Kalpana Yedlapalli, Individually and as Next Friend of Shriya Yedlapalli, and Kalyani Kancharla v. Mahalakshmi Jaldu ( 2022 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 28, 2022
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-00531-CV
KALAPANA YEDLAPALLI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF
SRIVA YEDLAPALLI, AND KALYANI KANCHARIA, Appellants1
V.
MAHALAKSHMI JALDU, Appellee
On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 417-02746-2017
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
Appellant Kalapana Yedlapalli, individually and as next friend of Sriva
Yedlapalli, and appellant Kalyani Kancharia appeal the trial court’s take-nothing
judgment, rendered on a jury verdict, on their negligence claims arising from an
automobile collision. In two issues, appellants contend (1) the trial court erred by
denying their directed verdict, and (2) the jury’s answer of “no” to the liability
question was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.
1
Throughout the record, the parties and the trial court inconsistently spell Appellants’ names. In this
proceeding, we will use the spellings of the names as they appear in the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On December 1, 2015, Kalapana Yedlapalli picked up her daughter and a
neighbor’s daughter from school in her minivan. Her sister, Kalyani Kancharia, and
Kancharia’s young son were in the car too. Yedlapalli was driving, Kancharia was
in the passenger seat, and the children were in the middle row of the minivan. After
leaving the carpool line, Yedlapalli made her way out of the neighborhood. While
stopped at a stop sign behind another vehicle, a minivan driven by appellee
Mahalakshmi Jaldu rear-ended Yedlapalli’s car.
The women dispute how the accident happened. At trial, Yedlapalli explained
that the vehicle in front of her was stopped at the stop sign because children were
crossing the street, and the school crossing guard had stopped traffic. According to
Yedlapalli, she was looking in her rearview mirror to see and talk to the children in
the back seat when she saw Jaldu’s vehicle coming toward her and not slowing
down. Yedlapalli testified she saw Jaldu clearly and saw a cell phone in Jaldu’s hand
before the collision. Yedlapalli told the jury that she “immediately felt a sharp pain
in her neck” and her neck “was like a jolt” when Jaldu’s minivan collided with her
minivan. Yedlapalli’s daughter “complained about something in her shoulder
because she hit her shoulder” on the car seat where Kancharia’s son was seated.
Yedlapalli and Kancharia checked on the children and found no scratches or bruises
on them. When Yedlapalli got out of the minivan to speak with Jaldu, her daughter
also got out. But Yedlapalli got her daughter back into the vehicle and then spoke
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with Jaldu. Yedlapalli testified that Jaldu apologized, asked if she and the kids were
hurt, and “was also tensed about what happened.” Yedlapalli maintained she told
Jaldu that she had “a sharp pain” in her neck, but “that was it.”
Jaldu, in contrast, asserted that she was at a full stop at the stop sign before
the accident. Jaldu testified that two vehicles were in front of her vehicle at the stop
sign, and both vehicles were stopped. Contrary to Yedlapalli’s account, Jaldu told
the jury there were no children crossing the street and the crossing guard was sitting
down on the side of the road. According to Jaldu, she was stopped behind Yedlapalli
“just [a] few seconds” before the crash. While she was stopped with her foot on the
brake, she saw a piece of paper on the floor between her seat and the passenger seat.
Jaldu testified she kept her left hand on the steering wheel and then bent down to
pick the paper up. As she bent down, her foot slipped off the brake and her vehicle
rolled into and tapped Yedlapalli’s vehicle. Jaldu told the jury that her foot was on the
brake right before the accident and her foot did not hit the gas. Neither Jaldu nor her
daughter were injured. After the collision, Jaldu got out of her minivan, helped
Yedlapalli get her daughter back in their vehicle, and spoke with Yedlapalli and
Kancharia. Jaldu maintained that Yedlapalli and Kancharia told her they “were fine”
and no one in their car was injured.
The women both testified that the crossing guard checked on them and
everyone agreed there was no need to call the police. Jaldu recalled the crossing
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guard telling the women that they did not need to call the police “because it was a
minor accident.” The women exchanged contact information and left the scene.
Yedlapalli and Kancharia filed suit against Jaldu on June 14, 2017, asserting
negligence. A jury trial was held in February 2020. On cross-examination,
appellants’ counsel asked Jaldu if she was “taking one hundred percent
responsibility for the crash on December 1st, 2015.” Jaldu agreed that her vehicle
hit Yedlapalli’s vehicle when her foot slipped from the brake and the car rolled. She
further testified that she remembered telling Yedlapalli at the scene that it was her
“mistake,” and she understands being responsible for the damage to the car. But
Jaldu refused to take responsibility for appellants’ purported injuries because
“everybody was completely fine” right after the accident. Jaldu told the jury she
thinks it is “very fishy” that appellants only sued after they went to doctors and
chiropractors and did not pay the medical bills.
