Stephen Dunson v. Shirley Jacobson, Tarrant Appraisal Review Board, and Tarrant Appraisal District ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-18-00059-CV
___________________________
STEPHEN DUNSON, Appellant
V.
SHIRLEY JACOBSON, TARRANT APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD, AND
TARRANT APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellees
On Appeal from the 348th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 348-285454-16
Before Kerr and Birdwell, JJ., and Michael C. Massengale
(Former Justice, Sitting by Assignment).
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Stephen Dunson sued appellees—the appraisal authorities of Tarrant
County—over their handling of various property-tax matters in which he was involved.
The trial court granted appellees’ pleas to the jurisdiction and dismissed Dunson’s
claims with prejudice. Because we conclude that immunity bars Dunson’s claims and
that this defect is not curable, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In his petition, Dunson explained that he is a licensed property-tax consultant.
According to Dunson, property owners often engage tax-consulting firms to handle
their property-tax matters. He alleged that these consulting firms “sometimes
encounter[] logistical obstacles when acting for a property owner with numerous
properties located in multiple jurisdictions.” On such occasions, the firm will engage
the services of another tax consultant as a local representative. According to Dunson,
he often acted as a local representative, handling tax matters within Tarrant County on
behalf of consulting firms based outside the county.
But he alleged that beginning in 2015, appellees—Tarrant Appraisal District
(TAD), Tarrant Appraisal Review Board (TARB), and TARB’s then-chairman Olen
Frazier1—refused to recognize some of these local-representative arrangements as
1
Frazier left office before the conclusion of this appeal. “When a public officer
is a party in an official capacity to an appeal or original proceeding, and if that person
ceases to hold office before the appeal or original proceeding is finally disposed of, the
public officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party if appropriate.” Tex. R.
2
valid. Appellees reasoned that these arrangements potentially ran afoul of tax code
section 1.111(d), which provides that a property owner may not “designate more than
one agent to represent the property owner in connection with an item of property.”
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(d). Appellees asserted that unless a local representative
was an officer or full-time employee of the consulting firm, both the consulting firm
and the local representative would be acting as separate agents of the property owner,
in violation of section 1.111(d). Dunson alleged that based on this stance, appellees
enacted policies and issued guidance that limited his ability to appear as a local
representative. Appellees demanded proof that he was an employee of the consulting
firms he sought to represent and in some cases declined to recognize him as an
authorized representative. According to Dunson, appellees went so far as to refuse to
recognize their own tax-settlement agreements in matters in which he appeared as a
local representative.
For his part, Dunson argued that he should not be considered a separate agent
when appearing on behalf of another consulting firm. He noted that entities such as
tax-consulting firms can act only through individuals. In Dunson’s view, nothing in
section 1.111 limited a consulting firm’s ability to choose who should appear for the
firm at a tax proceeding; section 1.111 does not provide that a consulting firm may
appear only through its full-time employees. Instead, normal principles of agency
App. P. 7.2(a). Thus, Shirley Jacobson, the current chairwoman of TARB, has been
substituted for Frazier as the named appellee.
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dictate that the firm could appear at tax proceedings through any representative it chose.
And when he appeared for a consulting firm, Dunson contended, he was acting as the
consulting firm and not as a separate tax agent in violation of section 1.111.
Appellees remained unconvinced. So, Dunson filed suit, seeking a declaration
that appellees’ policies and conduct exceeded their authority under tax code section
1.111. He alleged that Frazier in particular had acted ultra vires. Dunson asked for a
declaration ensuring that he would be allowed to appear as a local representative going
forward. He also requested a declaration that his settlement agreements were valid and
binding upon TARB. Finally, Dunson prayed for attorney’s fees as well as mandamus
relief under tax code section 41.07(a) compelling appellees to decide certain outstanding
tax disputes. Id. § 41.07(a).
Appellees filed pleas to the jurisdiction. Dunson then filed a supplemental
petition in which he purported to “withdraw[] his claims for relief premised on
§ 41.07(a), Texas Tax Code.” After hearing argument, the trial court granted the pleas
to the jurisdiction and dismissed Dunson’s remaining causes of action with prejudice.
