Raven Ryon Lovings v. State , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6761 ( 2012 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion filed August 14, 2012.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-11-00406-CR
    NO. 14-11-00407-CR
    RAVEN RYON LOVINGS, Appellant,
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
    On Appeal from the 337th District Court
    Harris County
    Trial Court Cause Nos. 1249643 & 1249644
    OPINION
    Appellant Raven Ryon Lovings was charged with aggravated sexual assault in two
    causes. A jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of sexual assault and the
    trial court sentenced him to ten years’ confinement in both causes, to be served
    concurrently. On appeal, Lovings contends (1) he was egregiously harmed by the trial
    court’s failure to include the applicable statutory definitions of “without consent” in the
    jury charge; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to convict him in either cause because the
    evidence “conclusively establishes reasonable doubt as to the complainant’s lack of
    consent.” We affirm.
    I
    In January 2009, the complainant was staying with her family at the Reed Motel
    when she met Lovings, who was dating the complainant’s sister. Lovings came to the
    motel to see the complainant’s sister, but she was not there. While Lovings waited for the
    complainant’s sister to return, he engaged in pleasant conversation with the complainant
    and her mother in their room. The complainant knew Lovings only as “Raven.” At some
    point, the complainant’s mother asked Lovings to drive the complainant to a store to run
    an errand for her. Lovings agreed, and he and the complainant got in Lovings’s car. At
    that point, their versions of events sharply differ.
    According to the complainant, she had been “chilling out” and getting high with
    two men just before she met Lovings. She admitted she was using drugs heavily at the
    time, and she and the two men had shared a cigarette laced with PCP. When the men
    wanted to follow the complainant into her motel room, she refused to let them inside.
    Lovings later told her he had made the men leave. The complainant thought Lovings
    seemed like a nice guy, so when her mother asked Lovings to drive her to the store, the
    complainant agreed. As they drove, however, Lovings repeatedly asked the complainant
    to go to his house. The complainant refused. They began to talk about getting some
    drugs, and the complainant directed him to a house where they could buy some. After
    arriving at the house, Lovings gave the complainant $10 for cocaine. She went in,
    purchased the cocaine, and returned to the car.
    As Lovings and the complainant continued on their way, they were talking and
    “all of sudden” arrived at Lovings’s house. The complainant refused to go in with
    Lovings, so he went in alone. After a minute or so, Lovings came back out to the car and
    asked the complainant to come in and help him look for his marijuana. She agreed,
    thinking she would not be in the house long. Lovings immediately went to his bedroom
    and began “hitting” the cocaine. The complainant sat on the edge of the bed. Lovings
    asked the complainant if she wanted to “hit” the cocaine, and she said, “No, I’m not
    hitting that because you might think I’m here to do something with you and — no.”
    2
    Lovings told the complainant, “It’s not like that,” and so she agreed to “hit” the cocaine
    with him.
    After they used the cocaine, the complainant told Lovings they needed to leave,
    but Lovings hit the complainant and said, “You’re not going nowhere . . . get your ass
    back on that bed.” Fearing for her safety, the complainant did as Lovings told her. The
    complainant then saw a knife on the dresser. In an attempt to protect herself, she grabbed
    the knife and “went for him in his chest area.” They wrestled over the knife, and Lovings
    eventually overpowered the complainant. As the complainant tried to hold onto the knife,
    she pulled on the sharp edge and cut her finger “wide open.” The knife broke in half.
    Lovings wrestled the complainant to the floor and put his foot on her neck. He
    began hitting her, yelling, “bitch . . . you tried to stab me.” Lovings threatened to kill the
    complainant if she did not get on the bed and take her clothes off. Fearing for her life, the
    complainant complied, and Lovings began raping her. Lovings first sexually assaulted the
    complainant vaginally, and then he turned her around and sexually assaulted her anally.
    the complainant pleaded with Lovings to stop because it hurt, but he told her to “shut up”
    as he continued to rape her.
    Throughout these attacks, Lovings continued to beat and threaten the complainant.
    At one point Lovings threatened to call other men over to gang rape the complainant; at
    another point, he threatened to put her in the trunk of his car. The complainant was afraid
    and believed him. Lovings would not let the complainant out of his sight while he was
    awake, and when he slept he kept his arm around her so that she could not leave. The
    complainant tried to sneak away, but he awoke and began hitting and sexually assaulting
    her again. the complainant’s face began to swell from the blows.
