Jose Angel Lerma v. State ( 2014 )

ACCEPTED
13-13-00369-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
12/29/2014 5:31:16 PM
DORIAN RAMIREZ
CLERK
In the Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth District of Texas
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
JOSE ANGEL LERMA, § CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
Appellant § 12/29/2014 5:31:16 PM
§ DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
v. § Clerk
No. 13-13-00369-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee §
Trial Number 219-81913-2012, in the 219th District Court
Collin County, Texas.
The Honorable Scott J. Becker, Judge Presiding.
________________
STATE’S BRIEF
________________
GREG WILLIS
Criminal District Attorney
Collin County, Texas
JOHN R. ROLATER, JR.
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Chief of the Appellate Division
LIBBY J. LANGE
Oral argument is not requested, Assistant Criminal District Attorney
unless Appellant requests argument. 2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200
McKinney, Texas 75071
(972) 548-4323
FAX (214) 491-4860
State Bar No. 11910100
llange@co.collin.tx.us
LAUREN HOPKINS
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS ..................................................... 7
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST ISSUE
(The evidence was sufficient to prove DWI) ......................................................... 8
The evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for
driving while intoxicated. Appellant exhibited classic signs of
intoxication, the field sobriety tests indicated he was intoxicated, and
he refused to provide a breath or blood sample. The jury was free to
disbelieve Appellant’s alternative explanations for his behavior.
Standard of Review ............................................................................................... 8
Analysis ................................................................................................................. 9
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND ISSUE
(The indictment provided sufficient notice) ........................................................ 14
Because Appellant failed to object to, or file a motion to quash, the
indictment before trial, he cannot now complain that his indictment
was defective because it failed to define “intoxication.” In any event,
the definitions of “intoxicated” are evidentiary matters that need not
be alleged in the indictment, and Appellant’s indictment satisfied
constitutional notice requirements, such that he was aware of the
charges against him and could prepare a defense.
Appellant did not preserve error ......................................................................... 14
i
The indictment was not defective ....................................................................... 15
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 18
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Constitutions, Statutes, Codes, and Rules
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(b) ........................................................................14
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 ............................................................................................15
TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.01(2)(A) ...............................................................................9
TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a) ...............................................................................9, 15
TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(b)(2) ................................................................................1
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1................................................................................................... 4
TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 724.015 ...................................................................................3
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI ........................................................................................... 15
Cases
Bartlett v. State,
270 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .............................................................12
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...............................................................8
Cotton v. State,
686 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ...............................................................9
Crenshaw v. State,
378 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) .............................................................15
Crouse v. State,
441 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) ............................................13
iii
Dodson v. State,
No. 05-13-00297-CR, 2014 WL 429337 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 2014, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) ...................................................................12
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979) ...............................................................................................8
Kirsch v. State,
306 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...............................................................9
Maldonado v. State,
No. 02-13-00076-CR, 2014 WL 670745 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 20, 2014,
no pet.) (not designated for publication) ..............................................................12
Russell v. State,
290 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) ............................... 12, 13
State v. Barbernell,
257 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ...................................................... 15, 16
State v. Carter,
810 S.W.2d 197(Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled by State v. Barbernell,
257 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) .............................................................15
State v. Cordell,
34 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd) ...................................15
State v. Villarreal,
No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014) ...............4
Studer v. State,
799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .............................................................14
Teal v. State,
230 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .............................................................14
Wesbrook v. State,
29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .................................................................9
iv
Williams v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ...............................................................9
Zill v. State,
355 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)........... 10, 11, 13
v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not request oral argument, as it is not requested by Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury found Appellant Jose Angel Lerma guilty of the third-degree-felony
offense of driving while intoxicated.1 CR 75, 76; 3 RR 177. Pursuant to the
parties’ agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years in prison,
suspended his sentence, and placed him on community supervision for seven years.
CR 76; 3 RR 178-80.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 26, 2012, Marc Miscuraca was driving
northbound on the service road of Highway 121 (the Sam Rayburn Tollroad), when
he saw a silver Acura ahead of him driving “erratically.” 3 RR 20-21. The driver
was swerving in and out of his lane, and he eventually hit a curb, which either
knocked off one of his tires or caused it to go flat. 3 RR 3 RR 21. When
Miscuraca saw a Department of Public Safety Trooper parked at a nearby gas
station, he pulled over, and reported a possible drunk driver to Trooper Matthew
Kasenic. 3 RR 22.