At the conclusion of the evidence, appellants moved for directed verdict on
liability based on what they categorized as Jaldu taking one hundred percent
responsibility for the accident. The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict.
The court charged the jury, the parties presented closing arguments, and the jury
retired to deliberate. The jury answered “no” to whether the negligence, if any, of
Jaldu proximately caused the occurrence in question. The trial court signed a take
nothing judgment in accordance with the verdict. Appellants filed a motion for new
trial, which was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In their first issue, appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their motion
for directed verdict. The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for directed
verdict is a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard of review. L.G. Ins. Mgmt.
Servs., L.P. v. Leick, 378 S.W.3d 632, 642 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the
nonmovant produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a fact issue
on the material questions presented. Id. In such a review, an appellate court considers
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolves all
reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence admitted at the trial in the
nonmovant’s favor. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51
(Tex. 2003).
In their second issue, appellants complain the evidence was factually
insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jaldu’s negligence, if any, did not
proximately cause the occurrence in question. To establish a lack of factually
sufficient evidence, appellants must demonstrate the finding is against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence presented at trial. See Dow Chem. Co. v.
Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (party attacking factual sufficiency of
evidence supporting adverse finding on which it had burden of proof must
demonstrate that finding is against great weight and preponderance of evidence).
“The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence, and can set aside
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a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. “Jurors
are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their
testimony.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). Jurors “may
choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.” Id. As it is the jurors’ role to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, our review assumes that they did so in a manner
consistent with their verdict. Id. at 820; Capcor at KirbyMain, L.L.C. v. Moody Nat’l
Kirby Houston S, L.L.C., 509 S.W.3d 379, 384–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, no pet.).
APPLICABLE LAW
To prevail on their negligence cause of action against Jaldu, appellants had to
establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately
caused by the breach. W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). To
establish breach of duty, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant did
something an ordinarily prudent person exercising ordinary care would not have
done under the particular circumstances or that the defendant failed to do something
that an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the exercise of ordinary care.
Douglas v. Aguilar, 599 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,
no pet.).
“The occurrence of an accident or a collision is not of itself evidence of
negligence.” Smith v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—
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Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied). Proof that the defendant’s vehicle rear-
ended the plaintiff’s vehicle does not establish negligence as a matter of law. Id.Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s specific acts were negligent, and
that they proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages. Id.ANALYSIS
Appellants bring two issues on appeal. First, they contend the trial court erred
by denying their motion for directed verdict. Second, they assert the evidence was
factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jaldu’s conduct was not
negligent and did not proximately cause the occurrence in question. We address each
issue in turn.
I. Denial of directed verdict
At the close of evidence, appellants’ counsel moved for directed verdict,
arguing as follows:
The only thing I would say, now that the defendant has accepted a
hundred percent responsibility for the crash, that the plaintiff’s [sic]
move for a directed verdict on liability.
In response, Jaldu’s counsel maintained the issue of liability should be an issue put
to the jury. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellants based their directed-verdict argument on the following exchange
during the cross-examination of Jaldu:
Q. I’m am [sic] asking you, Mrs. Jaldu, if you are taking one hundred
percent responsibility for the crash on December 1st, 2015?
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A. I would not say crash, definitely my foot rolled off -- moved --
slipped from the brake when I was bending to pick up the sheet which
was in the middle of the seat --
Q. Let me --
A. -- the car; it rolled and tapped in front of the vehicle. You can see
from the picture which the plaintiff showed.
....
Q. Are you taking one hundred percent responsibility for the incident
on 12/1/2015, where your minivan ran into the back of my client’s
minivan?
A. Yeah. It went and hit and I remember getting down and telling her
it was my mistake. When I was picking up the sheet, my foot slipped
from the back -- the brakes, and it hit your vehicle, yes.
Q. So that’s a yes you’re taking one hundred percent responsibility?
A. For that sentence, like I said, for that, yes.
Q. Okay. Do you feel, since you’ve taken responsibility for the
incident, that you should be responsible for the damages you caused to
the plaintiffs?
A. For the car, I understand, but the plaintiff going to chiropractor the
third day when she said that nothing hurt her -- she was, everybody was
completely fine, that seems very fishy to me.
Q. So is that a no?
A. So I cannot take responsibility for the injuries caused later for them
in 2016 or '17, when I heard about that they were suing me. Until then
I did not know that this all -- this had happened. So they went and
shopped for a chiropractor, doctor, whatever, whom they haven't even
paid.
