Amanda Gayle Read v. State ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-14-00025-CR
    AMANDA GAYLE READ, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 115th District Court
    Upshur County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 16,330
    Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Amanda Gayle Read appeals from the final adjudication of her guilt on a charge of
    possession of a controlled substance.     The trial court found the alleged violations of the
    conditions of her community supervision to be true and assessed punishment at twenty-four
    months in a state jail facility. Read’s attorney on appeal filed a brief on June 13, 2014, which
    states that he has reviewed the record. Counsel has provided a detailed summary of the evidence
    elicited during the course of the proceeding and briefly explains the procedural history, stating
    that he has found no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. In so doing, counsel has provided a
    professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds
    to be advanced. This meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 743–44
    (1967); Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); and High v. State,
    
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
    As also required by Anders, counsel has filed a motion with this Court seeking to
    withdraw as counsel in this appeal. Counsel mailed a copy of his brief to Read on June 11, 2014,
    along with a copy of his motion to withdraw and a letter informing Read of her right to review
    the record and file a pro se response. Counsel also provided Read with a complete copy of the
    record for her review.
    We have now received a pro se response from Read in which she argues that her trial
    counsel was ineffective because his explanation of the plea agreement offered by the State was
    inaccurate, and the inaccuracy caused her (upon changing her mind about attending a
    2
    rehabilitation program) to be sentenced to twenty-four months’ incarceration rather than the
    eighteen months that she states was originally offered by the State.
    Read also complains that trial counsel was ineffective because he introduced evidence
    about her boyfriend, Eric Quinn. The record indicates a full understanding by Read that she was
    pleading guilty without an agreement in place and was thus subject to the full range of possible
    punishment. It also shows that she remained adamant about not attending the nine-month
    rehabilitation program.
    There is no plea agreement shown by the record, but at most an oral agreement to modify
    the terms of her community supervision—which she thereafter refused to sign. As a result of her
    decision, the conditions were not modified, and the case went to the court on the full range of
    punishment. Counsel questioned her about Quinn, and she testified that she had not used drugs
    until meeting him.
    The ineffectiveness of counsel is a matter that must be firmly founded in the record, and
    the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Smith v. State, 
    51 S.W.3d 806
    , 812 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).             Under the standard of Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984), the record does not show counsel’s actions or decisions made
    while handling the case to be below the standard of professional norms and thus constitutionally
    ineffective. The first prong of Strickland has not been met.
    We have determined that this appeal is wholly frivolous. We have independently
    reviewed the appellate record and find no genuinely arguable issue. See Halbert v. Michigan,
    
    545 U.S. 605
    , 623 (2005). We, therefore, agree with counsel’s assessment that no arguable
    3
    issues support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2005). 1
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Bailey C. Moseley
    Justice
    Date Submitted:            September 2, 2014
    Date Decided:              September 5, 2014
    Do Not Publish
    1
    Since we agree this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accord with Anders, grant counsel’s request to
    withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    . No substitute counsel will
    be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
    appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or appellant must file a pro se
    petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from either
    the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing or for en banc reconsideration was
    overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk
    of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should
    comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-14-00025-CR

Filed Date: 9/5/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014