Petrohawk Energy Corporation v. Overwatch Enterprises, LLC ( 2016 )

ACCEPTED
04-16-00282-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
5/31/2016 7:06:35 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
04-16-00282-CV
________________________________________________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 4th COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
5/31/2016 7:06:35 PM
________________________________________________________________________
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
Petrohawk Energy Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
Overwatch Enterprises, LLC,
Plaintiff–Appellee.
________________________________________________________________________
ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE 36th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, MCMULLEN COUNTY, TEXAS, CAUSE NO: M-14-0051-CV-A
________________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING
APPELLATE REVIEW OF ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
________________________________________________________________________
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration.1 Appellant Petrohawk Energy Corporation (“Petrohawk”) filed the motion to
compel arbitration on March 4, 2016. 2 On April 27, 2016, the motion to compel
1
Petrohawk submits in support of this Motion a sworn Appendix containing documents relevant
to the Court’s determination of the issue presented here. A copy of the trial court’s order denying
the motion to compel arbitration is provided in the Appendix at Tab A. The timely-filed notice
of appeal, dated May 3, 2016, is attached at Tab B.
2
The motion, without its exhibits, is attached at Appendix Tab C. The Clerk’s Record and
Reporter’s Record became available to Petrohawk on May 26, 2016, though as delivered they are
incomplete in some respects. The Clerk’s Record in its present form is cited herein as CR ___
and the Reporter’s record as RR ___. The motion to compel arbitration, entitled Defendants’
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, appears with its exhibits at CR 111.
arbitration was heard before the Honorable Joel B. Johnson, visiting judge. At the
hearing, counsel for Appellee Overwatch Enterprises, LLC (“Overwatch”) explicitly
argued that Judge Johnson should deny Petrohawk’s motion because Petrohawk would be
allowed to appeal:
If they want to check your decision, they have a right to go and check that
decision on appeal . . . If they want to check your decision, they can. We
can’t. We get sent off to arbitration, somebody in Houston, one man, will
get to make a decision on this.3
Judge Johnson denied the motion to compel arbitration, on grounds of waiver, at the
conclusion of the hearing.4 Trial is set for July 18, 2016, just seven weeks away.5 After
attempting to confer with Overwatch’s counsel—who had stated to the court at the
hearing that he was “not necessarily opposed to a continuation of the jury trial,”6 but
ultimately did not agree to any continuation—Petrohawk on May 6, 2016, filed a motion
asking the trial court to stay proceedings and continue the trial while Petrohawk pursued
this appeal with respect to arbitration.7 That motion to stay and continue was denied by
Judge Patrick Flanigan in an order signed May 25, 2016, which stated that “if
Interlocutory Appeal is permitted in the case, the Court of Appeals may consider
Defendant’s Motion for Stay.”8
3
Transcript, Appendix Tab D at 33:13–14, 34:3–5.
4
See id. at 34:14–19.
5
CR 107.
6
See Transcript, Appendix Tab D at 36:12–14. Counsel may have been referring to a
continuance for a fixed time, as opposed to a continuance for the duration of the appeal.
7
See Appendix Tab E.
8
See Appendix Tab F. Petrohawk does not appeal this order of May 25, 2016.
2
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 allows this Court to “make any temporary
orders necessary to preserve the parties’ rights” while an interlocutory appeal is under
consideration. Petrohawk’s contractual right to arbitration will be irreparably damaged if
this case proceeds to trial in a court rather than adjudication by the American Arbitration
Association as called for in the contract at the center of Overwatch’s claims.9 Petrohawk
accordingly files this Motion requesting a stay of all trial court proceedings pursuant to
Rule 29.3.10
I. Background
Plaintiff Overwatch filed this case in McMullen County, Texas on October 20,
2014. Overwatch’s live pleading is the “Second Amended Original Petition” (herein
“SAP”) filed August 24, 2015. 11 The SAP revolves around a 2012 Master Service
Contract (“2012 MSC”)12 that Appellee Overwatch defines as “the Contract” at the outset
of the SAP:
OTG Services, LLC (hereafter “OTG”) had an ongoing contractual
relationship with Defendant, PETROHAWK ENERGY
CORPORATION, for the provision of security and gate guard services at
various oil and gas well locations in South Texas. On or about February 9,
2012, Defendant and OTG Services, LLC entered into a “Master Service
Contract” (sometimes referenced herein as “the Contract.”), which was
assigned to Plaintiff [Overwatch].
