Rolando Bosquez v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00401-CR
NO. 02-13-00402-CR
ROLANDO BOSQUEZ APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1311910D, 1331026D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Rolando Bosquez appeals from his convictions for possession of
a firearm by a felon and possession of a controlled substance. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
During the early morning hours of January 21, 2013, Fort Worth Police
Officer Benjamin Bucy was on patrol when he heard two “pops.” Bucy then saw
a red truck and a white truck speed toward him, with the red truck following the
white truck. The driver of the white truck saw Bucy and started honking and
waving his arms at Bucy. Bucy followed the trucks. The driver of the white truck
pulled over, but the red truck continued on. Bucy approached the driver of the
white truck who told Bucy that the “guy in that red truck just shot [at his white
truck] two times.” Bucy caught up to the red truck and pulled it over.
Bucy determined that the driver of the red truck was Appellant and his
passenger was Alicia Happy. Bucy saw a gun on the seat between Appellant
and Happy. Bucy searched the truck and found bullets, two spent casings, a gun
holster, and four baggies appearing to contain methamphetamine. The
methamphetamine was found in the driver’s door panel and was later determined
to weigh 6.34 grams. The red truck was registered to Appellant. Bucy arrested
Appellant and gave him the required warnings. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 38.22, § 2(a) (West Supp. 2014). Appellant waived his right to remain silent
and gave Bucy a written statement in which he claimed that the driver of the
white truck pulled out a pistol after they disagreed “on who was going first” at a
traffic light. Appellant averred that when the driver of the white truck started to
roll down his back window, Appellant “ducked and shoot [sic] in the air.”
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Appellant wrote that he “told the officer that guy had a gun” when Bucy pulled
him over. A grand jury indicted Appellant for unlawful possession of a firearm
(the January gun case) and for possession of one gram or more but less than
four grams of methamphetamine (the January drug case). See Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115 (West 2010); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
46.04 (West 2011).2
On June 18, 2013, while the January gun case and the January drug case
were pending, Fort Worth Police Officer Anthony Tobar saw a red truck that had
a nonworking license-plate light.3 When Tobar stopped the red truck, Tobar
determined that the driver was Appellant and that the red truck was registered in
Appellant’s name. When Tobar approached Appellant, he “could smell alcohol
coming from within the vehicle and from within [Appellant’s] breath.” After
searching the truck, Tobar found several small bags containing 20.48 grams of
methamphetamine and scales under the driver’s seat and a glass pipe with drug
residue in the glove compartment. A grand jury indicted Appellant for possession
with the intent to deliver more than 4 but less than 200 grams of
2
The State alleged that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited in the
January drug case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (West
Supp. 2014).
3
Tobar was familiar with the red truck because he had seen the same truck
the day before and had determined that the truck’s registration was expired.
Tobar was unable to stop the truck, however, because the driver “quickly pulled
into an apartment complex and quickly exited and began to enter a residence.”
3
methamphetamine (the June drug case). See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§§ 481.102(6), 481.112 (West 2010).
B. PROCEDURE
Before trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion to consolidate the
January gun case, the January drug case, and the June drug case into one trial.
See id. § 481.132 (West 2010). The State also filed a motion in limine in the
June drug case directed to any oral statements made by Appellant because they
were self-serving and potentially inadmissible. See Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d
146, 152–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (discussing when self-serving declarations
are admissible). This motion was agreed to by Appellant. In the January gun
case and the June drug case, Appellant filed motions in limine also directed to
his statements, including his statements given to police officers.
Appellant testified at trial and asserted that the driver of the white truck
shot at Appellant before Appellant returned fire. Appellant explained that after
the driver of the white truck shot at him, Happy handed Appellant a pistol he had
never seen before and that he shot the gun into the air. Regarding the June drug
case, Appellant testified that the drugs and paraphernalia may have been
inadvertently left in his truck by his friend, J.P., who had done mechanical work
on the truck on June 17, 2013, and had kept the truck until June 18—the day
Tobar arrested Appellant.
