Jonte Chrishon v. State ( 2010 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 2, 2010.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-09-01085-CR

Jonte Chrishon, Appellant

V.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1174819

MEMORANDUM  OPINION

Appellant Jonte Chrishon was convicted of murder and sentenced to 25 years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  In two issues he contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.  We affirm.

Background

On April 3, 2008, deputies of Harris County Precinct 4 discovered the body of Marcus Smith in an apartment complex from which gunshots had been reported the previous evening.  The subsequent investigation led law enforcement officers to develop appellant as a suspect in the murder. Appellant was arrested, waived his rights, and gave a voluntary statement to authorities.

In his statement, appellant admitted that on the night of the murder he was with an acquaintance named Lodgy Jackson at the apartments where Smith was murdered.  Appellant stated that Jackson told him that since they were unable to “get K-lo,” they should go to building number three in the apartment complex and “shoot whoever is standing over at building #3.”  As appellant and Jackson were walking toward building number three, appellant saw two men nicknamed, “Gator” and “Nine.”  Appellant “shot three rounds from [his] .380 towards “[Gator]” and “[Nine]” and then ran away.” Appellant then went into his apartment, unplugged the microwave oven, and put his .380 handgun inside the microwave.  Appellant stated he did not see the victim, but only saw “Gator” and “Nine.”  Michael Dulaney, an acquaintance of appellant’s, testified at trial that appellant wanted to shoot “K-lo,” but when he could not “get to him,” appellant became angry and started shooting. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction for murder because there is no evidence that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Marcus Smith.

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony, and it is the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence.  Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  Hence, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of all the evidence or substitute our judgment for the fact finder’s.  King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

With regard to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, a majority of the judges of the court of criminal appeals recently determined that “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Brooks v. State, No. PD-0210-09, 2010 WL 3894613 *1 (Tex. Crim. App. October 6, 2010) (plurality op.)(Hervey, J., joined by Keller, P.J., Keasler, and Cochran, J.J.); id., 2010 WL 38946l3, at *14–15 (Cochran, J., concurring, joined by Womack, J.) (same conclusion as plurality).   Therefore, we will review the evidence under the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia.

Specifically, appellant argues, that the evidence showed that appellant shot a firearm down a breezeway at the apartment complex in the direction of two individuals, “Gator” and “Nine.”  However, appellant argues, the evidence indicates that appellant did not intend to kill or cause serious bodily injury to the complainant or the other two individuals.

A person commits the offense of murder if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (West 2003). A person’s intent to commit an offense generally must be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the person’s acts, words, and conduct.  Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992).  A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct or as a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2003).  When a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that the appellant intended to kill.  Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Arnold v. State, 234 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

At trial, officers testified that they recovered several .380 shell casings, which were consistent with the gun appellant hid in the microwave.  Appellant’s statement was admitted at trial in which he admitted shooting the gun toward “Gator” and “Nine” and that he walked to building number three with the intent to “shoot whoever is standing over at building #3.”  Appellant’s statement was corroborated by the physical evidence at trial, the officer who took his statement, and appellant’s acquaintance who testified that appellant wanted to kill “K-Lo.”  Therefore, the evidence showed that appellant used a deadly weapon in a deadly manner in shooting toward “Gator” and “Nine.”  Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that appellant acted with the requisite intent to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life resulting in death.  Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for murder.  Appellant’s two issues are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                    PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Frost, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).