Danny Ray Tate v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                       NO. 12-20-00279-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    DANNY RAY TATE,                                       §       APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                                    §       JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE                                              §       SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Danny Ray Tate appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In
    his sole issue, Appellant argues that the “time payment” fee assessed in the trial court’s bill of
    costs is unconstitutional. We modify the bill of costs and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, i.e.,
    he used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a box cutter, during the commission of or immediate flight
    from the offense, a second-degree felony. 1
    Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to the offense and
    the allegation that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.
    Appellant signed various documents in connection with his guilty plea, including an agreed
    punishment recommendation, and a stipulation of evidence in which he judicially confessed to
    the offense alleged in the indictment, admitted that he committed each and every allegation
    alleged in the complaint, and admitted he was guilty as charged. The trial court accepted
    Appellant’s plea, found the evidence substantiated his guilty plea, deferred proceedings without
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b) (West Supp. 2021).
    entering an adjudication of guilt, and ordered that Appellant be placed on deferred adjudication
    community supervision for seven years.
    Later, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt, alleging that he violated the
    terms of his community supervision in several respects. At the hearing on the State’s motion,
    Appellant pleaded “true” to some of the State’s allegations, including that he used synthetic
    cannabinoids, failed to report and submit to a random urinalysis, failed to pay various
    community supervision fees, and failed to perform his community service hours and complete an
    anger management course. Appellant pleaded “not true” to the remainder of the allegations that
    he escaped custody while causing bodily injury and failed to attend substance abuse support
    group meetings. After the hearing, the trial court found all the allegations in the State’s motion
    to be true, granted the motion, revoked Appellant’s deferred adjudication community
    supervision, and adjudicated Appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The
    trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at fifteen years of imprisonment and ordered him to
    pay any unpaid court costs. This appeal followed.
    COURT COSTS
    In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when assessing in its bill of
    costs a “time payment” fee previously authorized by Texas Local Government Code Section
    133.103. 2
    The trial court’s earlier order placing Appellant on deferred adjudication supervision
    assessed court costs in the amount of $279.00. The conditions of supervision required that
    Appellant pay his court costs at $20.00 per week. There is no itemized bill of costs in the record
    pertaining to that order. Appellant neither makes an argument in his brief that he appeals court
    costs imposed in the order placing him on community supervision, nor does he assert that a time
    payment fee was assessed against him during that time period. In any event, the order placing
    2
    The Texas Legislature passed legislation, effective January 1, 2020, that transfers Texas Local
    Government Code Section 133.103 to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 102.030 and revises the statute to
    provide that all of the fees collected under the section are “to be used for the purpose of improving the collection of
    outstanding court costs, fines, reimbursement fees, or restitution or improving the efficiency of the administration of
    justice in the county or municipality.” See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., S.B. 346, § 2.54, 2019 Tex. Sess.
    Law Serv. Ch. 1352. The changes apply only to a cost, fee, or fine assessed on a conviction for an offense
    committed on or after the effective date of the Act. Id. § 5.01. Because the offense in this case was committed
    before January 1, 2020, the former law applies. See Ovalle v. State, 
    592 S.W.3d 615
    , 617 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2020), vacated, 
    2021 WL 1938672
     (Tex. Crim. App. May 12, 2021).
    2
    him on deferred adjudication is not a “judgment” authorizing a time payment fee. See Turner v.
    State, No. 05-19-01493-CR, 
    2021 WL 3083501
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 21, 2021, no
    pet.) (mem. op. on remand, not designated for publication) (holding that assessment of time
    payment fee for costs assessed in order placing defendant on deferred adjudication community
    supervision is not “judgment” as term is used by Section 133.103 authorizing time payment fee
    for unpaid costs on or after 31st day after date on which “judgment” is entered).
    Instead, Appellant challenges a time payment fee assessed in the bill of costs after the
    trial court subsequently adjudicated his guilt as part of this direct appeal from that judgment.
    The trial court, in its final judgment adjudicating his guilt entered December 11, 2020, assessed
    “$0.00” in court costs, and the judgment is unaccompanied by an “Order to Withdraw Funds.”
    However, the bill of costs includes an entry for a $25.00 time payment fee. But the total
    outstanding balance in the bill of costs, and each itemized fee including the $25.00 time payment
    fee, is $0.00. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that the pendency of an appeal
    “stops the clock” for purposes of the time payment fee. Dulin v. State, 
    620 S.W.3d 129
    , 133
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Consequently, to the extent the time payment fee was actually assessed
    against Appellant, the assessment is premature and should be struck in its entirety, without
    prejudice to its being assessed later if, more than thirty days after the issuance of the appellate
    mandate, the defendant has failed completely to pay any fine, court costs, or restitution that he
    owes. 3 
    Id.
    We are authorized on direct appeal to modify the bill of costs to remove the time payment
    fee independent of finding error in the trial court’s judgment. See Contreras v. State, No. 05-20-
    00185-CR, 
    2021 WL 5049107
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1, 2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (citing Bryant v. State, No. 10-18-00352-CR, 
    2021 WL 3191937
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Waco July 28, 2021, no pet.) (op. on remand)). Accordingly, we modify the bill
    of costs by deleting the time payment fee of $25.00.
    Finally, the bill of costs includes a paragraph stating that an additional $15.00 fee will be
    assessed if any part of the court costs is paid on or after the 31st day after the judgment assessing
    the court costs is entered. But see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.103(c), redesignated as
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030 (West Supp. 2021) (treasurer shall deposit ten percent
    3
    Because the fee assessment Appellant challenges in his first issue is premature, we do not consider the
    constitutionality of the fee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
    3
    of fees collected under this section in general fund of county or municipality for purpose of
    improving efficiency of administration of justice in county or municipality). Although the bill of
    costs states that said fee could be assessed, the record does not show that it was assessed.
    Because the record does not show that any additional time payment fee was assessed, we
    conclude that Appellant’s argument regarding the $15.00 fee is without merit, and we overrule
    that portion of his sole issue. See Kinsey v. State, No. 12-21-00014-CR, 
    2021 WL 4203101
    , at
    *2–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 15, 2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    The remainder of Appellant’s sole issue is sustained.
    DISPOSITION
    Based on the foregoing, we modify the trial court’s bill of costs by deleting the
    assessment of a time payment fee, without prejudice to its being assessed later, if, more than
    thirty days after the issuance of our mandate, Appellant fails to completely pay fines, court costs,
    or restitution he owes. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered December 8, 2021.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
    (DO NOT PUBLISH)
    4
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    DECEMBER 8, 2021
    NO. 12-20-00279-CR
    DANNY RAY TATE,
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 7th District Court
    of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-0775-19)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the bill of costs of the
    court below should be modified and as modified, affirmed.
    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the bill of
    costs of the court below be modified to delete the assessment of a time payment fee, without
    prejudice to its being assessed later, if, more than thirty days after the issuance of our mandate,
    Appellant fails to completely pay fines, court costs, or restitution he owes; the judgment of the
    trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
    Brian Hoyle, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-20-00279-CR

Filed Date: 12/8/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2021