When I go to doctors, if I don’t pay them, they send me notice
because -- because if I don’t pay, the credit score goes down or the
collection -- whomever collects, they send a notice that, you know, you
haven’t paid. I don’t understand after five years they haven’t paid.
Who is sending them? I don’t understand.
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How -- how are they sure that 2015, from then -- 2020, somebody
is going to pay them? If it is family, I understand. Friends I,
understand.
I don’t think so they are friends or family, I feel they have a
motive behind it, and they have a plan I -- I believe that.
On appeal, appellants reurge their position that the question of negligence should not
have gone to the jury because Jaldu assumed one hundred percent responsibility for
the accident. We disagree.
Jaldu’s statements acknowledging that her foot slid off of the brake and her
vehicle then hit Yedlapalli’s vehicle are not conclusive evidence that she breached
the duty of ordinary care. See, e.g., Jowdy v. Rossi, No. 01-19-00715-CV, 2021 WL
2793474, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Rossi’s admission that she was responsible for the crash because she was driving
is an admission that she struck Jowdy’s vehicle, but it is not an admission of
negligence.”); see also In re Ybarra, No. 04-17-00245-CV, 2017 WL 4655347, *4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 18, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that
defendant’s “testimony and pre-trial statements that he was responsible for the
accident do not constitute an admission of negligence”); see Benavente v. Granger,
312 S.W.3d 745, 749–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)
(defendant’s testimony that he ran into plaintiff’s car did not establish negligence as
a matter of law).
Moreover, when a driver shows “some care,” then the question of negligence
is a question of fact for the jury even if the driver does not deny the accident was her
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fault. Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at 108; Cnty. of Dallas v. Poston, 104 S.W.3d 719, 723
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“when the driver exercises some degree of care,
it becomes an issue of fact as to whether the driver’s conduct was negligent.”). In
such cases, the trial court does not err by denying a directed verdict. Douglas, 599
S.W.3d at 108, 109.
The Douglas opinion is instructive. In that case, Douglas was driving on the
highway when she tried to change from the left lane to the right lane. Douglas, 599
S.W.3d at 107. She checked her rearview mirror and both side mirrors, activated her
turn signal, and began to move lanes. Id. Douglas did not see another vehicle when
she checked her mirrors. Id. When Douglas started to move lanes, she hit the car
next to her, which was driven by Aguilar. Id.
Aguilar sued Douglas and moved for directed verdict at trial based on
Douglas’s testimony that she did not dispute her responsibility for the accident. Id.
at 108. Douglas did, however, maintain that she used ordinary care by checking her
mirrors and that Aguilar was not in the lane when she did so. Id. at 109. The trial
court granted Aquilar’s motion for directed verdict and entered “Yes” as the answer
to the jury charge’s negligence question. Id. at 108. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that a directed verdict was not proper because there was some evidence “that
Douglas did what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or
similar circumstances. ” Id. at 109. Further, “the jury could have reasonably believed
that despite Douglas’s acceptance of responsibility she drove in a reasonable manner
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and did not act negligently” or that she did not drive responsibly and was negligent
in failing to yield the right-of-way. Id. at 109. Under those facts, her negligence was
a question of fact for the jury and not proven as a matter of law. Id. at 110.
We find this analysis equally applicable here. Jaldu’s acceptance of
responsibility, standing alone, did not establish her negligence as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at 110; see also Jowdy, 2021 WL 2793474, at *4; In
re Ybarra, 2017 WL 4655347, *4. Moreover, Jaldu contested liability by filing a
general denial and maintained throughout trial her lack of liability for appellants’
alleged personal injuries and accompanying damages See Estrada v. Dillon, 44
S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. 2001) (if a party files a general denial in the trial court, that
pleading puts a plaintiff to his or her proof on all issues, including liability.). Jaldu
testified that when she reached down to pick up the paper, she was at a complete
stop a safe distance behind Yedlapalli with her foot on the brake. That testimony
provided some evidence that Jaldu did what a person of ordinary prudence would
have done under the same or similar circumstances. Under these facts, the question
of negligence was one for the jury and was not established as a matter of law. See
Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at 110.
Appellants urge this Court against following Douglas, arguing that it was
wrongly decided and conflicts with the Fourteenth Court’s prior opinion in Ginn v.
Pierce, 595 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). This
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assertion is unavailing because we find Douglas persuasive and Ginn distinguishable
from Douglas and the case at bar.
In Ginn, the parties came to a stop on a road that was blocked by an accident.
