in Re Chelsea L. Davis ( 2015 )

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FILED
IN SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FEB 02 2015
DALLAS DIVISION Blake Hawthorne, Clerk
CHELSEA L. DAVIS § by ____________ .~my
§
v. §
§
§
MCKOOL SMITH P.C., §
STATE BAR OF TEXAS ET AL § No. 3:14-cv-4190-N
§
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
I, Chelsea L. Davis, hereby timely file my Notice of Removal ofln re: Chelsea L. Davis,
Docket No. 14-1063, an original proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court and of an additional
disciplinary appeal/petition for writ of mandamus I attempted to file in the Texas Supreme Court,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. See attached filing rejections. There
appears to be a sealed alleged grievance investigation or proceeding in which I am being denied
due process. As a result of this matter, I have been unlawfully arrested for contempt of a child
support order even though there is no child support order, I do not have any children and I am
not married. I have been denied access to the record. Further, Judge Jill Willis signed a
vexatious litigant order against me, and the Texas Supreme Court has refused to accept my
pleadings in any original proceeding or appeal. Now, in another matter, I have heard that I will
be arrested for failure to appear next, but I have not yet been arrested or served with any criminal
charge, complaint or order of capias in any proceeding. I attempted to file a plea to the
.;
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jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000, and I
have a federal defense.
I object to the removed matter for lack of service, notice, process, case or controversy,
etc. in the state courts of Texas. I also contend that there is now a civil case or controversy due
to 'my filing in the Texas Supreme Court in which I am the "defendant." I timely present my
notice of removal of any and all allegations against me. I object to the numerous errors on the
"case" summary/docket sheets/document/events listing because the listings contain numerous
errors, including party designations where there are no parties and a lower court designation
where there is no lower court.
Multiple appeals may be opened or pending in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas,
Texas and/or the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which have (likely erroneously and without
authority) been assigned Docket Nos. 05-13-01744-CV, 05-13-01747-CV, 05-13-01748-CV,
05-14-00090-CV. 05-14-00095-CV, 05-14-01105-CV, 05-14-01036-CV, 05-14-01034-CV,
05-14-00841-CV and 05-14-00846-CV, etc. in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas,
and/or No. 54202 and 55408 in the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which may also be removed
to this Court to the extent there is any case or controversy now pending in the Texas Supreme
Court. Certain "matters" and/or "appeals" may be consolidated into Docket No.
05-13-01747-CV by the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. I have attempted to file
pleas to the jurisdiction, each of which raises a federal question, institutes a case or controversy,
and raises causes of action which present federal questions for which the amount in controversy
is over $75,000 for each cause of action.
Under In re Chelsea L. Davis, "No. 54202", in which there does not yet appear to be any
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petition against me, before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, a response from me was requested
to a motion by Dec. 25, 2014. This notice of removal is timely filed within thirty days of my
raising of a federal question. I have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however,
attempt to file a plea to the jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in
controversy of over $75,000.
On Dec. 29, 2014, I received a communication indicating that the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals has created a "No. 55408" even though no petition has ever been filed, based on
Grievance No. 201305119. I object to there being any State Bar of Texas cause number based
on Grievance No. 201305119. This notice of removal is timely filed in advance of thirty days. I
have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however, attempt to file a plea to the
jurisdiction, which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000. I
received an order indicating an action taken against me akin to a petition.
There is much confusion as to how any cause n'umber may be open and any proceeding
or action may proceed due to a lack of any evidentiary petition and disciplinary petition, lack of
any case or controversy, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of a record, etc., especially when
there has not been any finding or showing of just cause or reasonable belief of disability to the
extent required to initiate any disciplinary or disability proceeding against me. Nevertheless, I
am being called to appear before the Texas Supreme Court on January 30, 2015 and before
courts in Dallas and Collin Counties, Texas thereafter, and I seek to remove those called-for
appearances to this Court under this action already pending in this Court between the same
parties, which may involve the same subject matter.
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a), "[a] civil action or criminal prosecution that IS
3
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commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be
removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending." Id. Without waiving my right to contest the commencement and
pendency of a proceeding in state court due to the preliminary anti-suit injunction and/or stage of
the undercover investigation which cannot be a case, I may remove and quash the thing to the
extent it is alleged to be a civil action or criminal prosecution because I am an "officer (or any
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or
individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1442(a)(l). I may also be "property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where
such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States"; and/or "[a]ny
officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the
performance of his duties."Jd. My license to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office is a property right because I have spent nearly fifteen years gaining the
requisite education to become a U.S. Patent Attorney and the experience practicing as a Patent
Attorney.
I remove any and all complaints, grievances, petitions and allegations against me, to the
extent there are any, of professional misconduct and/or disability to this federal Court because I
am an officer of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 63,791. I am a person
acting under the United States, its agencies or its officers that has been sued for, unlawfully
prosecuted or relating to any act under color of such office and has a colorable federal defense to
the counter/intervenor plaintiffs claim(s), if any. Because I assert a colorable government
contractor defense, this Court may obtain federal subject matter jurisdiction. See State of La. v.
