Roger Bufler and Sandy Bufler v. Texas Department of Transportation ( 2016 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00323-CV
Roger Bufler and Sandy Bufler, Appellants
v.
Apeck Construction, LLC, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COKE COUNTY, 51ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. CV12-04444, HONORABLE BARBARA L. WALTHER, JUDGE PRESIDING
NO. 03-14-00383-CV
Roger Bufler and Sandy Bufler, Appellants
v.
Texas Department of Transportation, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COKE COUNTY, 51ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. CV12-04444, HONORABLE BARBARA L. WALTHER, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Roger Bufler and Sandy Bufler, husband and wife, appeal from the
judgment of the district court of Coke County in a premises-liability suit. The district court sustained
the plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee Texas Department of Transportation and granted
appellee Apeck Construction, L.L.C.’s motion for summary judgment. We will affirm the judgment.
Roger Bufler was injured in the late afternoon of December 18, 2011, when he fell
on the sidewalk of the Department’s rest stop located on Highway 87 in Coke County. Bufler was
walking to the lavatory when he fell. It was drizzling rain and the sidewalk was wet. Bufler slipped
and fell when he stepped on a smooth part of the sidewalk wet from the rain. The sidewalk consisted
of poured concrete slabs interspersed with prefabricated smooth concrete slabs that contained star-
shaped medallions made of gravel.
Bufler filed suit against the Department and Apeck, which was under contract with
the Department to provide janitorial services for the rest-stop area.
Claim against the Department
Bufler maintained that the “varying surfaces” of the sidewalk constituted a premises
defect. He claimed that the wet surface of the concrete was not the “main factor” causing him to
slip and fall. Bufler cast his case against the Department as one coming within the terms of the
Texas Tort Claims Act waiving sovereign immunity for claims involving personal injury caused
by a condition or use of real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be
liable to the claimant under Texas law. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(a). He asserted
that the Department owed him the duty that a private person owes a licensee on private property.
See id. § 101.022(a).
The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity. To
invoke waiver of the sovereign immunity provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, Bufler, as a
licensee, had to plead and prove, among other elements, that a condition of the property posed an
unreasonable risk of harm to him. See State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. 1996) (noting
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elements of premises-liability claim where plaintiff is licensee). Bufler suggests that the “condition
of the varying surfaces [of concrete] created an unreasonably dangerous condition.” Bufler claimed
that “the wet slick surface of certain portions of the concrete sidewalk posed an unreasonable risk
of harm, in part because the use of this type of [smooth] concrete on an outdoor sidewalk step
is negligent in and of itself and [is] particularly defective when wet.” Bufler, himself a long-time
veteran in the construction trade, testified by deposition that “anybody in the construction business
should know [that] smooth concrete [used] on an exterior [surface] is a no-no.” Cruz Rubio,
Bufler’s expert witness, opined on deposition that smooth concrete should not be used for outside
projects because it can become slick when wet.
The involved sidewalk was constructed, as designed, between 2001 and 2002 as a
part of the original building of the rest-stop area. Nothing about the sidewalk has been changed
since its inception. The “varying surface” sidewalk is in use in at least one other of the Department’s
rest stops.
Bufler’s complaint concerning the “varying surfaces” of the sidewalk speaks to
the design-discretion immunity found in section 101.056 of the Act. By that provision, the State
preserves its immunity for an act “if the law leaves the performance or nonperformance of the
act to the discretion of the governmental unit.” Id. § 101.056(2). Accordingly, if the State’s act is
discretionary, it does not waive its immunity. An act is discretionary if it requires the exercise of
judgment and the law does not mandate the performance of the act with such precision that nothing
is left to discretion or judgment. “Design of any public work, such as a roadway, is a discretionary
function involving many policy decisions and the governmental entity responsible may not be sued
for such decisions.” State v. Rodriguez, 985 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1999), (per curiam), overruled on
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other grounds by Denton Cty. v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 331 n.11 (Tex. 2009); see Texas Dep’t
of Transp. v. Perches, 388 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Id.).
