Trina Shaw v. Mason Friendswood OP, LLC D/B/A Friendship Haven Healthcare ( 2014 )

Opinion issued September 23, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-01098-CV
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TRINA SHAW, Appellant
V.
MASON FRIENDSWOOD OP, LLC D/B/A FRIENDSHIP HAVEN
HEALTHCARE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 212th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 11CV0513
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Trina Shaw appeals the trial court’s orders granting appellee, Mason
Friendswood OP, LLC d/b/a Friendship Haven Healthcare’s joint motion for
summary judgment and motion to dismiss Shaw’s defamation claim. We affirm.
Background
Shaw filed suit against Friendship Haven asserting a claim for defamation on
March 24, 2011, 1 which Friendship Haven timely answered. Two weeks later,
Shaw’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as her counsel. Thereafter, Friendship
Haven filed a joint no-evidence motion for summary judgment and motion to
dismiss, and the following day, the trial court denied Shaw’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw. No response to Friendship Haven’s motion was filed.
On September 17, 2012, the trial court granted Friendship Haven’s joint
motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. Shaw, in her pro se
capacity, filed her timely motion for new trial which, following a hearing, was
denied on October 30, 2012.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment
de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). A
party seeking a no-evidence summary judgment must assert that no evidence exists
as to one or more of the essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim on which the
1
In her suit, Shaw alleged that an administrator from Friendship Haven called to
inform her then-employer, Protouch Staffing, that it had terminated Shaw’s
employment because Shaw had committed theft at the facility. She also alleged
that Friendship Haven told Protouch Staffing that she had been arrested, charged,
and convicted as a result of the incident.
2
nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. Miles v. Lee Anderson Co.,
339 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). In
conducting our no-evidence summary judgment review, we will “review the
evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence
favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286
S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d
572, 582 (Tex. 2006)). Once the movant specifies the elements on which there is
no evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue on the
challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Summary judgment must be granted
unless the nonmovant produces competent summary judgment evidence raising a
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. Hamilton v. Wilson, 249
S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). A no-evidence summary judgment will be sustained
on appeal when (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the
court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only
evidence offered by the nonmovant to prove a vital fact, (3) the nonmovant offers
no more than a scintilla of evidence to prove a vital fact, or (4) the nonmovant’s
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. King Ranch, Inc. v.
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
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B. Analysis
Shaw challenges the trial court’s orders granting Friendship Haven’s no-
evidence motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. Friendship Haven
contends that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in its favor
because Shaw failed to raise a fact issue on any of the elements of her claim.
To establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the
defendant published a factual statement, (2) that was capable of defamatory
meaning, (3) concerning the plaintiff, (4) while acting with either negligence, if the
plaintiff is a private individual, or actual malice, if the plaintiff is a public figure or
public official, concerning the truth of the statement. See WFAA–TV, Inc. v.
McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998); Miranda v. Byles, 390 S.W.3d 543,
573 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). In its no-evidence
motion, Friendship Haven argued that Shaw had presented no evidence that an
employee of Friendship Haven had made a defamatory statement about her.2
Once Friendship Haven specified the elements on which there was no
evidence, the burden shifted to Shaw to raise a fact issue on the challenged
elements. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Shaw, however, did not present any
evidence to the trial court raising a fact issue regarding any of the challenged
2
Friendship Haven also asserted in its motion that Shaw had failed to show that she
was terminated from her employment at Protouch Staffing as the result of, or
otherwise damaged by, the alleged defamatory statement.
4
elements of her cause of action.3 Because Shaw failed to meet her burden under
Rule 166a(i), Friendship Haven was entitled to a no-evidence summary judgment
on Shaw’s defamation claim. See Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (stating summary
judgment must be granted unless nonmovant produces competent summary
judgment evidence raising genuine issue of material fact on challenged elements);
King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 742 (noting no-evidence summary judgment will
be sustained on appeal when there is complete absence of evidence of vital fact).
Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Friendship Haven. We overrule Shaw’s issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jim Sharp
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.
3
The record reflects that Shaw was represented by counsel at the time her summary
judgment response was due to be filed.
5