Richard A. Dunsmore v. State ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Opinion issued September 9, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-14-00251-CR
    NO. 01-14-00274-CR
    NO. 01-14-00306-CR
    NO. 01-14-00307-CR
    ———————————
    RICHARD A. DUNSMORE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court
    Brazoria County, Texas
    Trial Court Case Nos. 56909 and 56910
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On October 8, 2010, appellant Richard A. Dunsmore was convicted of
    sexual assault and attempted sexual assault in trial court cause numbers 56909 and
    56910. On April 12, 2012, we dismissed his untimely appeals of his convictions
    for lack of jurisdiction. See Dunsmore v. State, Nos. 01-10-00981-CR & 01-10-
    00982-CR, 
    2012 WL 1249418
     (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 12, 2012,
    pet. ref’d). Our mandate issued on December 5, 2012.
    Acting pro se, Dunsmore filed four related notices of appeal in March and
    April 2014. In Cause Numbers 01-14-00251-CR and 01-14-00306-CR, Dunsmore
    attempts to appeal two separate orders issued by the trial court in connection with
    his conviction for sexual assault in trial court cause number 56909: (1) a March 11,
    2014 order denying Dunsmore’s “Motion for Evidentiary Hearing or Issuance of
    an Order Appointing Counsel for the Defendant as to Article 11.07 Filing” and (2)
    a March 24, 2014 order denying his “Motion for the Court Judge to Request a
    Court of Inquiry Pertaining to Principle [sic] Parties Associated with Criminal
    Cause Number 56909.” In Cause Numbers 01-14-00274-CR and 01-14-00307-CR,
    Dunsmore attempts to appeal two similar orders issued in connection with his
    conviction for attempted sexual assault in trial court cause number 56910. We lack
    jurisdiction over these attempted appeals.
    Orders Denying Appellant’s Motions for Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment
    of Counsel (Cause Nos. 01-14-00251-CR and 01-14-00274-CR)
    Appeals in criminal cases are permitted only when they are specifically
    authorized by statute. See State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 
    330 S.W.3d 904
    , 915 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2006).
    Generally, a criminal defendant may appeal only from a final judgment. See State
    2
    v. Sellers, 
    790 S.W.2d 316
    , 321 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Courts of appeals do
    not have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders in a criminal appeal unless that
    jurisdiction has been expressly granted by statute. See Ragston v. State, 
    424 S.W.3d 49
    , 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Apolinar v. State, 
    820 S.W.2d 792
    , 794
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    Here, the trial court’s orders denying Dunsmore’s “Motion for Evidentiary
    Hearing or Issuance of An Order Appointing Counsel for the Defendant as to
    Article 11.07 Filing” are not final judgments nor is there a statutory grant of a
    direct appeal from interlocutory orders denying post-conviction motions for either
    an evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, No.
    05-12-01738-CR, 
    2013 WL 1286208
     (Tex. App.—Dallas March 1, 2013, no pet.)
    (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he denial of court-appointed
    counsel is not a judgment of conviction nor does it fall within the categories of
    appealable interlocutory orders.”); Zarychta v. State, No. 09-07-624-CR, 
    2008 WL 281840
     (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 16, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
    for publication) (“An order denying a post-conviction motion to compel disclosure
    of records and for an evidentiary hearing is neither a judgment of guilt nor an order
    from which an appeal is specifically authorized by statute.”); see also Poole v.
    State, No. 14-14-00115-CR, 
    2014 WL 590460
     (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.]
    Feb. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing
    3
    appeal for want of jurisdiction where trial court denied appellant’s request for free
    copy of records to pursue post-conviction writ of habeas corpus); Self v. State, 
    122 S.W.3d 294
    , 294–95 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.) (same). Because the
    orders denying Dunsmore’s motions were neither final judgments nor appealable
    interlocutory orders, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over the appeals of these
    orders in Cause Nos. 01-14-00251-CR and 01-14-00274-CR. We therefore dismiss
    the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
    Orders Denying Appellant’s Motions for Court of Inquiry (Cause Nos. 01-14-
    00306-CR and 01-14-00307-CR)
    In Cause Numbers 01-14-00306-CR and 01-14-00307-CR, Dunsmore
    attempts to appeal the trial court’s denials of his requests for a court of inquiry
    pursuant to Article 52.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE
    CRIM. P. ANN. art. 52.01 (West 2006). Chapter 52, however, does not provide for
    an appeal from an order denying a court of inquiry. See id; see also Joseph v. State,
    No. 01-11-00220-CR, 
    2011 WL 2112796
     (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May
    26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal of
    court of inquiry denial for lack of jurisdiction); In re Court of Inquiry, 
    148 S.W.3d 554
    , 555 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication) (dismissing appeal of court of inquiry termination for lack of
    jurisdiction). Again, a criminal defendant may appeal only that which is authorized
    by statute. See Lykos v. Fine, 
    330 S.W.3d at 915
    ; TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN.
    4
    art. 44.02. Because an appeal from an order denying a motion requesting a court of
    inquiry is not authorized by statute, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over appeals
    of these orders in Cause Nos. 01-14-00306-CR and 01-14-00307-CR. We therefore
    dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We
    dismiss any pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-14-00251-CR

Filed Date: 9/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014