Joshua Jacob Patterson v. State ( 2016 )

Opinion issued June 21, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00167-CR
———————————
JOSHUA JACOB PATTERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 240th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 11-DCR-058778
OPINION
A jury found Joshua Jacob Patterson guilty of murder and assessed
punishment at 50 years’ confinement and a $1,000 fine. In nine issues, Patterson
contends that his conviction should be reversed because:
(1) under the doctrine of in pari materia, he should have been indicted for
engaging in organized criminal activity rather than murder;
(2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of an extraneous
aggravated robbery;
(3) he was not given all of the custodial warnings required by Section
3(a)(2) of Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and his
interrogation was therefore wrongly admitted into evidence; and
(4) his trial counsel was ineffective.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
A grand jury indicted Patterson for the murder of Kristian Sullivan, who died
of multiple gunshot wounds in the front yard of his grandmother’s house. Patterson
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress any statement he had made to law enforcement
officers. In this motion, he asserted several bases for suppression, including that his
statements “were taken without the safeguards required by and in violation of Article
38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” But Patterson did not secure a ruling on
the motion before or during trial.
The State’s theory of the case was that Patterson and other members of the
criminal street gang “100 Click” planned and carried out the murder of Sullivan, a
member of the rival gang “F.A.B.,” in retaliation for an earlier gang-related shooting.
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The defense disputed that Patterson was an active member of 100 Click and claimed
that he did not know that the gang intended to kill Sullivan. The defense’s theory
was that Patterson drove Sterlyn Edwards and Antonnyer Morrison, one or both of
whom shot Sullivan, to and from the murder scene without knowing they planned to
shoot Sullivan. According to defense counsel, Patterson mistakenly believed he was
driving the group to Sullivan’s house to buy marijuana. Counsel told the jury
Patterson was simply “in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong people.”
Multiple law enforcement officers testified for the State, including K. Tullos,
a peace officer with the Missouri City Police Department who was assigned to
investigate gang-related crimes and who investigated Sullivan’s murder. Tullos
testified about 100 Click and F.A.B.1 and about the violent rivalry between these two
gangs. In particular, he stated that a F.A.B. member allegedly shot a member of 100
Click a couple of weeks before Sullivan’s murder. Tullos testified that Sullivan was
a member of F.A.B. and that the men Patterson drove to and from Sullivan’s house—
Edwards and Morrison—were members of 100 Click or an affiliated gang known as
the “Young Ones.”
Tullos discussed the criteria that the State uses to classify someone as a gang
member. He testified that he classified Patterson as a member of 100 Click based
1
According to Tullos, F.A.B. stands for Forever About Bread, with “Bread”
being a reference to money.
3
on social media postings in which Patterson associated with known gang members
and displayed a hand sign associated with the gang. Tullos also relied on interviews
with Edwards and others in identifying Patterson as a member of 100 Click. Tullos
conceded on cross-examination that he had discretion to decide whether Patterson
met the criteria, and that he had not encountered Patterson engaging in any gang-
related activity before Sullivan’s murder.
After Tullos’s cross-examination, the State argued that by raising lack of
evidence of Patterson’s gang involvement as a defense in this case, the defense had
opened the door to proof of an aggravated robbery that Patterson and Edwards
allegedly committed together two to three months after Sullivan’s murder. The
defense objected that it had not opened the door and that the danger of unfair
prejudice associated with this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.
The trial court overruled Patterson’s objections to the admission of this extraneous
aggravated robbery. Tullos then testified on re-direct that committing a crime with
a known gang member is a criterion used by law enforcement authorities when
assessing gang membership. He stated that he assisted in the investigation of an
aggravated robbery of a check-cashing business, in which law enforcement officers
identified Edwards as one of the robbers based on fingerprint evidence. Tullos
identified Patterson as the other robber based on still photographs taken from video
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surveillance footage. The State introduced these photos into evidence without
objection.
