Joseph Peine v. HIT Services L.P., Wood Group USA, Inc., John Wood Group PLC, Wood Group Power GP, LLC and Wood Group Management Services, Inc. , 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10964 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • Affirmed and Opinion filed October 27, 2015.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-14-00412-CV
    JOSEPH PEINE, Appellant
    V.
    HIT SERVICES L.P., WOOD GROUP USA, INC., JOHN WOOD GROUP
    PLC, WOOD GROUP POWER GP, LLC, AND WOOD GROUP
    MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., Appellees
    On Appeal from the 269th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2010-60099
    OPINION
    This is an appeal from an order granting a traditional motion for summary
    judgment.   Appellant Joseph Peine sued appellees, HIT Services, L.P., Wood
    Group USA, Inc., John Wood Group PLC, Wood Group Power GP, LLC, and
    Wood Group Management Services, Inc., alleging that he was wrongfully
    discharged for refusing to commit a crime. Peine argues on appeal that the trial
    court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the
    summary judgment evidence showed a genuine issue of material fact on whether
    his refusal to commit a criminal act was the sole cause of his termination. We
    overrule Peine’s issue because the summary judgment evidence conclusively
    proved that he was terminated, at least in part, because he breached his
    confidentiality duties when he sent confidential company information to a reporter.
    We therefore affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    Peine is a certified public accountant. Appellee HIT Services, L.P., hired
    him as its Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in February 2007. HIT Services is part of
    the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit, which is in turn a division
    of appellee John Wood Group, PLC, a multinational corporation.
    According to Peine’s summary judgment evidence, HIT Services was a
    troubled company with a history of inflating its earnings. Peine alleged he was
    hired by HIT Services as part of an effort to turn the company’s performance
    around. The letter in which HIT Services offered Peine the CFO job stated: “in
    this role, you will be responsible for all finance and accounting aspects as it relates
    to the management of the business including financial reporting, month/year end
    closings, budgeting, forecasting, profitability analyses, management of accounting
    department/personnel and other associated responsibilities . . . .” Peine also served
    as secretary of Wood Group Power GP, LLC, the general partner of HIT Services.
    In that position, Peine served as an officer of the company and was charged with
    the responsibility of ensuring “that appropriate filings are made on time and
    accurately.”
    Due to his various responsibilities, Peine reported to different supervisors.
    One of those supervisors was Durg Kumar, the financial director for the Heavy
    2
    Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit. Peine alleged that in December 2008,
    Kumar instructed him to overstate HIT Services’ profits by approximately $2.5
    million. According to Peine, Kumar ordered him to falsify records by booking the
    entire value of a project with a sister company, Wood Power Solutions, even
    though HIT Services had not yet completed the project. Peine refused, believing
    such an action would violate accounting standards and the law. Peine alleged that
    Kumar threatened to “clean house” if Peine and his staff did not follow Kumar’s
    orders.
    In January 2009, Peine brought the matter to the attention of Scott Jessiman,
    the controller of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic Business Unit. As a result
    of his conversations with Jessiman, Peine “prevailed and the income was not
    overstated in HITS’ books.” Instead, Jessiman authorized Peine to close HIT
    Services’ 2008 accounting out of balance with Wood Power Solutions. According
    to Peine, HIT Services did not materially misstate its 2008 performance as a result
    of Jessiman authorizing this action. The next month, Kumar called Peine into his
    office and told him that “it was not working out” and that he needed to learn how
    to “play the game.” Peine was not fired at that time, however.
    That same month, Peine met with Chris Wilkinson, the president of HIT
    Services, to discuss his problems with Kumar. Wilkinson told Peine he would
    report the problems to Nick Blaskoski, the president of the Heavy Industrial
    Turbines Strategic Business Unit. Peine also reported the issue to Grant Johnston,
    the Wood Group’s Western Hemisphere Controller. Johnston asked Peine for time
    to fix the problem.