9
See Part I, infra.
10
To be clear, Petrohawk has not appealed the denial of its May 6, 2016 motion for stay and
continuance pending appeal in the trial court. That motion was directed to the trial court’s
continuing ability to make orders related to the case. See Tex. R. App. P. 29.5. This Motion,
before this Court, is directed to this Court’s discretion.
11
See Appendix Tab G; CR 69.
12
See Appendix Tab H (as filed with business records affidavit).
3
SAP (Tab G) ¶ 4. Overwatch seeks to recover amounts that it claims to be owed in
connection with the security and gate guard services it provided under the 2012 MSC.
Overwatch alleges that Petrohawk breached the 2012 MSC and “fail[ed] to perform” it,
and specifically that Petrohawk failed to pay for services under it, delayed payments, and
otherwise failed in its contractual duties. See Id. ¶ 17. Overwatch also alleges
misrepresentations (concerning outstanding invoices under the 2012 MSC) and breach of
an alleged oral agreement (which Plaintiff asserts established a “custom, practice, and
course of dealing” under the 2012 MSC). See id. at ¶¶ 5–6, 10. These allegations
concern and arise out of Overwatch’s provision of security and gate guard services as set
forth in the 2012 MSC. Prior to the SAP, filed August 24, 2015, Overwatch’s Petitions
did not rely specifically on the 2012 MSC, but instead asserted a vague “ongoing
contractual relationship.”13
Throughout 2015, the parties conducted some preliminary discovery, taking five
depositions and serving a small number of discovery requests in both directions.14 As of
August 25, 2015—the day after the SAP was filed—Overwatch stated in a discovery
response that “[f]ormal discovery has just begun.”15
Shortly thereafter, the case entered into a period of inactivity—no discovery, no
motions, no contested hearings—that continued for six months until Petrohawk moved to
compel arbitration on March 4, 2016. During this time, the parties jointly represented to
the Court that they needed additional time to mediate, and that further time and discovery
13
See Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition CR 37, at ¶ 4.
14
See also hearing transcript, Appendix Tab D, at 14:17–20 (discussing Petrohawk’s requests).
15
See Plaintiff’s Responses to Request for Disclosure, Appendix Tab I, at 9.
4
were necessary before the case could be adjudicated. On September 1, 2015 (eight days
after the SAP was filed), Plaintiff and Defendant filed a Joint Motion for Continuance.16
In that motion, the parties jointly represented that scheduling conflicts had prevented
mediation and “full discovery,” and stated in particular that “approximately five (5)
additional depositions may be required.” Id. In response to this Motion, the Court issued
an order resetting trial for February 29, 2016.17 Subsequently, in response to further joint
request of the parties, the Court reset trial for July 18, 2016.18
It is undisputed that the parties never did conduct the discovery or mediation
contemplated by the September 1, 2015 Joint Motion for Continuance. Mediation was
postponed several times, at the instance of counsel for both parties.19 The depositions
and “full discovery” contemplated by the September 1 motion did not ever take place.
On March 4, 2016, Petrohawk filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings,20 seeking to compel arbitration of the entire dispute under the 2012 MSC,
and to stay the case under the nondiscretionary stay provision of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem
Code § 171.025(a) (“The court shall stay a proceeding that involves an issue subject to
arbitration if an order for arbitration or an application for that order is made under this
subchapter.”) The motion could not be set for hearing until April 27, 2016.