During cross-examination of Appellant, the State questioned why
Appellant’s trial testimony was the first time Appellant accused the driver of the
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white truck of shooting first in the January gun case. Appellant explained that his
written statement included the fact that he “told the officer that he had a gun,”
that he thought he had written that the driver of the white truck had shot first in
his statement, and that he had verbally told Bucy he had been shot at when Bucy
pulled him over. The State asked Appellant how J.P. could have planted the
drugs in his truck in the June drug case given Tobar’s testimony that he saw
Appellant driving the red truck on June 17. Appellant explained that when Tobar
saw him on June 17, he was on his way to J.P.’s house to leave the truck.
At the conclusion of Appellant’s testimony, Appellant’s counsel requested
that the video of Appellant’s “arrest and interaction with Officer Tobar” in the June
drug case be admitted into evidence as a prior consistent statement to rebut the
State’s fabrication allegation: “[Appellant] was explaining [to Tobar] that he just
picked the car up from [his friend] just like he told the jury.” The State argued
that such evidence was inadmissible because it would improperly bolster
Appellant’s trial testimony and constituted hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 613(c),
801(d). The trial court denied Appellant’s request but included the video in the
appellate record. See Tex. R. Evid. 103. During the State’s closing jury
argument, the prosecutor argued that Appellant had “excuse after excuse after
excuse” to explain the presence of the gun and the drugs. The prosecutor
questioned whether it was “really reasonable that [Appellant] didn’t know and
these weren’t his drugs” and again stressed that Appellant’s written statement in
the January gun case contained nothing “about the other car shooting at him.”
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The jury found Appellant not guilty in the January drug case. However, the jury
found Appellant guilty in the January gun case and the June drug case and
assessed his punishment at eight years’ confinement and fifteen years’
confinement, respectively.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellant raises a single point and asserts that the trial court
erred by denying his request to admit the video of his discussion with Tobar in
the June drug case to rebut the State’s allegation of fabrication. We review a trial
court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion and will not
reverse the exercise of that discretion if it is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). If
an abuse occurred, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the error
affected a substantial right of the appellant, i.e., the error had a substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Walters v.
State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 218–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Hammons v. State, 239
S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Tex.
R. Evid. 103(a).
In general, a witness’s prior statement that is consistent with the witness’s
trial testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Tex. R. Evid. 613(c). A prior consistent
statement is admissible, however, “to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(1)(B). To fall within this
hearsay exception, (1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-
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examination, (2) there must be an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication, (3) the statement must be consistent with the
declarant’s in-court testimony, (4) the prior consistent statement must be offered
to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication, and (5) the prior
consistent statement must have been made before the alleged motive to
fabricate arose. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156–58, 115 S. Ct.
696, 700–01 (1995); Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804; Dowthitt v. State, 931
S.W.2d 244, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). To determine whether the cross-
examination of a witness establishes an implied charge of fabrication, we
consider the totality of the record and may look to such clues as voir dire,
opening statements, and closing arguments. See Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 808.
We first note that the State and Appellant seem to be talking past each
other. The State asserts that the video from the June drug case could not be
admitted to rebut the State’s implication of fabrication in the January gun case.
Appellant also seems to argue, at least in part, that the video of the June drug
case should have been admitted to rebut the State’s attack on Appellant’s failure
to include information in his written statement in the January gun case. But the
video related to Appellant’s verbal statements made to Tobar in the June drug
case, not his written statement to Bucy in the January gun case. Appellant,
however, additionally argues that the video was admissible to rebut the State’s
implication that he fabricated his testimony about how the drugs in the June drug
case could have been found in his truck—J.P. left them there after fixing
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Appellant’s truck.4 Appellant’s specific argument on appeal is that “[t]he in-car
video contained prior statements that were consistent with Appellant’s testimony
on the day of the trial; thus, the purpose of playing this video was to demonstrate
a prior consistent statement.” See generally Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The
statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary
question that is fairly included.”). Appellant testified at trial that he believed J.P.
planted the drugs in his truck, and the State on cross-examination had Appellant
reiterate that he believed J.P. had planted the drugs in his truck in the June drug
case. The State questioned the credibility of Appellant’s explanation during
closing arguments.
