Joveidi Mariana-Rivera v. State ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00136-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JOVEIDI MARIANA-RIVERA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 23rd District Court
of Wharton County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Joveidi Mariana-Rivera challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial
application for writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.08 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). In what we construe as one issue, which is based on
three constitutional provisions, Mariana-Rivera contends that the trial court erred in
denying his application because section 32.51 of the penal code, which criminalizes the
fraudulent use or possession of identifying information, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.), is unconstitutional on the grounds that it creates
a “thought crime” in violation of the United States Constitution’s (1) First Amendment, (2)
Due Process Clause, and (3) Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mariana-Rivera was indicted for possessing less than five items of identifying
information of another person—specifically a social security number—with the intent to
harm or defraud another. See id. Mariana-Rivera applied for a pretrial writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the statute is facially unconstitutional. The trial court denied
relief, and Mariana-Rivera appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas relief. See Ex parte
Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“The denial of relief on a pretrial writ
of habeas corpus may be appealed immediately, but the denial of a pretrial motion may
be appealed only after conviction and sentencing.”).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Normally, a trial court’s ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Fassi, 388 S.W.3d 881, 886 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). However, this case presents a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, which is a purely legal question. See Ex
parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Therefore, our standard of review
is de novo. Id.
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B. Applicable Law
Section 32.51 of the Texas Penal Code provides in relevant part:
(a) In this section:
(1) “Identifying information” means information that alone or in
conjunction with other information identifies a person,
including a person’s:
....
(E) social security number or other government-issued
identification number.
(b) A person commits an offense if the person, with the intent to harm or
defraud another, obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses an item of:
(1) identifying information of another person without the other
person’s consent;
(2) information concerning a deceased natural person, including
a stillborn infant or fetus, that would be identifying information
of that person were that person alive, if the item of information
is obtained, possessed, transferred, or used without legal
authorization; or
(3) identifying information of a child younger than 18 years of age.
(c) An offense under this section is:
(1) a state jail felony if the number of items obtained, possessed,
transferred, or used is less than five. . . .
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51(a)(1)(E), (b), (c)(1).
In our review, we “presume that the statute is valid and that the legislature was
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary in enacting it.” Curry v. State, 186 S.W.3d 39, 42
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(1),
(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2002). If the statute may be construed in two different ways, and one
construction sustains the validity of the statute, we must use the construction that sustains
the statute’s validity. Maloney, 294 S.W.3d at 626. The party who challenges the
statute bears the burden of establishing that it is unconstitutional. See State v. Rosseau,
396 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
C. Analysis
The issue presented by Mariana-Rivera is nearly identical to the one addressed by
our sister court in Ex parte Harrington, 499 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, pet. ref’d), and it is similar to an issue addressed in Ex parte Sanchez, No. 01-16-
00180-CR, 2016 WL 4253731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). Both opinions are instructive.
Mariana-Rivera argues that section 32.51 may be construed to punish thoughts.
He contends that thoughts qualify as the “possession” of information, which means that
a person can be charged for merely thinking about another person, without that other
person’s consent, and with the intent to harm or defraud that other person. If the statute
is applied in this manner, Mariana-Rivera argues that there is no actus reus. Continuing
with that premise, he contends that an offense without an actus reus violates the
overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.
An offense must have an actus reus. See Ex parte Harrington, 499 S.W.3d at 148
(citing Ramirez–Memije v. State, 444 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Section
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6.01 of the Texas Penal Code addresses this fundamental requirement. That statute
provides that a person commits an offense “only if he voluntarily engages in conduct,
including an act, an omission, or possession.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). The statute then explains that possession
qualifies as a voluntary act “if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing
possessed.” Id. § 6.01(b). Applying section 6.01 to the current context, a person can
only face criminal liability under Section 32.51 for possessing the identifying information
of another if the person knowingly obtained or received that information without the other’s
consent. See Ex parte Harrington, 499 S.W.3d at 148 (citing Ramirez–Memije, 444
S.W.3d at 628).
As the habeas applicant in Harrington, Mariana-Rivera argues:
If I know (i.e. possess) someone’s Social Security Number I commit
no crime, but if I know someone’s Social Security Number and intend to
embarrass (i.e. harm) him or someone else, I commit a felony under Section
32.51: This is a thought crime—I may be punished for simply thinking
about a crime, or for mere daydreams.
In response to this argument, our sister court wrote:
This argument muddles the distinction between the actus reus and
the mens rea. Under Section 32.51, a person engages in proscribed
activity (the actus reus) if the person “obtains, possesses, transfers, or
uses” an item of identifying information without the other person’s consent.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.51(b). “Thinking about a crime” does not fit the
description of any of these proscribed activities. However, having a
criminal thought could describe the culpable mental state (the mens rea) if
the person engaged in a proscribed activity “with the intent to harm or
defraud another.” Id. The thought itself would not be punishable, but the
proscribed activity would be. And if the proscribed activity was the
possession of identifying information, the act of possession would
encompass the act of coming into possession of that information. Id. §
6.01(b).
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We conclude that Section 32.51 contains an actus reus requirement
and does not proscribe mere thought crimes.
Ex parte Harrington, 499 S.W.3d at 148. The analysis in Harrington is persuasive,
Mariana-Rivera provides us with no argument for why we should deviate from our sister
court, and we decline to do so.
In Ex parte Sanchez, the court addressed a similar “thought crime” argument by
looking to the text of the statute. Specifically, the court wrote:
The [Texas] Penal Code defines “possession” as “actual care,
custody, or management,” terms which suggest physical possession of
tangible items. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2011). Black’s
Law Dictionary similarly defines possession in terms that suggest control of
physical items, referring to it as “the exercise of dominion over property.”
Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Because the usual
definition of the term assumes physical control, we construe possession in
this context to require physical control of identifying information in written or
recorded form. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(39), 32.51; Maloney
v. State, 294 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
ref’d); Goldberg v. State, 95 S.W.3d 345, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). This construction comports with the general
purpose of the [Texas] Penal Code, which is to deal with actually or
potentially harmful conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02.
Although Sanchez is an unpublished memorandum opinion and lacks precedential value,
see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(a), as with Harrington, we find it persuasive. Also as with
Harrington, Mariana-Rivera provides us with no argument for why we should deviate from
our sister court, and we decline to do so.
Mariana-Rivera’s sole issue is overruled.
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III. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
26th day of July, 2018.
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