    According to Peine, he discovered in July 2009 that Kumar was going
    around him and his staff to book substantially inflated earnings estimates for jobs
    in June 2009. Peine reported the problem to Johnston. Johnston told Peine that the
    3
    earnings estimates were internal numbers only and were not reported externally.
    Johnston directed Peine to correct the earnings estimates by the end of the year.
    In the ordinary course of his responsibilities to certify HIT Services’
    financial condition on a quarterly basis, Peine objected to attesting to the accuracy
    of the July 2009 quarterly certification because he believed HIT Services’
    accounting data contained false information. As a result, Peine believed that
    signing the quarterly certification without qualifying language would constitute tax
    fraud. Peine sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining his position: “although we are
    unaware of any material misstatement in our financial statements, based on our
    documented experience, we have serious concerns about the Internal Control
    Environment . . . .” Appellees did not order Peine to sign the certification without
    qualifying language. Instead, they acceded to his concerns. Wilkinson and Kumar
    inserted language qualifying the reported numbers, and with that concession, Peine
    signed the quarterly certification.
    That same month, Peine reported his concerns about Kumar’s actions to
    Todd Harper, a John Wood Group corporate officer working in the Shared Services
    Department. Shared Services was absorbing some of the accounting functions that
    had been performed internally at HIT Services. Harper, in turn, reported Peine’s
    complaints to Christopher Watson, the CFO of the Gas Turbine Division of the
    John Wood Group. Watson told Harper to conduct an independent review of
    Peine’s allegations.
    On July 27, 2009, Harper warned Peine that he would be fired if he did not
    withdraw his accusations against Kumar. Harper explained that one or the other
    would be fired and it would most likely be Peine because Watson did not believe
    his accusations. Peine refused to withdraw his accusations against Kumar. Peine
    was not fired at that time. Instead, on July 28, Harper forwarded to Watson the
    4
    documents that Peine had provided to him in support of his claims. Watson then
    consulted with Blaskoski, the president of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Strategic
    Business Unit, and they ordered the John Wood Internal Audit Department to
    investigate Peine’s accusations.
    On July 30, Peine, believing “there was an endemic, serious, catastrophic
    failure within Wood Group and that they weren’t going to do anything to fix it,”
    emailed internal company documents to Robert Gibbons, a Thomson Reuters
    reporter. These documents included not only those Peine had previously sent to
    Harper, but also additional documents, including earnings forecasts. In his email
    to the reporter, Peine wrote: “Let’s give them a chance to fix it . . . . if they choose
    not to, you have a front row seat.”
    On August 6, Western Hemisphere Controller Johnston emailed Gas Turbine
    Division CFO Watson about Peine’s calls reporting problems at HIT Services.
    Watson responded: “Joe is a liability and please do not take anything he says at
    face value. I will call you later to discuss.” Watson then forwarded Johnston’s
    email to Blaskoski, writing: “Nick. We need to take action now. Chris.”
    Peine and his staff then sent a letter and accompanying documents to
    Wilkinson, HIT Services’ president, explaining their concerns about the company’s
    accounting issues.    Wilkinson turned those documents over to the personnel
    conducting the internal audit. After receiving the documents, Abby Yates, an in-
    house attorney involved in the audit, recommended that Peine be placed on paid
    leave pending the completion of the investigation. Yates also recommended that
    Kumar be removed from his position overseeing HIT Services’ accounting
    functions during the investigation.     Both recommendations were accepted and
    implemented.
    During the course of the internal audit into Peine’s accusations, Yates
    5
    learned that Peine had sent confidential company documents to a reporter. When
    confronted with his email to the reporter, Peine admitted that he had sent both the
    email and the documents to the reporter.            Yates recommended that Peine be
    terminated immediately for violating his confidentiality obligations. Company
    management did not oppose terminating Peine, and he was terminated on
    September 16, 2009.