R. Ramirez, a patrol sergeant with the City of Sugar Land Police Department,
also testified for the State. At the time of the murder investigation, Ramirez was a
supervisor of a special crimes unit that was comprised of law enforcement authorities
in Sugar Land, Stafford, and Missouri City. The unit’s purpose was to investigate
gang crimes and street-level narcotics. Ramirez testified about the history of
violence between 100 Click and F.A.B., noting that a person associated with 100
Click had been shot a couple of weeks before Sullivan’s murder.
Ramirez also testified that he conducted a videotaped interview of Patterson,
which the trial court admitted over a hearsay objection. During the interview,
Patterson initially denied any involvement in Sullivan’s murder, but eventually
admitted that he drove Edwards and Morrison to and from the murder scene. He
claimed in the interview that he did not know that Edwards and Morrison intended
to kill Sullivan. Patterson insisted that he was not an active member of 100 Click
and that he drove Edwards and Morrison to the scene of the crime believing that they
were going to buy marijuana.
After Patterson’s videotaped interview was played for the jury, Ramirez
resumed his testimony. Ramirez testified that Edwards was the first person to
implicate Patterson and conceded on cross-examination that Edwards told multiple,
5
conflicting versions of the events surrounding Sullivan’s murder. But Ramirez
stated that Edwards ultimately told law enforcement officers that Patterson not only
was the driver but also had been involved in the planning of Sullivan’s murder and
that the motive for the murder was gang-related retaliation.
The State also called as witnesses two young women who were with Patterson,
Edwards, and Morrison on the evening of Sullivan’s murder. Kandace Hall, who
had a romantic relationship with Patterson, testified that she knew that Edwards,
Morrison, and Patterson were members of 100 Click. Hall stated she and these three
men left the location at which they were hanging out on the night of Sullivan’s
murder to purchase marijuana. Before they left, Patterson put a backpack in which
he kept a gun in the car’s trunk. Patterson drove while Edwards gave him directions.
Once they arrived at their destination, Edwards and Morrison got out of the car and
walked down the street. After a few minutes, Edwards and Morrison came running
back to the car. Hall testified that Patterson backed the car up to meet them. When
Edwards and Morrison got into the car, Hall saw that Edwards had the gun that
Patterson kept in his backpack and Edwards said that he shot “him” without
specifying whom he shot. Patterson did not ask who had been shot; he merely asked
whether Edwards and Morrison had gotten the marijuana. Hall testified that there
was no further conversation about the shooting, and that Patterson drove away from
the scene. Hall also testified that Edwards and Patterson subsequently placed the
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gun under the hood of the car and that Patterson retrieved it from under the hood
when she later dropped him off at home.
Hall’s best friend, Samon Williams, also testified. Williams stated that she
and Hall had been hanging out with some members of 100 Click, including
Patterson, the evening of Sullivan’s murder. But when another man named Tracy
arrived, she left with him. Later, Hall, Patterson, Morrison, and Edwards arrived at
Tracy’s house to pick up Williams. Williams testified that the men were talking and
seemed normal, but that Hall was shaking and scared. The five of them left Tracy’s
house, and Williams and Hall dropped Patterson, Morrison, and Edwards off at their
respective homes. When they reached Patterson’s home, Williams testified that he
asked her to pop the hood and then retrieved a gun from under it.
In her closing argument, defense counsel argued that the jury had “not heard
one single piece of evidence” that linked Patterson with Sullivan’s murder other than
that “he was in the wrong place at the wrong time” with the “wrong people.” She
also argued that Patterson denied being an active gang member, and that no witness
could testify about any supposed gang activity on his part.
The jury rendered a guilty verdict and assessed punishment at 50 years’
confinement and a $1,000 fine. Patterson filed a motion for new trial, in which he
complained of the admission of evidence relating to the aggravated robbery and his
gang affiliation. The trial court denied the motion.