4
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Sparks, 978 F .2d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has for over two decades
required a liberal interpretation of § 1442(a) in view of its chief purpose-to prevent federal
officers who simply comply with a federal duty from being punished by a state court for doing
so."). In addition, this Court already has federal subject matter jurisdiction based on filing and
service of the Complaint at Doc. 1 in the action styled Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P. C.,
State Bar of Texas, Leslie D. Ware, Samuel F Baxter, et al., Cause No. 3:14-cv-4190 (N.D. Tex.
filed Nov. 24, 2014).
The 28 U.S.C.S . .§ 1367 exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction do not apply to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seg.
I have a duty of disclosure as U.S. Patent Attorney which gives rise to a federal defense
especially where I engaged in particular conduct to comply with this USPTO Rule regarding
disclosure. All decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public
interest. See Lear. Inc.~ Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). N.C. Ethics Op. 2005-9 (2006) (lawyer
for public company may reveal confidential information about corporate misconduct to SEC
under permissive-disclosure regulation authorized by Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even if disclosure
would otherwise be prohibited by state's ethics rules). Additionally, Section 11.1 06(c) states that
"[a] practitioner shall disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable
duty of disclosure provisions" and is provided to make clear that the duty of disclosure is
mandatory, not optional. Section 11.1 06(c) merely continues the current duty of disclosure
provision set forth in 37 CPR 10.23(c)(l0). See,~' Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,
8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012) Ch. 2000. While paragraph (c) does not impose a new requirement,
the express provision may be helpful in responding to any allegation of an ethical violation
5
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before a State bar in a situation where the practitioner engaged in particular conduct to comply
with this USPTO Rule. See Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 78 FR 20179. See, ~' 37 CFR 1.56, 1.555(a), 1.740(a)(13),
1.765(c) and (d), 1.933(a), Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012)
Ch. 2000; ~ill.SQ 37 CFR 10.23(c)(10). See 37 CFR 11.34(d) (disciplinary complaints are to be
filed within one year after the date on which the OED Director receives a grievance forming the
basis ofthe complaint). Section 11.104 addresses the practitioner's duty to communicate with the
client. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.4. As in § 10.23(c)(8), under this rule a
practitioner should not fail to timely and adequately inform a client or former client of
correspondence received from the Office in a proceeding before the Office or from the client's or
former client's opponent in an in!sa: partes proceeding before the Office when the
correspondence (i) could have a significant effect on a matter pending before the Office; (ii) is
received by the practitioner on behalf of a client or former client; and (iii) is correspondence of
which a reasonable practitioner would believe under the circumstances the client or former client
should be notified. Section 11.1 06(b)(3) states that a practitioner may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the practitioner reasonably believes
necessary to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from inequitable conduct before the
Office. Section 11.107 prohibits a practitioner from representing a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1. 7. See
~ 37 CFR 10.66.
I must disclose Samuel Baxter's conflicts of interest because I have a duty of disclosure
6
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as a U.S. Patent Attorney. Section 11.108 addresses conflicts of interest for current clients and
specific rules, including rules regarding practitioners entering into business transactions with
clients, the use of information by a practitioner relating to representation of a client, gifts
between the practitioner and a client, literary rights based on information relating to
representation of a client, a practitioner's provision of financial assistance to the client,
compensation for services by a third party, aggregate settlement of claims where the practitioner
represents two or more clients in a similar matter, agreements between the client and practitioner
limiting liability of the practitioner, and the practitioner's acquiring a proprietary interest in the
matter. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.8. Section 11.1 08(e) provides that a
practitioner shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation or proceeding before the Office, except that a practitioner may advance
court or tribunal costs and expenses of litigation. Section 11.112 provides specific rules
regarding the imputation of conflicts of interest for practitioners who are former judges,
arbitrators, mediators or third-party neutrals. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.12.
The practitioner's responsibility to present the client's case with persuasive force is qualified by
the practitioner's duty of candor to the tribunal. ~Lipman Y... Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1443, "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
( 1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
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persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights,
or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." !d.
To gain removal to federal court under 28 USCS § 1443(1) defendant must show both
that (1) right allegedly denied arises under federal law providing for specific rights stated in
terms of equal protection; and (2) removal petitioner is denied or cannot enforce specified federal
rights in state courts due to some formal expression of state law. Texas v GulfWater Benefaction
Co., 679 F.2d 85 (CAS Tex. 1982).
Even after an action was dismissed, so long as there was time to insist on reconsideration
or appellate review, it continued to be an action brought to redress a private right. The state-court
dismissal did not extinguish the case or controversy. So long as there existed issues to be
resolved at some level of judicial review, there existed a case or controversy and a basis for
federal jurisdiction. Nieto v. Univ. of New Mexico, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (D.N.M. 201 0).
A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action ~s pending. 28 U.S.C.S. § 144l{a).
The statutes governing procedures for removal appear to require only: (i) an existing civil
action, ~ U .S.C.S . .§..§ 1441, 1446(a),.(Q).; (ii) over which the federal district court has original
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.S . .§ 1441(a); and (iii) that the defendant file a notice of removal within
thirty days of receipt of service,~ U.S.C.S . .§ 1446(b). There is no express requirement that the
removal occur at any particular stage of the adjudicatory process.