    Peine then sued appellees, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated for
    refusing to perform the illegal act of falsifying HIT Services’ financial records by
    inflating earnings.1 Appellees eventually filed a traditional motion for summary
    judgment, asserting that the summary judgment evidence conclusively proved that
    Peine’s refusal to perform an illegal act was not the sole cause of his termination,
    thereby defeating his Sabine Pilot cause of action.2 See Sabine Pilot Service, Inc.
    v. Hauck, 
    687 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating narrow exception to
    employment-at-will doctrine to provide cause of action to employee terminated
    “for the sole reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act.”). The trial
    court granted the motion and this appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    Peine argues that the trial court erred when it granted appellees’ motion for
    summary judgment because the summary judgment evidence he produced
    generated a genuine issue of material fact on whether his refusal to commit an
    illegal act was the sole cause of his termination. We disagree.
    1
    Appellees did not move for summary judgment on the ground that the allegedly illegal
    act underlying Peine’s lawsuit, falsifying HIT Services’ earnings, was not in fact illegal. We
    therefore assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the act appellees ordered Peine to do was
    illegal.
    2
    We previously reversed a summary judgment for appellees because they did not present
    grounds for summary judgment in their motion itself. Peine v. HIT Servs., L.P., No. 14-12-
    00991-CV, 
    2014 WL 586430
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.). On
    remand, appellees did present grounds in their motion as discussed above.
    6
    I.    Standard of review and applicable law
    We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Mid-
    Century Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 
    243 S.W.3d 618
    , 621 (Tex. 2007). The movant for
    traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine
    issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R.
    Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 
    289 S.W.3d 844
    , 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who conclusively negates an essential
    element of a plaintiff’s claim is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
    Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 
    891 S.W.2d 640
    , 644 (Tex. 1995).
    Evidence is considered conclusive if reasonable people could not differ in their
    conclusions. Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 
    214 S.W.3d 672
    , 676 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
    The general rule in Texas is that an employee may be terminated at will and
    without cause. Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 
    965 S.W.2d 501
    , 502
    (Tex. 1998). In Sabine Pilot, the Supreme Court of Texas created a narrow public
    policy exception to the employment-at-will 
    doctrine. 687 S.W.2d at 735
    . This
    exception allows an employee to sue for wrongful termination if he is fired for the
    sole reason that he refused to perform an illegal act. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs.
    v. Hinds, 
    904 S.W.2d 629
    , 633 (Tex. 1995); see Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 
    365 S.W.3d 655
    , 664 (Tex. 2012) (“A plaintiff may not bring a Sabine Pilot claim
    immediately after being asked to perform an illegal activity, but must first refuse
    and be fired.”).    A Sabine Pilot plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
    preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than the
    refusal to commit an illegal act—in other words, the refusal was the sole cause of
    his discharge. 
    Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633
    . If an employer discharges an employee
    both for refusing to perform an illegal act and for a legitimate reason, it cannot be
    7
    liable for wrongful discharge. 
    Id. II. Appellees
    conclusively proved a legitimate reason for discharging Peine,
    and Peine’s evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact on
    his Sabine Pilot cause of action.
    Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action is based on his allegation that he was
    terminated for refusing to commit an illegal act. Appellees could obtain summary
    judgment on this cause of action by proving, as a matter of law, at least one
    legitimate reason for terminating Peine. See 
    id. Appellees’ summary
    judgment
    evidence conclusively established that one reason for terminating Peine was his
    disclosure of confidential information to a reporter.    See Winters v. Houston
    Chronicle Publishing Co., 
    795 S.W.2d 723
    , 724–25 (Tex. 1990) (declining to
    extend Sabine Pilot exception to include employees who are discharged for
    reporting illegal activities). This evidence includes, among other things, Peine’s
    own admissions that he sent confidential information to a reporter and that a
    violation of HIT Services’ confidentiality policy constituted a terminable offense.
    See Robinson v. Devereux Foundation, No. 14-01-00081-CV, 
    2002 WL 1315631
    ,
    *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 6, 2002, pet. denied) (holding employer
    entitled to summary judgment on Sabine Pilot claim because it conclusively
    proved other reasons for termination, including some admitted by employee,
    thereby negating essential element that sole reason for termination was refusal to
    perform illegal act).