By subsequent letter, the court explained that it was not giving Dunson the opportunity
to replead because his pleadings negated subject matter jurisdiction. Dunson appeals.
II. INADEQUATE BRIEFING
As a preliminary matter, appellees contend that Dunson has inadequately briefed
his arguments because he failed to include citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(g), (i). We disagree.
4
Disposing of appeals for harmless procedural defects is disfavored. G.T. Leach
Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 517 n.12 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Perry
v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam)). Instead, appellate briefs are to
be construed reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by
waiver. Id.; see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. “Simply stated, appellate courts should reach the
merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry, 272 S.W.3d at 587.
In his brief, Dunson provided an eight-page synopsis of the factual contentions
in his petition and his supporting evidence, which he attached in his appendix. While
his initial brief lacked citations to where his petition and evidence could be found in the
record, he resolved this problem in his reply brief, in which he provided record citations
for his petition and various other documents in the appendix. See In re L.T.H., 502
S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (holding that party’s
reply brief cured a problem concerning lack of record citations). We therefore hold
that Dunson has adequately briefed his arguments.
III. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Within his appellate issue, Dunson first argues that the remainder of his petition
sufficiently alleged (1) a waiver of immunity under the declaratory judgments act as to
TAD and TARB, and (2) the ultra vires exception to immunity as to Frazier. 2
At a hearing, Dunson and appellees orally commemorated a rule 11 agreement
2
in which they clarified that some of Dunson’s claims were being withdrawn. The parties
now dispute exactly how much of Dunson’s pleadings were withdrawn by the rule 11
agreement. We need not resolve that dispute because even assuming that Dunson is
5
A. Standard of Review
Analysis of whether jurisdiction exists begins with the plaintiff’s live pleadings.
See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The
plaintiff has the initial burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial
court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally, taking
them as true, and look to the pleader’s intent. Id.
A party may present evidence to negate the existence of a jurisdictional fact
alleged in the pleadings. Id. at 227. The trial court’s review of the evidence generally
mirrors the summary judgment standard. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Johnson, 572 S.W.3d
658, 664 (Tex. 2019). If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional
issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will
be resolved by the factfinder. Id. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or
fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea
to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. This is a question of law that we review de
novo. Id.
B. TAD and TARB
Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the
State or certain governmental units have been sued unless the State consents to suit.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. We have recognized that tax authorities such as TAD and
correct that he did not withdraw the factual allegations that appellees contend were
withdrawn, those allegations do not alter our analysis or conclusions.
6
TARB are entitled to immunity—referred to as “governmental immunity”—unless it
has been waived. See City of Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see also Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547
S.W.3d 830, 839 (Tex. 2018).
Dunson first argues that he has sufficiently alleged a waiver of immunity under
the declaratory judgments act as to TAD and TARB. He contends that TAD and
TARB misinterpreted and misapplied the tax code by promulgating policies that limited
his ability to represent tax-consulting firms and by, in some cases, refusing to recognize
his authority to represent these firms. He argues that sections 37.004 and 37.006 of the
declaratory judgments act expressly waive immunity for such a claim. Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.004, .006.
Dunson’s reliance on section 37.004 is unavailing. Section 37.004 does not waive
immunity when the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or
other law, as Dunson has sought here. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618,
621 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). Section 37.004 “is not a general waiver of sovereign
immunity.” See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex.
2011). Instead, the declaratory judgments act waives immunity only in particular cases.
Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622. For example, under section 37.006(b), “the state may be a
proper party to a declaratory judgment action that challenges the validity of a statute.”
Id.
7
But Dunson has not challenged the validity of a statute. Instead, he challenges
TAD’s and TARB’s actions and policies under the tax code. Section 37.006(b) does
not waive immunity for a challenge to a governmental entity’s “actions under” a statute.
