Ex Parte Andre Jackson ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                          ACCEPTED
    03-17-00302-cr
    21406744
    THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    12/20/2017 12:39 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    CLERK
    No. 03-17-00302-CR
    In the Court of Appeals for the Third District FILED IN
    3rd COURT OF APPEALS
    Austin, Texas                 AUSTIN, TEXAS
    12/20/2017 12:39:29 PM
    Andre Jackson,                 JEFFREY D. KYLE
    Clerk
    Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 331st Judicial District Court
    Travis County, Texas
    Cause Number D-1-DC-16-302285
    Honorable Judge David Crain, Presiding
    STATE’S REPLY BRIEF
    Margaret Moore
    District Attorney
    Travis County, Texas
    Nancy L. Nicolas
    Assistant District Attorney
    State Bar No. 24057883
    P.O. Box 1748
    Austin, Texas 78767
    512-854-9400 (phone)
    512-854-4206 (fax)
    Nancy.Nicolas@traviscountytx.gov
    AppellateTCDA@traviscountytx.gov
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................... iii
    STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR .. 1
    The trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s petition for
    habeas corpus seeking bond reduction or personal bond. .......... 1
    Factual Background ............................................................. 2
    The Standard of Review is Abuse of Discretion....................... 3
    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion. ........................ 4
    PRAYER ................................................................................. 9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE.................. 10
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Ex parte Gill, 
    413 S.W.3d 425
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)..................... 3
    Ex parte McNeil v. Rains, 
    772 S.W.2d 488
    (Tex. App. -- Houston [1st
    dist.] 1989) ................................................................................ 4
    Ex parte Smith, 
    486 S.W.3d 62
    (Tex. App. -- Texarkana [6th dist.]
    2016)...................................................................................... 3,4
    Jones v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ......... 4,5,6,7
    Pate v. State, 
    592 S.W.2d 620
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) .................... 5
    Philen v. State, 
    683 S.W.2d 440
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).................. 7
    Statutes
    Tex. Code Crim. P. Art. 17.151...................................................... 4
    iii
    No. 03-17-00302-CR
    In the Court of Appeals for the Third District
    Austin, Texas
    Andre Jackson,
    Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 331st Judicial District Court
    Travis County, Texas
    Cause Number D-1-DC-16-302285
    Honorable Judge David Crain, Presiding
    STATE’S REPLY BRIEF
    To the Honorable Third Court of Appeals:
    Now comes the State of Texas and files this answer in
    response to the brief filed by Appellant.
    STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
    The trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s
    petition for habeas corpus seeking bond reduction or
    personal bond.
    Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found that
    the State had been ready for trial with ninety days from the
    commencement of his detention, as required by Article 17.151 of
    1
    the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.                                          The State contends
    Appellant has failed to prove this claim has merit.
    Factual Background
    On November 6, 2006, police responded to a call of an
    unconscious man lying in the roadway.                                          CR 5.           An autopsy
    determined that that Kenneth Johnson, the decedent, died as a
    result of gunshot wounds. CR 5. Following an investigation by the
    Austin Police Department, a probable cause affidavit and warrant
    for Appellant’s arrest were issued, alleging Murder. CR 5-9. Bond
    was set at $250,000. CR 10. Appellant was arrested on November
    28, 2016, the same day the arrest warrant was issued.                                                    CR 4.
    Appellant’s personal bond on a different case, for which he had
    previously been released, was also revoked and set at $25,000 on
    November 30, 2016.1                        A grand jury indicted Appellant for the
    offense on January 18, 2017. CR 21-23.
    Through his attorney, Appellant filed a Motion for Writ of
    Habeas Corpus seeking bail reduction on January 18, 2017.                                                      CR
    1
    The other case, an allegation of felony Evading Arrest or Detention, is proceeding in trial court under Cause
    number D-1-DC-16-301434, and is the subject of Appellant’s other appeal, which is before this Court under Number
    03-17-00301-CR. The facts and procedural history of that case are discussed more thoroughly in the State’s
    corresponding answer.
    2
    15-20. A hearing on this motion took place January 24, 2017, in
    which the trial court denied Appellant’s request to reduce the bond.
    2 RR 10.
    Appellant filed, pro se, a “Petition for Habeas Corpus Because
    of Delay” on March 13, 2017. CR 52. The petition was discussed in
    a bench conference on March 15, 2017, but no formal hearing took
    place at that time because the State had not been provided prior
    notice of the petition. 3 RR 12. On April 10, 2017, the trial court
    held a hearing on Appellant’s motion, at the conclusion of which the
    motion was denied. 4 RR 8. Appellant challenges that ruling by the
    trial court in the instant appeal.
    The Standard of Review is Abuse of Discretion.
    Claims that the trial court erred concerning the imposition or
    reduction of bail are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte
    Smith, 
    486 S.W.3d 62
    , at 64 (Tex. App. – Texarkana [6th dist.] 2016),
    citing Ex parte Gill, 
    413 S.W.3d 425
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The
    reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling unless “no
    reasonable view of the record” supports the legal conclusion,
    3
    viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling. Ex parte
    Smith, 
    486 S.W.3d 64
    .
    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion.
    Where an accused invokes Article 17.151 and challenges the
    State’s timely readiness for trial, the State must make a prima facie
    showing that the State is or was ready before the applicable
    deadline. Jones v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 712
    , at 719 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1991).   If the State has made its prima facie showing, then the
    burden shifts to the accused to rebut it, absent which a trial court
    has discretion to find the State was timely in its readiness for trial.