To satisfy Article III's core justiciability requirements, a plaintiff must have standing, his
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or her claims must not be moot, and his or her claims must be ripe. To have standing, a plaintiff
must show: (i) that he or she has suffered an injury in fact-- an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (ii) that there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the injury and the
defendant's conduct complained of; and (iii) that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress
the injury. I have made such a showing because I have suffered damages in fact, including
physical injuries, and an imminent threat is being made against me to put me in jail again for no
legitimate reason and to take away my law license without cause or even a reasonable basis or
belief of misconduct or disability; there is a causal connection between McKool Smith P.C.'s
retaliation against me and conspiracy to disbar me and the injury complained of; and a favorable
decision to will redress the injury and prevent me from being disbarred for no legitimate reason.
My legal practice is 100% patent and trademark prosecution before the United States
Patent & Trademark Office.
The State Bar lacks jurisdiction to impose discipline for misconduct that occurred prior to
licensing me as an attorney.
A common law right of access continues to exist in records of those public entities not
governed by the Open Records Act and provisions where there is a legitimate public interest,
especially where that interest is not outweighed by other interests. The public has a legitimate
interest in the administration of the disciplinary system for attorneys and judges. In particular,
the public has a legitimate interest in whether different groups of attorneys, based on race, sex, or
ethnicity, are disciplined and investigated differently or more frequently and whether any
disparities in treatment are the result of the discriminatory process or other factors. See Sander v.
9
. .
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State Bar of California, 58 Cal. 4th 300, 301 (Cal. 2013). Access to court records is governed by
long-standing common law principles. There is legitimate public interest and concern over
whether the state of Texas has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be
unconstitutional if done by the state.
Specifically, with respect to my § 1983 claim, I allege that Angeline Bain intends to
maliciously instigate a claim of mental illness against me with the State Bar for the purpose of
having me disbarred or put on disability status so that I cannot continue to sue her client or sue
Judge Carlos Cortez who I believe has assaulted multiple women within the past two years who
are in need of representation. See Complaint at Doc. 1. I contend that named defendants
themselves, not the State Bar of Texas, engaged in unconstitutional acts. The State Bar of Texas
has not yet begun to prosecute me in any disciplinary action. Id. I reserve my right to allege that
Angeline Bain and Susan Farris jointly engage in such conduct with the State Bar of Texas once
a disciplinary or disability proceeding institutes. I have plead facts which suggest that these
private actors are liable under the circumstances.
Dated: Jan. 15, 2015 Respectfully submitted,
Is/Chelsea L. Pavis
Chelsea L. Davis, Pro-Se
2068 Meadow View Rd.
Princeton, TX 75407
Telephone: (469) 426-5850
Facsimile: (469) 533-0466
cdavis@chelseadayispc.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 21, this is to certify that a true and correct copy of this
instrument is being filed electronically and sent concurrently to counsel of "record" by electronic
10
• . ,.
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filing service provider as permitted by Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a or in accordance with court ordered
substitution of service; or, on this day, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with
the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court or U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit using
the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel
and/or pro se parties of record electronically by email or, as a pro-se party, on the date it is
electronically docketed in the Court's CMIECF system, as authorized by the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5(b)(2) and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.
Dated: Jan. 15,2014 R~p~c~f)~Y sutitted,
/s~ay~
Chelsea Davis, Pro-Se
11
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHELSEA L. DAVIS §
§
v. §
§
§
MCKOOL SMITH P.C., §
STATE BAR OF TEXAS ET AL § No. 3:14-cv-4190-N
§
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
I, Chelsea L. Davis, hereby timely file my Notice of Removal of In re: Chelsea L. Davis,
Docket No. 14-1063, an original proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court and of an additional
disciplinary appeal/petition for writ of mandamus I attempted to file in the Texas Supreme Court,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. See attached filing rejections. There
appears to be a sealed alleged grievance investigation or proceeding in which I am being denied
due process. As a result of this matter, I have been unlawfully arrested for contempt of a child
support order even though there is no child support order, I do not have any children and I am
not married. I have been denied access to the record. Further, Judge Jill Willis signed a
vexatious litigant order against me, and the Texas Supreme Court has refused to accept my
pleadings in any original proceeding or appeal. Now, in another matter, I have heard that I will
be arrested for failure to appear next, but I have not yet been arrested or served with any criminal
charge, complaint or order of capias in any proceeding. I attempted to file a plea to the
1
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jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000, and I
have a federal defense.
I object to the removed matter for lack of service, notice, process, case or controversy,
etc. in the state courts of Texas. I also contend that there is now a civil case or controversy due
to my filing in the Texas Supreme Court in which I am the "defendant." I timely present my
notice of removal of any and all allegations against me. I object to the numerous errors on the
"case" summary/docket sheets/document/events listing because the listings contain numerous
errors, including party designations where there are no parties and a lower court designation
where there is no lower court.
Multiple appeals may be opened or pending in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas,
Texas and/or the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which have (likely erroneously and without
authority) been assigned Docket Nos. 05-13-01744-CV, 05-13-01747-CV, 05-13-01748-CV,
05-14-00090-CV. 05-14-00095-CV, 05-14-01105-CV, 05-14-01036-CV, 05-14-01034-CV,
05-14-00841-CV and 05-14-00846-CV, etc. in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas,
and/or No. 54202 and 55408 in the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which may also be removed
to this Court to the extent there is any case or controversy now pending in the Texas Supreme
Court. Certain "matters" and/or "appeals" may be consolidated into Docket No.