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Discussion
A. Murder and organized crime statutes are not in pari materia
In his first issue, Patterson contends that the State violated his right to due
process by prosecuting him for murder rather than for engaging in organized
criminal activity. He argues that Section 19.02 of the Penal Code, which defines
murder, and Section 71.02 of the Penal Code, which defines organized crime,
address the same subject matter and conflict. Therefore, he argues that the doctrine
of in pari materia required that he be prosecuted under the more specific organized
crime statute, not under the more general murder statute.
1. Applicable law
The doctrine of in pari materia confers on defendants a due process right to
be prosecuted under a narrower, more specific statute when it irreconcilably conflicts
with a broader statute addressing the same subject. Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182,
191–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). But the doctrine does not apply in every instance
in which two statutes address the same subject; it does not apply if the two statutes
“have different objects, intend to cover different situations, and are not intended to
be considered together.” Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d 39, 41–42 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).
In deciding whether two statutes address the same subject matter for purposes
of the doctrine, we consider whether they (1) are contained in the same legislative
8
enactment, (2) have the same elements of proof, (3) impose different penalties, and
(4) are written to achieve the same purpose or objective. Bearnth v. State, 361
S.W.3d 135, 141–42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Hollin v.
State, 227 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).
Similarity of purpose is the most significant of these four factors. Bearnth, 361
S.W.3d at 142; Hollin, 227 S.W.3d at 121. If the statutes were not enacted with the
same purpose in mind, they do not address the same subject matter for purposes of
the in pari materia doctrine. Burke v. State, 28 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). Moreover, even when two statutes address the same subject, they do not
irreconcilably conflict with one another unless “only one of them can apply to a
particular situation.” Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
That two statutes both might apply to the same conduct in some situations does not
mean that they irreconcilably conflict with one another. Id.
Whether two statutes are in pari materia is a question of law. Garrett v. State,
424 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d). We
therefore review this issue de novo. Id.
2. Analysis
A person commits the offense of murder if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or
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(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter,
and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or
attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he
commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human
life that causes the death of an individual.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b). A person commits the offense of engaging in
organized criminal activity if he commits or conspires to commit any one of a
number of specified offenses, including murder, “with the intent to establish,
maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a
member of a criminal street gang.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 71.02(a)(1).
Sections 19.02(b) and 71.02(a)(1) of the Penal Code do not address the same
subject. First, these are not part of the same legislative enactment. Section 19.02(b)
is part of Title 5 of the Penal Code, which concerns offenses against the person.
Section 71.02(a)(1) is part of Title 11 of the Penal Code, which concerns organized
crime.
Second, these two offenses have different elements. A person commits an
offense under Section 71.02(a)(1) by committing or conspiring to commit a wide
variety of predicate crimes “with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a
combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street
gang.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 71.02(a). Murder is one of the predicate crimes that will
support an organized criminal activity conviction. Id. § 71.02(a)(1). But murder
10
does not require the specific intent required by the organized criminal activity
statute. Compare id. § 19.02, with id. § 71.02(a).
The two offenses also carry different penalties. Patterson was charged with
intentionally and knowingly committing murder, a first degree felony punishable by
imprisonment “for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years”
and “a fine not to exceed $10,000.” Id. §§ 12.32, 19.02(b)(1), (c). In contrast, a
conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity involving murder is
punishable by imprisonment for “life or for any term of not more than 99 years or
less than 15 years.” Id. § 71.02(b)(3).
Finally, the offenses were not written to achieve the same purpose or
objective. The murder statute broadly prohibits and punishes the unjustified killing
of a person regardless of purpose or motive. See id. § 19.02. The organized criminal
activity statute, however, is intended to impose harsher punishment when specified
offenses are committed in the service of organized crime. See id. § 71.02(b); see
also McDonald v. State, 692 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
pet. ref’d) (organized criminal activity statute “is an obvious attempt to discourage
and deter” organized crime by punishing it more severely based on “the legislature’s
recognition that organized criminal activity is more dangerous to the welfare of the
state than unorganized activity”). Having considered the four relevant factors, we
11
conclude that Penal Code Sections 19.02(b) and 71.02(a)(1) are not addressed to the
same subject. Burke, 28 S.W.3d at 547.