    On appeal, Peine does not dispute the evidence showing that (1) he sent
    internal company documents to a reporter, and (2) the stated reason for his
    termination by HIT Services was his breach of his confidentiality obligations he
    owed to his employer. Instead, citing Continental Coffee Products v. Cazarez, 
    937 S.W.2d 444
    (Tex. 1996), Peine asserts that direct evidence and inferences from
    circumstantial evidence in the summary judgment record create genuine issues of
    8
    material fact regarding whether he was terminated for refusing to perform an
    illegal act.
    In Casarez, the supreme court examined the types of evidence that are
    legally sufficient to establish a causal link between an employer’s termination of
    an employee and the employee’s filing of a workers’ compensation claim, thereby
    shifting the burden to the employer to show a legitimate reason for the termination.
    
    Id. at 450–51;
    see also Parker v. Valerus Compression Servs., LP, 
    365 S.W.3d 61
    ,
    66–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Because a plaintiff in a
    workers’ compensation retaliatory-discharge case is not required to prove that his
    termination was caused solely by his filing of a claim, we conclude this standard
    from Cazarez does not apply here.        Compare 
    Safeshred, 365 S.W.3d at 662
    (confirming sole causation standard for Sabine Pilot claim), with 
    Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 451
    n.3 (stating that plaintiff need not prove that filing of workers’
    compensation claim was sole cause of her termination). Instead, we consider
    whether the evidence and inferences Peine identifies create a genuine issue of
    material fact regarding the element of his claim that he was terminated solely for
    refusing to perform an illegal act.
    A.      Peine has not presented direct evidence that he was fired solely
    for refusing to commit an illegal act.
    Initially, Peine puts forward what he considers “direct evidence” that he was
    terminated solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. This evidence
    includes: (1) Kumar’s threat to “clean house” if Peine did not follow his orders; (2)
    Harper’s warning to Peine that, if he did not retract his statements about Kumar, he
    would be fired; (3) Watson’s email to Grant Johnston that “Joe is a liability and
    please do not take anything he says at face value. I will call you later to discuss;”
    and (4) Watson’s email to Blaskoski stating: “Nick. We need to take action now.
    9
    Chris.” According to Peine, this evidence constitutes direct evidence that he was
    fired solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. We disagree.
    Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact without
    inference or presumption. See College of the Mainland v. Glover, 
    436 S.W.3d 384
    ,
    392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The evidence detailed
    above is circumstantial rather than direct evidence because, among other things, it
    does not address whether any of the speakers had a role in Peine’s firing. Thus, an
    inference would be required to reach Peine’s suggested conclusion that he was
    fired solely for refusing to perform an illegal act. We discuss below whether the
    record supports such an inference.
    B.     Peine’s circumstantial evidence does not generate a fact issue.
    In Cazarez, the supreme court listed some types of circumstantial evidence
    that an employee can use to establish, as part of his prima facie case, a causal link
    between his termination and his filing of a workers’ compensation 
    claim. 937 S.W.2d at 451
    . This includes evidence that: (1) those making the decision to
    terminate an employee have knowledge of the workers’ compensation claim; (2)
    expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s injuries by those making
    the termination decision; (3) a failure to adhere to established company policies;
    (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to other similarly-situated employees;
    and (5) evidence that the stated reason for the employee’s termination was false.
    
    Id. Even if
    we assume that such circumstantial evidence could, in some cases, also
    create a fact issue on the sole-cause element of a Sabine Pilot claim, we conclude
    Peine has not identified a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was
    terminated solely because he refused to perform an illegal act. We discuss each of
    the categories of circumstantial evidence and suggested inferences that Peine
    references in his appellate briefing.
    10
    1.    Statements by division-level employees do not support an
    inference that Peine was terminated for refusing to perform
    an illegal act.
