Ezi Nnabugwu v. Enyimba Social Club, USA, Inc. ( 2019 )

Affirmed; Opinion Filed October 16, 2019.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01334-CV
EZI NNABUGWU, Appellant
V.
CHUMA COS-OKPALLA, LEONARD NWONUMAH, ANDERSON OBIAGWU,
KINGSLEY NWASURUBA, AND BONNY UWAKWEH, INDIVIDUALLY AND
DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF ENYIMBA SOCIAL CLUB U.S.A., INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-12053
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Myers
Ezi Nnabugwu brings this appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Chuma Cos-
Okpalla, Leonard Nwonumah, Anderson Obiagwu, Kingsley Nwasuruba, and Bonny Uwakweh,
individually and derivatively on behalf of Enyimba Social Club U.S.A., Inc. The trial court
awarded appellees $30,000 in actual damages, $10,000 for exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees. The trial court also ordered appellant to turn over a trademark he had applied for on behalf
of Enyimba Social Club, and the court enjoined appellant from conduct that interfered with the
club. Appellant brings five issues on appeal contending the trial court abused its discretion by (1)
awarding actual damages of $30,000, (2) awarding exemplary damages of $10,000, (3) awarding
attorney’s fees through trial of $21,075, (4) ordering appellant to turn over the trademark to the
club, and (5) granting the permanent injunction against him. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Enyimba Social Club is a for-profit Texas corporation organized as a social club for the
purpose of aiding people from the city of Aba in Nigeria by bringing them together, providing
social events and gatherings, and to “support them in times of brotherhood.” In 2014, the club had
chapters in Dallas, Austin, Houston, Atlanta, and Chicago.
The club is governed by its National Executive Council (NEC), which the club’s
constitution states is the “decision making body of the club.” The NEC consists of members
selected by each chapter with the number of members from a chapter proportionate to the size of
the chapter. The officers of the NEC include the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer,
and public relations officer. The president is the club’s principal officer. He is a signatory to the
club’s bank accounts and approves the disbursement of the club’s funds. The constitution provides
that the president has “the power to authorize expenses up to $500.00 annually without consulting
cabinet members.” Amounts “in excess of $500.00 shall require 2/3 approval of NEC members.”
The officers are elected at the club’s national convention held every three years. The terms of the
current NEC officers end at the beginning of the convention, and the officers elected during the
convention are sworn in. Only members of the NEC may vote in the election of the NEC officers.
Although the NEC is the club’s decision-making body, the constitution gives the club’s
general assembly “the sole right to reject or reverse any enactment, decision, report or
recommendation of NEC.”
The club also has a board of directors consisting of one member from each chapter. The
constitution provides that the board’s functions include acting “as the co-coordinating authority on
Enyimba affairs,” supporting the NEC and reviewing its performance, approving the budget for
NEC events, and undertaking studies and researching the urgency of matters brought to its
attention by the chapters or the NEC. The board’s members also conduct the club’s election of the
NEC officers.
This case concerns the events and their aftermath at the club’s national convention on July
12, 2014. Appellant, who was from the club’s Austin chapter, was the NEC president before the
convention, and his term and the term of the other NEC officers ended as the convention began.
Appellant was running for re-election as president against Victor Okereke from the Houston
chapter. When the votes were tallied, the secretary of the board of directors announced appellant
had twelve votes and Okereke had eleven. Appellees Cos-Okpalla, Nwonumah, and Nwasuruba,
who were from the Houston and Dallas chapters, questioned whether one of the voters from the
Austin chapter, Godfery Emeribe, was a member of the NEC. The board’s secretary, who also
was from the Austin chapter, stated that Emeribe was an NEC member. When Emeribe was asked
whether he was a member of the NEC, he admitted he was not but stated he was voting on behalf
of an NEC member who had to leave the convention. The constitution states, “No member shall
be allowed to vote or be voted for in absentia.” After Emeribe admitted he was not an NEC
member, the general assembly decided that the presidential election would be canceled. The
general assembly determined that the newly elected vice-president would be acting president until
a new presidential election could be held, and the assembly gave him and the NEC thirty days to
come up with a plan for electing a president.1 The newly elected officers were sworn in that night.
