Greer, David AKA David Duane Greer ( 2015 )


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    OCT 08 2015
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    WRIT NO. l?,-03324-Cc!F-272-A
    EX PASTE                                §    IN THE COURT OF CRIMIDinL DISTRICT
    §   272nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    DAVE D. CREER                            §   PRAZQS COUNTY, TEXAS
    APPLICANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE AND DISQUALIFY. THE HONORABLE JUDGE TRAVIS
    E8YAN III FROM ANY AND ALL PROCEEDINGS DEALING WITH APELICASSTT'S 11.07
    HABEAS CORPUS
    TO THE HONORABLE^JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
    COMES NOW, DAVE DUANE GREER, Applicant.herein and in support of this
    motion will show this Honorable Court the f£ttlowing:
    I.
    Right before the jury was sworn in, during a hearing in open court,
    concerning the fact that trial judge TravisBryan III, had previously
    represented applicant in a criminal case as a defense attorney, His
    representation (was unsuccessful) as hisrepresantaticn resulted in Applicant
    being convicted. TravisBryan III stated for the record "and if either side
    wants rns off the case, I'll willingly recuse itsyself..." Vol. 4 P.8L.12-13.
    Applicant was of the belief that when he filed his original application of
    habeas corpus 11.07 which cited numerous allegations of Unconstitutional
    violations and iirproprieties of TravisSryan III himself during and before trial
    even began concerning his actions andinactions by personally violating
    iriandatory statutes, as well as known rules of evidence and procedures. Applicant
    also alleged in grounds of errors 18-19 in his habeas application that judge
    Bryan allowed the prosuctor in open court on the record to ccsrardt a bfcatant
    criminal offense (Tex.P. Cede 2.0.1) (See Vol 4 Page 
    165 Lans. Ch. 14-15
    "It does not.
    have to be beyond a reasonable doubt...") which unambiguously denied Applicant
    a fair trial. Additionally Applicant alleged with a supporting affidavit that
    judge Bryan had extensive secret ex parte oonamanica.t.ion with the deliberating
    jury. This is .in effect asking the j#dge to openly and inpartially allow
    Applicant to further develop the record to provide additional evidence       that
    he abused his discretion, violated numerous rules, requlations and statutorally
    mandated procedures. To further devel^ethe record the judge himself would be
    forced to voluntarily testify against hihiself and provide additional svsorn
    evidence that he.both violated all the aforementioned rights of Applicant but
    why he allowed the prosecutor to tell the jury during closing areguroents that
    the proof did not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt. Then recarananding that
    his actions and inactions denied, applicant a fw.x trial'. Essentially Judge
    Bryan is being placed in a position to set himself up to personally develop
    the record to be used to verify his acts of judicial misconduct , possible
    revomal from the bench, or the public beconming aware of these acts of mis
    conduct lossing reelection due to lossing public trust. To say as a .drastic
    understatement Judge Bryan 's impartiality is highly questioable.. 8'iso it's
    now beyond controversy that jud£>e. Bryan has a crucial persional interest in
    the outcome of the subject matter of this proceeding. As.such he has a
    personal biasness and prejudice in influencing the put come of these proceeding.
    See In re Chaves, 130 S.W.3d. .107,112 (Tex.App.-E3. Paso 2003):
    "Disqualification of a judge can not be waived, even by consent of the
    parties, and the issue nay be '.. >.V.'ij' raisa3 at any time. Games ]v. State,
    