Also contrary to Bufler’s position, neither does a wet “varying surface” sidewalk
create an unreasonably dangerous premises condition. The Supreme Court in M.O. Dental Lab
v. Rape considered whether a condition occurring as the result of natural conditions constituted a
premises defect, i.e., a condition posing an “unreasonable” risk of harm:
To prevail in a premises liability case, an invitee [licensee] must plead and prove,
among other elements, that a condition on the premises posed an unreasonable risk of
harm to the invitee [licensee]. We held in both Brownsville Navigation District1 and
Johnson County2 that ordinary mud or dirt in its natural state can and often does
form a condition posing a risk of harm, but not an “unreasonable” risk of harm. We
further observed in Johnson County that holding a landowner liable for “[t]he natural
state of dirt” would cause the landowner to “be an insurer against all injury to
a tenant’s lessees.” Although the court of appeals correctly pointed out that neither
Brownsville Navigation District nor Johnson County specifically involved the
accumulation of mud on a man-made surface, we find this distinction immaterial.
Ordinary mud that accumulates naturally on an outdoor concrete slab without the
assistance or involvement of unnatural contact is, in normal circumstances, nothing
more than dirt in its natural state and, therefore, is not a condition posing an
unreasonable risk of harm.
139 S.W.3d 671, 675–76 (Tex. 2004) (footnotes omitted). Rain on a sidewalk can and often
does form a condition posing a risk of harm, but not an “unreasonable” risk of harm. Id. at 675. The
holding and reasoning in M.O. Dental Lab control the disposition of Bufler’s claim.
1
Brownsville Navigation Dist. v. Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1992).
2
Johnson County Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. 1996).
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Claims against Apeck
Bufler also asserted a premises-liability claim against Apeck, shaping his pleading so
as to cast himself as an invitee on Apeck’s premises (the sidewalk). Although not case-
determinative here, the summary-judgment proof, previously recited, demonstrates that Bufler was
not an invitee, as claimed, but rather a licensee.3 Moreover, in his response to Apeck’s motion for
summary judgment, Bufler admits his status as a licensee.
Apeck contracted with the Department to provide janitorial services to the rest-stop
building and to clear litter and trash from the rest-stop grounds. Apeck also had certain contractual
responsibility regarding the sidewalks: it was to replace the sidewalk if it were cracked or broken;
it was to apply salt to the sidewalk if it were iced; and it was to remove from the sidewalk litter and
debris, including chewing gum, oil slicks, and other things that might jeopardize safety. Apeck was
not contractually obligated to remove water from the sidewalk while it was raining.
Bufler pleaded, among other things, that the conditions of the smooth, wet concrete
sidewalk at the rest stop presented an unreasonable risk of harm.
Apeck filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, see Tex. R. Civ.
P. 166a(a–b), as well as a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, see id. 166a(i), claiming,
among other things, that assuming arguendo that it owed a duty to Bufler as a landowner or quasi-
landowner, Bufler failed to show that a condition of the property was unreasonably dangerous.
3
A licensee enters land with the express or implied consent of the owner, but does so for
his own convenience or on business for someone other than the owner. Weaver v. KFC Mgmt., Inc.,
750 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied).
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In his brief, Bufler argues that certain portions of the sidewalk posed an unreasonable
risk of harm when wet, partly because use of the smooth type of concrete on an outdoor sidewalk
was “negligent in and of itself.” As we understand, Bufler’s primary complaint on appeal is that
the subject sidewalk was unreasonably dangerous because of the makeup of the concrete and not
so much because of the wet condition of the sidewalk. Bufler’s argument overlooks the fact that
Apeck was in no way involved in the design or construction of the concrete sidewalk. Also, Apeck
contracted its services to the Department many years after the sidewalks were designed and
constructed. Accordingly, Apeck has no liability to Bufler stemming from decisions made by others
concerning the kind of concrete used in the sidewalks.
We have previously determined that the wet sidewalk here involved was not an
unreasonably dangerous condition.
The judgment is affirmed.
__________________________________________
Bob E. Shannon, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Bourland, and Shannon*
Affirmed
Filed: June 21, 2016
* Before Bob E. Shannon, Chief Justice (retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.
See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).
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