05-13-01747-CV by the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. I have attempted to file
pleas to the jurisdiction, each of which raises a federal question, institutes a case or controversy,
and raises causes of action which present federal questions for which the amount in controversy
is over $75,000 for each cause of action.
Under In re Chelsea L. Davis, "No. 54202", in which there does not yet appear to be any
2
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petition against me, before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, a response from me was requested
to a motion by Dec. 25, 2014. This notice of removal is timely filed within thirty days of my
raising of a federal question. I have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however,
attempt to file a plea to the jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in
controversy of over $75,000.
On Dec. 29, 2014, I received a communication indicating that the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals has created a "No. 55408" even though no petition has ever been filed, based on
Grievance No. 201305119. I object to there being any State Bar of Texas cause number based
on Grievance No. 201305119. This notice of removal is timely filed in advance ofthirty days. I
have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however, attempt to file a plea to the
jurisdiction, which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000. I
received an order indicating an action taken against me akin to a petition.
There is much confusion as to how any cause number may be open and any proceeding
or action may proceed due to a lack of any evidentiary petition and disciplinary petition, lack of
any case or controversy, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of a record, etc., especially when
there has not been any finding or showing of just cause or reasonable belief of disability to the
extent required to initiate any disciplinary or disability proceeding against me. Nevertheless, I
am being called to appear before the Texas Supreme Court on January 30, 2015 and before
courts in Dallas and Collin Counties, Texas thereafter, and I seek to remove those called-for
appearances to this Court under this action already pending in this Court between the same
parties, which may involve the same subject matter.
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a), "[a] civil action or criminal prosecution that ts
3
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commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be
removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending." Id. Without waiving my right to contest the commencement and
pendency of a proceeding in state court due to the preliminary anti-suit injunction and/or stage of
the undercover investigation which cannot be a case, I may remove and quash the thing to the
extent it is alleged to be a civil action or criminal prosecution because I am an "officer (or any
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or
individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1442(a)(l). I may also be "property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where
such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States"; and/or "[a]ny
officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the
performance of his duties."Jd. My license to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office is a property right because I have spent nearly fifteen years gaining the
requisite education to become a U.S. Patent Attorney and the experience practicing as a Patent
Attorney.
I remove any and all complaints, grievances, petitions and allegations against me, to the
extent there are any, of professional misconduct and/or disability to this federal Court because I
am an officer of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 63,791. I am a person
acting under the United States, its agencies or its officers that has been sued for, unlawfully
prosecuted or relating to any act under color of such office and has a colorable federal defense to
the counter/intervenor plaintiffs claim(s), if any. Because I assert a colorable government
contractor defense, this Court may obtain federal subject matter jurisdiction. See State of La. v.
4
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Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has for over two decades
required a liberal interpretation of § 1442(a) in view of its chief purpose-to prevent federal
officers who simply comply with a federal duty from being punished by a state court for doing
so."). In addition, this Court already has federal subject matter jurisdiction based on filing and
service of the Complaint at Doc. 1 in the action styled Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P. C.,
State Bar of Texas, Leslie D. Ware, Samuel F. Baxter, eta/., Cause No. 3:14-cv-4190 (N.D. Tex.
filed Nov. 24, 2014).
The .£a U.S.C.S . .§ 1367 exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction do not apply to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq.
I have a duty of disclosure as U.S. Patent Attorney which gives rise to a federal defense
especially where I engaged in particular conduct to comply with this USPTO Rule regarding
disclosure. All decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public
interest. See Lear. Inc . .Y.. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). N.C. Ethics Op. 2005-9 (2006) (lawyer
for public company may reveal confidential information about corporate misconduct to SEC
under permissive-disclosure regulation authorized by Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even if disclosure
would otherwise be prohibited by state's ethics rules). Additionally, Section 11.106(c) states that
"[a] practitioner shall disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable
duty of disclosure provisions" and is provided to make clear that the duty of disclosure is
mandatory, not optional. Section 11.1 06(c) merely continues the current duty of disclosure
provision set forth in 3 7 CFR 10.23(c)(1 0). See, ~' Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,
8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012) Ch. 2000. While paragraph (c) does not impose a new requirement,
the express provision may be helpful in responding to any allegation of an ethical violation
5
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before a State bar in a situation where the practitioner engaged in particular conduct to comply
with this USPTO Rule. See Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 78 FR 20179. See, ~. 37 CFR 1.56, 1.555(a), 1.740(a)(l3),
1.765(c) and (d), 1.933(a), Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012)
Ch. 2000; ~.a.ls.Q 37 CFR 10.23(c)(IO). ~ 37 CFR 11.34(d) (disciplinary complaints are to be
filed within one year after the date on which the OED Director receives a grievance forming the
basis ofthe complaint). Section 11.104 addresses the practitioner's duty to communicate with the
client. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.4. As in § 10.23(c)(8), under this rule a
practitioner should not fail to timely and adequately inform a client or former client of
correspondence received from the Office in a proceeding before the Office or from the client's or
former client's opponent in an .inlia: ~ proceeding before the Office when the
correspondence (i) could have a significant effect on a matter pending before the Office; (ii) is
received by the practitioner on behalf of a client or former client; and (iii) is correspondence of
which a reasonable practitioner would believe under the circumstances the client or former client
should be notified. Section 11.1 06(b)(3) states that a practitioner may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the practitioner reasonably believes
necessary to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from inequitable conduct before the
Office. Section 11.107 prohibits a practitioner from representing a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.7. See
.a.Ls.Q 37 CFR 10.66.