Id.; see Schmitz v. Denton Cty. Cowboy Church, 550 S.W.3d 342, 354 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g). And as for Dunson’s challenge to the
validity of TAD’s and TARB’s policies, section 37.006(b) speaks only of suits involving
the validity or constitutionality of a “statute, ordinance, or franchise.” Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006(b). A challenge to other sorts of rules, such as the policies
at issue here, “falls outside the [declaratory judgments act] altogether.” See Tex. State
Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 708 (Tex. App.—Austin
2013, no pet.); see also Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. Doe, No. 03-16-00657-CV,
2017 WL 1534209, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 20, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Sections 37.004 and 37.006 do not provide a waiver of immunity for the claims
that Dunson advances here, and Dunson has not identified any other statutory
provision that would otherwise waive immunity. We therefore conclude that Dunson
has not established a waiver of immunity as to TAD and TARB under the declaratory
judgments act.
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C. Frazier
We next consider whether Dunson has sufficiently alleged an ultra vires claim
against Frazier in his role as chairman of TARB.
Under Texas law, a suit against a governmental employee in his official capacity
is generally considered to be a suit against his governmental employer. Franka v.
Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 382 (Tex. 2011). An employee sued in his official capacity
has the same governmental immunity, derivatively, as his governmental employer. Id.
at 382–83.
A narrow exception to this rule exists for ultra vires claims; even if immunity has
not been waived by the legislature, a claim may be brought against a governmental
official if the official engages in ultra vires conduct. City of Hous. v. Hous. Mun. Emps.
Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018). Ultra vires suits do not implicate
immunity because they do not attempt to exert control over the state—they attempt to
reassert the control of the state. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex.
2009). Plaintiffs in ultra vires suits must allege, and ultimately prove, that the employee
acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. City of Hous.,
549 S.W.3d at 576.
Essentially, Dunson advances two theories as to how Frazier acted ultra vires.
First, Dunson argues that Frazier has misread section 1.111(d), which, again, provides
that a property owner may not “designate more than one agent to represent the property
owner in connection with an item of property.” Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(d).
9
Dunson argues that when he acts as a local representative of a tax-consulting firm, he
is not acting as a second agent of the property owner so as to violate section 1.111(d).
Rather, Dunson contends that in these situations, he is merely acting as a representative
of the tax-consulting firm. According to Dunson, the property owner has only one
agent—the tax-consulting firm—which acts through its representatives. He asserts that
Frazier therefore misinterpreted this section when he and the other appellees refused
to recognize Dunson’s authority to appear as a local representative and issued policies
that limited his ability to appear in this capacity.
Second, Dunson contends that Frazier acted ultra vires in that his policies and
actions violated an express limitation contained in another part of section 1.111. As
Dunson points out, section 1.111(g) provides that “[a]n appraisal district, appraisal
review board, or taxing unit may not require a person to designate an agent to represent
the person in a property tax matter other than as provided by this section.” Id. § 1.111(g)
(emphasis added). Dunson contends that this provision effectively bars Frazier from
promulgating any policy that is not specifically enunciated by section 1.111.
To the contrary, the allegedly ultra vires actions that Dunson attributes to Frazier
were taken by TARB pursuant to its authority to determine protests and challenges,
including its express authority to establish procedural rules for hearings. Further, as we
explain, we conclude that Frazier and TARB did not exceed their authority, because the
challenged policies were not adopted without reference to or in express conflict with
the constraints of the governing statutes.
10
The protections of governmental immunity are robust, but they are not absolute.
Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Hous., 487 S.W.3d 154, 163 (Tex. 2016).
Governmental immunity protects exercises of discretion, but when an employee acts
beyond his granted discretion—in other words, when he acts without legal authority—
his acts are not protected. Id.; Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. Appellees do not suggest
that Frazier had absolute discretion with respect to his challenged actions. Thus,
whether this suit attacking Frazier’s exercise of limited discretion will be barred is
dependent upon the grant of authority at issue. See Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 164. As
our supreme court has observed, many legislative grants of authority, although not
absolute, will be broad enough to bar most, if not all, allegedly ultra vires claims. Id.
(citing Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2015)).