595 S.W.3d at 765. Pierce stopped in front of Ginn, “but after one minute decided
he did not want to wait for the traffic jam to clear,” put his car in reverse, and backed
into Ginn’s car. Id. at 767. Ginn sued Pierce for negligence. Id. at 765. At trial, Ginn
testified that he was parked a car’s length behind Pierce and honked as soon as Pierce
began reversing. Id. at 767. Ginn stated that Pierce told him after the accident that
Pierce had not looked in his mirrors. Id. Pierce insisted at trial, however, that he
checked his mirrors before reversing and Ginn’s vehicle must have been in his blind
spot. Id. Ginn moved for directed verdict, and the trial court denied the motion. Id.
at 765. The jury found Pierce was not negligent. Id.
On appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court erred by denying the
motion for directed verdict because “no reasonable factfinder could find that Pierce
would not have seen Ginn’s vehicle if Pierce had used ordinary care in looking in
his rear-view mirror.” Ginn, 595 S.W.3d at 767–68. The court concluded “that the
trial evidence proved as a matter of law that (1) Pierce failed to use ordinary care in
backing up his truck; (2) if Pierce had used ordinary care, he would have seen Ginn’s
stationary vehicle and been able to avoid a collision with the vehicle; and (3) Pierce’s
negligence proximately caused the accident.” Id.
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Our facts are distinguishable from those in Ginn because Jaldu, unlike Pierce,
did not make a conscious decision to move her car. Jaldu testified that she left her
foot on the brake when she reached for the paper but her foot slipped off the brake
unintentionally. Unlike Pierce, Jaldu took steps to remain at a complete stop. We
conclude that this testimony constituted at least a scintilla of evidence that raised a
fact question for the jury and did not establish her negligence as a matter of law. See,
e.g., Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at 109–110 (directed verdict not proper because there was
some evidence “that Douglas did what a person of ordinary prudence would have
done under the same or similar circumstances”); see also Schwartz v. Forest Pharm.,
Inc., 127 S.W.3d 118, 121–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)
(driver’s testimony that her foot accidently slipped off of the brake after she dropped
a cold drink in her lap was factually sufficient to support finding that driver was not
negligent).
Appellants further argue that a directed verdict was required here because
Jaldu did not assert an affirmative defense or otherwise claim that Yedlapalli was at
fault for the accident. But Jaldu was not required to assert an affirmative defense of
contributory negligence to deny that she was negligent. See Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at
110 (citing Davis v. Manning, 847 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“lack of negligence” is not an affirmative defense)). Jaldu’s
statements conceding some responsibility did not entitle appellants to a finding of
negligence as a matter of law. And, as discussed above, the record includes evidence
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from which a jury could reasonably determine Jaldu was not negligent. The trial
court, therefore, did not err by denying the motion for directed verdict. We overrule
appellants’ first issue.
II. Sufficiency of the evidence to support finding of no negligence
In their second issue, appellants contend the evidence is factually insufficient
to support the jury’s answer to Question No. 1 of the jury charge, which asked
whether “the negligence, if any, of [Jaldu] proximately cause the occurrence in
question?” The jury answered “no.” To establish a lack of factually sufficient
evidence to support that finding, appellants must demonstrate the finding is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence presented at trial. See Dow
Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We conclude appellants have failed to do so.
Proof that a defendant’s vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle does not, by
itself, establish that the jury’s failure to find negligence is unsupported by factually
sufficient evidence. E.g., Schwartz, 127 S.W.3d at 121–22 (affirming jury’s finding
that driver was not negligent where driver testified she was at a complete stop at a
red light when her foot slipped off of the brake after she dropped a cold drink in her
lap). “To the contrary, plenty of courts have upheld a jury’s ‘no’ answer on this issue,
even in rear-end collision cases when the defendants made quasi-admissions of
fault.” Brooks v. Salazar, No. 14-19-00176-CV, 2020 WL 6737744, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing cases);
Jowdy, 2021 WL 2793474, at *4 (“Rossi’s admission that she was responsible for
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the crash because she was driving is an admission that she struck Jowdy’s vehicle,
but it is not an admission of negligence.”) (citing cases and noting that this is a jury
question).
