.2
    Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that her appeal
    is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744–45, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 1400 (1967);
    see also In re K.M., 
    98 S.W.3d 774
    , 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
    (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief
    meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record
    and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.
    Mother was provided with the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record
    1
    In a termination-of-parental-rights case, we use aliases for the names of the
    children and their parents. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002
    (d); Tex. R. App.
    P. 9.8(b)(2).
    2
    Father did not appeal the trial court’s termination of his parental rights.
    2
    and to file a pro se response, and she did so, but her pro se response presents no
    arguable appellate grounds. The Department has declined to file a response.
    When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate
    record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-
    00219-CV, 
    2018 WL 4496240
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)
    (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays
    v. State, 
    904 S.W.2d 920
    , 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also
    consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-
    CV, 
    2018 WL 3288591
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied)
    (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.
    proceeding).
    We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, Mother’s pro se response, and the
    appellate record. Finding no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is
    without merit.3 See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re
    D.D., 
    279 S.W.3d 849
    , 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we
    affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to F.H. and I.H.
    3
    Mother’s counsel set out five potential issues in the Anders brief, challenging
    the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights under the endangering-
    environment, court-order, and best-interest grounds, see 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (O), (2), and raising ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of
    a jury trial. Mother’s pro se response included these last two issues, as well as
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence and jurisdictional complaints. After a full review of these
    potential issues and the record, we agree with counsel that there is no arguable basis
    on which to reverse the trial court’s judgment.
    3
    Counsel filed a motion to withdraw, but the record does not show good cause
    for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See
    In re P.M., 
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27–28 (Tex. 2016); In re C.J., 
    501 S.W.3d 254
    , 255 (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly, counsel remains appointed in
    this appeal through proceedings in the supreme court unless otherwise relieved from
    his duties for good cause in accordance with Family Code Section 107.016. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016
    ; P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.
    /s/ Dana Womack
    Dana Womack
    Justice
    Delivered: November 10, 2021
    4