Donald W. Taylor v. the Renegade Ranch Subdivision Architectural Review Committee Members and Treasure: Brian and Dixon Schultz, Kevin & Cynthia Gallagher Secondary Architectural Review Committee Member Co-Treasure: Jeffrey C. and Vada Michelle Pitts ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                            Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    May 24, 2022
    No. 04-22-00093-CV
    Donald W. TAYLOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE RENEGADE RANCH SUBDIVISION ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW
    COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND TREASURE: Brian and Dixon Schultz, Kevin & Cynthia
    Gallagher Secondary Architectural Review Committee Member Co-Treasure: Jeffrey C. and
    Vada Michelle Pitts,
    Appellees
    From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 16772
    Honorable Dennis Powell, Judge Presiding
    ORDER
    In the underlying suit, Appellant/Plaintiff Donald Warren Taylor sued
    Appellees/Defendants Renegade Ranch Subdivision Architectural Review Board Committee
    Members Brian Schultz, Dixon Schultz, Dr. Kevin and Cynthia Gallagher (the Gallagher
    defendants), and Jeffrey C. and Vada Michelle Pitts (the Pitts defendants) for fraud, negligence,
    and deceptive trade practices. Taylor moved for summary judgment against all defendants. Brian
    Schultz and Dixon Schultz each filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
    Procedure 91a, and the Gallagher and Pitts defendants each filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
    both Rule 91a and the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Taylor filed motions to dismiss
    those motions. He also filed motions for sanctions. The trial court held a hearing on December
    14, 2021. Taylor “passed” on his motion for summary judgment and the trial court heard the
    defendants’ motions to dismiss.
    On December 16, and 17, 2021 the trial court signed a series of orders:
    •   memorializing that Taylor passed on a hearing for his motion for summary judgment;
    •   granting Brian Schultz’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 91a, awarding costs of court,
    declining to award attorney fees, and finding that no causes of action remain against
    Brian Schultz;
    •    granting Dixon Schultz’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 91a, awarding costs of
    court, declining to award attorney fees, and finding that no causes of action remain
    against Dixon Schultz;
    •    granting the Gallagher defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 91a and the
    TCPA, awarding costs of court and attorney’s fees under the TCPA to be determined at a
    “future hearing,” and finding “no surviving causes of action” against the Gallagher
    defendants;
    •    granting the Pitts defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 91a and the TCPA,
    awarding costs of court and attorney’s fees under the TCPA to be determined at a “future
    hearing,” and finding “no surviving causes of action” against the Pitts defendants; and
    •    confirming that “all causes of action against all defendants in this lawsuit have been
    dismissed and the case is dismissed. This is a final order disposing of this litigation.”
    On January 13, 2022, Taylor filed a notice appeal seeking to appeal the “court decision.”
    The order dismissing the claims against Brian Schultz disposes of all claims in dispute between
    Taylor and Brian Schultz. The order dismissing the claims against Dixon Schultz disposes of all
    claims in dispute between Taylor and Dixon Schultz. But the orders dismissing the claims
    against the Gallagher and Pitts defendants do not appear to dispose of all claims in dispute
    between Taylor and the Gallagher and Pitts defendants.
    The general rule is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v.
    Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001). A final judgment is one that disposes of all
    pending parties and all claims. 
    Id.
    Interlocutory appeals constitute an exception to the “one final judgment” rule. De Ayala
    v. Mackie, 
    193 S.W. 575
    , 578 (Tex. 2006). Statutes permitting interlocutory appeals are strictly
    applied because they present a narrow exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are
    not immediately appealable. CMH Homes v. Perez, 340S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011).
    Here, it appears the Gallagher and Pitts defendants’ claims for attorney’s fees under
    Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.009 remain outstanding.1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
    REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009. Furthermore, no order appears in the record severing the Gallagher
    and Pitts defendants’ claims for attorney’s fees from Taylor’s claims against Brian Schultz and
    Dixon Schultz. In the absence of a severance order, an order that does not dispose of all parties
    and causes of action is not final and appealable. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195
    (Tex. 2001); Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist.v. Aldridge, 
    400 S.W.2d 893
    , 895 (Tex. 1966).
    Nevertheless, we may treat the notice of appeal as prematurely filed and allow Taylor
    time to present this court with a supplemental clerk’s record that includes a final, appealable
    order or judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.1(a), 27.2; Iacono v. Lyons, 
    6 S.W.3d 715
    , 717 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (per curiam); see also Hervey v. Flores, 
    975 S.W.2d 21
    , 24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied) (“a final, appealable summary judgment may
    consist of a series of piecemeal orders.”).
    Therefore, we ABATE this appeal and REMAND this cause to the trial court so that
    1
    On March 7, 2022 the Gallagher defendants filed a motion for the mandatory attorney’s fees. On March 17, 2022
    the Gallagher defendants filed an objection to Taylor’s notice of appeal “and in the alternative conditional notice of
    cross appeal.”
    Taylor may attempt to obtain a final, appealable judgment or order that disposes of all parties
    and all claims. We ORDER Taylor to ensure that a supplemental clerk’s record with a final,
    appealable judgment or order is filed in this court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this
    order. If Taylor fails to cure the jurisdictional defect as ordered, we will reinstate this appeal and
    dismiss it for want of jurisdiction without further notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
    All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.
    _________________________________
    Beth Watkins, Justice
    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
    court on this 24th day of May, 2022.
    ___________________________________
    Michael A. Cruz,
    Clerk of Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-22-00093-CV

Filed Date: 5/24/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/31/2022