16
See Appendix Tab J.
17
CR 93.
18
CR 107.
19
See Transcript, Appendix Tab C at 27:1–3 (mediation postponed due to scheduling conflict on
the part of Overwatch’s counsel). Mediation was also postponed at the instance of Petrohawk’s
counsel. Subsequent to denial of the motion to compel arbitration, the parties again scheduled
mediation for June 17, 2016.
20
Appendix Tab C (without exhibits); CR 111ff. (with exhibits); see also CR 157ff..
5
On April 25, 2016, Overwatch filed a Response that asserted waiver of right to
arbitrate as the sole argument in opposition to arbitration.21 Petrohawk filed a reply the
next day, April 26, 2016, contesting the waiver argument and providing extensive
citations to Texas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals case law compelling arbitration
in cases with more and lengthier litigation activity than the present case.22 The hearing
took place April 27, 2016.
At the hearing, Counsel for Petrohawk emphasized that waiver was the only
argument made in Overwatch’s Response, 23 and that Overwatch bore the burden to
establish waiver.24 Counsel for Petrohawk argued that Petrohawk had not substantially
invoked the litigation process inter alia because (1) only limited discovery had been
conducted, most of it benefitted Overwatch, and document production had been
overwhelmingly by Petrohawk, not Overwatch, 25 (2) both parties had been content to
leave the case essentially inactive for six months before Petrohawk moved to compel
arbitration,26 and (3) the law heavily favors arbitration, and the Texas Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal had compelled arbitration in circumstances with more substantial
21
Appendix Tab K (without exhibits), at 5–17; see also CR 179ff. (same with exhibits).
22
Appendix Tab L.
23
Transcript, Appendix Tab D at 5:7–6:3. Counsel for Overwatch interrupted opposing
counsel’s presentation to assert that this was not the case, and in fact he intended to make
additional arguments. Counsel for Petrohawk twice requested the opportunity to respond to any
such arguments, id. at 6:11–15, 18:13–24, but at the conclusion of the argument by counsel for
Overwatch, the trial court ruled immediately without allowing any rejoinder. Id. at 34:14–19.
24
See id. at 13:23–35.
25
See id. at 14:5–20.
26
See id. at 7:1–22.
6
litigation activity for longer periods of time.27 Counsel argued that Overwatch had not
been prejudiced inter alia because (1) the discovery conducted would be “useful in
arbitration,” In re Vesta Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006),28 (2) Most of the
discovery was taken by Overwatch itself, which like most plaintiffs presumably would
have jumped at the chance to take discovery in court prior to arbitration if given the
choice,29 and (3) Overwatch’s willingness to request and tolerate delay and inactivity in
the case showed lack of prejudice.30
Counsel for Overwatch responded with, inter alia, arguments not present in
Overwatch’s Response, such as asserting haphazardly that certain claims related to a
different contract, which Overwatch did not attach to its Response or provide to the
Court. 31 Counsel for Overwatch also emphasized inter alia that Petrohawk had filed
counterclaims and designated experts,32 and that Overwatch had incurred discovery costs
27
See id. at 10:5–11, 12:23–13:22; 14:21–15:12.
28
See id. at 15:15–16:22
29
See id. at 16:23–17:13.
30
See id. at 17:18–18:1.
31
See id. at 23:2–22. Counsel for Overwatch inaccurately claimed that Overwatch somehow had
put this contract into evidence via an affidavit that merely makes passing reference to it.
Although Overwatch utterly failed to properly present arguments based on this contract,
Petrohawk in its brief on the merits will address why any arguments based on it do not defeat the
clear right to arbitration under “the Contract” as defined by Overwatch’s Petition, i.e., the 2012
MSC. See also id. at 18:15–24; Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., L.L.C., 392
S.W.3d 633, 635 (Tex. 2013) (holding trial court ruling rejecting arbitration based on waiver
could not be affirmed based on arguments not raised below questioning applicability of
arbitration clause).
