the Town of Annetta South, Texas Gerhard Kleinschmidt James Ablowich Phillip Kuntz And David Goolsby v. Seadrift Development, L.P. ( 2014 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-12-00171-CV
    THE TOWN OF ANNETTA SOUTH,                          APPELLANTS/APPELLEES
    TEXAS; GERHARD
    KLEINSCHMIDT; JAMES
    ABLOWICH; PHILLIP KUNTZ; AND
    DAVID GOOLSBY
    V.
    SEADRIFT DEVELOPMENT, L.P.                             APPELLEE/APPELLANT
    ----------
    FROM THE 415TH DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. CV11-0220
    ----------
    DISSENTING OPINION
    ----------
    This cross-appeal requires this court to determine whether a municipality’s
    minimum lot size requirement, when applied to property within the municipality’s
    extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ), 1 violates a local government provision that
    prohibits a municipality from regulating the number of residential units that can be
    built per acre of land within its ETJ. Because I conclude that the ordinance at
    issue does not violate the local government code, I respectfully dissent.
    Local government code section 212.002 provides that a municipality may
    adopt rules governing plats and subdivisions of land within its jurisdiction. 2 When
    a municipality adopts rules under section 212.002, section 212.003 authorizes it
    to apply those rules to the territory in its ETJ. 3 Not every municipal ordinance
    adopted under section 212.002 may be extended into the ETJ, however, and
    section 212.003 also includes a list of what municipalities may not regulate in
    their ETJ. 4 And under that section, unless otherwise authorized by state law, a
    municipality may not regulate “the number of residential units that can be built
    per acre of land.” 5
    1
    See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 
    111 S.W.3d 22
    , 26 (Tex. 2003)
    (“Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to ‘the unincorporated area that is contiguous
    to the corporate boundaries of the municipality’ and is located within a specified
    distance of those boundaries, depending upon the number of inhabitants within
    the municipality.”).
    2
    Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 212.002 (West 2008).
    3
    
    Id. § 212.003(a).
          4
    
    Id. 5 Id.
    § 212.003(a)(4).
    2
    Seadrift argued in its summary judgment motion that by adopting the
    limitations in 212.003(a), “the Legislature was prohibiting municipalities from
    limiting residential density in a town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.” It contended
    that the Town’s ordinance would prohibit it from putting more than one detached
    single-family home on a single lot. It then asserted that because this ordinance
    requires two-acre lots and because other ordinances of the Town prohibit putting
    more than one detached single-family home on each lot, the Town’s ordinance
    was merely a method for it to do what was otherwise prohibited by state law:
    limit the density of residential development. The trial court agreed with Seadrift,
    as does the majority of this panel.
    I see two problems with Seadrift’s density argument.          First, the local
    government code shows that the legislature knows how to say “density” when it
    means density. As the Town points out, in the local government code section
    setting out generally what zoning regulations a municipality may make, it states
    that a municipality may regulate “population density.” 6 And while the zoning
    regulations allowed under section 211.003 are remarkably similar to the
    regulations not allowed to be imposed in the municipality’s ETJ under section
    212.003, the legislature chose not to make these provisions identical. It did not
    transfer the “population density” language of section 211.003 to the restrictions in
    section 212.003. If the legislature had intended to prohibit under section 212.003
    6
    
    Id. § 211.003(a)(4).
    3
    all of the regulations discussed in section 211.003, it could have easily done so.
    Instead, it chose to prohibit under 212.003 only some of the kinds of regulations
    listed in section 211.003. It could have used the term “population density” in
    section 212.003, as it did in section 211.003, but it chose not to.
    The second problem with Seadrift’s density argument is that this ordinance
    does not regulate population density. That is, even if section 212.003 contained
    a prohibition on regulating density, the ordinance would not violate it. Texas law
    treats a condominium unit, a townhouse, and an apartment unit as a “residential
    unit.” 7 As Seadrift conceded at oral argument, nothing in the Town’s ordinances
    stopped it from putting multifamily homes on its property.        Thus, as Seadrift
    concedes, the lot-size ordinance does not regulate how many residential units
    Seadrift may put on each acre.
    Perhaps in adopting section 212.003, the legislature intended to prevent
    municipalities from regulating lot size or building density in its ETJ. But that is
    not what the statute says, and that is not what the context of the statute
    7
    See, e.g., Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 214.1955(a) (West 2008) (“A
    municipality may not refuse to issue an alarm system permit for a residential
    location solely because the residential location is an individual residential unit
    located in a multiunit housing facility.”); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 12.017(b)(1)
    (West Supp. 2014) (“This section applies only to a mortgage on: (1) property
    consisting exclusively of a one-to-four-family residence, including a residential
    unit in a condominium regime.”), § 62.003(2)(A)(B) (West 2007) (stating that the
    term “[c]ommercial real estate” does not include “real estate improved with one to
    four residential units” or “a single-family residential unit, including a
    condominium, townhouse, or home in a subdivision, if the unit is . . . conveyed on
    a unit-by-unit basis and regardless of whether the unit is part of a larger building
    or located on real estate containing more than four residential units”).
    4
    suggests.    The plain language of section 212.003 prohibits regulation of the
    number of residential units per lot. 8 The plain language of the Town’s ordinance
    regulates lot size.
    The ordinance stops Seadrift from developing the property in the way it
    would prefer.    Section 212.003, however, does not give a developer carte
    blanche to develop land in an ETJ for whatever use it would prefer. The limit on
    the number of residential units that Seadrift may put on its property is the result
    of Seadrift’s own choice to build only single-family homes. I would hold that the
    trial court erred by declaring that the Town’s ordinance setting out a minimum lot
    size in its ETJ violated state law and by granting summary judgment for Seadrift
    on that basis.
    The majority opinion states that “although multiple duplexes, triplexes, and
    apartment complexes may technically be built on a single two-acre lot in the
    Town’s ETJ, they can never be individually sold.” 9 I disagree with the majority’s
    emphasis on buyers as opposed to residents. If a developer may put apartments
    on a two-acre lot, then the ordinance is not limiting density just because the
    apartment units all have the same owner. Density does not depend on how
    many individual properties can be sold from a two-acre tract. Density depends
    8
    See Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 
    376 S.W.3d 742
    , 747 (Tex. 2012)
    (looking at a statute’s plain and common meaning of the statute’s words to
    discern the intent of the statute).
    9
    Majority op. at 10.
    5
    on how many residents could live there. Because nothing in the ordinance limits
    the number of residents who may reside on a two-acre lot, the ordinance does
    not regulate density. I would sustain the Town’s first issue and render judgment
    that Seadrift take nothing on its suit.
    /s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
    LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
    JUSTICE
    DELIVERED: September 25, 2014
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-12-00171-CV

Filed Date: 9/25/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014