Moreover, Patterson has not identified an irreconcilable conflict between
these statutes and we discern none. Both statutes might apply to the same conduct
in some situations. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 71.02(a)(1) (incorporating murder as
one predicate offense that may constitute engaging in organized criminal activity
when committed with requisite purpose or motive). But the fact that two criminal
statutes might apply to the same situation does not mean that they irreconcilably
conflict with one another. Lomax, 233 S.W.3d at 312.
In conclusion, we hold that the doctrine of in pari materia does not apply
because Section 19.02(b) and Section 71.02(a)(1) do not address the same subject or
irreconcilably conflict with one another. Because the doctrine does not apply, the
State had discretion to prosecute Patterson under Section 19.02(b). See Burke, 28
S.W.3d at 547; Hollin, 227 S.W.3d at 122.
We overrule Patterson’s first issue.
B. No abuse of discretion or prosecutorial misconduct in the admission of
extraneous offense evidence
In his second issue, Patterson contends that the State misled the trial court by
arguing that the defense opened the door to evidence about Patterson’s extraneous
aggravated robbery with Edwards. He also argues that his counsel did not open the
door to this evidence in her opening statement or cross-examination of witnesses.
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Relatedly, in his eighth issue, Patterson contends the trial court erred by failing to
balance the probative value of the aggravated robbery against its potential for unfair
prejudice before admitting it during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
1. Applicable law
To preserve error, a party must object with specificity in the trial court and the
error the party asserts on appeal must conform to the objection made at trial. Clark
v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The requirement of a proper
objection extends to most errors, including prosecutorial misconduct. Penry v. State,
903 S.W.2d 715, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Hajjar v. State, 176 S.W.3d 554, 566
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Therefore, a party may not assert
prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal. Hajjar, 176 S.W.3d at 566.
In general, evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove bad character
or conduct in conformity, but may be relevant and admissible for other purposes like
proving motive, intent, or absence of mistake, during the guilt-innocence phase of
trial. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). Thus, defense counsel may open the door to proof of other crimes by putting
motive, intent, or mistake at issue in an opening statement or during the cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438–40 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001); Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d); Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 11–13 (Tex. App.—
13
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Like any other issue concerning the
admissibility of evidence, whether a defendant has opened the door to evidence of
other crimes is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See Bowley v. State, 310
S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101–02
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). So long as the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of
reasonable disagreement, there is no abuse of discretion. Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469.
The court’s decision to admit proof of other crimes is generally within this zone if
the evidence “is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue.” Id.
If the defendant objects to the admission of extraneous offense evidence on
the basis that its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value, then the trial court must weigh the relevance of the evidence against its
prejudicial impact. TEX. R. EVID. 403; Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 219–20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). But it “need not conduct a formal hearing or even announce
on the record that it has mentally conducted this balancing test.” Cruz v. State, 122
S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Rule 403 favors
admissibility of relevant evidence and carries with it a presumption that probative
evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Hajjar, 176 S.W.3d at 562. Factors we
consider include: (1) how compellingly the evidence of the other crime makes a fact
of consequence more or less probable; (2) the evidence’s potential to affect the jury
in an irrational and incurable way; (3) the degree of delay and distraction caused by
14
the presentation of this extraneous evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the
particular evidence in light of the other admissible proof. Santellan v. State, 939
S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Hajjar, 176 S.W.3d at 561.
2. Analysis
At trial, defense counsel argued that Patterson had not opened the door to
evidence of the extraneous aggravated robbery and further objected that any
probative value it might possess was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Defense counsel did not assert that the State misled the court or
otherwise engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, Patterson has not preserved
any alleged prosecutorial misconduct issue for appellate review. See Penry, 903
S.W.2d at 764; Hajjar, 176 S.W.3d at 566.