32
See id. at 27:22–4; at 32:21–22. Petrohawk’s counsel directed the Court to G.T. Leach
Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 513–14 (2015), which found no waiver in
circumstances involving a counterclaim, designation of experts and responsible third parties, and
more.
7
during the litigation.33 He argued that any “delay alone” was prejudicial to Overwatch
because it “hurt [Overwatch] cash flow wise.”34
At the conclusion of the arguments, the trial court concluded that Petrohawk had
waived arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process and causing prejudice
to Overwatch, and denied the motion.35
In response to the trial court’s ruling, counsel for Petrohawk requested that the
court stay proceedings, and trial in particular, pending appeal of the order denying the
motion to compel arbitration.36 Counsel for Overwatch stated that he opposed a stay, but
was “not necessarily opposed to a continuation of the jury trial, if they are going to do
that.”37 Judge Johnson stated that he did not consider it appropriate, as a visiting judge,
to rule on the issue, and that the request for stay pending appeal should be addressed to
“the elected judge of this court.”38
Petrohawk then filed its notice of appeal and attempted diligently for more than a
week to confer with Overwatch regarding a potential agreed continuance and/or stay.
Counsel for Overwatch stated repeatedly that he still needed to engage appellate counsel
and confer with his client. Overwatch never agreed to any stay or continuance.
33
Transcript, Appendix Tab D at 32:1–10.
34
See id. at 31:7–19.
35
Id. at 34:14–35:3.
36
Id. at 36:17–19, 35:18–19.
37
Id. at 36:12–15.
38
Id.
8
Petrohawk therefore filed in the trial court its Motion to Stay Proceedings and
Continue Trial Pending Interlocutory Appeal, on May 6, 2016.39 Petrohawk explained
clearly that this was not a motion for reconsideration of the motion to compel arbitration
or for non-discretionary stay in deference to arbitration; instead, it was a motion asking
the trial court to continue trial and stay proceedings (other than mediation and any
discovery that the parties agreed would facilitate mediation) while the appeal was
pending.40 This motion was set for oral hearing on May 25, 2016. Overwatch responded
by characterizing the motion as a motion for reconsideration and stating that it was
inconvenient for counsel to come to McMullen County for the hearing.41
The day before the hearing, May 24, 2016, counsel for Overwatch sent an e-mail
stating that (1) his staff had contacted the trial court, (2) the hearing was cancelled, (3)
Petrohawk’s motion would be denied, and (4) he had been asked to inform Petrohawk of
these circumstances.42 On May 25, 2016 the trial court, Hon. Patrick Flanigan, signed an
order stating that the motion was denied, but “if Interlocutory Appeal is permitted in the
case, the Court of Appeals may consider Defendant’s Motion for Stay.” 43 Petrohawk’s
interlocutory appeal is explicitly authorized by statute.44
39
See Appendix Tab E.
40
See id. at 2 (“This is not a motion for reconsideration of the Motion to Compel Arbitration”);
3–4 (“Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.025(a) provides for a non-discretionary stay in
response to an application for arbitration . . . Petrohawk requested such a stay as part of its
Motion to Compel Arbitration, which was denied on April 27, 2016. The present motion does not
seek reconsideration of that denial.”).
41
See Appendix Tab M.
42
See Appendix Tab N.
43
See Appendix Tab F. Petrohawk does not appeal this order of May 25, 2016.
44
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 171.098, 51.016.
9
II. Legal Standards
Tex. R. App. P. 29.3 provides that “[w]hen an appeal from an interlocutory order
is perfected, the appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the
parties’ rights until disposition of the appeal and may require appropriate security.”
With respect to the underlying interlocutory appeal, this Court “review[s] whether
a party has waived its right to arbitration de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's
ruling.” IBS Asset Liquidations LLC v. Servicios Multiples Del Norte SA de CV, 419
S.W.3d 573, 575 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (citing Perry Homes v.
Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 598 (Tex.2008)). Under Texas law, when two requirements are
met—when (1) a valid arbitration agreement exists; and (2) the parties’ dispute falls
within the scope of the agreement—“the [trial] court has no discretion but to compel
arbitration and stay its own proceedings.” Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51,
56 (Tex. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The policy in favor of
enforcing arbitration agreements is so compelling that a court should not deny arbitration
unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.” Prudential Sec. Inc. v.
Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995). There is a strong presumption against
waiver of arbitration, and any doubts regarding waiver are resolved in favor of
arbitration. Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008).
III. Argument
It is necessary for this Court to stay trial court proceedings pending appeal, or else
this case will proceed to trial before the appeal is likely to be decided. That would be a
10
waste of resources and a violation of the very rights at issue in the appeal. This Court
and other Texas appellate courts routinely reverse denials of motions to compel
arbitration, and while it is not possible fully to argue the merits of the appeal in this
Motion, the frequency of such reversals and the circumstances of this case strongly
counsel in favor of a stay.
This case is set for trial on July 18, 2016, but as described above, both
Overwatch’s counsel (who encouraged the trial court to deny Petrohawk’s motion on the
grounds that Petrohawk would have an appeal as of right) 45 and the trial court (which
denied Petrohawk’s motion for stay pending appeal with the statement that such a stay
could be considered by this Court)46 have expected due appellate consideration of the
denial of Petrohawk’s motion to compel arbitration.
Petrohawk’s contractual right to arbitration cannot fully be preserved if the case
proceeds to trial, because Petrohawk (and Overwatch) will prepare for and adjudicate the
matter in a forum different from the one that was contractually agreed. 47 In that
circumstance, the time and resources of the trial court, jurors, and the parties would be
wasted for a proceeding that could be (and should be) rendered moot by a ruling of this
Court compelling arbitration after all.
45
Transcript, Appendix Tab D at 33:13–14, 34:3–5.
46
See Appendix Tab F.
47
Subsequent to the denial of Petrohawk’s motion to compel arbitration, and in the absence of a
stay, Petrohawk already has been forced to prepare for potential adjudication in the trial court
contrary to Petrohawk’s right to arbitration. Petrohawk must protect its rights in court
proceedings if that is what it is forced to do. Advocacy and participation in litigation subsequent
to denial of a motion to compel arbitration does not constitute waiver, see, e.g., Tenneco Resins,
Inc. v. Davy Int’l, 770 F.2d 416, 420 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1985), but as trial becomes imminent it
imposes increasing burdens on a party that has the right to arbitrate instead.
11
In order to preserve the status quo and avoid irreparable damage to the rights
sought to be protected by this appeal, it is necessary for this Court to stay the trial court
proceedings while the Court considers the appeal. Texas appellate courts frequently stay
trial court proceedings while considering appeals of orders denying motions to compel
arbitration. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Int’l Ass'n of Firefighters, 441 S.W.3d 305
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (“I agree with the majority’s order to stay any
trial on the merits in this lawsuit, pending this court’s decision on the arbitrability of this
case”). This case presents an urgent need to do so.
Overwatch may claim that the proximity to trial is an indicator of some sort of
tardiness in seeking arbitration. To the contrary, Petrohawk moved to compel arbitration
on March 4, 2016, 4.5 months prior to trial, and has steadfastly and diligently pursued
arbitration and stay of trial court proceedings by various means since that time. This
contrasts with the lack of progress that Overwatch and Petrohawk equally tolerated and
contributed to since the September 1, 2015 Joint Motion for Continuance.
This Motion does not attempt to argue the merits of the appeal or summarize all of
the arguments that Petrohawk and Overwatch have made, and indeed, considering the
“totality of the circumstances” nature of the waiver issue, it would be impossible to do so.
Petrohawk’s brief on the merits is due June 14, 2016, but Petrohawk intends to file its
brief early, no later than Tuesday, June 7, 2016.