    The next day, the complainant told Lovings she was pregnant and needed to get
    something to eat, but Lovings would not let her leave. He also refused to let her call
    anyone. The complainant repeatedly asked him to take her to get something to eat, and
    around noon he finally agreed to take her to McDonald’s. Lovings gave the complainant
    a sock with which to wrap her finger, but he refused to let her put her underwear or jacket
    3
    on. Although the complainant had a can of mace in her jacket, she was afraid to try to use
    it because her earlier attempts to defend herself had been unsuccessful.
    When Lovings and the complainant left the house, the complainant ran from him
    and tried to get the attention of people nearby. Lovings pulled up to the complainant in
    his car, but she refused to get in. Instead, she ran down the street, crying and screaming
    for help. The complainant went inside a convenience store where a stranger helped her
    get change to call the police. An ambulance arrived and took the complainant to the
    hospital.
    At the hospital, the complainant told Officer Raul Yzquierdo of the Houston
    Police Department what had happened to her. The complainant also recounted the
    assaults to the hospital personnel and she was given a sexual-assault examination. About
    a month after the complainant was released from the hospital, Yzquierdo picked her up
    and drove her to a police station, where he showed her photographs of possible suspects.
    The complainant identified Lovings as her assailant.
    Lovings did not testify at trial, but the prosecution presented to the jury a lengthy
    video statement he made to Yzquierdo and Sergeant Brian Harris. The jury heard Lovings
    explain that he went to the Reed Motel to wait for his girlfriend, the complainant’s sister,
    with whom he had plans that evening. He prevented the two men who had been with the
    complainant from entering the motel room she was sharing with her mother and sister.
    The two men told him they each had given the complainant $20 of “powder” and she had
    agreed to have sex with them. After the men left, Lovings visited with the complainant
    and her mother while waiting for the complainant’s sister to arrive. He was drinking. The
    complainant’s sister kept coming in and then going outside and driving off with other
    men. Lovings grew increasingly upset and drank too much. The complainant wanted him
    to take her to get more “powder” and he told her she had already had enough.
    When the complainant’s mother asked the complainant and Lovings to go to the
    store for her, the complainant grabbed his arm and they went to the car. As he drove, the
    complainant asked him for $10 and directed him to a house, which he recognized as the
    4
    house where the complainant’s sister bought cocaine. The complainant went into the
    house and came back with cocaine. Lovings took the cocaine from her and told her it was
    for her sister. He drove to his house while the complainant kept asking for the cocaine.
    When they arrived at his house, Lovings went in and left the complainant outside.
    He went to sleep in his bedroom. Sometime later he was awakened by the complainant
    bursting through the door and insisting that he give her the cocaine. At first he refused,
    but eventually he relented and gave her some. The complainant wanted more cocaine and
    became aggressive. Lovings turned away from her to return to his bedroom, and the
    complainant stabbed him on the back of his shoulder with a knife. He showed the
    interviewing officers a cut on his back. Lovings accused the complainant of trying to kill
    him, and he punched her several times in self defense. The complainant began to cry and
    told Lovings that CPS had just taken her seven children. Lovings saw that the
    complainant had cut her finger while holding the knife and was bleeding, but she said she
    did not care. Lovings pried her fingers open and took the knife from her. He did not know
    how the knife broke. The complainant kept asking him to give her the cocaine and to
    drive her home. He told her he would not drive her home because he had been drinking.
    Lovings said he talked with the complainant a long time, telling her she needed to
    get off drugs, get God in her life, and show CPS she could be a good mother. He gave her
    the cocaine on the condition that there be no more “drama.” Later, the complainant got
    into bed with him, and they had both vaginal and anal consensual sex. In the morning he
    awoke to find her “messing with” him and they had sex again. She told him she needed
    food because she was pregnant and asked him to take her to McDonald’s. Lovings was
    very worried about the complainant’s sister and mother finding out about their night
    together and he let her know they had no future together. The complainant’s attitude
    toward him began to change. They got dressed and went to the car; Lovings asked if the
    complainant wanted to drive or if she wanted him to drive. She said, “I’m OK,” and went
    across the street. He went to McDonald’s by himself.
    5
    When Lovings returned home from McDonald’s, his relatives were outside his
    house and a cousin told him the police were on the way because a woman had reported
    that he raped her. Lovings immediately drove to the Reed Motel to talk to the
    complainant’s sister and mother to ask them if the complainant had mental or emotional
    problems. The complainant’s sister told him the complainant was at the hospital and had
    said her face was swollen.