Six days later, appellant sent a letter to the board of directors stating the board should not
go to the expense of holding a new election but should declare him to be the winner of the election
at the convention. Appellant also sent letters to the officers stating he was president and that all
1
The minutes of the convention state the general assembly gave the interim president and the NEC thirty days to come up with a plan for the
election. Witnesses testified that the general assembly required the NEC to hold the election within thirty days.
decisions had to be routed through him. Appellant closed one of the club’s bank accounts and
moved the money to another bank. Testimony about the amount of money appellant moved varied
from $20,000 to $28,000.
The NEC held the second presidential election on September 19, 2014. Appellant did not
attend, and Okereke was elected and sworn in as president of the club.
After these events, there was a split in the club. Some members recognized appellant as
president and followed him as he set up a separate governing body for the club, and others stayed
with the officers elected at the convention and with Okereke as president. Although the club
already had a website, appellant created another website in the club’s name that stated he was the
president.2
Appellant then hired a lawyer, who filed suit in October 2014 in the club’s name against
appellees in their individual capacities. The suit alleged appellees had filed false statements with
the Texas Secretary of State identifying the club’s registered agent and board of directors.
Amongst other claims, the suit sought a declaratory judgment that appellees had no authority to
act on behalf of Enyimba Social Club.
The next year, appellant’s lawyers sent cease-and-desist letters to the Dallas and Houston
chapters to stop using the club’s name and logo. Appellees then filed suit against appellant alleging
his term as president ended on July 12, 2014 and that he refused to turn over the club’s assets.
Appellees sought declaratory judgments that appellant was not president, that Okereke was
president, and that appellant lacked authority to act on the club’s behalf. They also brought causes
of action for conversion, money had and received, and breach of fiduciary duty for appellant’s
2
The only difference in the website names was the suffix: Enyimba Social Club’s website ended with “.org” while appellant’s website ended
with “.com.”
closing the club’s bank account, moving the money to another bank, and refusing to provide an
accounting for the funds. They also sought injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.
Before trial, appellant nonsuited the claims he brought in the club’s name against appellees.
The case was tried before the court. The court rendered judgment for appellees awarding
them $30,000 for actual damages, $10,000 for exemplary damages, $21,075 for attorney’s fees
through trial, and additional amounts for appellate attorney’s fees. The trial court did not make
any declaratory judgments.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant’s issues contend the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s judgment.
In his arguments, appellant complains that the trial court did not file findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Appellant timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the
trial court did not file them. To preserve his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law,
appellant had to file notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty days
of the original request. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 297. Appellant did not do so. Accordingly, he waived
any complaint that the trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re W.C.B.,
337 S.W.3d 510, 513 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
When no findings of fact and conclusions of law were properly requested or filed, it is
implied that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its judgment. Worford v.
Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). The judgment will be upheld on any legal theory that finds
support in the evidence. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d at 754.
We review the implied findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency, and we review the
trial court’s implied legal conclusions de novo. In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2008, no pet.). When addressing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact-
finder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is
legally sufficient to support the finding. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs &
Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the
evidence in a neutral light and set aside the finding only if the finding is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence such that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v.
Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 334
S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
DAMAGES
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
appellees actual damages of $30,000. Appellant argues the trial court should not have awarded
appellees any damages because the board of directors directed him to move the club’s money to
another bank and spend the money on the attorney’s fees and expenses for bringing this lawsuit.
Appellant argues that his actions benefitted the club. The parties presented two different versions
of what happened.
Under appellees’ version, appellant was not president after his term ended at the beginning
of the convention. The presidential election at the convention was voided by the general assembly
because of the illegal vote cast by Emeribe, and the vote for the president was postponed. Cos-
Okpalla testified that people from the Austin chapter said Emeribe voted the same way the absent
member would have voted; however, Cos-Okpalla said the vote was by secret ballot, so there was
no way to know how Emeribe voted or how the absent member would have voted. When the
second election was held on September 19, appellant was not elected president. Therefore,
although appellant was a member of the NEC, he was not an officer, and he had no authority to
access the club’s bank account or to spend the club’s money.