For example, Schwartz involved a rear-end collision similar to the one at issue
here. There, as here, the parties disagreed on how the collision occurred. Schwartz,
127 S.W.3d at 121–22. The plaintiff, Schwartz, testified that he was stopped at a red
light when the driver, Wilson-Woodcox, hit his car while travelling approximately
10 m.p.h. Id. at 121. Wilson-Woodcox, in contrast, testified that she was at a stop
before the collision and accidently lifted her foot off of the brake pedal when she
moved in her seat. Id. at 121–22. She told the jury that she jumped when she dropped
a cold beverage on her lap, which then caused her foot to come off the brake. Id. The
jury found the plaintiff suffered no damages proximately caused by the driver. Id. at
122. The court of appeals concluded the evidence was factually sufficient to support
the finding because the evidence was not so weak nor the finding so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was clearly wrong and unjust. Id.Although Schwartz presented evidence that was inconsistent with the jury’s finding,
the court reasoned that the jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony, could resolve conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony of any one witness as well as the conflicting
testimony of different witnesses. Id. The court concluded there was more than a
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scintilla of evidence to support the finding that Schwartz did not suffer any injuries
proximately caused by Wilson-Woodcox and affirmed the judgment. Id.The same is true in this case. Here, as in Schwartz, the parties dispute how the
collision occurred. Yedlapalli testified that Jaldu was not stopped before the collision
but was, instead, driving toward the stop sign without slowing down while holding
her cell phone. Jaldu testified that she was stopped at the stop sign behind Yedlapalli
when she reached for a piece of paper and her foot slipped off the brake. The jury
was charged with judging the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their
testimony and was permitted to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies of any witness
as well as the conflicting testimony of different witnesses. Schwartz, 127 S.W.3d at
122; Klein v. Brown-Griffin Texaco Distribs., Inc., 562 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (in a rear-end collision, “[i]t was uniquely
within the jury’s province to determine whether plaintiff succeeded in proving
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence.”). With rear-end collisions,
“standards of ordinary care cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty but must be
left in large measure to the trier of the facts.” Neese v. Dietz, 845 S.W.2d 311, 314
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (quoting Gaitan v. Reyes
Salvatierra, 485 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1972, no writ)).
“The jury is not only the judge of the facts and circumstances proven, but may also
draw reasonable inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced before it.” Id.–16–
Conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony present credibility questions for the jury to
resolve. Id. at 314–15.
Moreover, as discussed in relation to the denial of appellants’ motion for
directed verdict, the mere occurrence of a rear-end accident does not establish
negligence as a matter of law. Douglas, 599 S.W.3d at 109–110; Cent. Freight Lines,
774 S.W.2d at 412. “And it is neither impossible nor automatically invalid for a jury
to determine that neither driver in a rear-end accident committed negligence.”
Gaskey v. One Source Sec. & Found, No. 14-07-00850-CV, 2009 WL 7047692, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Brooks,
2020 WL 6737744, at *3 (“Car accidents can happen without the negligence of any
party.”). Whether a rear-end collision resulted from negligence depends on all the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. Pearson v. DeBoer, Inc., 99 S.W.3d
273, 276 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) “A rear-end collision
may be some evidence of negligence of the rear-ending driver, but it does not
constitute conclusive proof.” P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Stevens Transp., Inc., No. 05-
12-01031-CV, 2013 WL 3948880, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (internal citations omitted).
In the face of conflicting evidence, the jury may have believed Jaldu and
concluded she acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted in the same or
similar circumstance. Or the jury may have simply believed appellants failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either driver was negligent.
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Regardless of the jury’s reasoning and considering all of the evidence, we hold that
the jury’s finding of no negligence was not so contrary to the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it was clearly wrong and unjust. See Benavente,
312 S.W.3d at 747, 749–50 (factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s “no”
answer regarding negligence of a driver who rear-ended a stopped car although the
driver admitted to being distracted by looking at a yellow Lamborghini); see also
Schwartz, 127 S.W.3d at 122 (driver not negligent for mistakenly removing foot
from the brake and causing vehicle to collide with vehicle in front of her).
We therefore conclude the evidence was factually sufficient to support the
jury’s answer to Question No. 1. We overrule appellants’ second issue.
CONCLUSION
Under this record, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying
appellants’ motion for directed verdict, and the evidence was factually sufficient to
support the jury’s answer to the liability question. Accordingly, we overrule
appellants’ issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Robbie Partida-Kipness/
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE
200531F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
KALAPANA YEDLAPALLI, On Appeal from the 417th Judicial
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT District Court, Collin County, Texas
FRIEND OF SRIVA YEDLAPALLI, Trial Court Cause No. 417-02746-
AND KALYANI KANCHARIA, 2017.
Appellant Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
Kipness. Justices Myers and Carlyle
No. 05-20-00531-CV V. participating.
MAHALAKSHMI JALDU, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee MAHALAKSHMI JALDU recover her costs
of this appeal from appellants KALAPANA YEDLAPALLI, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF SRIVA YEDLAPALLI, AND KALYANI
KANCHARIA.
Judgment entered this 28th day of June 2022.
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