Ex Parte John Timothy Brantley ( 2017 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-16-00262-CR
EX PARTE JOHN TIMOTHY BRANTLEY
From the County Court at Law
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 16-0339A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellant, John Timothy Brantley, complains about the trial court’s
denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, Brantley contends that
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that: (1) his application is barred by the
doctrine of laches; and (2) a collateral consequence is insufficient to invoke habeas-corpus
jurisdiction. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the application
based on the doctrine of laches, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Here, Brantley was charged by information with intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causing bodily injury to April Mahaffey, a family member, on or about
December 5, 1998. On January 14, 1999, Brantley pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor
offense of assault.1 The trial court deferred a finding on Brantley’s guilt and placed him
on deferred-adjudication probation for one year with a $500 fine.
On July 5, 2015, Brantley filed his application for writ of habeas corpus. In his
application, Brantley argued that his 1999 guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary,
because he was not advised or warned that he was pleading guilty to an offense that
included an affirmative finding of family violence, and because he has suffered a
collateral consequence as a result of the family-violence finding.2 The State responded
that Brantley’s application is barred by the doctrine of laches.
Ultimately, the trial court denied Brantley’s application and made the following
findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On January 14, 1999, the defendant pled guilty to the offense of
assault. The Court deferred a finding of guilt and the defendant was placed
on deferred adjudication for one year.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court finds the application for the writ is barred by the Doctrine of
Laches.
2. This Court finds that the ability to legally obtain a firearm in Texas is a
collateral consequence of a plea. A plea “will not be rendered involuntary
1 Included in the plea papers that Brantley signed was a waiver of counsel.
2 Brantley has alleged that as a collateral consequence of the family-violence finding, he is ineligible
to legally obtain a firearm.
Ex parte Brantley Page 2
by lack of knowledge as to some collateral consequence.” State v. Jimenez,
987 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Based on the foregoing findings and the applicable law, this Court finds
the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the doctrine of
laches.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a habeas court’s decision on an application for a writ of habeas corpus
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ex Parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). An applicant who asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary must
prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the
habeas court’s ruling, and we must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id.;
see Ex parte Rodriguez, 378 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d). We
give almost total deference to the trial court’s findings that are “’based upon credibility
and demeanor.’” Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting
Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
In habeas corpus proceedings, “[v]irtually every fact finding involves a
credibility determination” and “the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses.” Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996). In an article 11.072 habeas case, such as the one before
us, the trial court is the sole finder of fact. Ex parte Garcia, 353 S.W.3d 785,
788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “There is less leeway in an article 11.072 context
to disregard the findings of the trial court” than there is in an article 11.07
habeas case, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals is the ultimate fact
finder.
Ex parte Brantley Page 3
Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref’d). We must also defer
“not only to all implicit factual findings that the record will support in favor of a trial
court’s ruling, ‘but also to the drawing of reasonable inferences from the facts.’” Amador
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 674-75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d
722, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
III. THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES
In his first issue, Brantley asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that the doctrine of laches barred his application for writ of habeas corpus.
Specifically, Brantley complains that the delay in filing his application was not
attributable to his own doing, but rather due to the Texas Department of Public Safety’s
recent entry of a retroactive finding of family violence in his 1999 case.
This Court has described the equitable doctrine of laches in criminal cases as
follows:
The equitable doctrine of laches refers to a party’s failure to assert a
claim which, along with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to the adverse party, bars the claim. Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d
206, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The doctrine also includes the failure, for
an unreasonable and unexplained period of time under circumstances
permitting diligence, to do what should have been done. Id. The trial court
considers the totality of the circumstances, including all forms of prejudice,
when deciding whether to apply the doctrine of laches. Id. at 208.
Since the decision in Perez, the State need not make a particularized
showing of prejudice. Id. at 215. Rather, the trial court may consider
“anything that places the State in a less favorable position, including
prejudice to the State’s ability to retry a defendant[.]” Id. “[T]he longer a
Ex parte Brantley Page 4
case has been delayed, the more likely it is that the reliability of a retrial has
been compromised.” Id. at 218. This includes “the diminished memories
of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State’s evidence,
both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a
conviction becomes final.” Id. at 216.
It may be proper for a reviewing court to consider, among all
relevant circumstances, factors such as the length of the applicant’s delay
in filing the application, the reasons for the delay, and the degree and type
of prejudice resulting from the delay. Id. at 217. No single factor is
necessary or sufficient. Id. Instead, courts must “engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process” that takes into account the parties’ overall
conduct. Id. In considering whether prejudice has been shown, a court may
draw reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence to determine
whether excessive delay has likely compromised the reliability of a retrial.
Id. If prejudice to the State is shown, a court must then weigh that prejudice
against any equitable considerations that militate in favor of granting
habeas relief. Id.
