Carlos Hernandez Camacho A/K/A Edgardo Alvarado-Camacho v. State ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00328-CR
NO. 09-13-00329-CR
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CARLOS HERNANDEZ CAMACHO
A/K/A EDGARDO ALVARADO-CAMACHO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 258th District Court
San Jacinto County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 11031, 11032
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In these appeals, Carlos Hernandez Camacho 1 complains the trial court,
during his punishment hearing, erred by considering a presentence investigation
report that included “entries alleging an arrest [in 1996] for driving while
intoxicated, and an arrest [in 2000] for criminal trespass[.]” According to
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The record reflects that Camacho is also known as Edgardo Alvarado-
Camacho.
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Camacho, the report did not show that he had been convicted of the 1996 and 2000
offenses. Based on the State’s lack of proof that he had committed these two
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, Camacho argues the trial court erred by
considering the information regarding these arrests at his sentencing hearing. At
the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Camacho to a
twenty-year sentence on both the aggravated assault case, trial cause number
11031, and on the manslaughter case, trial cause number 11032. Because the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by considering the arrests at issue, we affirm the
trial court’s judgments.
Background
Camacho pled guilty to an information charging him with aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury and an information charging him with manslaughter.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.04, 22.02 (West 2011). Camacho’s plea in each
case subjected him to a potential sentence on each case of not more than twenty
years in prison. See id. § 12.33(a) (West 2011). After the trial court found
Camacho guilty, it scheduled a sentencing hearing and requested that the State
conduct a presentence investigation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 37.07 §
3(d), 42.12 § 9(a) (West Supp. 2014).
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During the sentencing hearing, Camacho objected to the trial court
considering the information in the report regarding his 1996 and 2000 arrests. The
court overruled Camacho’s objections and considered the report, which indicates
that no records were located showing how Camacho’s 1996 and 2000 arrests were
resolved. According to Camacho, these two arrests should not have been
considered by the trial court during the sentencing hearing because the evidence
was not sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Camacho had actually committed these offenses.
Trial courts are authorized to obtain a presentence investigation before
sentencing a defendant in a felony case. See id. art. 37.07 § 3(d). The trial court is
statutorily authorized to then consider the presentence report during the sentencing
hearing. Id. “By statute, the Legislature has directed what is to be included in a
PSI, and the statute does not limit the criminal history to final convictions.”
Stringer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 42, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trial court shall
allow the defendant to review and comment on the report, and, with leave of the
court, proffer evidence as to any factual inaccuracies in the report. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 9(d), (e) (West Supp. 2014); Stringer, 309 S.W.3d at
48 (“The PSI statute also provides the defendant the opportunity to present
contrary evidence.”).
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In Smith v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court may
consider evidence of extraneous misconduct in assessing punishment when that
information is included in a presentence investigation, even where the defendant
was not shown beyond reasonable doubt to have actually committed the
misconduct. 227 S.W.3d 753, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Based on the holding in
Smith, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the
information concerning Camacho’s arrests. See id. We overrule the sole issue
raised by Camacho in his appeals.
Nevertheless, the judgment in cause number 11031, Camacho’s aggravated
assault case, contains a clerical error. The judgment the trial court rendered in this
case refers to section 19.04 of the Penal Code, a statute that makes it a crime to
commit manslaughter. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04. But, in cause number
11031, Camacho pled guilty and was convicted of aggravated assault, a conviction
based on section 22.02 of the Penal Code. See id. § 22.02.
An appeals court may modify a judgment to correct clerical errors. Bigley v.
State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We correct the clerical error
in the judgment in cause number 11031 by replacing the reference in the judgment
to section 19.04 of the Penal Code with a reference to section 22.02 of the Penal
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Code. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment in cause number 11031 is affirmed as
modified. The trial court’s judgment in cause number 11032 is affirmed.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; AFFIRMED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on May 21, 2014
Opinion Delivered September 10, 2014
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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