John Wayne Woodall v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-21-00217-CR
No. 07-21-00218-CR
JOHN WAYNE WOODALL, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 91st District Court
Eastland County, Texas1
Trial Court Nos. 25943, 26171, Honorable Steven R. Herod, Presiding
July 8, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
In two cases consolidated for trial, a jury convicted appellant, John Wayne
Woodall, of burglary of a habitation and assault.2 The trial court found “true” the
enhancement allegation that appellant is a repeat felony offender and assessed his
1Originally appealed to the Eleventh Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by
the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 30.02(c)(2).
punishment at confinement for fourteen years for the burglary charge and one year for
the assault charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. In a single issue on appeal,
appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous act
evidence over his objection. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions. Therefore, we limit our discussion to the evidence that is necessary to
understand the issue he raises on appeal. The evidence showed that on July 17, 2020,
appellant went to the home of Rachel Simpson to discuss repayment of the $100 he had
loaned her. Appellant did not see Simpson, but he had a brief discussion with Eddy
Velasquez, who was dating Simpson’s daughter, outside the home before leaving. A
short time later, appellant returned with a companion, Adam Bonvillain. Simpson’s son,
Kane Wilson, opened the door to the house and appellant and Bonvillain forced their way
inside. Appellant then said, “Who’s first?” Appellant and Bonvillain began hitting
Velasquez and Wilson, who both fought back. Soon, Wilson’s friend, Tomas Rodriguez,
came inside the house and was also struck by appellant. Eventually, Velasquez and
Wilson “stayed down.” Appellant and Bonvillain searched the house for Simpson and left
when they did not find her. Appellant was subsequently charged with burglary of a
habitation and injury to a disabled person.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion in limine relating to “any evidence that
[appellant] is affiliated with a criminal street gang, biker gang, criminal organization, or
other affiliation of persons connected to criminal activity.” The trial court granted the
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motion.3 Accordingly, at trial, counsel for the State approached the bench for a ruling
before questioning a witness about appellant’s relationship with a particular group. The
witness, Velasquez, was taken on voir dire, outside the presence of the jury, and he
explained that following the incident, he contacted a man named Michael Post.
Velasquez explained that Post and appellant were in a group called Keepers of the Faith
and Post was “the president of their crew.” Velasquez stated that he was concerned for
the safety of his girlfriend, their child, and Simpson, because of the incident and because
of other encounters between Simpson and appellant. According to Velasquez, Post “said
it would be taken care of as they were in the wrong,” but Velasquez did not know how the
matter would be handled. Counsel for the State explained that she desired to elicit this
testimony from Velasquez to establish that Simpson was concerned about retaliation.
When the trial court asked if he had any objection, appellant’s counsel stated, “Yes,
Judge. That’s very abstract. I’ve got concerns. I’ve got concerns. I’ve got concerns.
We’ve got motorcycles, we’ve got gang being thrown around. Link them together.
There’s no link between the true faith. That’s no link to Mike Post. That’s not there.”
After further discussion, the trial court concluded the bench conference by stating it would
allow the State to proceed.
Upon the jury’s return, the State elicited the testimony from Velasquez that
appellant challenges on appeal. Velasquez stated that he “didn’t want [this matter] to
come to court” and that he tried to make peace. Velasquez testified that he wrote a
3 Appellant states that the trial court “overruled” his motion in limine, but the order in the clerk’s
record reflects that appellant’s motion was granted.
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statement about the incident for Post. He approached Post because “[h]e’s the president,
he’s chief of the Indians” and appellant and Bonvillain “are members.” Velasquez
believed that Post had influence over appellant and Bonvillain. Velasquez had concerns
about retaliation against his family, including his girlfriend, their infant daughter, and his
girlfriend’s mother, Simpson. He stated that he left his statement with Post and that, after
their visit, he had no further contact with appellant or Bonvillain.
Later in the proceedings, Simpson was asked whether she recalled telling the
police chief that she was concerned about retaliation. She answered, “I was[,] just
because [appellant] knows – I mean, there’s a lot of people that know him. I didn’t think
anybody in particular would; I was just worried about just in general.” Appellant made no
objection to this testimony. In his testimony, appellant identified Post as his “preacher.”
ANALYSIS
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.Here, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence “that
[appellant] was a member of a local motorcycle gang” and had “dealings with the
president of a group of bikers.” According to appellant, this testimony served only to
demonstrate that he was “a bad guy” and, thus, was inadmissible extraneous-offense
evidence. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 583–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en
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banc) (gang affiliation is considered to be evidence of an “other crime, wrong or act”
subject to exclusion under Rule 404(b)).
We observe that the jury heard no references to “a local motorcycle gang” or to “a
group of bikers.” The statements appellant complains of appear to be those made by
Velasquez on voir dire, when he stated that Post is “the president of their crew or a biker
– I don’t know what you call it.” Before the jury, there was no reference made to a
motorcycle gang, any other type of gang, or “Keepers of the Faith.” There was no
testimony concerning appellant’s, Post’s, or their group’s activities or reputation. In short,
the testimony at trial did not make it obvious that appellant was involved in a motorcycle
gang.
Even if this scant evidence supported an inference that appellant was affiliated
with a gang, and assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the
evidence and that appellant preserved his complaint regarding its admission, we conclude
that any error was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (providing that any error, other
than constitutional error, that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded). A
substantial right is affected when, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court concludes
the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the outcome of the
proceeding. See Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 637 & n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). To
conduct a harm analysis, we consider everything in the record, including any testimony
or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the trial court’s instructions to
the jury, the State’s theory, any defensive theories, closing arguments, and even voir dire
when appropriate. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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We also consider the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the
alleged error, and the weight of the evidence of appellant’s guilt. Id.The evidence suggesting that appellant had a connection to a motorcycle gang
was a very small part of the total evidence introduced during the trial of this case. After
carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence could have had only a
negligible influence on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, any error in the admission of the
complained-of testimony was harmless, and we overrule appellant’s issue. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(b).
Our review of the record reveals an error in the trial court’s judgment in trial court
cause number 25943. The judgment indicates that appellant pleaded “true” to the
enhancement paragraph. However, the record reflects that appellant pleaded “not true”
to the allegation. We are authorized to reform judgments sua sponte to make the record
speak the truth. “The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure give us authority to reform
judgments and correct typographical errors to make the record speak the truth.” Torres
v. State, No. 07-13-00179-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2664, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Mar. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing TEX. R. APP. P.
43.2, and French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc)). We
reform the judgment in trial court cause number 25943 to accurately reflect appellant’s
plea of “not true” to the State’s enhancement allegation.
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CONCLUSION
We reform the judgment in trial court cause number 25943 to reflect that appellant
pleaded “not true” to the enhancement paragraph. We overrule appellant’s sole issue
and affirm the judgments of the trial court as reformed.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
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