1
Appellant stipulated to two prior DWI convictions. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.09(b)(2); 3 RR
128, 136; SX 12.
1
As Trooper Kasenic set out to investigate, he saw a fellow trooper, Trooper
Clayton Platt, pursuing the car with his lights and police siren activated. 3 RR 90-
92. He also noticed that the suspect’s front driver’s-side tire was missing, causing
sparks to fly everywhere and creating a loud, grinding noise. 3 RR 92-93. As
Trooper Kasenic joined the pursuit, he could see that the driver was staring straight
ahead, with both hands on the steering wheel, giving no indication that he needed
help. 3 RR 93. Because the suspect continued driving, Trooper Platt turned on his
loud speaker and ordered him to stop. 3 RR 30.
A short time later, the suspect—later identified as Appellant—pulled over.
The troopers drew their weapons for officer safety, and Trooper Kasenic
commanded Appellant to exit the car.2 3 RR 31-32, 94. Appellant complied but
seemed “pretty confused.” 3 RR 94. Trooper Kasenic holstered his weapon, and
Trooper Platt ordered Appellant to get on the ground. 3 RR 32, 94. When
Appellant did not comply, Trooper Kasenic put him on the ground and placed him
in handcuffs. 3 RR 32, 95. The troopers then helped him up off the ground and
read him his Miranda rights. 3 RR 33. Appellant told them that he had been at a
bar, was heading to his home in Lewisville “right down the street,” and that he had
stopped to put air in his tire. 3 RR 33, 95. The troopers knew, however, that
2
The recording of the stop was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. 3 RR 50, 108; SX
1.
2
Appellant was over twenty miles from Lewisville, that he was heading in the
wrong direction, and that his front left tire was missing. 3 RR 56, 73, 91, 97.
Trooper Platt noticed a strong smell of alcohol coming from Appellant’s breath,
that Appellant had “really glassy” eyes, and that he appeared not to understand
their directions. 3 RR 33. Trooper Kasenic detected a strong odor of alcohol on
Appellant’s breath and noticed that his speech was slurred. 3 RR 95. Appellant
said that he had been experiencing flu-like symptoms that day. 3 RR 39, 49.
The troopers decided to pursue a DWI investigation, and Trooper Kasenic
secured the scene while Trooper Platt administered field sobriety tests to determine
whether Appellant was intoxicated. 3 RR 66, 98, 102-03. Trooper Platt
administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and had Appellant perform
the walk and turn and the one-legged stand tests. 3 RR 38-41, 42-46. Appellant
showed signs of intoxication on all three tests. 3 RR 41, 44, 46, 47. Based on
everything he had seen, Trooper Platt determined that Appellant did not have the
normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol
into his body, and he arrested Appellant. 3 RR 47-49.
Trooper Platt placed Appellant in the front seat of his patrol car, read him
the DIC-24 statutory warnings,3 and requested that he give either a blood or a
3
These warnings set out the penalties associated with refusing to provide a blood or breath
sample. See Tex. Transp. Code § 724.015.
3
breath sample. Appellant refused both. 3 RR 51-52. Because Appellant had twice
before been convicted of DWI, Trooper Platt took Appellant to a hospital for a
mandatory blood draw.4 3 RR 52.
The blood-draw results showed that Appellant’s blood alcohol level was
.063 grams of alcohol per 100 millileters of blood approximately one hour and 45
minutes after the stop. 3 RR 54, 110, 114-15, 118; SX 10, 13. A person with an
alcohol level of .08 or more satisfies the legal definition of intoxication. 3 RR 115.
Although Troopers Platt and Kasenic expected Appellant’s blood alcohol level to
be “pretty high,” Appellant’s blood-alcohol results did not change their opinion
that Appellant had been driving while intoxicated due to the ingestion of alcohol.
3 RR 74, 81, 104. While Trooper Platt agreed on cross-examination that he had
only had “very basic” first-responder training in identifying stroke symptoms or
neurological disorders, he disagreed that the symptoms for those medical
conditions were “very similar” to symptoms of intoxication. 3 RR 80.
Forensic scientist Andrew Macy, who tested Appellant’s blood sample,
testified that, according to the National Safety Council’s Committee on Alcohol
and Other Drugs, anyone with an alcohol blood-alcohol level of .08 will have lost
the normal use of his or her mental and physical faculties due to alcohol but that
4
Appellant has not previously challenged the legality of the blood draw and therefore has
forfeited any relief on this issue. See State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178
(Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014) (holding that mandatory blood draws are unconstitutional). See
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. In any event, the record makes clear that Appellant strategically relied on
the 0.063 blood-draw result to assert his innocence. 3 RR 18-19, 123, 167-70.