The NEC sent appellant a letter demanding that he return the money, but he refused, stating
he had closed the account at the behest of the board of directors and that he had turned the money
over to the board. Cos-Okpalla testified he did not know what appellant had done with the money,
but he had heard appellant had spent all the money on attorneys and litigation expenses. Appellant
set up a parallel governing structure within the club with himself as president. He set up a parallel
website using the club’s name. He also obtained a federal registered trademark for the name
“Enyimba Social Club U.S.A., Inc.” and its logo. Appellant hired lawyers using the club’s money
to send cease-and-desist letters to the Houston and Dallas chapters telling them they were violating
the club’s trademark by using the club’s name and logo. The constitution has provisions for
terminating chapters, but appellant did not follow them.3 It was members of the Dallas and
Houston chapters that had raised the issue of the illegal vote at the convention that prevented
appellant from being recognized as president. Appellant used the money in the bank account to
pay the lawyers and expenses of bringing the litigation, the cease-and-desist letters, obtaining the
trademark and for paying for the creation of the new website. Appellant did not have the NEC’s
approval to make these expenditures as required by the constitution. The NEC asked appellant to
return the money, but he refused. Cos-Okpalla testified that the board of directors has an advisory
role to the NEC and that the board does not have authority to write checks or sign contracts on the
club’s behalf. Before trial, appellant nonsuited the claims he brought in the club’s name. Cos-
Okpalla testified that appellant’s actions did not benefit the club.
3
The constitution states that a chapter that has not paid its membership dues “shall be terminated.” For a chapter to be terminated, the NEC
must send a registered letter to the chapter explaining that the chapter would be terminated and stating the chapter would have forty-five days to
respond.
Under appellant’s version, the club was in legal trouble before the convention because of
false documents filed with the Texas Secretary of State. Appellant said these documents did not
correctly list the club’s registered agent or its board of directors. Chukwuma Enyinna, the former
chairman of the board of directors, testified for appellant, stating that the club had become a “loose
corporation” and was in danger of collapsing.
Appellant testified that before the election, the club was split concerning the requirements
for being a member of the board of directors or an officer of the NEC. A recent change to the
constitution required members of the board or the NEC officers to have at least a degree from a
four-year college. According to appellant, this requirement created a split in the club when the
club required candidates to prove they had the required degree.
Appellant testified that he was elected president at the convention, winning by one vote.
Appellant then left the convention thinking he had won the election. Enyinna testified that when
the issue of Emeribe’s illegal vote was raised, Emeribe said he voted for Okereke and not appellant.
Enyinna also testified that the president of a club chapter could permit a person who was not a
member of the NEC to vote for an absent NEC member even though the constitution appeared to
prohibit that practice. Enyinna said no second election took place: “[T]here was not a true
election. It was just action. People acting in concert.” Appellant testified the second election was
not valid because the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the board of directors were not
present.
Enyinna testified that on July 19, a week after the convention, the board of directors met
and decided to certify appellant as the president instead of holding an election. At that same board
meeting on July 19, the board was concerned that there might be an attempt to hijack the club’s
account. Appellant was a signatory on the club’s account, so the board asked him to close the
account and move the money to another bank. Appellant testified that the board instructed him to
send cease-and-desist letters to the people falsifying the documents filed with the secretary of state
and to bring suit against them if necessary. Enyinna testified the board of directors could direct
the spending of the money even though the constitution required a two-thirds vote of the NEC for
expenditures greater than $500. According to Enyinna, the NEC president and general secretary
waived the two-thirds-of-the-NEC requirement and gave the board of directors authority to spend
the money because it was an urgent matter.4 Appellant testified he moved the bank account into
an account to which only he and the board of directors had access. He testified he spent the money
in obedience to the board’s instructions. He testified he brought the lawsuit against appellees for
the following reason:
because we wanted to get all these things straightened out that is going on. I didn’t
want to have any faction with anybody with the organization. I didn’t want to have
any faction. It was divided. It was my aim and purpose of filing the lawsuit for
them to stop so that we cannot going beyond doing the things the way we’re
supposed to.