The tax code expressly grants appraisal review boards the power to “determine
protests initiated by property owners.” Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 41.01(a)(1). Additionally,
the code expressly authorizes appraisal review boards to “establish by rule the
procedures for hearings it conducts” for the review of appraisal records and taxpayer
protests. Id. § 41.66(a). Thus, TARB’s duty to determine tax protests and to promulgate
procedural rules to govern its hearings necessarily carried with it the power to
implement the enabling laws governing taxpayer protests.
The question remains whether Frazier exceeded the bounds of his authority. “In
order to act without legal authority in carrying out a duty to interpret and apply the
law,” the government official “must have exercised discretion ‘without reference to or
11
in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing [him] to act.’” Hall v. McRaven,
508 S.W.3d 232, 242 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 163).
Unlike cases in which an official’s actions have been deemed ultra vires, such as
Brennan v. City of Willow Park, 376 S.W.3d 910, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pets.
denied) (op. on reh’g)—a case relied upon by Dunson which involved allegations that
a tax official acted outside his statutorily authorized authority—Frazier and TARB did
not transgress the express limits of section 1.111. This is illustrated by comparing the
content of section 1.111 with appellees’ alleged actions and policies. We first examine
the bounds of appellees’ authority as they are set out in the statute. See Chambers-Liberty
Ctys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 350 (Tex. 2019) (combined appeal & orig.
proceeding).
Section 1.111 provides an avenue through which a property owner may designate
another person to act as the owner’s agent. Ray v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., Nos. 04-08-
00210-CV, 04-08-00212-CV, 2009 WL 700869, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar.
18, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). A tax consultant may be an “individual, partnership,
corporation, or association.” Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1152.001(4)–(5). The designation
of a property-tax agent must be made by written authorization on a prescribed form.
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(b). That form must be signed by the owner, a property
manager authorized to designate agents for the owner, or another person authorized to
act on behalf of the owner other than the person being designated as agent. Id. The
form must clearly indicate that the person is authorized to act on behalf of the property
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owner in tax matters relating to the property or the property owner. Id. The designation
does not take effect until a copy of the designation is filed with the appraisal district.
Id. An appraisal review board shall accept and consider a motion or protest filed by an
agent of a property owner if an agency authorization is filed at or before the hearing on
the motion or protest. Id. § 1.111(i). Critically, “[a] property owner may not designate
more than one agent to represent the property owner in connection with an item of
property.” Id. § 1.111(d). The designation of an agent in connection with an item of
property revokes any previous designation of an agent in connection with that item of
property. Id.
Dunson’s own allegations show that Frazier did not exceed the limits on his
authority; rather, he attempted to carefully observe them. According to Dunson’s
petition, Frazier and TARB perceived an interpretive problem: did local-representative
arrangements, where tax agents such as Dunson would stand in for other consulting
firms, violate section 1.111(d)? As Frazier interpreted section 1.111, a property owner’s
chosen consulting firm appeared to be one tax agent, and Dunson appeared to be
another. So by Dunson’s own account, Frazier took steps to address this supposed
problem. Frazier and TARB implemented policies allowing them to require proof that
the local representative was a full-time employee of a consulting firm, such as a
“business card or other documentation to verify the affirmation,” before the local
representative would be allowed to advocate for the firm’s clients. Dunson alleged that
in 2015, Frazier and TARB questioned his authority to appear in certain cases and issued
13
policies requiring property owners to preclear their local-representative arrangements
with TAD and TARB. The policies quoted section 1.111(d)’s limitation as the reason
for these rules, saying, “The TARB will abide by this law[] and has no authority to waive
it or modify it.”
But Dunson alleged that things began to change after he filed suit in 2016.
Shortly after he filed suit, Dunson received a letter from a TAD representative
indicating that TAD would recognize Dunson as the authorized representative of a
consulting firm so long as the consulting firm submitted a formal letter, on the firm’s
letterhead, listing the accounts Dunson was authorized to represent. The TAD
representative indicated that in cases where Dunson had arranged for such a letter to
be submitted, TAD had already recognized his authority.