    The jury also heard from other witnesses who testified concerning the incident.
    Officer Reese Hardy testified that he responded to the sexual assault call. He arrived at
    Lovings’s residence and received permission from the owner to enter. Inside, he saw
    blood on the floor, bloody rags or towels, and a broken knife handle near a bedroom. In
    the bedroom, he saw female clothing and a pair of panties on the floor.
    Officer Yzquierdo testified that when he interviewed the complainant, she was
    able to give a physical description of her assailant and his first name, “Raven.” She also
    described him as having the word “Beast” tattooed on his chest. Yzquierdo saw no
    indication that the complainant was intoxicated or high on drugs. Officer Yzquierdo’s
    investigation led him to Lovings. Yzquierdo prepared a photo lineup that included
    Lovings for the complainant to review. When the complainant reviewed the lineup, she
    identified Lovings as her assailant. Yzquierdo also conducted a more detailed interview
    with the complainant in which she admitted she had been using drugs and she went into
    Lovings’s house to look for marijuana, but she denied it was a “sex-for-drugs situation.”
    Officer Harris, who interviewed Lovings, testified that in his opinion, Lovings was
    very egotistical, “almost had a superiority complex,” and viewed himself as a “redeemer”
    of women. Harris formed his opinion of Lovings in part based on documents Lovings
    authored which Harris reviewed in preparation for the interview.1 Harris also testified
    1
    The State introduced one of Lovings’ writings found in a spiral notebook titled “Beast on a
    Bike,” which read as follows:
    One night a 27 year old woman was walking at 12:30 pm. She ran into a beast on a bike.
    She said she was going to the store, although all stores were close[d] — but she wanted
    him to pump her on his bike. She hop[p]ed on the handle bars, and she said she could not
    6
    that based on his interview of Lovings, he concluded Lovings was “fairly intelligent” and
    thought that Lovings’s answers “were extremely well-calculated to account for any type
    of physical evidence.”
    Dr. Megan McCarthy testified that she performed the sexual-assault examination
    on the complainant. She explained that the complainant’s medical records reflected that
    she complained of repeated physical and sexual assault and was suffering emotional
    distress. The complainant also had a laceration on her finger, a bruised eye, and redness
    on her elbow. Dr. McCarthy also confirmed that the complainant was twenty-seven years
    old and pregnant. The pelvic exam Dr. McCarthy performed on the complainant revealed
    no signs of trauma in either the vaginal or rectal areas, but Dr. McCarthy explained that a
    lack of trauma does not necessarily mean that a sexual assault has not occurred because
    “the vagina is very accommodating for intercourse.” Another factor was the
    complainant’s vaginal deliveries of at least six of her children, which Dr. McCarthy
    explained could result in a “laxity in the muscles of the perineum.” Dr. McCarthy also
    explained that multiple births could result in “tissue laxity” of the anus, but she
    acknowledged she was not an expert in that area. She also admitted she did not check for
    sphincter damage caused by multiple vaginal deliveries. However, she testified that most
    sexual assaults do not result in signs of trauma.
    Claudette Nance, a neighbor of Lovings, also testified. She was sitting in her yard
    with her daughter and some friends when she saw Lovings and a woman come out of his
    house and begin walking toward his car. When they got near the driveway, the woman
    “jumped the ditch” and said, “Y’all know him? He raped me.” Nance heard Lovings say,
    “Girl, what are you doing? We [are] fixing to get something to eat.” The complainant
    then ran down the street looking for help. Lovings got in his car and left, returning a short
    time later with some food. By then, many people had gathered around his house.
    get off until she got to his house. When they got inside Beast beat and raped her and rode
    off into the sunset. The pussy must have been bad. No one has seen him since. You
    decide, breaking news or joke.
    In his police interview, Lovings explained that a cousin gave him the nickname “Beast.”
    7
    Someone told Lovings he was accused of rape, and Lovings drove off. Nance never saw
    him again.
    II
    In his second issue, Lovings contends the evidence is insufficient to convict him of
    sexual assault in either case because the evidence conclusively establishes reasonable
    doubt as to the complainant’s lack of consent.2
    A
    When addressing a sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); Gear v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 743
    , 746 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011). We give deference to the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to
    weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
    Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge of
    the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony and is free to accept
    or reject any or all evidence presented by either side. See Lancon v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 699
    , 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    A person commits sexual assault if he intentionally or knowingly causes the
    penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, without that
    person’s consent. Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(a)(1)(A). Section 22.011 lists eleven
    circumstances that constitute “without consent.” 