Appellant also testified that although he is president of the NEC, he has not attended a
national event or NEC meeting since the 2014 convention. Appellant testified his life would be in
danger if he attended those events.
Appellant also testified he obtained the trademark for the club and not for himself. He told
the court that all of his actions were to benefit the club.
4
Enyinna’s testimony on this matter is as follows:
Q. . . . Where does it say the board can give the approval?
A. The board override that constitution based on a special assignment to them.
Q. Special assignment by who?
A. By the national executive council president and the general secretary of the national executive council.
Q. Okay. Now your testimony is that the NEC gave—override the two-third requirement that is required before you can
spend over $500?
A. Absolutely, because of urgent certain matter.
Q. Okay. When—when did they do that?
A. They did that in a special meeting.
Actual Damages
Appellant contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support awarding
appellees any damages. One of appellees’ causes of action against appellant was conversion.
Conversion is the unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control
over the personal property of another to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the owner’s rights.
Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971); Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys.,
Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 365 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
denied). To establish a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the plaintiff owned or
had possession of the property or entitlement to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and
without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion of, or
inconsistent with, the plaintiff’s rights as an owner; (3) the plaintiff demanded the return of the
property; and (4) the defendant refused to return the property. Tex. Integrated Conveyor Concepts,
300 S.W.3d at 366.
Appellant admitted he took possession of the funds when he testified that he moved the
funds to another bank account where only he and the board of directors had access. The trial court
could conclude appellant’s spending the funds was unauthorized for two reasons: first, he was not
president of the club and therefore had no authority to move or spend the money, and second, the
constitution required a two-thirds approval of the NEC for spending more than $500 per year.
Although appellant testified the board of directors certified he was president the week after the
election and that there was no second election, that evidence was contrary to the evidence that a
second election was held and appellant was not elected. The trial court was not required to believe
appellant’s and Enyinna’s testimony that the board of directors could override the constitution and
direct the spending of over $20,000 of the club’s money without the NEC’s approval. Cos-Okpalla
testified the board of directors had no authority to act on the club’s behalf. The trial court could
find that appellant’s moving the money to an account where only he and the board had access and
then spending the money without the NEC’s approval was an act inconsistent with the club’s right
to the money. The trial court could also find that appellant, as past-president of the club, was
aware of the limitations on the president and the board of directors to spend the club’s money
without the NEC’s approval. Cos-Okpalla testified the NEC demanded appellant return the money
and that appellant refused. We conclude the evidence supports implied findings that appellant
committed the tort of conversion.
The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to award actual
damages to appellees. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is
factually sufficient because the implied findings in favor of the judgment are not so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.5 We overrule appellant’s
first issue.
Exemplary Damages
In his second issue, appellant contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to support the trial court’s award of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be awarded
“only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the harm with respect to which
the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from: (1) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross
negligence.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a). “‘Malice’ means a specific intent
by the defendant to cause substantial injury or harm to the claimant.” Id. § 41.001(7). “‘Clear and
convincing’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact
a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. §
41.001(2).
5
Appellant does not assert on appeal that the amount of actual damages awarded, $30,000, was excessive.
Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to prove he acted with malice. Appellant
asserts, “A review of the entire record reflects that the evidence introduced at trial actually negated
Appellees’ assertion that [appellant] acted with specific intent to cause Enyimba substantial injury
or harm.”
Besides the evidence appellant cites, which is his own and Enyinna’s testimony, appellees
presented contrary evidence. Evidence showed appellant’s previous term as president ended at the
beginning of the convention, and appellant’s election at the convention was rejected by the general
assembly due to Emeribe’s illegal vote. The general assembly decided the presidential election
should be delayed, which later resulted in the election of Okereke as president. Appellant rejected
that decision, and he continued to insist he was president. In the guise of being president, he closed
a bank account containing at least $20,000 and moved the money to a bank account where only he
and the board of directors had access. According to the constitution, only the NEC president, vice-
president, and treasurer may access the club’s bank account. Appellant then spent over $20,000
on lawyer’s fees and litigation and website expenses without the NEC’s approval.