4
some people will have lost it with a blood-alcohol level as low as .05 and maybe
even lower. 3 RR 123. After discussing absorption and elimination rates and
retrograde extrapolation, Macey stated that Appellant’s blood alcohol
concentration at 3:00 a.m. could have been higher, lower, or the same at 1:15 a.m.,
when Appellant was driving. 3 RR 116-17, 121. Macey could not say one-
hundred percent whether Appellant’s alcohol level while he was driving was .08 or
over, or under .06. 3 RR 123.
Forty-six-year-old Appellant testified that his behavior that night was due to
medical issues. 3 RR 133-36, 148. He explained that he had gone to work the day
before but that he had felt ill from flu-like symptoms that had persisted for the past
two weeks. 3 RR 137. He went home after work but then went to a neighborhood
bar in Lewisville to meet some friends. He was not sure what time he arrived, but
it was late. 3 RR 139-40. He took three beers with him to the bar and drank either
two or three of them. 3 RR 141. After a while, he began getting a “really
massive” headache and feeling nauseous. His legs started to get kind of wobbly
and shaky, and his eyes got “kind of blurry,” and he could not focus. 3 RR 140,
154. He became confused. 3 RR 141. He left to go home, which was five to
seven miles away, but he ended up in McKinney. 3 RR 141-42. He did not
remember what happened after he left the bar that night. 3 RR 142, 147-48, 155.
5
Appellant testified that his blurred vision lasted for two or three days after
his arrest and that his headaches lasted for close to three months. 3 RR 143-44.
His general practioner prescribed antibiotics and a fever reducer for high blood
pressure and a sinus infection. 3 RR 144. But his symptoms did not subside, and
he eventually got insurance and went to see other doctors. He is now being treated
for “[c]holesterol and high blood pressure” and for “possibly having an onset of a
ministroke.” 3 RR 146. On cross-examination, the State introduced Appellant’s
medical records. 3 RR 149-50; SX 16, 17. Although Appellant’s testimony was
not entirely clear regarding the content of the records, the State argued without
objection in closing argument that the medical records did not contain any
information about Appellant having a stroke.5 3 RR 175.
5
Appellant’s medical records are difficult to decipher, and Appellant did not at trial and does not
now cite to any place in the records that supports his suggestion that he was suffering from a
neurological disorder the night of the offense and that this disorder caused the loss of his mental
and physical faculties.
6
SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS
State’s Reply to Appellant’s First Issue:
The evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for driving
while intoxicated. Appellant exhibited classic signs of intoxication, the field
sobriety tests indicated that he was intoxicated, and he refused to provide a breath
or blood sample. The jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s alternative
explanations for his behavior, as it is the sole judge of the weight and credibility to
be given to witness testimony and other evidence.
State’s Reply to Appellant’s Second Issue:
Because Appellant failed to object to or file a motion to quash the indictment
before trial, he cannot now complain that his indictment was defective for failing
to define “intoxication.” In any event, the definitions of “intoxicated” are
evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the indictment, and Appellant’s
indictment satisfied constitutional notice requirements, such that he was aware of
the charges against him and could prepare a defense.
7
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST ISSUE
(The evidence was sufficient to prove DWI)
Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he lost the
normal use of his mental or physical faculties due to the introduction of alcohol
because his behavior was easily explained by the medical conditions he was
suffering at the time and because his blood alcohol concentration was below the
legal limit. App. Br. 5, 10, 12.
The evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for driving
while intoxicated, however. Appellant exhibited classic signs of intoxication, the
field sobriety tests indicated he was intoxicated, and he refused to provide a breath
or blood sample. The jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s alternative
explanations for his behavior, as it is the sole judge of the weight and credibility to
be given to witness testimony and other evidence.
Standard of Review
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court considers
all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and determines
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The trier of fact is
the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony, and it is
within the sole province of the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.
