in Re Commitment of Ernest Ralph Williams ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-14-00029-CV
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IN RE COMMITMENT OF ERNEST RALPH WILLIAMS
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On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 13-06-06548 CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State of Texas filed a petition to commit Ernest Ralph Williams as a
sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.151
(West 2010 & Supp. 2013). A jury found that Williams is a sexually violent
predator and the trial court rendered a final judgment and an order of civil
commitment. In two appellate issues, Williams contends (1) the State’s original
petition was barred by the statute of limitations and (2) the trial court erred by
denying his discovery requests. We affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of
civil commitment.
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Statute of Limitations
In issue one, Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for
summary judgment. We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We
take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. The movant must
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and he is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Id. at 216. We also review issues of statutory construction de novo,
and our objective is to give effect to the Texas Legislature’s intent. Molinet v.
Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). “The plain meaning of the text is the
best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the
context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results.” Id.
On March 21, 2013, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice informed the
Special Prosecution Unit that the multidisciplinary team had determined that
Williams is a repeat sexually violent predator and is likely to reoffend. The State
received this letter on April 1 and filed its petition on June 21. In his answer,
Williams asserted that the State’s petition was barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court subsequently denied Williams’s traditional motion for summary
judgment on his limitations defense. At trial, Williams re-urged his motion, which
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the trial court again denied. On appeal, Williams argues that section 841.041(b)(1)
of the Texas Health and Safety Code required the State to file its petition within
ninety days from the date of the TDCJ’s referral letter rather than the date on
which the referral was received.
When an SVP candidate is referred to the State, the State may file a petition
alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to
support the allegation. In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.
2005). The State must file the petition no later than the 90th day after the date the
person is referred to the State’s attorney. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §
841.041(b)(1) (West 2010); Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 641. “Referred” is the past tense
of “refer” and the root of the word “reference,” and it is defined as the act of
sending or directing to another for investigation, information, service,
consideration, or decision. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1306-07 (8th ed. 2004).
Section 841.041(b)(1) is susceptible to more than one meaning: (1) “referred”
means the date of the TDCJ’s referral letter; (2) “referred” means the date the
TDCJ transmits its referral letter to the State; or (3) “referred” means the date the
State receives the referral letter. See id. Because of this ambiguity, to construe
section 841.041(b)(1), we may consider the: “(1) object sought to be attained; (2)
circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) legislative history; (4)
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common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar
subjects; (5) consequences of a particular construction; (6) administrative
construction of the statute; and (7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency
provision.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2013); see Tex. Dep’t of Public
Safety v. Swierski, 49 S.W.3d 417, 419 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)
(“Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in the
statute.”).
“The SVP statute accomplishes dual interests that are possessed by the
State: (1) the parens patriae power to provide care to its citizens who are unable
because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; and (2) the police power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who lack volitional
control over certain types of dangerous behaviors.” In re Commitment of Rushing,
No. 09-11-00268-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8140, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Sept. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re Commitment of Evers, 420
S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, pet. denied). “Through long-term
supervision and treatment, the SVP statute addresses the risk of repeated predatory
behavior by persons suffering from behavioral abnormalities not amenable to
traditional mental illness treatment modalities.” Rushing, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS
8140, at *6 (citation omitted). “The intended result of the statute is to prevent
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repeated predatory behavior by providing sex offender treatment to persons
afflicted with a difficulty controlling their behavior that predisposes them to sexual
violence to the extent they become a menace to the health and safety of others.” Id.
In other similar provisions in the SVP statute, the TDCJ is required to give
the multidisciplinary team notice of a person’s status as a potential predator and,
no later than sixty days after the multidisciplinary team receives this notice, the
team must make its assessment, notify the TDCJ of its assessment, and make its
recommendation. Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 841.021, 841.022 (West Supp.
2013). The statute further provides that the TDCJ, or the Department of State
Health Services, then has sixty days to conduct its own assessment and if it
believes that the person suffers from a behavioral abnormality, it “shall give notice
of that assessment and provide corresponding documentation to the [State’s]
attorney not later than the 60th day after the date of [the multidisciplinary team’s]
recommendation[.]” Id. § 841.023(b) (West Supp. 2013). The Texas Supreme
Court has construed section 841.023(b) as follows: “If the TDCJ or the TDMHMR
concludes that the person suffers from a behavioral abnormality, the department
must give notice and corresponding documentation to the state’s attorney not later
than sixty days after receiving the team’s recommendation.” Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at
640-41 (emphasis added).
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In light of the State’s dual interests in exercising its parens patriae and
police powers, the purpose of the statute to protect the community and provide
treatment for the SVP, and the Texas Supreme Court’s construction of a similar
provision to mean the date upon which notice is received, the interpretation of
section 841.041 that best serves the intent of the SVP statute is that the State must
file its petition alleging predator status within ninety days of its receipt of the
referral letter. See id.; see also Evers, 420 S.W.3d at 86; Rushing, 2012 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8140, at **5-6. In this case, the State received the referral letter from the
TDCJ on April 1 and filed its petition on June 21, within ninety days after
receiving the referral letter. Accordingly, since the State’s petition was timely filed
in accordance with section 841.041, whether or not the Legislature intended it to
operate as a period of limitation is an issue we need not decide. We overrule issue
one.
Discovery
In issue two, Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his discovery
requests regarding the multidisciplinary team’s assessment. “We review a trial
court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.” In re Commitment of Perez, No.
09-12-00132-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 1866, at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “We will reverse a
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judgment upon a challenge to that court’s discovery ruling when the appellant
shows that the trial court abused its discretion and the trial court’s error probably
caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented the appellant from
properly presenting the case on appeal.” Id. at *16; Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).
In a notice of intent to take the State’s oral deposition with subpoena duces
tecum, Williams requested the following:
The method by which the Multidisciplinary Team selected [Williams]
for referral to the Special Prosecution Unit for prosecution as a
sexually violent predator[.]
The criteria used by the Multidisciplinary Team to select [Williams]
for referral to the Special Prosecution Unit for prosecution as a
sexually violent predator[.]
...
All documents concerning the multidisciplinary team assessment of
[Williams].
The State moved to quash on grounds that the requests sought protected work
product, information outside the scope of discovery, and information regarding
matters within the realm of prosecutorial discretion. The trial court granted the
State’s motion.
In a request for production, Williams sought the following:
The complete file reviewed by the expert who assessed [Williams] at
the [request of the] multidisciplinary team pursuant to Section
841.023 of Chapter 841.
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All documents generated by the expert who assessed [Williams] at the
request of the multidisciplinary team pursuant to Section 841.023 of
Chapter 841.
The State objected that these requests sought information from testifying experts
in violation of the discovery rules. Williams filed both a motion to compel the
State’s responses to these requests and a motion to determine the sufficiency of the
State’s objections. The trial court denied both motions.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion by
sustaining the State’s objections to the above requests, we conclude that any error
was harmless. The trial court’s docket control order required the State to produce
the Multi-Disciplinary Team referral packet, which generally contains the
offender’s psychological evaluation, parole reviews, penitentiary packets,
educational records, sex offender treatment program records or evaluations,
medical records, and prison disciplinary records. See Perez, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1866, at *16-17. Because Williams had access to other sources to obtain
the information he sought in his discovery requests, any error in the trial court’s
decision to sustain the State’s objections did not cause the rendition of an improper
judgment or prevent Williams from presenting his case on appeal. See Tex. R.
App. P. 44.1(a). We overrule issue two and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on July 22, 2014
Opinion Delivered September 4, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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