    737 S.W.2d 315
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1907[ 737 S.W.2d.at 318. FOOTNOTE 2: Rule
    18b(2) providesthe verious grounds for recusal, which include requiring
    a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which, (a) his impartiality
    might reasonably be questioned, and (b) he has a personal bias or prejudice
    concerning the subject matter or a party, or personal knowlwdge of
    disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
    The courts have further held that even Wten a judge's impartiality might
    reasonably be questioned he should recuse himself. Gulf Maritime Warehouse
    Co. v. Towers, 858 S.W.2d 556,558 (Te^. App.-Beaur.xjnt 1993):
    "Regarding disqualification of a judge, we have two bases of consideration.
    First, is TEX.CONST.art. V. §11 which states as follows: Sec. 11 No judge
    shall sit in any case wherein hemay be interested;..." At 559 "Having a
    pecuniary or financial interesf-ls certainly of foremost consideration.
    There are other concerns however which have been addressed by Justice Spears
    concerning comments in Sun Exploration and. production Co. v. JacTtson,
    783 5.W. 2d 202, 206 (Tex.1989); Public policy demands that the judge who
    Sits in a case act with absolute impartiality. Pendergrass v. Beale,
    59 Tex.446,447 .0,883). Beyond the demand that a judge be impartial, however,
    i   is the requriement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts
    or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity of the court.. Aetna
    Life Ins. Co. v. .Lavore, 
    475 U.S. 813
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 1580
    , 
    89 L. Ed. 2d 823
    (19^6);
    Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 
    446 U.S. 230
    , 
    100 S. Ct. 1610
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d
    . 182
    (1980). The judiciary must strive not only to give all parties a fair
    trial but also to maintain a high level of public trust    and confidence.
    Indemnity Ins. Co. v. wcGee, 
    163 Tex. 412
    , 
    356 S.W.2d 666
    , 668 (Tex. 1962).
    The legitimacy of the judicial process is based upon the public's
    respect and its confidence that the system settles controversies
    inpartially and fairly. Judicial decisions rendered under circumstances
    that suggest bias, prejuduce, or favoritism undremine the integity of the
    court.'s, breed skepticism and mistrust, and thwart the very priciples on
    which the judicial system isbased. The judiciary must be ejetremely
    diligent in advoiding any appearance of impropriety and must hold itself
    to ejtacting standards lest it lose its legitimacy and suffer a loss of
    public confidence. Although the court ..."
    TEX. R.CIV.PROC. RULE 18b Grounds for Recusal and Disqulification of judges:
    "(a) Groundsfor Disqualifications. A. judge must disqualify   in any
    proceeding in. which;
    (2)   the judge knows that, .individually or as a fiduciary, the judge has
    an interest in the subject matter in controversy; or
    (3)(b) Groundsfor recusal. A judge must recuse in which:
    (1) the judge's impartiality might resonably be questioned;
    (2) the judge has a personal bias or prejudiceconcerning the subject
    matter or party;
    (3)7-," the judge has personal knowledgeof disputed evidentiary facts
    concerning the proceeding:.
    The judge can no more be expected to admit his own incopetency than a
    a trial attorney can be expected to file a direct appeal and admitt his own
    incompetecy. This is the very reason that after a trial a new and. different
    attorney is appointed to to prepare and file the direct .appeal. Alsacn v. Garrison..
    720 F.2d 812,816 (4th Cir.1983)("The content of an appeal is heavily controlled
    foy counsel, and wher$ as here, the defendant's trial lawyer also prosected the
    appeal, it isobviousthat ineffective assist;ance of counsel its not likely to
    be raised at trial.or to appear among the assignments of constitutional error.").
    II.
    In support of Applicant'sbalief Judge Bryan willingness to recuse himself
    •when placedin a questionable situation, is the VERY FIRST RULING OF THE COURT
    which wasissued on July 6, 2015 Court Order that Designated"Issues of FactTo Be
    Resolved." That was signed by the Honorable Kyle Hawthorn As "Presiding Judge"
    which is another District Judge. Applicant naturally believed the judge Bryan
    had. voluntarily recused himself because it was obviousljfrom a quick reading
    of applicant's 11.07 that judge Bryan could not impartially decide whether his
    own conduct violated Applicant's right to a fair trial.
    III.
    Judge Haw-thorn ordered Both Trial Counsel and appellant Counsel.to submit
    affidavits by no later than Oct. 6, 2015. He also ordered the District Clerk'
    of Brazos County to withhold preparing and transmitting the record to the Court
    Criminal Appeals until further order of this court.
    Just image Applicant's shock and awe, when over a month prior to the
    aforementioned attorneys' affidavitsbeing received, heinstead received on
    August 24, 2015 an "Order To Transmit Habeas Corpus ReoordB,.:» signed toy gravis
    Bryan II?. This order wasdated Augxtst 17, 2015 which included ama^ly that
    n^ovu existec
    there now miraculously nH-ted no
    no factual
    t701 S.W.2d 921 
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Streetman v.
    Lynaugh, 812 F.2d 950,956 (5th Cir.1987); Townsend v. Sain, 83 S.ct. 745, 756
    (1963). Judge Bryan's highly controvresial and obvious self serving order*.does
    simply question his impartially but SCREAIELOUDLY "I'll do everthing in my
    power to both cover up my illegal actions and prevent anyone else from
    discovering them and developing a record providing them.
    I, DAVE D. GREER TDCJ-TD #1829754, incarated in the Texas Deratment of
    C riminal Justice Institutional Division at the Wayne Scott Unit, in Bf^aoria
    County, Texas declar under the penalty '.) of perjury that the facts within this
    motion are true and correct.
    My birthday is \7^-iM> k&
    EXECUTED on this   o           day of October, 2015..
    UNDER both Federal Law 28 U.S.C. §1746 and State. Law V.A.C.CIV. PRCC. &
    Rem. Code §132.001-132.003.
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Applicant prays this motion in all
    things be granted, that this motion be assigned to the presiding administrative
    judge, then an order be issued that Judge Eryan be disqualified and ordered
    recused, also that any and all orders signed or issued by him are hereby null
    and. void. Then grant Applicant any other or addittional relief he is justly
    entitled to, it is so prayed.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Dave D. Greer #1829754
    Wayne Scott Unit
    6999 Retrieve Rd.
    Angleton, Texas 77515
    CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this motion has been
    sent to all parties in this cause by addressing a copy to: District Attorney,
    r-V. Jarvis Parsons, 300(. E. 26th Street, Suite 310, Bryan, Texas 77203; The
    Brazos Co. .District Clerk, E%arc Famlin, 300 E. 25th St., Suite 1200, £ryan,
    Texas 77G03; The Second Adciinistrative Judicial District Presiding Judge Olen
    Underwood, 301 I>T. Thompson St. Ste. 102, Conroe, Texas 77301; The Honorable
    Judge Travis Bryan III, 300 E. 26th St. Ste. 204, Bryan, Texas 77803; The
    District Clerk of the Court of the Criminal Appeals> Abel Acosta, Supreme
    Court Bldg, 201 W.Mth St. RiTi 103, Austin, Texas 78"701-14^5, by placing
    a cotv of the same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid on this       3rd. day of
    October, 2015.
    Dave D. Greer'
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WR-41,864-02

Filed Date: 10/8/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/29/2016