James Henry Mills, Jr. v. State ( 2014 )


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  •     Opinion issued September 9, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    NO. 01-14-00425-CR
    ____________
    JAMES HENRY MILLS, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 248th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1402589
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement with the State, appellant, James Henry
    Mills, Jr., pleaded guilty to the felony offense of failure to comply with sex offender
    registration.1 The trial court followed the plea agreement, sentenced appellant to 20
    years in prison, and certified that this is a plea-bargain case and that there is no right
    1
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. § 62.102 (West Supp. 2013).
    to appeal. Less than 30 days later, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. In his
    notice, appellant acknowledges that he was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement,
    but states he wishes to appeal because of a mental health condition and because the
    trial court did not appoint new counsel following a pro se motion filed by appellant
    prior to trial.
    In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty
    or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment
    recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a defendant may
    appeal only those matters that were raised by written motion and ruled on before
    trial or after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2006); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The Court of Criminal
    Appeals has held that the voluntariness of a guilty plea may not be contested on
    direct appeal following a plea bargain agreement. See Woods v. State, 
    108 S.W.3d 314
    , 316 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Cooper v. State, 
    45 S.W.3d 77
    , 81, 83
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
    In this case, the record reflects that appellant pleaded guilty to the charged
    offense.      It further reflects that the trial court assessed the punishment
    recommended by the State and to which appellant had agreed. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    25.2(a)(2). Appellant does not have the trial court’s permission to appeal. See 
    id.
    2
    The basis of appellant’s appeal is twofold. First, we infer from his complaint about
    his mental health condition that he believes his guilty plea was not voluntary.
    Appellant cannot, however, raise the voluntariness of his plea as an issue on direct
    appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; Woods, 
    108 S.W.3d at
    316 &
    n.6; Cooper, 
    45 S.W.3d at 81, 83
    . Second, although appellant states he wishes to
    appeal from a motion filed and ruled on before trial, the record does not reflect a
    ruling was ever made on his motion for appointment of new counsel. While a copy
    of the motion is included in the record, it was filed by appellant pro se when he was
    already represented by counsel, and thus constitutes hybrid representation.
    Appellant is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Ex parte Bohannon, 
    350 S.W.3d 116
    , 116 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Landers v. State, 
    550 S.W.2d 272
    ,
    280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Livings v. State, 
    758 S.W.2d 16
    , 18 (Tex. App. —
    Beaumont 1988, no pet.). The trial court was under no duty to take action on any
    pro se motions filed by Mills. 
    Id.
     Therefore, appellant has no right of appeal, and
    we must dismiss this appeal “without further action.” Chavez v. State, 
    183 S.W.3d 675
    , 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    3
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We dismiss all
    pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-14-00425-CR

Filed Date: 9/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014