I must disclose Samuel Baxter's conflicts of interest because I have a duty of disclosure
6
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 7 of 11 PageiD 891
as a U.S. Patent Attorney. Section 11.108 addresses conflicts of interest for current clients and
specific rules, including rules regarding practitioners entering into business transactions with
clients, the use of information by a practitioner relating to representation of a client, gifts
between the practitioner and a client, literary rights based on information relating to
representation of a client, a practitioner's provision of financial assistance to the client,
compensation for services by a third party, aggregate settlement of claims where the practitioner
represents two or more clients in a similar matter, agreements between the client and practitioner
limiting liability of the practitioner, and the practitioner's acquiring a proprietary interest in the
matter. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.8. Section 11.1 08Ce) provides that a
practitioner shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation or proceeding before the Office, except that a practitioner may advance
court or tribunal costs and expenses of litigation. Section 11.112 provides specific rules
regarding the imputation of conflicts of interest for practitioners who are former judges,
arbitrators, mediators or third-party neutrals. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.12.
The practitioner's responsibility to present the client's case with persuasive force is qualified by
the practitioner's duty of candor to the tribunal. See Lipman Y.. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1443, "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
( 1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
7
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 8 of 11 PageiD 892
persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights,
or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." Id.
To gain removal to federal court under 28 USCS § 1443(1) defendant must show both
that (1) right allegedly denied arises under federal law providing for specific rights stated in
terms of equal protection; and (2) removal petitioner is denied or cannot enforce specified federal
rights in state courts due to some formal expression of state law. Texas v Gulf Water Benefaction
Co., 679 F.2d 85 (CA5 Tex. 1982).
Even after an action was dismissed, so long as there was time to insist on reconsideration
or appellate review, it continued to be an action brought to redress a private right. The state-court
dismissal did not extinguish the case or controversy. So long as there existed issues to be
resolved at some level of judicial review, there existed a case or controversy and a basis for
federal jurisdiction. Nieto v. Univ. of New Mexico, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (D.N.M. 2010).
A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C.S. § 144l(a).
The statutes governing procedures for removal appear to require only: (i) an existing civil
action, ~ U.S.C.S . .§.§. ill.L 1446(a),.(!ll; (ii) over which the federal district court has original
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.S . .§. 1441(a); and (iii) that the defendant file a notice of removal within
thirty days of receipt of service, 28 U.S.C.S . .§. 1446(b). There is no express requirement that the
removal occur at any particular stage of the adjudicatory process.
To satisfy Article III's core justiciability requirements, a plaintiff must have standing, his
8
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 9 of 11 PageiD 893
or her claims must not be moot, and his or her claims must be ripe. To have standing, a plaintiff
must show: (i) that he or she has suffered an injury in fact-- an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (ii) that there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the injury and the
defendant's conduct complained of; and (iii) that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress
the injury. I have made such a showing because I have suffered damages in fact, including
physical injuries, and an imminent threat is being made against me to put me in jail again for no
legitimate reason and to take away my law license without cause or even a reasonable basis or
belief of misconduct or disability; there is a causal connection between McKool Smith P.C.'s
retaliation against me and conspiracy to disbar me and the injury complained of; and a favorable
decision to will redress the injury and prevent me from being disbarred for no legitimate reason.
My legal practice is 100% patent and trademark prosecution before the United States
Patent & Trademark Office.
The State Bar lacks jurisdiction to impose discipline for misconduct that occurred prior to
licensing me as an attorney.
A common law right of access continues to exist in records of those public entities not
governed by the Open Records Act and provisions where there is a legitimate public interest,
especially where that interest is not outweighed by other interests. The public has a legitimate
interest in the administration of the disciplinary system for attorneys and judges. In particular,
the public has a legitimate interest in whether different groups of attorneys, based on race, sex, or
ethnicity, are disciplined and investigated differently or more frequently and whether any
disparities in treatment are the result of the discriminatory process or other factors. See Sander v.
9
0
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 10 of 11 PageiD 894
State Bar ofCa/ifornia, 58 Cal. 4th 300, 301 (Cal. 2013). Access to court records is governed by
long-standing common law principles. There is legitimate public interest and concern over
whether the state of Texas has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be
unconstitutional if done by the state.
Specifically, with respect to my § 1983 claim, I allege that Angeline Bain intends to
maliciously instigate a claim of mental illness against me with the State Bar for the purpose of
l
having me disbarred or put on disability status so that I cannot continue to sue her client or sue
Judge Carlos Cortez who I believe has assaulted multiple women within the past two years who
are in need of representation. See Complaint at Doc. 1. I contend that named defendants
themselves, not the State Bar of Texas, engaged in unconstitutional acts. The State Bar of Texas
has not yet begun to prosecute me in any disciplinary action. Id. I reserve my right to allege that
Angeline Bain and Susan Farris jointly engage in such conduct with the State Bar of Texas once
a disciplinary or disability proceeding institutes. I have plead facts which suggest that these
private actors are liable under the circumstances.