In considering this Motion, the Court should consider policies and presumptions in
favor of arbitration and against waiver, and the frequency with which this Court, other
courts of appeal, and the Texas Supreme Court have reversed lower court decisions and
12
compelled arbitration in recent years. Opinions of this Court, for example, have
summarized lengthy lists of litigation conduct including extensive discovery, motion
practice, and months or years spent in court, before concluding that arbitration was not
waived. See, e.g., In re Wells Fargo Bank 300 S.W.3d 818, 822-23, 830–31 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Hartman, 307
S.W.3d 804, 811–12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.); IBS Asset Liquidations
LLC v. Servicios Multiples Del Norte SA de CV, 419 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2013, pet. denied); Global Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. Estate of McLean, 2008 WL
372521, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 13, 2008, no pet.) (unpublished).
The Texas Supreme Court and other Texas courts of appeals have repeatedly
rejected arbitration waiver arguments in cases with significant and lengthy litigation
conduct, including pursuit of claims in court by the party seeking arbitration. The
Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that asserting one’s own claims in court
waives arbitration. See, e.g., Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., L.L.C.,
455 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. 2014) (“Merely filing suit does not waive arbitration, even
when the movant, as in this case, files a second, separate suit in another county based in
part on a contract at issue in the first action.”); G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire
V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 513–14 (Tex. 2015) (finding no waiver, though party seeking
arbitration had filed compulsory counterclaim, designated experts, and engaged in
various other significant litigation conduct).
Moreover, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have compelled arbitration
in cases with lengthy and expensive prior court proceedings far exceeding those in the
13
present case. See, e.g., In re Vesta Group, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006)
(compelling arbitration after “litigat[ion] for two years in the trial court.”); Richmont
Holdings, 455 S.W.3d at 575–76 (compelling arbitration when Movant filed 19 months
after being sued); In re Serv. Corp. Int’l., 85 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2002) (compelling
arbitration after 15 months of state court litigation); Cooper Indus., LLC v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 475 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.) (compelling arbitration after 28 months of litigation).
The circumstances described in the background section of this Motion make clear
that this case falls squarely within the realm of cases that this Court and others have
compelled to arbitration, and that the appeal deserves serious consideration and a stay
pursuant to Rule 29.3 to preserve Petrohawk’s rights while this Court considers whether
this case likewise should be compelled to arbitration.
Conclusion
For the reasons herein given, Petrohawk moves for a stay of trial and all trial court
proceedings (other than mediation) in the 36th Judicial District Court related to this
matter, until the present appeal is resolved.
Submitted May 31, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
DAVIS, CEDILLO & MENDOZA, INC.
By: /s/ Isaac J. Huron
Ricardo G. Cedillo
SBN: 04043600
Isaac J. Huron
SBN: 24032447
14
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, TX 78212
Phone: (210) 822-6666
Fax: (210) 822-1151
rcedillo@lawdcm.com
ihuron@lawdcm.com
REYNOLDS FRIZZELL LLP
Christopher M. Hogan
SBN: 24065434
Nathan M. Smith
SBN: 24053060
1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 485-7200
Fax: (713) 485-7250
chogan@reynoldsfrizzell.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT
PETROHAWK ENERGY CORPORATION
15
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.1(a)(5), counsel for
Appellant has conferred with counsel for Appellee about the merits of this motion.
Appellee is opposed to a stay of proceedings in the trial court and to a stay or
continuance of the July 2016 trial setting.
/s/ Isaac J. Huron
Isaac J. Huron
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
As required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5, I certify that I
have served this document on all other parties on May 31, 2016 via email as follows:
Gilbert T. Adams, III
GILBERT ADAMS LAW OFFICES
1855 Calder Avenue at Third Street
Beaumont, TX 77704-3688
gilbert@gta-law.com
Fax: (409) 832-6162
/s/ Isaac J. Huron
Isaac J. Huron