in Re the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2022 )


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  •                                NUMBER 13-22-00258-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    IN RE THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE
    SERVICES
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Silva
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa1
    On June 2, 2022, relator The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
    (the Department) filed a petition for writ of mandamus asserting that the trial court “abused
    its discretion in entering an order requiring the Department to take possession and
    conservatorship of a child in a suit to which the Department was not a party.” By motion
    1  See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
    required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
    47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
    for temporary emergency relief, the Department sought to stay the trial court’s order of
    May 18, 2022, and any contempt proceedings, sanctions, or enforcement actions based
    on that order pending resolution of this original proceeding. On June 3, 2022, this Court
    granted the Department’s motion for temporary emergency relief, ordered the trial court’s
    May 18, 2022 order to be stayed, and requested that the real party in interest, DeWitt
    County, Texas, or any others whose interest would be directly affected by the relief
    sought, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2,
    52.4, 52.8, 52.10(b). However, the Department has now filed a motion to dismiss its
    petition for writ of mandamus on grounds that the trial court vacated its May 18, 2022
    order, and the petition for writ of mandamus is now moot. The Department asks that we
    dismiss this original proceeding.
    The Court, having examined and fully considered the Department’s motion to
    dismiss, is of the opinion that it should be granted. See Heckman v. Williamson County,
    
    369 S.W.3d 137
    , 162 (Tex. 2012) (“A case becomes moot if, since the time of filing, there
    has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if the issues
    presented are no longer ‘live,’ or if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
    outcome.”); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 
    166 S.W.3d 732
    , 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
    proceeding) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties
    at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.”); see also In re Smith County,
    
    521 S.W.3d 447
    , 453–55 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, we lift
    2
    the stay previously imposed in this case, we grant the Department’s motion to dismiss,
    and we dismiss this petition for writ of mandamus.
    LETICIA HINOJOSA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed on the
    14th day of June, 2022.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-22-00258-CV

Filed Date: 6/14/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2022