R~~
Dated: Jan. 15, 2015
Is/Chelsea L. Davis
Chelsea L. Davis, Pro-Se
2068 Meadow View Rd.
Princeton, TX 75407
Telephone: (469) 426-5850
Facsimile: (469) 533-0466
cdavis@chelseadavispc.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 21, this is to certify that a true and correct copy of this
instrument is being filed electronically and sent concurrently to counsel of"record" by electronic
10
. . ,.
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 11 of 11 PageiD 895
filing service provider as permitted by Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a or in accordance with court ordered
substitution of service; or, on this day, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with
the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court or U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit using
the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel
and/or pro se parties of record electronically by email or, as a pro-se party, on the date it is
electronically docketed in the Court's CM!ECF system, as authorized by the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5(b)(2) and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.
Dated: Jan. 15, 2014 Respectfully sub~
/~y!s
Chelsea Davis, Pro-Se
11
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 1 of 11 PageiD 885
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHELSEA L. DAVIS §
§
v. §
§
§
MCKOOL SMITH P.C., §
STATE BAR OF TEXAS ET AL § No. 3:14-cv-4190-N
§
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
IN RE CHELSEA L. DAVIS
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
I, Chelsea L. Davis, hereby timely file my Notice of Removal of In re: Chelsea L. Davis,
Docket No. 14-1063, an original proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court and of an additional
disciplinary appeal/petition for writ of mandamus I attempted to file in the Texas Supreme Court,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. See attached filing rejections. There
appears to be a sealed alleged grievance investigation or proceeding in which I am being denied
due process. As a result of this matter, I have been unlawfully arrested for contempt of a child
support order even though there is no child support order, I do not have any children and I am
not married. I have been denied access to the record. Further, Judge Jill Willis signed a
vexatious litigant order against me, and the Texas Supreme Court has refused to accept my
pleadings in any original proceeding or appeal. Now, in another matter, I have heard that I will
be arrested for failure to appear next, but I have not yet been arrested or served with any criminal
charge, complaint or order of capias in any proceeding. I attempted to file a plea to the
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 2 of 11 PageiD 886
jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000, and I
have a federal defense.
I object to the removed matter for lack of service, notice, process, case or controversy,
etc. in the state courts of Texas. I also contend that there is now a civil case or controversy due
to my filing in the Texas Supreme Court in which I am the "defendant." I timely present my
notice of removal of any and all allegations against me. I object to the numerous errors on the
"case" summary/docket sheets/document/events listing because the listings contain numerous
errors, including party designations where there are no parties and a lower court designation
where there is no lower court.
Multiple appeals may be opened or pending in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas,
Texas and/or the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which have (likely erroneously and without
authority) been assigned Docket Nos. 05-13-01744-CV, 05-13-01747-CV, 05-13-01748-CV,
05-14-00090-CV. 05-14-00095-CV, 05-14-01105-CV, 05-14-01036-CV, 05-14-01034-CV,
05-14-00841-CV and 05-14-00846-CV, etc. in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas,
and/or No. 54202 and 55408 in the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, which may also be removed
to this Court to the extent there is any case or controversy now pending in the Texas Supreme
Court. Certain "matters" and/or "appeals" may be consolidated into Docket No.
05-13-01747-CV by the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. I have attempted to file
pleas to the jurisdiction, each of which raises a federal question, institutes a case or controversy,
and raises causes of action which present federal questions for which the amount in controversy
is over $75,000 for each cause of action.
Under In re Chelsea L. Davis, "No. 54202", in which there does not yet appear to be any
2
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 3 of 11 PageiD 887
petition against me, before the Board of Disciplinary Appeals, a response from me was requested
to a motion by Dec. 25, 2014. This notice of removal is timely filed within thirty days of my
raising of a federal question. I have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however,
attempt to file a plea to the jurisdiction which raises a federal question and an amount in
controversy of over $75,000.
On Dec. 29, 2014, I received a communication indicating that the Board of Disciplinary
Appeals has created a "No. 55408" even though no petition has ever been filed, based on
Grievance No. 201305119. I object to there being any State Bar of Texas cause number based
on Grievance No. 201305119. This notice of removal is timely filed in advance ofthirty days. I
have not yet been served with any petition. I did, however, attempt to file a plea to the
jurisdiction, which raises a federal question and an amount in controversy of over $75,000. I
received an order indicating an action taken against me akin to a petition.
There is much confusion as to how any cause number may be open and any proceeding
or action may proceed due to a lack of any evidentiary petition and disciplinary petition, lack of
any case or controversy, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of a record, etc., especially when
there has not been any finding or showing of just cause or reasonable belief of disability to the
extent required to initiate any disciplinary or disability proceeding against me. Nevertheless, I
am being called to appear before the Texas Supreme Court on January 30, 2015 and before
courts in Dallas and Collin Counties, Texas thereafter, and I seek to remove those called-for
appearances to this Court under this action already pending in this Court between the same
parties, which may involve the same subject matter.