Appellant spent some of the money on lawyers to send cease-and-desist letters to the Dallas
and Houston chapters for using the club’s name and logo. Evidence shows appellant tried to
rescind their membership in the club, which he lacked authority to do. The people who raised the
problem of the legality of the vote at the convention were three of the appellees from the Houston
and Dallas chapters, and the court could conclude appellant’s attempts to expel those chapters were
to punish and harass appellees and the other members of those chapters for interfering with his
election and to eliminate opposition to his presidency.
Appellant testified his actions were only to help the club and that the board of directors
authorized him to bring suit against appellees for filing false documents with the secretary of state.
However, the court could find that appellant was not the president or any other officer. Even if he
were president, he did not have authority to spend the club’s money without the approval of
two-thirds of the NEC, which he knew he did not have. Appellant’s unauthorized spending of the
club’s money deprived the club of those funds.
Appellant and Enyinna testified the board of directors had authority to declare appellant
president. However, their testimony was contrary to the club’s constitution and the actions of the
general assembly at the convention. The minutes from the convention showed the general
assembly required a new election, not a declaration from the board of directors affirming the vote
at the convention. The minutes also stated that the general assembly gave the NEC and the interim
president (the newly elected vice-president) “30 days or more to plan for a new Presidential
Election.”6 If the board of directors had the authority to declare appellant president, there would
have been no need for the second election. Yet the evidence shows that election took place, and
appellant was not elected.
The trial court could determine from the evidence that appellant took the club’s money and
used it without the NEC’s approval for his personal purposes of purging the club of the chapters
whose members, including three of the appellees, objected to Emeribe’s illegal vote at the
convention. He then used the money without the NEC’s approval to set up a parallel governance
structure within the club with himself as president. The trial court could conclude appellant
intended to cause substantial harm to appellees and the club by taking the club’s money and using
it to support his illegitimate claim of being president.
We conclude there is sufficient clear and convincing evidence of appellant’s malice to
support the award of exemplary damages, and appellant has not shown the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding appellees exemplary damages. We overrule appellant’s second issue.
6
Appellant testified that the minutes were forged. However, the minutes are signed by the interim president and the secretary. The trial court
was the judge of appellant’s credibility and was not required to believe his testimony.
ATTORNEY’S FEES
In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
appellees their attorney’s fees through trial of $21,074. In his appellant’s brief, appellant contends
the evidence did not support the trial court’s implied finding that the fees awarded were reasonable
and necessary.7
In Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997), the
Texas Supreme Court set forth a list of factors to be considered when determining the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of
collection before the legal services have been rendered.
Id. at 818. It is not necessary for the record to include evidence of all the factors. Brockie v. Webb,
244 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
During the trial, the court admitted into evidence appellees’ counsel’s invoice for attorney’s
fees. The invoice identified the attorney performing the work and the date of the work, described
7
In his reply brief, appellant contends there was no statutory or contractual basis for the award of attorney’s fees. Appellant did not raise this
argument in his appellant’s brief, nor did he raise it in the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude this issue has been waived and is not properly
before the Court. See Compton v. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 09-15-00321-CV, 2017 WL 3081092, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (argument that fees were not segregated could not be raised for first time in reply brief); see also Collin Cty. v. Hixon Family
P’ship, Ltd., 365 S.W.3d 860, 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (“A reply brief may not be used to raise new issues.”).
the task performed, and listed the billing rate, the number of hours for each task, and the total
charge for each task. The invoice was for $21,075. Appellees’ counsel testified:
I was hired in this case and been in this case since January of 2015. I’ve been
licensed and practiced law for 14 years now. And this is the kind of cases that I
normally handle. My hourly rate is $300 per hour. As of today, I’ve calculated a
total of $21,075 in attorney’s fees; that’s the equivalent of 70.3 hours of work. And
my fee is very reasonable based on the nature of this case and also my experience.
