Modis, Inc v. Net Matrix Solutions, Inc. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
14-14-00238-cv
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
3/16/2015 4:28:51 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 14-14-00238-CV
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 14th COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FOR THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
3/16/2015 4:28:51 PM
AT HOUSTON, TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
Modis Inc.,
Appellant,
VS.
Net Matrix Solutions, Inc.,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County, Texas
The Honorable Linda Storey, Presiding
Cause No. 1015435
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellee Net Matrix Solutions, Inc. moves for rehearing with regard to
the Court's judgment and opinion issued on March 3, 2015, and respectfully
states:
The Court rests its analysis on the proposition that in the provision
protecting the interests of Net Matrix (paragraph 8F), "hire" must mean "hire
directly" because other provisions protecting Modis (paragraphs 8C and 8D)
use language that suggests "indirect" as well as "direct" action.
The Court should reconsider this construction. The meaning of the term
"hire" is in no way limited in Paragraph 8C, nor does the agreement include a
definition of the term "hire."
The Subcontractor Agreement was prepared by Modis on its own
standard form. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 (Subcontractor Agreement, prepared
on form with "Modis" heading). The drafter does not need to define every term
to avoid ambiguity, but the drafter cannot fail to define a term and "then claim the
narrow and favorable interpretation." Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1382; see also
Roberson v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 330 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Nat'l Merck Co., Inc. v. UnitedServ. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that insurance policies are contracts and that insurers
are drafters, so any ambiguities are construed against the drafter); Mid-Continent
Cas. Co. v. Basdeo, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2010), affd, 477 Fed.
Appx. 702 (11th Cir. 2012); Bowen v. Cullman Bros.} Inc., 414 F.2d 739, 741 (5th
Cir. 1969) (citing Florida law, rejecting the narrow interpretation proposed by the
drafter of the contract).
The Court's construction ignores the fact that in the computer consulting
business in which both Modis and Net Matrix are engaged, hiring is commonly
1Paragraphs 8D and 8F use the term "hire." Paragraph 8C does not use that term.
2
done through subcontractors - exactly what occurred in this case. RR:24-25 (N.
Jain). And, this subcontract was the only placement of any kind between Modis
and Net Matrix. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 at 2 (deposition testimony of L. Kelley).
The Court's construction thus has precisely the effect it is trying to avoid - it
leaves Paragraph 8F with little if any meaning. Since consulting companies
typically act as subcontractors to each other, and as that is the only contractual
relationship that existed between Net Matrix and Modis, to exclude hiring through
a subcontractor emasculates this provision.
Moreover, courts must "give effect to the 'plain language'" of contracts.
Nat'l Merck Co., Inc., 400 So. 2d at 530; Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1382 (the first
step is to determine the "natural or plain meaning" of the contract language);
Adolfo House Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("terms of an insurance contract must be given their
plain, ordinary and generally accepted meanings viewed from the perspective of
the average person"). To do so, courts should look to the dictionary definitions of
undefined contract terms. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d
1008, 1026 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing the dictionary definition of groceries to
determine its meaning in leases with grocery exclusives).
The first dictionary definition of "hire" is "to engage the personal services of
for a set sum."2 This definition is not limited to the manner in which an individual
is hired, whether as an employee or a subcontractor, whether direct or indirect.
The concept is simply that the individual is "hired" to do a job, however that might
be accomplished.
To the extent that the use of more specific language in Paragraphs 8C and
8D creates any ambiguity, the Court should consider extrinsic evidence, including
the meaning that the parties themselves understood. See, e.g., Crespo v. Crespo,
28 So. 3d 125, 128 (Fla. Ct. Ap. 2010). In this case, testimony established the
broad meaning and purpose of this provision. RR:32 (N. Jain.); Plaintiffs Exhibit
16 at 4-5 (L. Kelley). Indeed, Modis' office manager herself testified that Modis
had "hired" Net Matrix's employee. Plaintiffs Exhibit 16 at 8 (L. Kelley). And,
this construction is most consistent with the conduct of Modis' employees, who
were untruthful to Net Matrix about their hiring of Nistane.
Neither Modis nor the Court has cited any authority, from Florida or
elsewhere, that suggests a broad term should not be given its ordinary meaning ~
in this case, the meaning ascribed by the parties themselves -- because more
2Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/inter?dest=/dictionarv/
hire.
3Modis knew of Nistane's statements to Net Matrix regarding his supposed new job, and knew
that those statements were untrue, yet Modis did nothing to inform Net Matrix of the truth. RR
79-82 (Hayes) and PX10; PX16 (Kelley) at pp. 19-20, 31-34 and PX11. Brief ofAppellee at4.
specific terminology is used elsewhere in the agreement. As discussed in
Appellees' Brief, the concept of "hiring" under Florida law is consistent with the
dictionary definition and thus includes indirect as well as direct hiring of an
employee. If Modis meant to include only "direct" hiring in Paragraph 8F, it easily
could have done so.
For these reasons, Net Matrix respectfully submits that the Court should
reconsider its decision in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
CRAIN, CATON & JAMES, P.C.
By: k .U>o2^
H. Miles Cohn
State Bar No. 04509600
mcohn@craincaton.com
Michelle V. Friery
State Bar No. 24040934
mfrierv(a>craincaton.com
Crain, Caton & James, P.C.
1401 McKinney Street, Suite 1700
Houston, Texas 77010
Telephone: (713)752-8668
Facsimile: (713)658-1921
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
NET MATRIX SOLUTIONS, INC.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 16 day of March, 2015, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing was served via ECF to Appellant's counsel:
R. Rogge Dunn
Gregory M. Clift
Clouse Dunn LLP
1201 Elm St., Suite 5200
Dallas, Texas 75270-2142
Facsimile: (214) 220-3833
Email: rdunn@trialtested.com
Email: gclift@clousedunn.com
4.uj£
H. Miles Conn