To the extent that Patterson argues that defensive theories advocated in an
opening statement or advanced through cross-examination cannot open the door to
proof of other crimes as a matter of law, the decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeals and this court are to the contrary. Powell, 63 S.W.3d at 438–40; Cantu, 395
S.W.3d at 213; Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 11–13. Instead, the salient question is
whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding that Patterson’s defensive
theory made evidence of his participation in a gang-related robbery relevant.
The principal disputes at trial concerned Patterson’s alleged membership in
100 Click and his role in the shooting of Sullivan. The defense maintained that
15
Patterson was not an active member of the gang and had no idea his companions,
who were gang members, intended to harm Sullivan. In her opening statement,
defense counsel acknowledged that Patterson drove the car that transported the
shooter or shooters to and from the murder scene, but argued that Patterson did so
believing they were merely going there to buy marijuana. Defense counsel
advocated that the evidence would show that Patterson simply was in the wrong
place at the wrong time with the wrong people. Defense counsel also pursued this
defensive theory during her cross-examination of Tullos by calling into question the
alleged proof that Patterson was a member of 100 Click and establishing that
Patterson played no known role in any prior gang-related violence. In her closing,
defense counsel once again argued that Patterson simply was in the “wrong place, at
the wrong time, with the wrong people,” that he was not an active gang member, and
that there was not “one single piece of evidence” that linked him to Sullivan’s
murder. Consequently, Patterson’s alleged participation in an extraneous aggravated
robbery with a member of 100 Click was relevant, as it made less probable the
defense’s theory that Patterson unwittingly transported gang members to the scene
of the murder. Proof of the extraneous robbery also rebutted the defense’s claim that
Patterson had not been involved in violent gang-related crime. We therefore
conclude that the defense opened the door to proof concerning the aggravated
robbery. See Blackwell, 193 S.W.3d at 11–13.
16
By overruling Patterson’s Rule 403 objection, the trial court implicitly
concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the
probative value of the aggravated robbery. See Cruz, 122 S.W.3d at 313. Analysis
of the four factors confirms the trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
First, evidence of Patterson’s participation in an extraneous robbery with a
known gang member was some proof that Patterson was a member of 100 Click and
involved in its criminal activities, and this in turn made it more probable that he had
a motive to participate in Sullivan’s murder. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138,
154 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (gang membership admissible
to show motive and intent or to refute defensive theories).
Second, the proof regarding the extraneous robbery was not likely to affect
the jury in an irrational way. It was not gruesome or emotionally charged. See
McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 120–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
pet. ref’d) (second factor entails consideration of “the ‘emotional weight’ of the
extraneous offense evidence and whether that evidence was ‘graphic’”).
Third, the evidence did not cause substantial delay or distraction. Rather, the
evidence consisted of still photographs from surveillance footage at the location of
the robbery and Tullos’s brief testimony about the robbery.
Fourth, given the defense’s theory that Patterson was not an active member of
100 Click, the prosecution had significant need for contrary proof to rebut the
17
defense’s theory that Patterson innocently found himself in the wrong place in the
company of the wrong people at the time of Sullivan’s murder. We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly deciding that
the robbery’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. See Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 169; Hajjar, 176 S.W.3d at 561.
We overrule Patterson’s second and eighth issues.
C. No error preserved regarding construction of Article 38.22
In his ninth issue, Patterson contends that the trial court erred by failing to
strictly construe the statutory requirement that law enforcement officers warn the
subject of a custodial interrogation that he may terminate the interview at any time.
1. Applicable law
Law enforcement officers are required to provide several warnings to anyone
in custody whom they interrogate, including an admonition that the person may
terminate the interview at any time. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a)(5),
3(a)(2). Any resulting statement is not admissible unless law enforcement officers
provide this warning or its “fully effective equivalent.” Id. § 3(e)(2); see also Nonn
v. State, 41 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (substantial compliance with
Article 38.22’s warnings requirements necessary).
In order to preserve a complaint regarding Article 38.22’s requirements for
appellate review, a defendant must raise the issue with specificity in the trial court.
