Miguel Guerra and Ana Anita Guerra v. Copernicus Guerra, Eric Stubbs, and Monica Trish Guerra ( 2018 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-16-00764-CV
Miguel GUERRA and Ana Anita Guerra,
Appellants
v.
Copernicus GUERRA, Eric Stubbs, and Monica Trish Guerra,
Appellees
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-CI-10888
Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 4, 2018
MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
This is an attempted restricted appeal from a default judgment against appellants, Miguel
Guerra and Ana Anita Guerra, and in favor of appellees, Copernicus Guerra, Eric Stubbs, and
Monica Trish Guerra. On appeal, appellants contend there is error apparent on the face of the
record because the record does not establish they were properly served with notice of the trial
setting. While the appeal was pending, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, arguing this appeal
should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because appellants timely filed a post judgment
motion, precluding them from seeking a restrictive appeal. Appellees also filed a motion to award
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damages, requesting that we award them damages as a sanction against appellants’ counsel
because the appeal is frivolous. Because appellants timely filed a motion for new trial and such a
motion precludes them from seeking a restricted appeal, we grant appellees’ motion to dismiss and
dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. We further deny appellees’ request for damages as a
sanction against appellants’ counsel for pursing a frivolous appeal.
BACKGROUND
The underlying dispute concerns the ownership of real property and partnership interests.
On July 2, 2015, appellees filed suit seeking declaratory relief, requesting the trial court to declare
the parties’ rights and liabilities with respect to the disputed real property and partnership interests.
In their petition, appellees also sought a temporary injunction and restraining order to prevent
appellants from using any funds related to the partnership, accessing the business, communicating
with the business’s employees, and destroying any business property in their possession.
Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim alleging conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and
quantum meruit. On July 10, 2015, the trial court signed an order granting both a restraining order
and temporary injunction in favor of appellees. The record reflects the restraining order and
temporary injunction were extended to September 10, 2015.
Thereafter, the case proceeded to a bench trial at which appellants failed to appear. The
trial court subsequently rendered a default judgment in favor of appellees on May 24, 2016. The
record reflects that on June 21, 2016, appellants timely filed a motion for new trial, seeking to
vacate the default judgment. In their motion, appellants argued they did not receive notice of the
trial setting. A hearing on the motion for new trial was held on July 22, 2016, and all parties
appeared in person represented by counsel. During the hearing, appellants requested a
continuance, and the hearing was reset for September 1, 2016. After the September hearing, the
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trial court denied appellants’ motion for new trial. Six months later — after the signing of the trial
court’s default judgment — appellants filed a notice of restricted appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, appellants contend there is error apparent on the face of the record because the
record does not establish they were properly served with notice of the trial setting. Specifically,
appellants assert the record does not demonstrate they were served with actual or constructive
notice of the trial setting. For support, appellants point to an affidavit by Ana Anita Guerra, who
states she was out of the country when appellees’ counsel left notice of the trial setting at her
doorstep.
Applicable Law — Restricted Appeal
A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a default judgment. Paez v. Trent Smith Custom
Homes, No. 04–13–00394-CV, 2014 WL 1089751, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 19,
2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Eguia v. Eguia, 367 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2012, no pet.); Whitaker v. Rose, 218 S.W.3d 216, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
no pet.)). To prevail on a restricted appeal, an appealing party must show that: (1) he brought the
appeal within six months after the trial court signed the judgment; (2) he was a party to the suit;
(3) he did not “participate” in the hearing that resulted in the complained-of judgment, nor did he
timely file any post judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and
(4) error is “apparent from the face of the record.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 30; Alexander v. Lynda’s
Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); Paez, 2014 WL 1089751, at *2. “These requirements
are jurisdictional and will preclude a party’s right to seek relief by way of a restricted appeal if
they are not met.” Aero at Sp. Z.O.O. v. Gartman, 469 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2015, no pet.); see Paez, 2014 WL 1089751, at *2.
