Dawn Bentley v. Casey Don Snodgrass ( 2018 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00319-CV
DAWN BENTLEY,
Appellant
v.
CASEY DON SNODGRASS,
Appellee
From the 413th District Court
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-C201500694
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellant, Dawn Bentley, challenges a judgment rendered in favor
of appellee, Casey Don Snodgrass, involving a motor-vehicle collision. Because we
overrule both of Bentley’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises out of a motor-vehicle collision between Bentley and Snodgrass
that occurred on August 28, 2014, at the intersection of Alsbury Boulevard and Spring
Meadows Drive in Burleson, Texas. At the time of the incident, Snodgrass was
approaching the intersection on Spring Meadows, while Bentley was driving on Alsbury.
After stopping at the stop sign on Spring Meadows, Snodgrass proceeded into the
intersection, where his vehicle was broadsided by the vehicle driven by Bentley. Bentley
characterized Snodgrass’s act of proceeding into the intersection at that time as negligent
because he did not have the right of way.
Thereafter, Bentley filed suit, alleging that Snodgrass was negligent in pulling
from the stop sign into the intersection when it was not safe to do so. The case was tried
to a jury, and at the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its verdict in favor of
Snodgrass, finding that his negligence, if any, did not proximately cause the accident.
The trial court subsequently entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. Bentley filed a
motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.
II. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In her first issue, Bentley argues that the jury’s finding of no negligence as to
Snodgrass is factually insufficient because she presented unrebutted evidence, including
admissions by Snodgrass that he caused the collision by pulling into the intersection
without having the right of way. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In a factual-sufficiency challenge, an appellate court must consider the weigh all
of the evidence. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). The verdict
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should be set aside only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. We may not pass upon the witnesses’ credibility
or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder, even if the evidence would support
a different result. 2900 Smith, Ltd. v. Constellation New Energy, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 741, 746
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). If we determine the evidence is factually
insufficient, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue and state in what regard
the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the trial court’s
judgment; we need not do so when affirming the judgment. Id.
B. Discussion
“It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove specific acts of negligence on the part of the
driver and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.” Gomez v. Adame,
940 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (citing Smith v. Cent. Freight
Lines, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)). The
mere occurrence of a collision does not establish negligence as a matter of law. Id. (citing
Smith, 774 S.W.2d at 412 (“The occurrence of an accident or collision is not of itself
evidence of negligence.”)); see Madara v. Marshall, 578 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). “Whether negligence and proximate cause
have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence is within the jury’s province to
determine.” Gomez, 940 S.W.2d at 252 (citing Smith, 774 S.W.2d at 412).
Bentley v. Snodgrass Page 3
Here, Snodgrass testified that, at the time of the collision, he was on his way home
from an open house at his three-year-old son’s day care. His son was in a booster seat in
the car at the time. In any event, Snodgrass stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of
Alsbury and Spring Meadows and waited a long time for traffic to clear. He recalled
looking both ways numerous times and proceeded into the intersection only when he
thought it was clear. Snodgrass noted that he did not see Bentley’s vehicle and that he
would not have entered the intersection had he known a car was coming. Snodgrass
denied eating, drinking, adjusting the radio, or consuming alcohol at or near the time of
the accident, and he stated that he was driving with ordinary care when he entered the
intersection. Snodgrass characterized the incident as “just an accident, not necessarily
anybody was at fault.”
However, in response to questioning by Bentley’s counsel, Snodgrass admitted
that this collision would not have occurred if he had not pulled from the stop sign when
it was unsafe and that his actions were the sole cause of Bentley’s damages and injuries.
He further acknowledged that he failed to yield the right-of-way to Bentley and that
Bentley did not do anything wrong to cause or contribute to the collision. And when
asked who should be financially responsible for the collision, Snodgrass stated the
following: “I mean, I mean, she hit me so it was my fault because I pulled out when I
wasn’t supposed to, so, yeah, you would say that I would be responsible for the actions
that happened or for all that.”
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Bentley also proffered the testimony of Brian Dixon, an eyewitness to the collision.
Dixon recounted that he was stopped on Spring Meadows behind Snodgrass. Dixon saw
Snodgrass pull from the stop sign when it was unsafe and immediately into the path of
Bentley’s vehicle. Dixon recalled saying at the time of the collision, “From what I could
see, it looked like she [Bentley] just didn’t have an opportunity to stop.” Dixon did not
hear tires screeching or a car horn honking, nor could he determine how fast Bentley was
traveling.
Bentley indicated that she was driving westward on Alsbury while going the
speed limit and with the flow of traffic. However, on cross-examination, Bentley noted
that she was driving the speed limit and that she thought the speed limit on Alsbury was
forty miles per hour, though she conceded that the police report stated that the speed
limit on Alsbury was actually thirty-five miles per hour. In any event, Bentley was in the
left lane of the two westbound traffic lanes, and there was no traffic-control device facing
her as she was driving through the intersection. Bentley then saw Snodgrass pull out in
front of her, and she “hit [her] brake, and the next thing I know we’re hitting. I hit him.”