    Id. § 22.011(b)(1)–(11).
    Of those, the
    State and Lovings agree the statutory definitions applicable here provide that a sexual
    assault is without the consent of the other person (1) if the actor compels the other person
    to submit or participate by the use of physical force or violence; or (2) the actor compels
    2
    The only difference between the two charges is the manner in which the sexual contact
    occurred. In case number 1249643, Lovings was charged with the penetration of the complainant’s anus;
    in cause number 1249644, Lovings was charged with the penetration of the complainant’s female sexual
    organ.
    8
    the other person to submit or participate by threatening to use force or violence against
    the other person, and the other person believes that the actor has the present ability to
    execute the threat. 
    Id. § 22.011(b)(1),
    (2).
    B
    Lovings contends the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt as to
    whether he acted without the complainant’s consent in both causes and therefore the
    evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. First, Lovings argues that the
    complainant’s credibility is undermined by direct and undisputed evidence that
    contradicts her testimony. Lovings points out the complainant testified she tried to stab
    Lovings “in the chest area,” but in the video, Lovings showed Harris a cut on his back,
    not his chest. According to Lovings, this evidence supports his version of events. Lovings
    also points out the complainant testified she had a can of mace in her jacket, and argues
    that if that is true and she was wearing it when she was pushed onto the bed, she would
    have had the means available to protect herself. Conversely, he posits, if the complainant
    was not wearing the jacket, her testimony that she had no intention of staying is “severely
    weakened.”
    Lovings also argues that the complainant’s recollection of events is suspect. He
    points out that the complainant testified, “I remember exactly what happened,” but then
    was unable to remember certain details of the assault, such as whether she or Lovings
    removed some of her clothing and whether Lovings used a condom or lubricant. Lovings
    also maintains that the complainant’s admitted heavy drug use and her testimony that she
    had been getting high on PCP with two men just before her encounter with Lovings
    shows that “by the time she took the hits she admits taking from Mr. Lovings, her
    consciousness would have been altered and her memory suspect.” Finally, Lovings
    argues her medical exam revealed no evidence of rape, and the lack of trauma to her
    vagina or anus undermines her claim that she was raped repeatedly all night. Lovings
    contends the cumulative effect of the evidence shows that “no rational jury would fail to
    have reason to doubt all her testimony.” We disagree.
    9
    As noted above, a sexual assault is without consent if “the actor compels the other
    person to submit or participate by the use of physical force or violence.” Tex. Penal Code
    § 22.011(b)(1). The complainant testified that she specifically sought Lovings’s
    assurance that he did not expect to have sex with her if she used his cocaine. But when
    she tried to leave, Lovings beat her and told her to get back on the bed. The complainant
    testified that she thought Lovings was going to kill her. The complainant tried using a
    knife to defend herself but was overpowered and beaten, and she remembered thinking,
    “well, I just knew I was dead.” At that point, the complainant acquiesced to Lovings’s
    demand that she get back on the bed, and the sexual assaults began. The complainant
    testified she did not want to have sex with Lovings and conveyed that to him by telling
    him “no” and begging him not to rape her. Thus, a rational jury could have concluded
    that Lovings used physical force and violence to compel the complainant to submit to the
    sexual acts, and her testimony was corroborated by her physical injuries and the evidence
    collected at the scene.
    A sexual assault also may be without consent “if the actor compels the other
    person to submit or participate by threatening to use force or violence against the other
    person, and the other person believes that the actor has the present ability to execute the
    threat.” When a complainant has previously been beaten for refusing sexual advances
    from a person, the mere demand for sex from such person on subsequent occasions
    carries with it an implicit threat of beating and is sufficient to show a lack of consent. See
    Graves v. State, 
    994 S.W.2d 238
    , 244 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref’d,
    untimely filed).
    A rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt Lovings compelled
    the complainant to submit or participate by threatening to use force or violence against
    her, and she believed he had the ability to execute the threat. The complainant testified
    that Lovings beat her and he repeatedly said, “If you don’t do what I say, I’ll kill you.”
    Because she believed him, she got onto the bed on her own. During the sexual assaults,
    Lovings continued to threaten the complainant, at one point telling her he was going to
    10
    “call some boys over” to gang rape her, and at another point, telling her he was going to
    put her in the trunk of her car. The complainant testified that she believed him and she
    was afraid.