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Motion to Dismiss
Before addressing appellants’ contention regarding improper service, we must first address
appellees’ motion to dismiss because it raises jurisdiction concerns. See Minton v. Gunn, 355
S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (holding appellate
court must determine its jurisdiction to consider appeal before reaching merits). In their motion,
appellees assert this court lacks jurisdiction over this restricted appeal because appellants timely
filed a post judgment motion when they filed their motion for new trial on June 21, 2016. In their
brief, appellants acknowledge a motion for new trial was timely filed on June 21, 2016.
Appellants, however, contend the motion was “conclusory and had a number of failings[,]” and
therefore did not constitute a proper motion for new trial for purposes of pursing a restricted appeal.
We disagree.
As indicated above, the requirements of a restricted appeal are jurisdictional. Gartman,
469 S.W.3d at 317; Paez, 2014 WL 1089751; Rodarte v. Bexar County, No. 04-12-00211-CV,
2013 WL 1908381, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 8, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
“Because the requirements are jurisdictional, if a party timely files a post judgment motion, a
restricted appeal is not available.” Gartman, 469 S.W.3d at 317; see Rodarte, 2013 WL 1908381,
at *3 (“When a party files a timely post-judgment motion, we lack jurisdiction over a restricted
appeal.”). A motion for new trial is a type of post judgment motion that extends the appellate
deadlines. See Gartman, 469 S.W.3d at 316. Contrary to appellants’ assertion that their
“conclusory” motion did not constitute a proper motion for new trial, “any timely-filed motion
seeking to vacate the trial court’s judgment, even a motion asserting meritless grounds for vacating
the judgment, constitutes a motion for new trial that will extend the appellate timetable.” Id.
(emphasis added); see, e.g., PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, 350 S.W.3d 699, 717 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (holding motion for new trial on damages, which did not request
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trial court to vacate judgment but only sought new trial exclusively on damages, sufficed as motion
for new trial); see also Taylor v. Trans–Cont’l Props., Ltd., 739 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1987, no writ) (construing “Demand for Removal” as post judgment motion that extended
the appellate timetable).
In this case, the trial court rendered a default judgment against appellants on May 24, 2016,
and the appellants timely filed a motion for new trial on June 21, 2016 — within thirty days of the
final judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a) (“A motion for new trial, if filed, shall be filed prior
to or within thirty days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed.”). In their motion
for new trial, appellants sought to vacate the judgment and to extend the appellate deadlines.
Accordingly, the motion constituted a proper motion for new trial, the timely filing of which
precluded appellants from pursuing a restricted appeal. See Gartman, 469 S.W.3d at 317; Rodarte,
2013 WL 1908381, at *3. We therefore grant appellees’ motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal
for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 30; Gartman, 469 S.W.3d at 317; Rodarte, 2013 WL
1908381, at *3.
Motion for Sanctions
As indicated in the introduction, while the appeal was pending in this court, appellees filed,
in addition to their motion to dismiss, a motion asking this court to award them damages under
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45. Appellees argue they are entitled to such damages because
appellants’ appeal is frivolous because counsel for appellants filed the notice of restricted appeal
fully aware that a post judgment motion was timely filed in this case, precluding a restricted appeal.
Rule 45 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an appellate court may
award damages to a prevailing party if it objectively determines an appeal is frivolous. TEX. R.
APP. P. 45.2. “To determine whether an appeal is objectively frivolous, we review the record from
the standpoint of the advocate and decide whether the advocate had reasonable grounds to believe
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the case could be reversed.” In re Willa Peters Hubberd Testamentary Trust, 432 S.W.3d 358,
369 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). “Whether to grant sanctions for a frivolous appeal
is a matter of discretion that this court exercises with prudence and caution and only after careful
deliberation in truly egregious circumstances.” Id.
In this case, we hold appellants’ appeal is not frivolous. Although appellate counsel for
appellants acknowledged in the notice of appeal, as well as in the appellate brief, that a motion for
new trial was timely filed, counsel argued that the merits of the motion for new trial were
insufficient to constitute a proper motion for new trial. Accordingly, counsel attempted to argue
for an extension of the law, which we conclude is not so egregious as to warrant an award of just
damages to appellees. See id. Accordingly, we deny appellees’ request for damages.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we grant appellees’ motion
to dismiss and dismiss this appeal. We further deny appellees’ motion to award damages.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
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