Also, according to Dunson’s petition and pleading exhibits, Frazier and TARB
issued revised policies shortly after he filed suit. Under the revised policies, Frazier and
TARB softened their stance. Preclearing local-representative arrangements was no
longer a rigid requirement; it was simply encouraged. The new policies emphasized that
TAD had the power to agree to recognize an individual’s authority to act on behalf of
a consulting firm. And under the 2016 policies, TAD would resolve any questions of
authority to represent a property owner; TARB and Frazier would no longer make these
decisions. Like the 2015 policies, the 2016 policies quoted section 1.111(d) as its source
of guidance.
14
Based on Dunson’s allegations, it is apparent that Frazier’s and TARB’s actions
were an effort to enforce the requirements of section 1.111(d) as Frazier and TARB
understood them. While disputed by Dunson, nothing about Frazier’s and TARB’s
course of action contravenes the text of section 1.111(d). See Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 242.
Dunson’s only argument that the TARB policies violated a statute is based on a
different provision, section 1.111(g), which provides: “An appraisal district, appraisal
review board, or taxing unit may not require a person to designate an agent to represent
the person in a property tax matter other than as provided by this section.” Tex. Tax
Code Ann. § 1.111(g). Dunson appears to argue that this section precludes Frazier and
TARB from promulgating any policy beyond what is already stated in section 1.111.
That cannot be the case, for again, the legislature expressly endowed TARB with the
authority to “establish by rule the procedures for hearings it conducts.” Id. § 41.66(a).
The policies announced and implemented by Frazier were approved by TARB in
exercise of its statutory authority to establish procedural rules. These policies did not
contravene any limitation posed by section 1.111(g); TARB’s policies did not purport
to impose additional procedural requirements beyond the bounds of section 1.111.
Instead, TARB’s policies addressed tertiary matters already within TARB’s core
mandate under the tax code, such as how TARB would communicate with agents, how
hearings would be scheduled, and how agents would demonstrate their authority to
appear on behalf of their principals.
15
We conclude that Frazier did not act ultra vires. Texas courts “have repeatedly
stated that it is not an ultra vires act for an official or agency to make an erroneous
decision while staying within its authority.” Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 242. Dunson’s petition,
even construed in the light most favorable to him, establishes that while Frazier may
have initially got it wrong, he and TARB nonetheless remained within their authority to
establish procedural rules and to verify tax agents’ compliance with the statute. We
therefore conclude that Dunson failed to sufficiently allege an ultra vires claim.
D. Opportunity to Replead
Generally, when a plea to the jurisdiction is sustained, a plaintiff is entitled to
amend his pleadings before his claims are dismissed with prejudice. Tex. A&M Univ.
Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). An exception to this rule exists where
the pleadings are incurably defective with respect to jurisdiction. Id. “If the pleadings
affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be
granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227.
Dunson has requested the opportunity to replead. However, he has made no
suggestion as to how to cure the jurisdictional defect. See Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 840
(observing that the plaintiff had “made no suggestion as to how to cure the
jurisdictional defect” and denying remand). There is simply no waiver under the
declaratory judgments act for the claims he would bring against TAD and TARB, and
pleading additional facts or different labels for his cause of action would not change his
16
predicament. See id. Moreover, because his pleadings show that Frazier acted consistent
with TARB’s authority, Dunson has affirmatively negated jurisdiction with regard to
Frazier. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. An opportunity to replead therefore “would
serve no legitimate purpose.” See Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 840. We conclude that the
trial court did not err by dismissing Dunson’s claims with prejudice.
E. Dunson’s Other Arguments
Also within his appellate issue, Dunson challenges the other grounds for
dismissal that appellees raised in the trial court: standing, mootness, and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. We have already concluded that the trial court
properly dismissed Dunson’s claims for want of jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to
consider these alternate grounds for dismissal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Molina v. City
of Pasadena, No. 14-17-00524-CV, 2018 WL 3977945, at *5 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Aug. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
IV. CONCLUSION
We overrule Dunson’s sole appellate issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Delivered: August 29, 2019
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