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Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A general assertion
that law enforcement officers took a videotaped statement “without the safeguards
required by and in violation of Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” is
not sufficient to preserve error, as Article 38.22 contains a number of discrete
subsections that might be applicable to any given videotaped statement. Id.; accord
Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 353 & n.28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
2. Analysis
Patterson filed a motion to suppress any statements made to law enforcement
officers. He asserted multiple bases for suppression, including that his statements
“were taken without the safeguards required by and in violation of Article 38.22 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.” But Patterson did not specify any particular
violation of Article 38.22, and defense counsel informed the trial court that she was
“going to pass on that motion” without seeking a ruling. Because Patterson raised
Article 38.22 without specifying any particular violation of the statute and declined
to present his suppression motion to the trial court, the trial court never had an
opportunity to construe or apply the statute. Patterson therefore has not preserved
this issue for review. Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 353 & n.28; Resendez, 306 S.W.3d at
313.
We overrule Patterson’s ninth issue.
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D. The record does not show ineffective assistance of counsel
In his third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues, Patterson contends that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to:
● move for a mistrial after the trial court overruled Patterson’s objections to
the admissibility of the extraneous aggravated robbery;
● obtain a ruling on his written motion to suppress by requesting that the
trial court determine whether Patterson was in custody when law
enforcement officers took his videotaped statement;
● object to the admissibility of Patterson’s videotaped statement on the basis
that it was taken in violation of his statutory right to be warned that he
could end the interview at any time;
● object to the admissibility of Patterson’s videotaped statement on the basis
that he did not waive his statutory right to terminate the interview at any
time; and
● object to the admission of Patterson’s videotaped statement on any basis
other than hearsay.
1. Applicable law
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance, Patterson must prove that his
trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142
20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984)). Patterson bears the burden of proof on both issues, and failure to make
either showing by a preponderance of the evidence will defeat his ineffectiveness
claims. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). His
counsel’s effectiveness must be evaluated based on the totality of the representation
rather than isolated acts or omissions. Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 509
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). But trial counsel’s failure to object to admissible evidence
or request a mistrial on the basis of admissible evidence is not deficient performance
as a matter of law. Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Unless the record shows that trial counsel’s acts were not the product of
strategic decision-making, we presume that her performance was adequate so long
as the challenged conduct is not so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it. State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Patterson, therefore, must show that no plausible reason exists for the
particular acts or omissions about which he complains. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d
828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). His ineffective assistance claims cannot rest on
speculation; they must be firmly founded in the record. Id. at 835. If we can only
speculate as to why trial counsel behaved as she did, the presumption of adequate
performance remains unrebutted. Scheanette, 144 S.W.3d at 510. Thus, we
“ordinarily need to hear from counsel whether there was a legitimate trial strategy
21
for a certain act or omission.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005).
2. Analysis
a. Counsel was not deficient by failing to move for mistrial
Patterson argues that his trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial after
the trial court admitted evidence of his extraneous aggravated robbery over his
objection. But we have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting this evidence. Thus, counsel was not deficient for failing to seek a mistrial
based on its admission. See Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d at 887 (failure to move
for mistrial based on admission of admissible evidence is not ineffective assistance).
We overrule Patterson’s third issue.
b. Record is insufficient to assess other ineffective assistance
claims
Patterson argues that his trial counsel should have objected or taken other
measures to secure exclusion of his videotaped statement. But Patterson did not
raise this issue in his motion for new trial, and therefore the record contains no
evidence concerning his trial counsel’s decision-making regarding the statement.
Given that Patterson’s videotaped statement is consistent with his trial defense—that
he drove the shooter or shooters to the murder scene but did not know that murder
was the purpose of the trip—we cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to seek its
exclusion on the bases identified by Patterson was so outrageous that no competent
22
attorney would have done so. Because we can only speculate in this regard,
Patterson has not rebutted the presumption that his trial counsel’s performance was
adequate. Scheanette, 144 S.W.3d at 510.
We overrule Patterson’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. All pending motions are dismissed as
moot.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.
Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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