The record shows that the State did not expressly or implicitly charge
Appellant with recent fabrication in the June drug case. In the January gun case,
the State expressly questioned the veracity of Appellant’s trial testimony that the
driver of the white truck shot first based on the lack of such a statement in
Appellant’s written statement to Bucy. But in the June drug case, the State did
not imply that Appellant had recently fabricated his testimony that J.P. planted
the drugs in the truck. In the June drug case, the State merely questioned
Appellant’s credibility, which does not equate to a charge of recent fabrication.
See Tex. R. Evid. 611(b); Linney v. State, 401 S.W.3d 764, 781–82 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d). The totality of the State’s questions on
4
Appellant testified that he assumed J.P. uses drugs.
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cross-examination regarding the June drug case merely attacked Appellant’s
general credibility and did not suggest that he had recently fabricated his story
about J.P. or that he had consciously altered his testimony. See Linney, 401
S.W.3d at 781–82. See generally Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 806 (explaining
totality of cross-examiner’s questions must be considered in deciding whether
cross-examination implied an intent by the witness to fabricate and, thereby,
opened the door to the admission of a prior consistent statement by the witness).
Because there was no allegation of recent fabrication in the June drug case, the
video was hearsay; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s request to introduce the video. See Tex. R. Evid. 613(c).
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s statement that “[i]f . . .
Appellant’s prior statement was offered only for the purpose of showing . . . that
the words were spoken during Appellant’s earlier exchanges with the officer and
not recently fabricated for purposes of trial, then the statement is not hearsay.”
The exhibit not admitted in this case—the in-car video from the June drug case—
does not include any prior statement, consistent or otherwise, relating to the
January gun case, which is the case in which the State raised recent fabrication.
Indeed, Appellant’s written statement to Bucy in the January gun case was
admitted into evidence.
Even if the State sufficiently implied recent fabrication in the June drug
case, Appellant’s statements to Tobar were not made before Appellant had a
motive to fabricate. Appellant’s videoed statement was made after Tobar pulled
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Appellant over and found drugs in Appellant’s truck. Appellant’s motive to
fabricate was present at the time of his stop and arrest in the June drug case as
well as during trial. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, No. 11-10-00057-CR, 2012 WL
424918, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 9, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“Because appellant had the same motive to lie at the
time of his statement to his mother as he did during his testimony at trial, his
statement to his mother on the night of the incident was not admissible to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication.”); Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 503–04 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (“The record shows that Lofton’s motive to
fabricate arose in the summer of 2002 . . . . Because Lofton’s January 2003
statement was made after the motive to fabricate arose, it did not rehabilitate
Lofton and was not admissible . . . .”). Because the record does not support
admission of the video of Appellant’s prior consistent statement under rule
801(e)(1)(B), it was inadmissible hearsay evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 613(c).
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying its admission.
We further note that even if the dissent were correct and the trial court had
abused its discretion by excluding the video, we would be compelled to analyze
whether any harm arising from the error affected Appellant’s substantial rights.
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a). Substantial rights are not
affected by the erroneous exclusion of evidence “if the appellate court, after
examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In the January gun case—the case in which the State
charged recent fabrication—Appellant testified that his conduct satisfied every
element of the offense charged. Appellant did not request that any defensive
issues be submitted in the court’s charge for the January gun case. In the
context of the entire record, from voir dire through the trial court’s charge to the
jury, any error in excluding the video did not substantially or injuriously affect the
jury’s verdict. Thus, we must disregard any error in the exclusion of the video.
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
III. CONCLUSION
Appellant’s prior consistent statement in the June drug case was
inadmissible hearsay. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding this hearsay evidence, we overrule Appellant’s sole point. We affirm
the trial court’s judgments. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DAUPHINOT, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: September 25, 2014
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