    As Lovings acknowledges, a complainant’s uncorroborated testimony, standing
    alone, can be sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
    art. 38.07 (a conviction for sexual assault is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony
    of the victim if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the offense
    within a year); Garcia v. State, 
    563 S.W.2d 925
    , 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding
    victim’s testimony of penetration by appellant, standing alone, was sufficient); Jensen v.
    State, 
    66 S.W.3d 528
    , 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (stating
    testimony of victim, standing alone, was sufficient). The State has no burden to produce
    physical or other corroborating evidence, and the jury determines the credibility of the
    witnesses and may “believe all, some, or none of the testimony.” Chambers v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 459
    , 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    The complainant informed others the day of her sexual assault, as testified to by
    Lovings’s neighbor, Dr. McCarthy, and Officer Yzquierdo. The complainant’s testimony,
    standing alone, was thus legally sufficient to support Lovings’s conviction without
    corroborating evidence. We therefore reject Lovings’s contention that the lack of
    evidence of vaginal or anal trauma renders the complainant’s testimony suspect or legally
    insufficient. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.07; 
    Garcia, 563 S.W.2d at 928
    ; 
    Jensen, 66 S.W.3d at 534
    .
    Lovings’s other purported conflicts in the evidence fare no better, as the jury was
    entitled to determine the significance, if any, of the alleged stab wound on his shoulder
    and the effect of the complainant’s drug use on her memory. A rational jury could
    conclude that it may be normal for a sexual assault victim to remember what happened,
    yet be unable to recall every detail, and not attribute it to drug use. The jury also could
    have concluded that whether the complainant removed her clothing herself, or had access
    to mace, were not determinative factors when deciding whether or not she consented to
    11
    sex. Ultimately, the jury was free to believe the complainant’s testimony that she did not
    consent to sex and to disbelieve Lovings’s version of events. See 
    Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746
    ; 
    Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461
    .
    Moreover, the jury’s verdict is supported by other evidence in addition to the
    complainant’s testimony. Lovings’s neighbor testified that she remembered seeing a
    woman running away from Lovings who said she had been raped. The police dispatched
    to Lovings’s house found blood stains on the floor, bloody rags or towels, the broken
    knife, and a pair of panties. Yzquierdo testified that the complainant did not appear
    intoxicated or high on drugs when he interviewed her. And Dr. McCarthy, Yzquierdo,
    and other emergency and hospital services personnel all documented the complainant’s
    injuries and emotional distress.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational fact
    finder could have found that the complainant did not consent and that Lovings committed
    the offenses of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318
    –
    19; 
    Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746
    . We overrule Lovings’s second issue.
    III
    In his first issue, Lovings contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
    include in the charge the statutory bases under which the jury could find the element of
    lack of consent and thereby caused him egregious harm. Lovings points out that neither
    the general instructions nor the application paragraphs included the applicable statutory
    definitions of “without consent” for either aggravated sexual assault or the lesser-
    included offense of sexual assault.
    A
    An appellate court’s first duty in analyzing a jury charge issue is to decide whether
    error exists. Ngo v. State, 
    175 S.W.3d 738
    , 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If error is found,
    the degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the
    error by objecting to the complained-of instruction. Olivas v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 137
    , 144
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Almanza v. State, 
    686 S.W.2d 157
    , 171 (Tex. Crim. App.
    12
    1985) (op. on reh’g). If the defendant properly objected to the erroneous jury charge
    instruction, reversal is required if we find “some harm” to the defendant’s rights. 
    Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144
    ; 
    Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743
    ; 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171
    . But if the
    defendant did not object, we may only reverse if the record shows egregious harm to the
    defendant. 
    Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144
    ; 
    Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743
    –44; 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171
    .
    Egregious harm is a difficult standard to prove and must be determined on a case-
    by-case basis. Taylor v. State, 
    332 S.W.3d 483
    , 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In making
    our determination, “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury
    charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative
    evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the
    record of the trial as a whole.” 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171
    ; see Garrett v. State, 
    159 S.W.3d 717
    , 719–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005), aff'd, 
    220 S.W.3d 926
    (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2007). Jury-charge error causes egregious harm to the defendant if it affects the
    very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a
    defensive theory. Hutch v. State, 
    922 S.W.2d 166
    , 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172
    .
    B
    It is undisputed that Lovings’s counsel did not object to the jury charge on the
    grounds that the trial court did not include the applicable statutory definitions of “without
    consent.” Therefore, Lovings must show that the trial court erred by failing to include
    these definitions and that the trial court’s error caused him egregious harm. 
    Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144
    ; 
    Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743
    –44; 
    Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171
    .
    The trial court must charge the jury on the “law applicable to the case,” which
    requires that the jury be instructed on each element of the offense or offenses charged.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. The “law applicable to the case” also includes the
    statutory definitions that affect the meaning of the elements of the offense. Ouellette v.
    State, 
    353 S.W.3d 868
    , 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Villarreal v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 321
    ,
    13
    329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Thus, a trial court is obliged to communicate to the jury
    each statutory definition that affects the meaning of an element of the offense. 
    Villareal, 286 S.W.3d at 329
    .
    The State appears to concede that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
    on the applicable definitions of “without consent” because it does not argue that no error
    occurred. Instead, the State argues that even if the trial court erred, the absence of the
    statutory definitions did not cause egregious harm to Lovings. Therefore, we will
    presume the trial court erred and determine whether the trial court’s error caused Lovings
    egregious harm.
    The charge reflects that the trial court properly instructed the jury in both the
    abstract and the application paragraphs that to convict Lovings of the offense it must find
    the sexual assault was “without consent.”3 The abstract portion of the charge read as
    follows: “A person commits the offense of sexual assault if the person intentionally or
    knowingly causes the penetration of the [female sexual organ or anus] of another person
    by any means, without that person’s consent.” Similarly, the application paragraph of the
    charge instructed the jury that if it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Lovings “intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of the [female sexual
    organ or anus] of [the complainant], by placing his sexual organ in the [female sexual
    organ or anus] of [the complainant], without the consent of [the complainant], then you
    will find the defendant guilty of sexual assault.” Even though “without consent” was not
    defined, the charge included all of the elements of the offense and consequently was not
    fundamentally defective. See Rohlfing v. State, 
    612 S.W.2d 598
    , 602–03 (Tex. Crim.
    App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (failure to define statutory element was harmless error because
    element was not omitted from charge and charge did not authorize conviction without
    finding all elements of the offense).
    Our courts have held that when a statutory definition is not included in the jury
    charge, “it is assumed the jury would consider the commonly understood meaning in its
    3
    Because the two charges are identical except for the way in which the sexual assaults were
    committed, we will discuss them as one charge.
    14
    deliberations.” Olveda v. State, 
    650 S.W.2d 408
    , 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Nejnaoui
    v. State, 
    44 S.W.3d 111
    , 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). On the
    facts of this case, the commonly understood meaning of “without consent” closely
    resembles the applicable statutory definitions and would not have confused the jury or
    caused the jury to misapply the law.
    The relevant statutory definitions of “without consent” are (1) “the actor compels
    the other person to submit or participate by the use of physical force or violence,” and (2)
    “the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by threatening to use force or
    violence against the other person, and the other person believes that the actor has the
    present ability to execute the threat.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.01l(b)(1), (2). The dictionary
    defines “consent” as “permission, approval, or assent” and gives the example, “to
    willingly engage in a sexual act.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 310
    (4th ed. 2001). Thus, engaging in a sexual act “without consent” would be commonly
    understood to mean doing so unwillingly. Because the statutory definitions of the phrase
    “without consent” describe compelling an unwilling person to engage in sexual acts, the
    statutory definition was not necessary to correct or complete the jury’s understanding of
    the concepts or terms in the application part of the charge. See 
    Nejnaoui, 44 S.W.3d at 120
    .
    As discussed above in greater detail, the complainant testified that Lovings
    committed sexual assault by overpowering her with threats and the use of physical force
    or violence. Conversely, Lovings maintained the sexual acts were consensual. The
    prosecutor argued that consent was the only disputed element and it hinged on whether
    the jury believed the complainant was telling the truth. Defense counsel responded that
    the complainant was not credible and suggested it was more likely that she was trading
    sex for drugs that night. The issue for the jury was which version of events to believe. On
    the facts of this case, the inclusion of the statutory definitions of “without consent” would
    not have assisted the jury in resolving any issues regarding the complainant’s credibility
    because she testified to the same conduct described in the statutory definitions.
    15
    Therefore, Lovings has not shown that the trial court’s error, if any, was so
    egregious that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. See 
    Rohlfing, 612 S.W.2d at 602
    –03; 
    Nejnaoui, 44 S.W.3d at 120
    . We overrule Lovings’s first issue.
    ***
    Having overruled Lovings’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/    Jeffrey V. Brown
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Seymore and Brown.
    Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    16