Bentley did not see Snodgrass’s vehicle “until it was too late.”
In addition to the foregoing, Bentley tendered Plaintiff’s Exhibit 29, which is the
police report corresponding with the collision. In this report, Burleson Police Officer
Cody Austin indicated the following:
Unit #1 (Snodgrass) was stopped at the stop sign in the 800 Blk of Spring
Meadows Dr. Unit # 2 (Bentley) was traveling southwest in the 500 Blk of
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NE Alsbury Blvd in the inside lane of traffic. Unit #1 Failed to Yield the
Right of Way, pulling onto the 500 Blk of NE Alsbury Blvd., to head
northeast. At this time[,] Unit #2 struck Unit #1 in the left side.
Despite the aforementioned evidence presented by Bentley, there was credible
evidence before the jury upon which its decision rests. Specifically, Snodgrass testified
that he stopped at the stop sign at the intersection of Alsbury and Spring Meadows,
looked both directions on numerous occasions, and entered the intersection only when
he believed it was clear. The record contains no evidence that Snodgrass ran the stop
sign; that Snodgrass was distracted or otherwise was not paying attention when he
entered the intersection; or that he even saw Bentley’s vehicle before entering the
intersection. Instead, the facts established the existence of an accident, not specific acts
of negligence on the part of either party. See Gomez, 940 S.W.2d at 252 (concluding that
the plaintiff failed to establish negligence when the record showed that the defendant
stopped at a stop sign, looked in both directions, and entered what she thought was a
clear intersection). Therefore, based on the evidence, we cannot say that the jury erred in
failing to conclude that Snodgrass was negligent as a matter of law. See id.
Nevertheless, Bentley relies heavily on Snodgrass’s purported admissions that he
failed to yield the right of way and that he was financially responsible for the damages
caused by the collision, as well as the police report, to establish that Snodgrass was
negligent by failing to yield the right of way. First, we note that the failure to yield the
right of way does not, in and of itself, establish negligence. See id.; see also Madara, 578
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S.W.2d at 790 (“However, if the driver intending to make a left turn misjudges the speed
of the approaching vehicle or its distance from the intersection, this does not necessarily
establish a want of due care on his part. Thus, in the case at bar[,] it was the plaintiff’s
burden to prove the defendant’s negligence upon the common law standard of whether
he acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances existing at the time of
the occurrence.” (internal citations omitted)); Dedear v. James, 184 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Austin 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (“The foregoing facts sustain the jury finding
that while the truck driver failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to yield the right of
way to the approaching automobile, that neither of such acts was negligence. The settled
rule is that negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury to determine.”).
Second, a review of the record demonstrates conflicts in the evidence, which were
within the province of the jury to resolve. See O’Connor v. Miller, 127 S.W.3d 249, 254
(Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. denied) (noting that it is within the province of the factfinder
to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony).
Moreover, the jury was entitled to believe one witness and disbelieve another witness,
may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, and it may accept lay testimony
over that of experts. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). Therefore,
we may not pass upon a witness’s credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the
jury, even if the evidence might clearly support a different result. See Maritime Overseas
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Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629,
634 (Tex. 1986)).
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the jury’s finding
that Snodgrass’s negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the collision is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
See Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; see also In re Ybarra, No. 04-17-00245-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS
9700, at *14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 18, 2017, orig. proceeding) (concluding that, in
a rear-end collision case, the trial court erred in granting a new trial and setting aside the
jury’s no-negligence finding because the “jury chose to believe Ybarra’s version of the
events leading to the collision, and determined that Ybarra had not failed to use ordinary
care. That determination was within the jury’s province. We are not free to disregard
the jury’s conclusion, and neither was the trial judge”); Laday v. Pedraza, No. 14-13-00638-
CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 1232, at **5-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 10, 2015,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting a factual-sufficiency issue in a rear-end-collision case
based on testimony by the defendant that he failed to stop on time and that the collision
was an accident and testimony by the plaintiff that he did not see the defendant’s truck
before the collision, nor did he hear brakes or tires squealing before the collision); Gaskey
v. One Source Sec. & Found., No. 14-07-00850-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4708, at **9-14
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming a no-
negligence finding despite the defendant’s admissions that he could have prevented the
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accident, that he was partly at fault, and that he was following too closely); Zelbst v.
Harkins, No. 10-07-00293-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2705, at **3-5 (Tex. App.—Waco May
21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). We therefore overrule Bentley’s first issue.
III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In her second issue, Bentley contends that the trial court erred by allowing the
judgment on the jury’s verdict to become final and for denying her motion for new trial
without a hearing. However, neither in her appellant’s brief nor in her reply brief did
Bentley provide argument or authorities in support of this issue. Accordingly, we hold
that this issue is inadequately briefed and, thus, waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling U.S.A., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (noting that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 requires a
party to provide the reviewing court with “a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of
the argument made in the body of the brief”). We overrule Bentley’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Bentley’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed September 26, 2018
[CV06]
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