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a), "[a] civil action or criminal prosecution that IS
3
case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 4 of 11 PageiD 888
commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to any of the following may be
removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending." !d. Without waiving my right to contest the commencement and
pendency of a proceeding in state court due to the preliminary anti-suit injunction and/or stage of
the undercover investigation which cannot be a case, I may remove and quash the thing to the
extent it is alleged to be a civil action or criminal prosecution because I am an "officer (or any
person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or
individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1442(a)(l). I may also be "property holder whose title is derived from any such officer, where
such action or prosecution affects the validity of any law of the United States"; and/or "[a]ny
officer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the
performance of his duties."Jd. My license to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office is a property right because I have spent nearly fifteen years gaining the
requisite education to become a U.S. Patent Attorney and the experience practicing as a Patent
Attorney.
I remove any and all complaints, grievances, petitions and allegations against me, to the
extent there are any, of professional misconduct and/or disability to this federal Court because I
am an officer of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 63,791. I am a person
acting under the United States, its agencies or its officers that has been sued for, unlawfully
prosecuted or relating to any act under color of such office and has a colorable federal defense to
the counter/intervenor plaintiffs claim(s), if any. Because I assert a colorable government
contractor defense, this Court may obtain federal subject matter jurisdiction. See State of La. v.
4
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 5 of 11 PageiD 889
Sparks, 978 F .2d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Supreme Court has for over two decades
required a liberal interpretation of § 1442(a) in view of its chief purpose-to prevent federal
officers who simply comply with a federal duty from being punished by a state court for doing
so."). In addition, this Court already has federal subject matter jurisdiction based on filing and
service of the Complaint at Doc. 1 in the action styled Chelsea L. Davis v. McKool Smith P.C.,
State Bar of Texas, Leslie D. Ware, Samuel F. Baxter, et al., Cause No. 3:14-cv-4190 (N.D. Tex.
filed Nov. 24, 2014).
The 28 U.S.C.S . .§ 1367 exceptions to supplemental jurisdiction do not apply to the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seg.
I have a duty of disclosure as U.S: Patent Attorney which gives rise to a federal defense
especially where I engaged in particular conduct to comply with this USPTO Rule regarding
disclosure. All decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public
interest. See Lear. Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). N.C. Ethics Op. 2005-9 (2006) (lawyer
for public company may reveal confidential information about corporate misconduct to SEC
under permissive-disclosure regulation authorized by Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even if disclosure
would otherwise be prohibited by state's ethics rules). Additionally, Section 11.106(c) states that
"[a] practitioner shall disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable
duty of disclosure provisions" and is provided to make clear that the duty of disclosure is
mandatory, not optional. Section 11.106(c) merely continues the current duty of disclosure
provision set forth in 37 CFR 10.23(c)(10). See,~' Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,
8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012) Ch. 2000. While paragraph (c) does not impose a new requirement,
the express provision may be helpful in responding to any allegation of an ethical violation
5
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 6 of 11 PageiD 890
before a State bar in a situation where the practitioner engaged in particular conduct to comply
with this USPTO Rule. See Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 78 FR 20179. See, ~. 37 CFR 1.56, 1.555(a), 1.740(a)(13),
1.765(c) and (d), 1.933(a), Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th Ed., Rev. 9 (Aug. 2012)
Ch. 2000; ~~ 37 CFR 10.23(c)(10). See 37 CFR 11.34(d) (disciplinary complaints are to be
filed within one year after the date on which the OED Director receives a grievance forming the
basis of the complaint). Section 11.104 addresses the practitioner's duty to communicate with the
client. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.4. As in § 10.23(c)(8), under this rule a
practitioner should not fail to timely and adequately inform a client or former client of
correspondence received from the Office in a proceeding before the Office or from the client's or
former client's opponent in an ~ ~ proceeding before the . Office when the
correspondence (i) could have a significant effect on a matter pending before the Office; (ii) is
received by the practitioner on behalf of a client or former client; and (iii) is correspondence of
which a reasonable practitioner would believe under the circumstances the client or former client
should be notified. Section 11.1 06(b)(3) states that a practitioner may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the practitioner reasonably believes
necessary to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from inequitable conduct before the
Office. Section 11.107 prohibits a practitioner from representing a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.7. See
.allil37 CFR 10.66.
I must disclose Samuel Baxter's conflicts of interest because I have a duty of disclosure
6
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 7 of 11 PageiD 891
as a U.S. Patent Attorney. Section 11.108 addresses conflicts of interest for current clients and
specific rules, including rules regarding practitioners entering into business transactions with
clients, the use of information by a practitioner relating to representation of a client, gifts
between the practitioner and a client, literary rights based on information relating to
representation of a client, a practitioner's provision of financial assistance to the client,
compensation for services by a third party, aggregate settlement of claims where the practitioner
represents two or more clients in a similar matter, agreements between the client and practitioner
limiting liability of the practitioner, and the practitioner's acquiring a proprietary interest in the
matter. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.8. Section 11.108(e) provides that a
practitioner shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation or proceeding before the Office, except that a practitioner may advance
court or tribunal costs and expenses of litigation. Section 11.112 provides specific rules
regarding the imputation of conflicts of interest for practitioners who are former judges,
arbitrators, mediators or third-party neutrals. This rule corresponds to ABA Model Rule 1.12.