The trial court offered appellant the opportunity to cross-examine appellees’ counsel, but appellant
asked him no questions.
The evidence in the entire case as well as the invoice and counsel’s testimony provided
evidence of the time and labor involved (factor 1), the amount involved and the results obtained
(factor 3), the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client (factor 6), the
lawyer’s experience (factor 7), and that the fee was fixed (factor 8). Appellant does not identify
any task appellees’ counsel performed that was not necessary or for which the fee was not
reasonable.
We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the award of
$21,075 for attorney’s fees through trial. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
TRADEMARK
In his fourth issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by requiring
appellant to turn over the trademark he received on behalf of the club. Appellant asserts the trial
court’s determination should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The trial court abuses its
discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, that is, whether it acts without reference
to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–
42 (Tex. 1985).
Appellant argues he was the president of the club when he applied for the trademark. He
testified he paid $1,381.86 from the club’s account to an attorney to obtain the trademark.
Appellant testified he obtained the trademark to preserve the name “Enyimba Social Club” and to
stop other organizations from using the name and logo.
The trial court could determine from the evidence that appellant was not president and had
no authority to obtain the trademark on the club’s behalf, to spend the club’s money to obtain the
trademark, or to retain possession of the trademark. The court could also determine appellant did
not use the trademark to protect the club but instead used it to harass and punish appellees for
questioning the legality of Emeribe’s vote in the presidential election at the convention. Appellant
does not explain how requiring the trademark to be turned over to appellees, at least one of whom
is an NEC officer, was an abuse of discretion.
We conclude appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by requiring
appellant to turn over the trademark. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.
INJUNCTION
In his fifth issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting
appellees’ request for a permanent injunction. See S. Plains Switching, Ltd. Co. v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
255 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (standard of review of permanent
injunction is abuse of discretion). The judgment enjoins appellant from filing documents on the
club’s behalf, representing himself to be the club’s agent or representative, binding the club to a
contract, accessing or spending the club’s funds, and using the club’s name or likeness.
Appellant argues the judgment imposing the permanent injunction is inadequate because
the judgment does not contain the trial court’s reasons for the injunction. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683
(“Every order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance . . . .”). Although
a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction must set forth the reasons for the issuance
of the injunction, this Court has held a final judgment does not have to set forth the reasons for a
permanent injunction. See Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 891–92 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
Appellant also argues the trial court granted more relief than appellees sought in their
petition. Appellees’ petition against appellant seeking injunctive relief incorporated the facts and
causes of action set forth in the petition. Appellees then alleged that they “seek permanent
injunctive relief against [appellant] because his conduct will cause irreparable harm for which there
is no adequate remedy at law.” Appellant did not specially except to the pleading. The pleading
was sufficient to place appellant on notice that appellees sought injunctive relief based on the
preceding facts and causes of action. Any deficiency in this pleading was waived by appellant’s
failure to file special exceptions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (“Every defect, omission or fault in a
pleading either of form or of substance, which is not specifically pointed out by exception in
writing . . . shall be deemed to have been waived by the party seeking reversal on such
account . . . .”).
We conclude appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by granting a
permanent injunction against appellant. We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
181334F.P05
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
Ezi Nnabugwu, Appellant On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-18-01334-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-12053.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Chuma Cos-Okpalla, Leonard Nwonumah, Justices Osborne and Nowell participating.
Anderson Obiagwu, Kingsley Nwasuruba,
and Bonny Uwakweh, Individually and
Derivatively on Behalf of Enyimba Social
Club U.S.A., Inc., Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees Chuma Cos-Okpalla, Leonard Nwonumah, Anderson
Obiagwu, Kingsley Nwasuruba, and Bonny Uwakweh, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf
of Enyimba Social Club U.S.A., Inc. recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Ezi
Nnabugwu.
Judgment entered this 16th day of October, 2019.