Long Island Village Owners Association (LIVOA) v. Cowen Island Properties, L. P. ( 2015 )

NUMBER 13-14-00442-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
LONG ISLAND VILLAGE OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant,
v.
COWEN ISLAND PROPERTIES, L.P., Appellee.
On appeal from the 445th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By one issue, appellant Long Island Village Owners Association, Inc. (“LIVOA”)
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting appellee Cowen Island
Properties, L.P.’s (“CIP”) application for a temporary injunction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute concerns the rights and obligations associated with portions of an
approximately 230-acre tract of land known as Long Island located in coastal Cameron
County.
In this case, two portions of Long Island are
at issue. 1 The first is a resort-like community
development of more than 1,000 resident-owners
known as Long Island Village. LIVOA is the
entity charged with managing and operating Long
Island Village. Residents access the Long Island
Village property from the mainland by crossing a
swing bridge to South Garcia Street. Ingress and
egress to the Long Island Village property is made
through a private street known as Sea Shell
Boulevard. A guard post is located at the
entrance of Sea Shell Boulevard, which runs from
South Garcia Street through the middle of the
Long Island Village property until it dead-ends into the second portion of land at issue in
this case, which has been owned by CIP since 2008 (“the CIP property). The CIP
property is an undeveloped, approximately 104-acre tract of land.
1 For the benefit of the reader, we have embedded a map included in appellee’s brief illustrating
the real property and boundaries at issue. We use this map solely for illustrative purposes.
2
John Cowen Sr., a representative of CIP, testified that CIP’s goal is to develop2 its
property, but it is unable to do so because LIVOA is denying CIP access to its property
by blocking CIP’s access to Sea Shell Boulevard through the guard post. Cowen
testified that aside from Sea Shell Boulevard, “there are no other roads that go directly to
my property.”
CIP sued LIVOA alleging numerous causes of action, specifically that: (1) CIP has
an easement through the Long Island Village property and seeks to enforce it; (2) LIVOA
impermissibly amended its condominium declarations to “cut off” CIP’s property rights;
(3) LIVOA’s actions are wrongfully barring CIP from entering its property thereby causing
damages; (4) LIVOA committed a trespass onto CIP’s property; (5) LIVOA’s conduct has
created a nuisance causing injury to CIP; and (6) promissory estoppel. In written
discovery, LIVOA admitted that it has refused and will continue to refuse to give CIP
access to Sea Shell Boulevard because neither CIP, nor its principals or personnel are
owners, renters, visitors, or guests at Long Island Village.
CIP later filed an application for temporary injunction alleging that it has an express
easement for ingress and egress through Sea Shell Boulevard as well as an express
easement for utilities. To support this argument, CIP attached the 1978 Declaration
recorded by the original developer of the Long Island Village community as well as the
plat purportedly evidencing these easements and argued that the easements are
appurtenant and burden both the Long Island Village property as well as the CIP property.
2Cowen testified that CIP had hired an architect and a “landscape artist” to assist in the
development of property and had conducted engineering and “eco” studies on the property, as well.
3
CIP sought injunctive relief to enjoin LIVOA from refusing CIP access to its easement via
Sea Shell Boulevard.
After a hearing in which CIP called two witnesses and LIVOA called none, the trial
court granted CIP’s request for a temporary injunction and enjoined LIVOA, as well as the
owner-residents of Long Island Village, from preventing CIP and any of its development
contractors ingress and egress to the CIP property via Sea Shell Boulevard. This appeal
followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through
2015 R.S.).
II. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
By its sole issue, LIVOA asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting
CIP’s application for a temporary injunction because CIP failed to establish a probable
right of recovery.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review the trial court’s ruling on a party’s application for a temporary injunction
for an abuse of discretion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).
We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment unless the trial court’s
action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Id.
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Id. A temporary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right. Id. Instead, to obtain a
temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against
the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and
irreparable injury in the interim. Id. The applicant is not required to show that he will
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ultimately prevail on the trial of the merits, but only that he is entitled to preserve the status
quo. Salazar v. Gallardo, 57 S.W.3d 629, 632–33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.).
B. Discussion
LIVOA argues that CIP has not demonstrated a probable right of recovery because
it did not join the “approximately 1,100 individual property owners who own undivided
interests in Sea [Shell] Boulevard, and who are necessary parties to any action to
establish such an easement.” We disagree.
As stated, CIP sued LIVOA alleging numerous causes of action, including the
establishment of an easement coterminous with Sea Shell Boulevard. Even taking
LIVOA’s argument as true—that the Long Island Village individual property owners own
undivided interests in Sea Shell Boulevard—the purpose of CIP’s application for
temporary injunction related specifically to the actions taken by LIVOA in preventing CIP
and its agents and contractors from utilizing Sea Shell Boulevard. In written discovery,
LIVOA also admitted that it denied and would continue to deny CIP access to Sea Shell
Boulevard because neither CIP nor its agents were property owners of Long Island
Village. At the temporary injunction hearing, CIP presented evidence to show that it had
an express easement through Sea Shell Boulevard, as described in the Long Island
Village developer’s 1978 Declaration and original site development plan. 3 Finally, CIP
3 We offer no opinion as to the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Our decision today relates only to
the trial court’s grant of CIP’s application for temporary injunction.
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presented evidence from its representative, John Cowen Sr., that LIVOA’s actions
prevented CIP from accessing and developing the land, thereby causing CIP injury.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting CIP’s application for temporary injunction because CIP showed that it had a
probable right to relief.4 We overrule LIVOA’s sole issue on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order granting CIP’s application for temporary injunction.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
12th day of November, 2015.
4 Because LIVOA only challenges this element of CIP’s application for a temporary injunction on
appeal, we need not address the remaining elements. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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