8
Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The reviewing
court may not act as a “thirteenth juror” and reweigh the jury’s determinations of
the weight or credibility of the evidence. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Analysis
A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI) if he is
intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See Tex. Penal Code
§ 49.04(a). “Intoxication” is defined alternatively in two ways: (1) subjectively—
not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the
introduction of alcohol; or (2) objectively—having an alcohol concentration of
0.08 or more. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.01(2)(A). Here, the trial court’s jury
instructions authorized the jury to convict Appellant if it found that he was
intoxicated under the subjective definition and that he had twice been convicted of
DWI. CR 70-71.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has identified evidence that “would logically
raise an inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving,”
including: erratic driving, slurred speech, glassy eyes, the odor of alcohol on the
person’s breath, admissions to drinking, and the inability to follow directions or
perform field sobriety. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010); Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142-43, 142 n. 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
9
The testimony of a police officer about a defendant’s behavior and opinion that the
defendant is intoxicated provides sufficient support to uphold a jury verdict. See
Zill v. State, 355 S.W.3d 778, 785-86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
pet.).
Based on several classic signs of intoxication, Trooper Kasenic believed
Appellant had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the
ingestion of alcohol; specifically, Appellant appeared to be oblivious to the fact
that he was driving on only three tires and that two marked vehicles with activated
lights and sirens were following him, his speech was slurred, and his breath had a
strong smell of alcohol. 3 RR 94-95, 103. Appellant’s .063 test result did not
change Trooper Kasenic’s opinion that Appellant was intoxicated, and he had no
reason to believe Appellant was suffering from a stroke or seizure that night. 3 RR
104.
Trooper Platt also witnessed recognized signs of intoxication, including
Appellant’s glassy eyes, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and his inability to
follow directions or properly perform the field sobriety tests. 3 RR 32-33, 47.
Trooper Platt specifically explained that the HGN tests he administered “certainly
indicated intoxication.” 3 RR 41. Before administering the HGN tests, Trooper
Platt questioned Appellant to determine whether he was a good candidate. When
he asked Appellant about any recent head injuries, Appellant said that he had hit
10
his head on the first-aid kit at his office, but he also indicated that it was no longer
causing him any problems. 4 RR 38-39. Appellant did not complain of a headache
or any other medical condition, other than flu symptoms. 3 RR 49-50. When the
State asked Trooper Platt whether he could tell from this type of test whether a
person had suffered a recent traumatic head injury, he stated that “[g]enerally,
neurological issues can be seen,” explaining that
[t]he pupils are not equal size, or there’s not equal tracking present
because, basically, in the few rare cases that I’ve had that people don’t
have equal pupil size, it generally indicates that they either have a
previous condition or have a condition that they don’t know about. It
could be something as serious as a brain tumor, or it could be
something more minor that they’ve had for a long time.
3 RR 42. Trooper did not see any of those signs in Appellant; in fact, Trooper Platt
had “every reason to believe” that Appellant was intoxicated due to the
consumption of alcohol. 3 RR 41-42, 81. If Trooper Platt had thought Appellant
was suffering from a medical condition, he would have called an ambulance. 3 RR
47.
In addition to the two troopers’ consistent conclusions that Appellant had
lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due to the ingestion of
alcohol into the body (3 RR 48-49, 81), the trial court admitted a redacted version
of the recorded encounter. 3 RR 50, 108; SX 1. Therefore, the jury could
determine for itself whether Appellant’s behavior appeared to be the result of a
medical/neurological condition or due to intoxication. See Zill, 355 S.W.3d at 788;
11
Russell v. State, 290 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.)
(“[B]ecause the jury saw the videotape of the stop, it could draw its own
conclusions from observing Russell’s behavior in deciding whether he appeared
intoxicated.”). The jury also could have considered Appellant’s refusal to take a
breath or blood test as indicating consciousness of guilt. See Bartlett v. State, 270
S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
While Appellant’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was under 0.08 at the
time of the test, this fact is not dispositive and does not, without more, prove
Appellant’s innocence.6 Indeed, the National Safety Council’s Committee on
Alcohol and Other Drugs has determined that some people will have lost the
normal use of their mental and physical faculties due to alcohol with a blood-
alcohol level as low as .05 and maybe even lower. 3 RR 123. And the subjective
definition of intoxication covers this situation. Moreover, forensic scientist Macey
testified that Appellant’s 3:00 a.m. 0.063 BAC level could have been higher—up
to .08 or .085—at the time he was stopped at 1:15 a.m., although it also could have
been lower or the same. 3 RR 121-22.
6
See Dodson v. State, No. 05-13-00297-CR, 2014 WL 429337, at *1-4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb.
3, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding DWI evidence sufficient, despite
defendant’s .063 and .058 blood-alcohol level two hours after the stop); Maldonado v. State, No.
02-13-00076-CR, 2014 WL 670745, at *1-5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (holding DWI evidence sufficient where defendant’s breath samples
registered at alcohol concentrations of .071 and .072).
