Marhinota Kejuan Ford v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00014-CR
___________________________
MARHINOTA KEJUAN FORD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 396th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1540587D
Before Bassel, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant Marhinota Kejuan Ford pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and
was placed on six years of deferred-adjudication community supervision. The written
plea admonishments informed him that, if he violated any condition of his
community supervision, he would be entitled to an adjudication hearing, after which
the trial court could adjudicate him guilty and assess his punishment “anywhere within
the range provided by law.” Further, the admonishments informed Ford that his
charged offense was a first-degree felony which carried a penalty range of 5 to 99
years or life in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. Both Ford and his attorney signed the
plea admonishments and Ford acknowledged with his signature that he fully
understood the written admonishments and that he was aware of the consequences of
his plea.1
While Ford was on community supervision, the State filed a petition to proceed
to adjudication alleging that he had violated its terms. At the revocation hearing on
the State’s petition, Ford pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court, without
admonishing Ford regarding the relevant range of punishment or consequences of
pleading true, adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen years’ confinement.
Ford filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law.
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Ford concedes that he was properly admonished when he pleaded guilty.
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Ford raises one point on appeal: that the trial court erred when it failed to
admonish him at the revocation hearing as to the range of punishment for the
underlying offense and the consequences of pleading true to the allegations in the
State’s petition. Specifically, he contends that this failure violated both his due
process rights as announced by the Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama and
Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See 395 U.S. 238, 242,
89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969); Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 26.13(a).
We overrule Ford’s point. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made it
abundantly clear that Article 26.13 does not require trial courts to admonish
probationers as to the consequences of a plea to a motion to revoke or adjudicate
guilt. See Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W. 3d 304, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding in
revocation context that trial courts are not required to admonish defendants pursuant
to Article 26.13); Harris v. State, 505 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (“We
hold that admonishments provided for in Article 26.13 . . . do not apply in revocation
of probation proceedings.”). Relatedly, discussing Boykin, the Court of Criminal
Appeals recognized that due process does not require a trial court to make Article
26.13 admonishments. Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (“Boykin clearly did not hold that due process requires the equivalent of the
Article 26.13(a) admonishments or an admonishment on the range of punishment.”).
Thus, neither due process nor Article 26.13 required the trial court to admonish
Ford about the range of punishment or the consequences of pleading true at the
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revocation hearing. And Ford does not point us to a statute or precedent that places
upon a trial court such a duty. For these reasons, we overrule his sole point on appeal
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 22, 2022
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