in Re Nadia Figueroa ( 2019 )


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  •                                      In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    __________________
    NO. 09-19-00240-CV
    __________________
    IN RE NADIA FIGUEROA
    __________________________________________________________________
    Original Proceeding
    279th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. F-204,311-G
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Nine months after the trial court entered a contempt order against Nadia
    Figueroa (Figueroa), she seeks mandamus relief from the trial court’s order of
    enforcement. On October 1, 2018, the trial court found Figueroa in contempt for six
    separate violations of a custody and possession order, sentenced her to 90 days of
    confinement for each violation, to be served concurrently, suspended the
    commitment and placed Figueroa on community supervision for 120 months, and
    awarded her ex-husband Warren Pena a total judgment of $27,500 in attorney’s fees
    1
    for the services of two lawyers in the enforcement action. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
    §§ 157.165, 157.167(b) (West 2014).
    In her mandamus petition, Figueroa contends the trial court abused its
    discretion when it denied her request for time to hire an attorney. She claims the
    order of enforcement is void because the trial court failed to advise her of her right
    to counsel and that an attorney could be appointed for her if she was indigent. See In
    re Rivas-Luna, 
    528 S.W.3d 167
    , 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding).
    Figueroa argues she has no adequate remedy by appeal because contempt orders are
    not appealable, and mandamus is appropriate because at this time she is not confined.
    See In re Long, 
    984 S.W.2d 623
    , 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
    At the commencement of the enforcement hearing, the attorney representing
    Figueroa in the on-going modification proceeding notified the trial court that
    Figueroa lacked the funds to retain her for purposes of the enforcement hearing and
    that she was not representing Figueroa in the enforcement hearing. Figueroa
    requested additional time. The trial court indicated to Figueroa’s attorney that if she
    was not going to represent Figueroa in the enforcement proceeding she would need
    to move behind the bar. After an off the record discussion with Figueroa, Figueroa’s
    attorney then notified the trial court that she had agreed to “help” Figueroa in the
    hearing, and she acted as Figueroa’s attorney in the enforcement hearing.
    2
    In her mandamus petition, Figueroa argues the trial court should have granted
    her request for additional time to secure counsel and she contends the trial court
    failed to comply with section 157.163 of the Texas Family Code, which requires the
    trial court to inform a respondent not represented by an attorney of the right to be
    represented by an attorney, and if the person is indigent, of the right to the
    appointment of an attorney. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.163(b) (West Supp.
    2018). She further argues that the contempt order is void because the trial court failed
    to admonish Figueroa of these rights. See Ex parte Acker, 
    949 S.W.2d 314
    , 316 (Tex.
    1997).
    To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court
    has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy.
    In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am, 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
    proceeding). “A contempt order is void if it is beyond the power of the court or
    violates due process.” In re Office of Attorney Gen., 
    422 S.W.3d 623
    , 628 (Tex.
    2013) (orig. proceeding). “If the trial court’s contempt order in this case is not void,
    there was no abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. After reviewing
    the mandamus record, we conclude that Figueroa was
    represented by an attorney at the enforcement hearing. Regardless of the unfairness
    of forcing a Hobson’s choice on Figueroa’s attorney, she did represent Figueroa in
    3
    the hearing and as a result of her participation Figueroa was not unrepresented for
    purposes of section 157.163. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.163(b). Figueroa
    makes no additional argument or authority for compelling the trial court to vacate
    the order. 1 Based on the record before us we conclude that the relator is not entitled
    to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. Tex.
    R. App. P. 52.8(a).
    PETITION DENIED.
    PER CURIAM
    Submitted on August 7, 2019
    Opinion Delivered August 8, 2019
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    1
    We limit our ruling to the issue raised by Figueroa regarding the alleged lack
    of counsel.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-19-00240-CV

Filed Date: 8/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/8/2019