12
Although Appellant presented alternative explanations for the admitted loss
of his physical and mental faculties, it was the jury’s function to resolve any
conflicts in the evidence, and the jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the
evidence presented by either side. See Crouse v. State, 441 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Thus, the jury was free to believe the troopers’
testimony that Appellant appeared to be intoxicated due to the ingestion of alcohol
and disbelieve Appellant’s alternative explanation that a medical/neurological
condition caused his erratic behavior. See Zill, 355 S.W.3d at 787 (“Although
Appellant’s behavior during the traffic stop may have been consistent with a head
injury, her behavior also constitutes recognized evidence of intoxication.”);
Russell, 290 S.W.3d at 396-98 (holding sufficient evidence to support DWI
conviction, despite Russell’s contention that his behavior and symptoms were
caused by hypolglycemia and diabetes).
For these reasons, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s
conviction, and his first issue should be overruled.
13
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND ISSUE
(The indictment provided sufficient notice)
Appellant asserts that his indictment was fatally defective because it failed to
define “intoxication,” and therefore, his conviction should be reversed and his case
remanded for a new trial. App. Br. 13-16.
Because Appellant failed to object to or file a motion to quash the indictment
before trial, he forfeited any complaint on this issue. Additionally, the definitions
of “intoxicated” are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the indictment,
and Appellant’s indictment satisfied constitutional notice requirements, such that
Appellant was aware of the charges against him and could prepare a defense.
Appellant did not preserve error
As Appellant acknowledges, he did not file a motion to quash the indictment
or object to any “defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance” in the
indictment before the trial commenced. App. Br. 13; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 1.14(b). Thus, he forfeited the right to object, and he “may not raise the
objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding.” Id.; see Teal v.
State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 176-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Texas law now requires
the defendant to object to any error in the indictment before the day of trial and
certainly before the jury is empaneled.”); Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 273
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Because Appellant failed to preserve error, this issue
should be overruled.
14
The indictment was not defective
A criminal defendant is entitled to fair notice of the specific charged offense.
See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. The charging instrument must
convey this notice sufficiently so that the accused may prepare his defense. See
State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
A DWI indictment provides adequate notice when it sets out the elements of
the offense, as it did in this case.7 See Tex. Penal Code § 49.04; Crenshaw v. State,
378 S.W.3d 460, 465-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). While “intoxication” is an
element of DWI, its two alternative definitions—subjective and objective
intoxication—are not. Indeed, these definitions are the means by which “‘the State
may prove intoxication, rather than alternate means of committing the offense.’”
Crenshaw, 378 S.W.3d at 466 (quoting Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 256). Thus,
“the State may simply allege that a person was ‘intoxicated’ to satisfy the notice
requirement.” Id.
Appellant cites State v. Cordell, 34 S.W.3d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2000, pet. ref’d), for the proposition that an indictment charging a person
with DWI must allege which definition of “intoxicated” the State will attempt to
prove at trial. App. Br. at 16. The Cordell court, however, relied on State v.
Carter, 810 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), which the Court of Criminal
7
The indictment against Appellant alleged that he operated a motor vehicle in a public place
while intoxicated and that he previously had been twice convicted of misdemeanor DWI. CR 12.
15
Appeals overruled in Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 255-56. The Barbernell court
held that the definitions of “intoxicated” in the DWI statute were evidentiary, and
therefore, do not need to be alleged in the charging instrument. Id. at 256.
Because Appellant’s DWI indictment provided him with fair notice of the
offense of which he was being charged, it was not defective, and his second issue
should be overruled.
16
PRAYER
Appellant’s trial was without prejudicial error. The State prays that
Appellant’s conviction and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GREG WILLIS
Criminal District Attorney
Collin County, Texas
JOHN R. ROLATER, JR.
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Chief of the Appellate Division
/s/ Libby J. Lange
LIBBY J. LANGE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200
McKinney, TX 75071
(972) 548-4323
FAX (214) 491-4860
State Bar No. 11910100
llange@co.collin.tx.us
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The State has e-served counsel for Appellant, Derek M. Harkrider, and sent
a courtesy copy of the State’s Brief to harkriderlaw@gmail.com, on this the 29th
day of December, 2014.
/s/ Libby J. Lange
Libby J. Lange
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the word limitations in Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.4(i)(2). In reliance on the word count of the computer program used to
prepare this brief, the undersigned attorney certifies that this brief contains 3,534
words, exclusive of the sections of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Libby J. Lange
Libby J. Lange
18