    We turn first to the evidence Peine initially argued was direct evidence: (1)
    Kumar’s threat to “clean house” if Peine did not follow his orders; (2) Harper’s
    warning to Peine that he would be fired if he did not retract his statements about
    Kumar; (3) Watson’s email to Johnston, the Wood Group Western Hemisphere
    Controller, that “Joe is a liability and please do not take anything he says at face
    value. I will call you later to discuss;” and (4) Watson’s email to Blaskoski, the
    president of the Heavy Industrial Turbines Special Business Unit, stating: “Nick.
    We need to take action now. Chris.” According to Peine, this evidence supports
    an inference that his corporate superiors decided to terminate him for refusing to
    perform an illegal act because it demonstrates they had a negative attitude toward
    him and possessed knowledge of his refusal. We disagree.
    With regard to Kumar’s threat, the undisputed summary judgment evidence
    established that it was made some eight months before Peine was terminated. The
    evidence also was undisputed that Kumar had been removed from any role
    supervising Peine and the HIT Services accounting team pending the outcome of
    the internal investigation. The undisputed evidence further established that this
    removal occurred before the decision was made to terminate Peine. Kumar’s
    threat, therefore, cannot support an inference that Peine was terminated for
    refusing to commit an illegal act. See M. D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v.
    Willrich, 
    28 S.W.3d 22
    , 25 (Tex. 2000) (holding that stray remarks, remote in time
    from plaintiff’s termination, and not made by a person directly connected with the
    decision to terminate the plaintiff, are not enough to raise a fact issue on whether
    stated reason for termination was false).
    The same reasoning applies to any statements or actions by Harper. Peine
    11
    has not pointed to any evidence in the summary judgment record demonstrating
    that Harper had any role in the decision to terminate him. Therefore, Harper’s
    warning cannot support Peine’s suggested inference. 
    Id. Turning to
    Watson’s emails, the summary judgment evidence indicates
    Watson did not make the decision to terminate Peine, but was instead asked only if
    he had any objection to Peine being terminated. Watson testified that he did not
    object because Peine had disclosed confidential company documents. Even if we
    assume this evidence is sufficient to establish that Watson was directly connected
    with the decision to terminate Peine, we conclude that Peine’s suggested inference
    from those emails is not reasonable. See Suarez v. City of Texas City, 
    465 S.W.3d 623
    , 634 (Tex. 2015) (“Circumstantial evidence can establish actual knowledge but
    such evidence must either directly or by reasonable inference support that
    conclusion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Although Peine argues that Watson’s emails support an inference that he
    was fired for refusing to falsify HIT Services’ internal financial books, other
    evidence in the record suggests an alternative view. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes,
    
    272 S.W.3d 588
    , 592 (Tex. 2008) (stating, in an appeal from a judgment following
    a jury trial, that even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
    challenged verdict, it must be viewed in its proper context with other evidence).
    This evidence, including Watson’s own deposition testimony, establishes that an
    internal audit had been ordered to investigate Peine’s accusations. According to
    Watson, his email to Blaskoski referred not to firing Peine, but to moving forward
    on that investigation into Peine’s accusations. There was also evidence in the
    record that upper management was growing increasingly concerned about Peine’s
    performance as CFO and that management had directly expressed those concerns
    to Peine shortly before he went to Harper in July 2009.
    12
    A fact may not be inferred from circumstantial evidence that could support
    multiple inferences if none are more probable than the others. Smith v. Landry’s
    Crab Shack, Inc., 
    183 S.W.3d 512
    , 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no
    pet.); see 
    Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634
    (“An inference is not reasonable if it is
    susceptible to multiple, equally probable inferences, requiring the factfinder to
    guess in order to reach a conclusion.”). Even when viewing Peine’s proffered
    evidence in the light most favorable to him, his suggested inference is, at best, no
    more probable than appellees’ suggested explanation for the emails. Therefore, it
    is not reasonable and does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
    avoid summary judgment. See 
    Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634
    (affirming grant of plea
    to the jurisdiction after concluding that plaintiff’s evidence raised two equally
    possible inferences, one that governmental entity had subjective awareness of
    dangerous condition, the other that it did not, and therefore constituted no evidence
    that governmental entity was subjectively aware of the danger).