The practitioner's responsibility to present the client's case with persuasive force is qualified by
the practitioner's duty of candor to the tribunal. See Lipman v. Dickinson, 174 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1443, "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions,
commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
( 1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all
7
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 8 of 11 PageiD 892
persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights,
or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." Id.
To gain removal to federal court under 28 USCS § 1443(1) defendant must show both
that ( 1) right allegedly denied arises under federal law providing for specific rights stated in
terms of equal protection; and (2) removal petitioner is denied or cannot enforce specified federal
rights in state courts due to some formal expression of state law. Texas v GulfWater Benefaction
Co., 679 F .2d 85 (CA5 Tex. 1982).
Even after an action was dismissed, so long as there was time to insist on reconsideration
or appellate review, it continued to be an action brought to redress a private right. The state-court
dismissal did not extinguish the case or controversy. So long as there existed issues to be
resolved at some level of judicial review, there existed a case or controversy and a basis for
federal jurisdiction. Nieto v. Univ. of New Mexico, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179 (D.N.M. 2010).
A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(a).
The statutes governing procedures for removal appear to require only: (i) an existing civil
action, 2..8. U.S.C.S . .§S 1441, 1446(a),.(!ll; (ii) over which the federal district court has original
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.S . .§ 1441(a); and (iii) that the defendant file a notice of removal within
thirty days of receipt of service, 28 U.S.C.S . .§ 1446(b). There is no express requirement that the
removal occur at any particular stage of the adjudicatory process.
To satisfy Article Ill's core justiciability requirements, a plaintiff must have standing, his
8
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 9 of 11 PageiD 893
or her claims must not be moot, and his or her claims must be ripe. To have standing, a plaintiff
must show: (i) that he or she has suffered an injury in fact-- an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (ii) that there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the injury and the
defendant's conduct complained of; and (iii) that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress
the injury. I have made such a showing because I have suffered damages in fact, including
physical injuries, and an imminent threat is being made against me to put me in jail again for no
legitimate reason and to take away my law license without cause or even a reasonable basis or
belief of misconduct or disability; there is a causal connection between McKool Smith P.C.'s
retaliation against me and conspiracy to disbar me and the injury complained of; and a favorable
decision to will redress the injury and prevent me from being disbarred for no legitimate reason.
My legal practice is 100% patent and trademark prosecution before the United States
Patent & Trademark Office.
The State Bar lacks jurisdiction to impose discipline for misconduct that occurred prior to
licensing me as an attorney.
A common law right of access continues to exist in records of those public entities not
governed by the Open Records Act and provisions where there is a legitimate public interest,
especially where that interest is not outweighed by other interests. The public has a legitimate
interest in the administration of the disciplinary system for attorneys and judges. In particular,
the public has a legitimate interest in whether different groups of attorneys, based on race, sex, or
ethnicity, are disciplined and investigated differently or more frequently and whether any
disparities in treatment are the result of the discriminatory process or other factors. See Sander v.
9
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 10 of 11 PageiD 894
State Bar of California, 58 Cal. 4th 300, 301 (Cal. 2013). Access to court records is governed by
long-standing common law principles. There is legitimate public interest and concern over
whether the state of Texas has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be
unconstitutional if done by the state.
Specifically, with respect to my § 1983 claim, I allege that Angeline Bain intends to
maliciously instigate a claim of mental illness against me with the State Bar for the purpose of
having me disbarred or put on disability status so that I cannot continue to sue her client or sue
Judge Carlos Cortez who I believe has assaulted multiple women within the past two years who
are in need of representation. See Complaint at Doc. 1. I contend that named defendants
themselves, not the State Bar of Texas, engaged in unconstitutional acts. The State Bar of Texas
has not yet begun to prosecute me in any disciplinary action. !d. I reserve my right to allege that
Angeline Bain and Susan Farris jointly engage in such conduct with the State Bar of Texas once
a disciplinary or disability proceeding institutes. I have plead facts which suggest that these
private actors are liable under the circumstances.
Dated: Jan. 15, 2015 Respectfully submitted,
Chelsea L. Davis, Pro-Se
2068 Meadow View Rd.
Princeton, TX 75407
Telephone: (469) 426-5850
Facsimile: (469) 533-0466
cdavis@chelseadavispc.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 21, this is to certify that a true and correct copy of this
instrument is being filed electronically and sent concurrently to counsel of "record" by electronic
10
. .
.
Case 3:14-cv-04190-N-BK Document 26-1 Filed 01/16/15 Page 11 of 11 PageiD 895
filing service provider as permitted by Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a or in accordance with court ordered
substitution of service; or, on this day, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with
the clerk of court for the U.S. District Court or U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit using
the electronic case filing system of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel
and/or pro se parties of record electronically by email or, as a pro-se party, on the date it is
electronically docketed in the Court's CMIECF system, as authorized by the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 5(b)(2) andthe Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.
Dated: Jan. 15, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
Is/~
Chelsea Davis, Pro-Se
II