Fred Wright, Jr. v. State ( 2016 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-15-00153-CR
    FRED WRIGHT, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 188th District Court
    Gregg County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 43,014-A
    Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Fred Wright, Jr., entered an open plea of guilty and was convicted of two counts of sexual
    assault. After a bench trial on punishment, Wright was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment.
    On appeal, Wright argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his plea of guilt. Because we
    find that Wright’s judicial confession and written stipulation of evidence constituted sufficient
    evidence of his guilt, we overrule Wright’s point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.1
    The State is required to introduce evidence demonstrating the defendant’s guilt, and no
    trial court is authorized to render a conviction in a felony case based on a plea of guilty without
    sufficient evidence to support the same. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005).
    “Article 1.15 ‘[b]y its plain terms . . . requires evidence in addition to, and independent of, the plea
    itself to establish the defendant’s guilt.’” Baggett v. State, 
    342 S.W.3d 172
    , 174 (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (quoting Menefee v. State, 
    287 S.W.3d 9
    , 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
    A judicial confession alone is usually sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15 “so long
    as it embraces every constituent element of the charged offense.” Menefee v. State, 
    287 S.W.3d 9
    , 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
    Wright argues that his judicial confession and pleas in open court were insufficient to meet
    Article 1.15 requirements.
    A guilty plea, even if the defendant states that he or she is pleading guilty to the
    charges in the indictment under oath, does not constitute a judicial confession
    because the defendant is merely entering a plea, “not confessing to the truth and
    correctness of the indictment or otherwise providing substance to the plea.”
    1
    In a second point of error, Wright also argues that the DNA evidence introduced by the State in support of his plea
    was insufficient because it was not supported by the required certification. We need not address this point since our
    ruling on Wright’s first point of error is dispositive of this appeal.
    2
    
    Baggett, 342 S.W.3d at 174
    (quoting 
    Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13
    , 15). However, a judicial
    confession acknowledging guilt of the indictment’s allegations is sufficient to meet the
    requirements of Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and to sustain a conviction
    because it confesses to the truth and correctness of the allegations. See Dinnery v. State, 
    592 S.W.2d 343
    , 352–53 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g); Potts v. State, 
    571 S.W.2d 180
    , 182 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15;
    Woods v. State, 
    398 S.W.3d 396
    , 401 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d).
    In his written plea papers, Wright entered the following judicial confession: “I further state
    that I have read the indictment or information filed in this case and that I committed each and every
    allegation it contains. I am guilty of the offense alleged as well as all lesser offenses. I swear to
    all of the foregoing . . . .” Wright also signed a stipulation of evidence in which he, again, judicially
    confessed and stipulated that he (1) intentionally and knowingly caused the penetration of the
    sexual organ of the victim without her consent and (2) intentionally and knowingly caused the
    penetration of the victim’s anus without her consent. Wright also pled guilty to two counts of
    sexual assault as alleged in the indictment in open court, stating that he was pleading guilty because
    he was, in fact, guilty of sexual assault.2
    Because Wright’s judicial confession and stipulation of evidence met the requirements of
    Article 1.15, the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain Wright’s conviction.
    2
    After the trial court heard Wright’s pleas, the State introduced, and the trial court admitted into evidence, Wright’s
    stipulation of evidence, along with the offense report, Texas Department of Public Safety Laboratory reports, a report
    from the examination of the victim, the victim’s counseling notes, and a video recording of Wright’s interrogation.
    3
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:      June 3, 2016
    Date Decided:        June 6, 2016
    Do Not Publish
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00153-CR

Filed Date: 6/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2016