    Additionally, Peine’s proposed view of Watson’s emails—that he was fired
    solely for refusing to commit an illegal act—would require the court to
    impermissibly stack one inference on another. With respect to Watson’s email to
    Johnston, the multiple inferences required include: (1) Watson was referring to
    Peine as a liability because he had refused to go along with falsifying HIT
    Services’ books (rather than due to poor performance as CFO) more than six
    months before; (2) Watson also communicated those same concerns to Yates; and
    (3) Yates decided to fire Peine solely for that reason. Turning to Watson’s email to
    Blaskoski, we would have to infer: (1) that Watson was referring to Peine; (2) that
    the action they had to take immediately was to fire Peine; and (3) that they had to
    fire Peine solely because he had refused to falsify HIT Services’ books more than
    six months before. We may not stack one inference on top of another to create a
    13
    fact issue. See Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 
    106 S.W.3d 724
    , 728 (Tex. 2003)
    (explaining that an inference stacked on other inferences is legally insufficient
    evidence); Zavala v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 
    355 S.W.3d 359
    , 373 (Tex.
    App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (“Stacking inferences is insufficient to create a fact
    issue precluding summary judgment.”); Rivas v. City of Houston, 
    17 S.W.3d 23
    , 28
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. den.) (“[A] vital fact may not be
    established by stacking an inference upon an inference.”). Moreover, even if the
    first two inferences were reasonable, Watson’s emails would at most suggest that
    Peine’s refusal to perform an illegal act was a reason for his firing. Particularly in
    light of the evidence discussed above regarding other reasons for Peine’s firing,
    Watson’s emails do not support an inference that the refusal was the sole reason
    for his firing. Therefore, Watson’s emails do not create a fact issue on the sole-
    cause element of Peine’s Sabine Pilot claim.
    To the extent Peine argues that Yates—the person the undisputed summary
    judgment established made the decision to terminate him—possessed a negative
    attitude toward him, he does not point to any evidence in the record supporting that
    contention. Accordingly, we conclude this argument also does not create a fact
    issue.
    2.   Peine offered no evidence that the decision to terminate him
    was made in violation of company policy.
    Peine next argues that the decision to terminate his employment was not
    made in compliance with company policy, which creates an inference that the
    stated reason he was terminated was false. Here, the evidence was undisputed that
    Yates made the decision to terminate Peine’s employment after she learned he had
    sent confidential company information to a reporter. According to Peine, an in-
    house attorney firing an employee violated company policy.           Peine does not,
    14
    however, point to any evidence in the record establishing which policy was
    violated and how Yates firing him violated it. Instead, Peine quotes a statement his
    attorney made in posing a question during Watson’s deposition: “Well, Mr.
    Blaskoski told me Abby Yates made the decision. But that’s a managerial decision
    and not a lawyer decision.” Watson’s answer did not confirm that Yates firing
    Peine violated a company policy, and Peine does not point to any other witness
    who so testified. Because Peine offered no evidence that company policy was
    violated when he was terminated, this argument does not create a fact issue.
    3.    The outside auditor’s report is not evidence that Peine was
    terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act.
    Peine also argues that an outside auditor’s report regarding the events
    surrounding his termination supports an inference that the stated reason for his
    termination was false. According to the report,
    [d]uring the year, the financial controller of HIT Services LP made a
    number of allegations against his superiors at a local and divisional
    level. Since the original allegations were made, the employee was
    suspended and later left the Group. These allegations have been made
    public and the employee pursued a number of potential legal claims
    against the Group, all of which have been unsuccessful.
    Peine contends the auditor misstated the facts surrounding his termination because
    it reported that he (1) was suspended rather than placed on paid leave, and (2) had
    left the Group rather than specifically stating he had been terminated.
    We disagree. First, the report does not state how or why Peine left the
    Group. Second, the report does not misstate the facts of his termination or his
    administrative leave with pay. “Suspended” is defined as “to bar temporarily from
    a privilege, office, or function;” while “leave” is defined as “authorized absence
    from duty.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary New Edition (2004). In this context,
    then, being “suspended” does not imply anything materially different from being
    15
    placed on “paid leave.” Accordingly, the report does not support an inference that
    the stated reason for Peine’s termination was false.