The degree of proof required is a “sliding scale.” Id. at 217. That is,
the extent of the prejudice the State must show bears an inverse relationship
to the length of the applicant’s delay. Id. The longer the delay, particularly
when the delay exceeds five years after conclusion of direct appeals, the less
evidence the State must present to demonstrate prejudice. Id. at 215.
“[D]elays of more than five years may generally be considered
unreasonable in the absence of any justification for the delay.” Id. at 216
n.12.
Ex parte Morejon, No. 10-14-00163-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5487, at **3-5 (Tex. App.—
Waco May 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Here, the record reflects that Brantley filed his application for writ of habeas
corpus on July 5, 2016—more than seventeen years after he was charged by information
with assaulting Mahaffey, a family member. See Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 215-16. However,
on January 14, 1999, Brantley signed papers pleading guilty to “the misdemeanor offense
Ex parte Brantley Page 5
of assault, said offense having been committed on or about the 5th day of December
1998.” Nowhere in the plea papers or the corresponding terms and conditions of
Brantley’s probation does it state a family-violence finding. And in his affidavit in
support of his application, Brantley explained:
Recently, I attempted to obtain a firearm but was told that I was ineligible
because the Texas Department of Public Safety classified my case as an
assault with an affirmative finding of family violence. I was never told that
an affirmative finding of family violence would be found in this case. I
would never have pleaded guilty had I known of an affirmative finding or
future collateral consequences which deem my case a family violence case.
Nevertheless, the delay of more than seventeen years between the plea and the
application is of particular importance. Brantley’s reason for the delay was only his lack
of knowledge that the plea could result in him not obtaining a firearm. Furthermore,
other than Brantley’s affidavit, the record does not contain any evidence—namely, any
documentation from the Texas Department of Public Safety—showing the alleged
affirmative finding of family violence and the subsequent denial of ownership of a
firearm. See Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d at 465 (explaining that the fact finder is the
exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and that the factfinder resolves conflicts
in the evidence); see also Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664 (noting that an applicant asserting that
his plea was not knowing and voluntary must prove his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence).
Additionally, in its response to Brantley’s application, the State contended that:
(1) Brantley has not alleged or shown any bad faith or official negligence on the part of
Ex parte Brantley Page 6
the State; (2) under the applicable case law, seventeen years was an unreasonably long
time to wait to file his application; and (3) the “long period of time . . . prejudices the State
in defending against the Defendant’s application,” especially given the difficulty in
procuring witnesses and prosecutors with recollections of the 1999 proceedings. In its
briefing, the State also points out that “[a]ny additional evidence that may have existed
at the time have been lost, due to the retention policies of both the Criminal District
Attorney’s Office and the Court.” Accordingly, the State asserts that a retrial of this
offense “would be impractical and potentially impossible”—a sentiment with which we
agree given the more than seventeen-year delay between the plea and the application.
Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in applying the equitable doctrine of laches to deny
Brantley’s application for writ of habeas corpus. See Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 210-218; Ex Parte
Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d at 324; see also Ex parte Morejon, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5487, at **3-5.
We overrule Brantley’s first issue.
IV. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
In his second issue, Brantley contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining a collateral consequence is insufficient to invoke habeas-corpus jurisdiction.
However, because we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Brantley’s application for writ of habeas corpus based on the doctrine of laches,
his second issue is immaterial; therefore, we need not address it. See State v. Dixon, 206
Ex parte Brantley Page 7
S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“We will sustain the lower court’s ruling if it is
reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the
case.” (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990))); see TEX. R. APP.
P. 47.1.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with a note)*
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed May 31, 2017
Do not publish
[CR25]
*(Chief Justice Gray dissents. A separate opinion will not issue. Chief Justice Gray
provides the following note. The Court affirms the trial court’s denial of the article 11.072
writ on the basis of laches. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072 (West 2015). I find
no evidence to support laches. Unlike Morejon, relied upon by the Court, there does not
appear to have been an evidentiary hearing in this proceeding. See Ex parte Morejon, No.
10-14-00163-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5487 (App.—Waco May 28, 2015, no pet.). Further,
the only affidavit that supports the application is that of Brantley. I do not find any other
affidavits or other potential forms of evidence upon which the trial court could have
made the finding. Delay, alone, is not adequate to support laches. See Ex parte Perez, 398
S.W.3d 206, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (no single factor is necessary or sufficient; extent
of prejudice the State must “show” is inversely related to applicant’s length of delay).
Accordingly, I dissent to the judgment of the court which affirms the trial court’s denial
Ex parte Brantley Page 8
of the application for a writ of habeas corpus by Brantley upon the finding that it is barred
by laches.)
Ex parte Brantley Page 9