Scott Lief Erickson v. State ( 2014 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-13-00241-CR
Scott Lief Erickson, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. CR2012-091, HONORABLE JACK H. ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 31, 2010, appellant, Scott Lief Erickson, was driving intoxicated with a
blood-alcohol content of 0.33 when he rear-ended another vehicle, causing minimal damage to that
vehicle but substantial damage to his own vehicle. Fortunately, appellant neither seriously injured
himself nor the occupants of the other vehicle. At trial, appellant pleaded guilty to felony driving
while intoxicated (DWI), Tex. Penal Code §§ 49.04, .09(b)(2), not guilty to use of a deadly weapon
during commission of the offense, id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B), and true to an enhancement paragraph
relating to a prior felony conviction, id. § 12.42(a). The jury found appellant guilty, found that he
had used a deadly weapon, and ultimately assessed a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
appellant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that his motor
vehicle was used or exhibited as a deadly weapon. We will affirm.
An object may be either a “deadly weapon” by design, if it is “manifestly designed,
made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury,” id. § 1.07(a)(17)(A),
or by use, if “in the manner of its use or intended use [it] is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury,” id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, under the
foregoing definition, a motor vehicle may become a deadly weapon if in the manner of its use it is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005); Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). “Specific intent to
use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon is not required.” Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798.
In Mann v. State, the court of criminal appeals held that Texas law authorizes a deadly
weapon finding in a prosecution for DWI when evidence shows that the danger to other persons was
real, not just hypothetical. 58 S.W.3d 132, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (classification of vehicle as
deadly weapon was proper because testimony showed defendant “almost hit another vehicle
head-on” and would have but for other driver’s evasive actions); see also Woodall v. State,
No. 03-05-00850-CR, 2008 WL 3539997, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2008, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (near collision where defendant swerved into
neighboring lane traveling 45 mph was sufficient to sustain jury’s finding that defendant used vehicle
as deadly weapon).
The court of criminal appeals elaborated on the Mann holding in Sierra v. State,
articulating a two-prong test to determine whether a motor vehicle is a deadly weapon under the
particular circumstances by considering: (1) the manner in which the defendant used the motor
vehicle during the offense, and (2) whether during the offense the motor vehicle was capable of
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causing death or serious bodily injury. 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). As to the first
prong, the court held that the evidence must be such that a rational fact-finder could conclude that
the defendant was driving recklessly or dangerously while intoxicated. Id. at 256. In Sierra,
evidence that the defendant was speeding and that he made no effort to brake to avoid colliding with
another vehicle, even though he had ample space to do so, was sufficient to support the jury’s
determination that his driving was dangerous and reckless. Id. Regarding the second prong, the
court held that a rational jury could have concluded that the defendant’s vehicle was capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury because the record established that the vehicle did cause
serious bodily injury to the driver of the other vehicle. Id.
In the present case, the record contains ample evidence that appellant operated his
vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner. First and foremost, there was testimony of an actual
collision between appellant’s vehicle and another vehicle with two occupants, as well as testimony
that traffic in the area was busy, that appellant’s blood-alcohol level was more than four times the
legal limit for intoxication, and that appellant took his eyes off the road to look at his cellular phone
at the time of the collision. The jury also saw video of the responding officer administering several
standard field sobriety tests to appellant, evidencing appellant’s impaired motor skills. Therefore,
we hold that the first prong of the Sierra test is met. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that
appellant’s driving was dangerous and reckless while intoxicated.
As to the second prong, the record is replete with evidence that others were actually
endangered by appellant’s act of driving his vehicle while intoxicated. The jury heard evidence that
the collision was forceful enough to throw both occupants of the other vehicle against their seats and
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saw photographs of the vehicles involved in the collision showing the degree of damage done to both
vehicles as a result of the collision. Moreover, appellant expressly admitted in his testimony that his
vehicle would have been capable of killing someone, given the speed he was traveling and the degree
of damage done to the two vehicles involved. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could conclude
that appellant’s vehicle, in the manner he operated it, was capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. We hold that the second prong of the Sierra test was met.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant’s vehicle was, in the manner of its
use, a “deadly weapon.” See Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (appellate
court views evidence in light most favorable to verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found essential elements of offense beyond reasonable doubt) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). We therefore overrule appellant’s sole appellate issue and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Field
Affirmed
Filed: August 21, 2014
Do Not Publish
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