    4.    Peine’s expert’s testimony did not create a fact issue that he
    was terminated solely for refusing to commit an illegal act.
    Peine next cites to the deposition testimony of his retained “governance
    compliance expert,” Donna Boehme. According to Peine, Boehme’s testimony
    created a fact issue because she testified that this case “presented a textbook case
    of retaliation.” Boehme did not, however, render an opinion on whether Peine’s
    disclosure to the reporter constituted a breach of his confidentiality obligations to
    his employer, or on what role this disclosure may or may not have had in his
    termination. Because Boehme did not exclude breach of Peine’s confidentiality
    obligations as a reason for his termination, her testimony does not generate a
    material issue of fact on the sole-cause element of Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of
    action. See 
    Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 633
    (“An employer who discharges an employee
    both for refusing to perform an illegal act and for a legitimate reason or reasons
    cannot be liable for wrongful discharge.”).
    5.    Peine’s co-workers’ experiences after his termination do not
    create a fact issue on Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action.
    In his appellate briefing, Peine recounts the experience of Patricia Solis, a
    staff accountant he had hired at HIT Services, following his termination.
    Specifically, Peine points out that Solis had to respond to rumors that he had been
    fired for “cooking the books at HIT Services,” and that Solis was “relieved of a
    fully functional workstation and computer for performing her job.”          Without
    further explanation, Peine asserts that these episodes support an inference that he
    was terminated for refusing to perform an illegal act. But Peine does not explain
    how these seemingly disconnected events—a third party responding to rumors and
    losing a desk and computer—can support an inference that he was terminated for
    16
    refusing to perform an illegal act. Without more, these events offer no support for
    Peine’s Sabine Pilot cause of action.        See 
    Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 634
    (“An
    inference is not reasonable if it is premised on mere suspicion . . . .”).
    6.     Temporal proximity does not support an inference that the
    sole cause of Peine’s termination was his refusal to perform
    an illegal act.
    Peine next asserts that the temporal proximity between his refusal to perform
    an illegal act and his termination supports an inference that he was fired in
    violation of Sabine Pilot. Peine alleges that he refused to follow Kumar’s orders to
    falsify HIT Services’ financial books in December 2008 and that he started
    reporting, and then continued to report, Kumar’s attempted accounting
    wrongdoings through July 2009. Peine then argues that because he was terminated
    six weeks later, temporal proximity supports an inference that he was fired for
    refusing to perform an illegal act. Even assuming that temporal proximity could,
    in some cases, create a fact issue on the sole-cause element of a Sabine Pilot claim,
    we disagree that the evidence on which Peine relies does so in this case. Cf.
    
    Safeshred, 365 S.W.3d at 664
    (“[T]he nature of a Sabine Pilot claim means that the
    illegal activity an employee is asked to do never actually occurs (because the
    employee will have refused to do it and been fired).”); Marx v. Electronic Data
    Sys. Corp., 
    418 S.W.3d 626
    , 635 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (“[E]ven
    under the but for causation standard applicable to Title VII retaliation cases, the
    mere temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse action is
    insufficient to show a causal link.”).
    As explained above, reporting allegedly illegal acts is not protected by
    Sabine Pilot. 
    Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724
    –25 (rejecting request to extend Sabine
    Pilot cause of action to private at-will employees who are discharged for reporting
    illegal activities). Because Peine contends that he made only a single refusal in
    17
    December 2008, approximately eight months before he was terminated, the timing
    of his termination does not support an inference that he was fired solely as a result
    of his refusal to commit an illegal act. See Green v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 
    199 S.W.3d 514
    , 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet denied) (concluding,
    in workers’ compensation retaliation case, that four-month gap between filing of
    compensation claim and termination did not support causal link between the two).