    
    Id. at 718,
    719. Here, the State was required to be ready for trial
    within ninety days of Appellant’s arrest for Murder, which would
    have made the State’s deadline for readiness February 27, 2017.
    Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 17.151(1).
    The State made its prima facie case when the trial court noted
    at the beginning of the proceeding on Appellant’s petition that
    Appellant had been indicted for the offense on January 18, 2017. 4
    RR 4. See Ex parte McNeil v. Rains, 
    772 S.W.2d 488
    , at 489 (Tex.
    App. – Houston [1st dist. 1989] (“The existence of a charging
    4
    instrument is an element of preparedness.        Where there is no
    indictment, the State cannot announce ready for trial.”), citing Pate
    v. State, 
    592 S.W.2d 620
    at 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Here, the
    Prosecutor affirmatively stated, “We’ve been ready since this case
    got indicted.” 4 RR 8. The Prosecutor further informed the trial
    court:
    Ms Meredith: You Honor, the State was ready. The Defendant
    was – the offense committed in this case was on November 6th
    of 2016. The State presented a case to grand jury on January
    18th of 2017 where the grand jury returned an indictment.
    That was well within the 90 days. The State was ready to
    calendar this for trial.
    4 RR 7.
    The only evidence offered by Appellant to rebut this showing
    was his argument in which he pointed out the State had made no
    formal announcement of ready within the statutory time period. 4
    RR 6. However, the State is not required to file a written notice or
    even announce ready prior to the ninetieth day; a retrospective
    announcement of readiness can sufficiently demonstrate the State’s
    compliance with Article 17.151. Jones v. 
    State, 803 S.W.2d at 717
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    5
    Further, Appellant claimed the State could not be ready
    without cell phone records that the State represented had just been
    received in March. 4 RR 6. The State’s response to this concern
    was that the records were “just in addition to all the other evidence
    that we have in this particular case. And we were ready to go to
    trial within the 90 days.” 4 RR 7. The record in this instance is
    distinguishable from the circumstances in Jones v. State, where the
    significance of certain testimony from a person who was not
    available to the State within the statutory time period was
    uncontroverted. Here, unlike in Jones, the State refuted that the
    cell phone records obtained after the ninety days had expired were
    “a key…piece of evidence,” and instead articulated to the court that
    the records were merely part of the totality of the case. 
    803 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). It is apparent from the Probable Cause
    affidavit that records relied upon by the Austin Police Department
    in their investigation were already in the possession of law
    enforcement, and therefore available to the State, on November 23,
    2016, prior even to the commencement of Appellant’s confinement.
    CR 8.   Absent a credible showing of the significance the records
    obtained by the State in March, the trial court was not bound to
    6
    conclude that the cell phone records were a key piece of evidence
    obtained untimely, and Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof
    to rebut the State’s prima facie claim of readiness. 
    Id. Additionally, even
    if the records were a key component in the
    case, their arrival into the State’s possession in March does not
    preclude the State’s readiness prior to that occurrence. The failure
    to subpoena witnesses is insufficient grounds to rebut the State’s
    announcement of ready, if the trial court finds that the State could
    have been ready for trial absent the subpoenas, and the State
    contends that same reasoning applies to evidence contained in
    records expected in response to a subpoena. Philen v. State, 
    683 S.W.2d 440
    , at 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).         Here, there is no
    demonstration that had the case been set for trial sooner, the State
    would have been unable to secure the records and requisite
    witnesses on which to base a predicate for admissibility.      Again,
    this is distinguishable from Jones, where the witness necessary to
    the State’s case was proven to be in custody in a different state, and
    no legal mechanism that could have secured his appearance was
    commenced within the ninety day period for readiness. 
    803 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    7
    The trial court’s succinct ruling demonstrates its application of
    the correct legal standard when it held, “The State has announced
    that they were ready at that time before the 90 days had elapsed
    and that creates on the face of it a readiness for trial. And I haven’t
    heard any credible evidence to negate their showing of readiness, so
    I’ll deny your Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus to be released.” 4
    RR 8.     Affording due deference to the trial court’s factual
    determinations, and because the court utilized the correct legal
    standard, the record does not support a finding of abuse of
    discretion.   The State contends that this Court should deny the
    relief sought by Appellant.
    8
    PRAYER
    The State requests that the Court overrule Appellant’s point of
    error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Margaret Moore
    District Attorney
    Travis County
    /s/ Nancy L. Nicolas
    Nancy L. Nicolas
    Assistant District Attorney
    State Bar No. 24057883
    P.O. Box 1748
    Austin, Texas 78767
    512-854-9400 (phone)
    512-854-4206 (fax)
    Nancy.Nicolas@traviscountytx.gov
    AppellateTCDA@traviscountytx.gov
    9
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
    I certify that this brief contains 1,462 words, based upon the
    computer program used to generate this brief and excluding words
    contained in those parts of the brief that Texas Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 9.4(i) exempts from inclusion in the word count, and that
    this brief is printed in a conventional, 14-point typeface.
    I further certify that, on the 20th day of December, 2017, a true
    and correct copy of this brief was served, by U.S. mail, electronic
    mail, telephonic document transmission, or electronically through
    the electronic filing manager,      to Appellant,    Andre Jackson,
    #1642983, Travis County Jail, 3614 Bill Price Road, Del Valle, TX
    78617.
    /s/ Nancy L. Nicolas
    Nancy L. Nicolas
    Assistant District Attorney
    10