    Peine attempts to shorten this gap between his refusal to commit an illegal
    act and his termination by citing to Hawthorne v. Star Enterprise, Inc., 
    45 S.W.3d 757
    , 761–62 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).            In Hawthorne, the
    employer issued a standing order to employees that they physically smell water
    samples to determine whether hazardous materials had been removed. 
    Id. at 758.
    Hawthorne refused the order, directed his subordinates not to comply with it, and
    then reported the order to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
    Hawthorne was then terminated by the employer. 
    Id. at 759.
    The trial court
    granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on Hawthorne’s
    testimony that he was fired not only for refusing to commit an illegal act, but also
    for reporting the order to OSHA. 
    Id. The court
    of appeals reversed the summary
    judgment, concluding that Hawthorne’s report of the illegal order was not a
    separate act but instead was a continuation of his initial refusal. 
    Id. at 761.
    Peine
    makes the same argument here: that his reports of Kumar’s order to falsify HIT
    Services’ financial records were a continuation of his initial refusal to perform an
    illegal act.
    We initially note that Hawthorne is not binding on this Court and also that
    no other appellate court has cited Hawthorne for the proposition that a Sabine Pilot
    refusal to commit an illegal act can be continued over time by reporting the order
    to perform an illegal act to governmental authorities. We need not decide today
    18
    whether to follow Hawthorne, however, because it is distinguishable. First, unlike
    in Hawthorne, there is no evidence here that Peine continued to refuse to follow an
    order to perform any illegal act. Instead, the record reflects that Peine’s superiors
    accommodated his demands.        Second, the manager involved in Hawthorne’s
    termination testified during his deposition that he was not aware that Hawthorne
    had made a report to OSHA at the time the decision was made to fire him. This
    admission alone created a fact issue on whether Hawthorne was terminated solely
    as a result of his refusal to perform an illegal act. 
    Id. at 762.
    Because there is no
    similar testimony here, Hawthorne does not support Peine’s effort to shorten the
    time gap between his refusal to falsify HIT Services’ financial records and his
    termination.
    Finally, Peine makes several public policy arguments that he was justified in
    reporting Kumar’s order to falsify HIT Services’ financial records to company
    management and the press, and he contends these policies in favor of reporting
    illegal activity served to continue his initial refusal. The Supreme Court of Texas
    has previously addressed this issue, and it has consistently rejected every attempt
    to extend the Sabine Pilot exception and recognize a common-law cause of action
    for retaliatory discharge of an employee who reports illegal activities in a private
    workplace.     Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 
    967 S.W.2d 400
    , 400 (Tex. 1998)
    (“Because the Legislature has been so proactive in promulgating statutes that
    prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers in many areas of the private sector, we
    decline to recognize a common-law cause of action.”); 
    id. at 403
    (rejecting public
    policy arguments to extend Sabine Pilot to reporting violations of the law because
    doing so “would in large part eviscerate the specific measures the Legislature has
    already adopted”); 
    Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724
    –25; see also Ed Rachal Found. v.
    D’Unger, 
    207 S.W.3d 330
    , 332 (Tex. 2006) (“Sabine Pilot protects employees
    19
    who are asked to commit a crime, not those who are asked not to report one.”).
    This Court has likewise rejected requests to extend Sabine Pilot to terminations
    based on reports or investigations of illegal activity, concluding such expansion
    should be left to the Supreme Court of Texas or the Legislature. See Melendez v.
    Exxon Corp., 
    998 S.W.2d 266
    , 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no
    pet.); Mayfield v. Lockheed Eng’g & Scis. Co., 
    970 S.W.2d 185
    , 187–88 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Because Sabine Pilot does not
    apply to reports of illegal activity, Peine’s reports of Kumar’s actions cannot
    continue his refusal to commit an illegal act. Accordingly, Peine has failed to
    identify evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element
    of his claim that he was terminated solely for refusing to perform an illegal act.
    CONCLUSION
    Having addressed and rejected each argument raised in Peine’s single issue
    on appeal, we overrule that issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/     J. Brett Busby
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.
    20