Angelo Ramos v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-21-00303-CR
No. 07-21-00304-CR
________________________
ANGELO RAMOS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 108th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 80,542-E-CR & 80,544-E-CR, Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding
October 12, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
“Short cuts make long delays, argued Pippin.” 1 The shortcut taken here led to a
destination. We affirm the two convictions from which Angelo Ramos appeals.
1 J.R.R. Tolkien, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING.
The shortcut began with appellant deciding to enter open pleas of guilty to two
indictments. Through each instrument, the State accused him of causing bodily injury to
others while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07(a) (describing the offense
of intoxication assault). The individuals injured were peace officers. The trial court
convened a hearing to entertain the guilty pleas and dispose of the cases. Yet, it called
only one cause number, i.e., 80,542-E, when opening the proceeding. Though the State
mentioned that it was “ready for pleas of guilty on Cause Number 80,542 and 80,544”
and anticipated “pleas of true to the enhancement paragraphs,” the omission of 80,544-
E remained unnoticed at the time. Not until the court admonished appellant regarding the
charge in 80,542-E, found appellant competent, accepted appellant’s pleas of guilty and
true to the accusation and enhancement paragraphs, respectively, and began receiving
evidence did it realize it had “the plea papers on 542, but not on 544.” That led counsel
for appellant to (1) utter that he “thought they had both,” (2) represent that one set of plea
papers was intended to encompass both pleas, and (3) conclude that “[w]e need one
more set of paperwork.”
The trial court briefly recessed the proceeding to allow counsel for the State and
appellant to “go ahead and prepare those papers so we can also go over those real quick.”
The hearing resumed shortly thereafter but without an additional set of “papers.” Instead,
the record disclosed that the trial court spoke with counsel for the parties off-record during
the recess. More importantly, they struck an accord during that discussion. Per the
court’s statement, “all parties ha[d] agreed that [the court] can note on the documents
that have been provided to [it], as far as the plea papers, that they will carry forward on
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both Cause Number 80,542 and 80,544, both styled State versus Ramos.”2 (Emphasis
added). It continued with: “[A]ll testimony that – and other evidence that has been
provided to me today will apply equally to both of those two cases.” And, when asked
whether these statements accurately manifested the accord struck, counsel for both sides
represented that they did.
At the hearing’s end, the trial court found appellant to be competent and guilty of
the offenses encompassed by “both these Cause Numbers 80,542 and 80,544.” So too
did it pronounce sentence in open court.
Appellant now argues, through two issues, that the trial court erred by failing to call
Cause Number 80,544-E, admonish him as required by article 26.13 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure vis-à-vis the intended plea of guilty to the charge encompassed
within the cause number, and receive his plea to that charge in open court as required by
article 27.13 of the same code. The “remedial measures” taken by the court allegedly
were also “insufficient to cure the error.” Had the trial court required the litigants to draft
and submit the paperwork regarding Cause Number 80,544-E as originally intended,
there would have been no need to address these arguments. Instead, it took the shortcut,
the effect of which we now address.
Most importantly, the shortcut taken was with the expressed approval of “all
parties.” It resulted in the trial court simply handwriting “080544-E-CR” atop the plea
papers and immediately under reference to “080542-E-CR.” Furthermore, those plea
papers consisted of the “plea memorandum” containing “waivers and admonishments,”
2 Of course, we are not privy to the off-record conversation. Yet, nothing suggests appellant left
the courtroom or eschewed participating in the discussion. So, in the trial court’s using the phrase “all
parties have agreed,” we afford the passage its plain meaning and construe “parties” as including appellant
himself.
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the “judicial confession,” “order approving admonishments, order on waivers and judicial
confession,” and “certificate acknowledging compliance with C.C.P. Article 39.14.” And,
save for the “order approving admonishments, order on waivers and judicial confession,”
appellant’s signature appeared in each document. Through his signature he purported
to acknowledge the waivers, admonishments, and confession encompassed within the
documents. Appellant also and expressly pleaded “guilty” within the “judicial confession”
he signed, which confession encompassed both cause numbers 80,544-E and 80-542-E
per the subsequent agreement of “all parties.” The latter fact is of import, as we now
illustrate.
Article 27.13 provides that a guilty plea in a felony case “must be made in open
court by the defendant in person.” TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.13. It also allows
an accused to plea “in the same manner as is provided for by Articles 1.13 and 1.15” of
the Code of Criminal Procedure “[i]f the plea is before the judge alone.” Id. In turn, articles
1.13 and 1.15 concern waiving the right to a jury trial and how that can be done. Those
two statutes require the waivers to be written and in open court. See id. art. 1.13(a)
(stating “the waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court”);
art. 1.15 (stating that no one can be convicted of a felony except by a jury unless the
person “has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing”). That no
jury was empaneled at bar is clear. Rather, the pleas were to be made “before the judge
alone.” Thus, article 27.13 permitted them to be made in writing. Additionally, the record
indicates that appellant was present in open court when the proceeding began and the
parties acceded to amending the original plea papers to include the charges
encompassed by both 80,542-E and 80,544-E.
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Admittedly, the procedure utilized by the trial court deviated from the norm. The
better practice was to sojourn down the path initially mentioned by the trial court. It was
to “pause a little bit and let [the parties] go ahead and prepare those papers so we can
also go over those real quick.” Yet, “all parties . . . agreed” to traverse the route the trial
court selected. Odd as it may be, it resulted in a written plea of guilty by appellant to the
offense charged in cause number 80,544-E. And, it complied with article 27.13.
The unique procedure and agreement of “all parties” also serve as the very
circumstances distinguishing our situation from those in the opinions cited by appellant.
Though the accused in White v. State, 929 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no
pet.) (White 1) and White v. State, 932 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, pet. ref’d)
(White 2) might not have entered a plea to a particular offense, in neither did “all parties”
permit the trial court to correct the omission by amending existing plea papers previously
signed by the accused, which plea papers contained the requisite plea of guilty. Indeed,
had that been done, it is questionable whether the result in White 1 would have been the
same. This is so because prior to reversing, the White 1 court noted the absence of
written documents admitted into evidence or presented in open court manifesting White’s
guilty plea and triggering the alternate way in which the defendant may plead guilty under
article 27.13. See White, 929 S.W.2d at 504 (stating that although White signed a written
stipulation admitting his guilt, it was not placed in evidence or presented in open court
and, therefore, could not serve as a plea of guilty under article 27.13).
As for error involving article 26.13, the document initially signed by appellant and
entitled “plea memorandum” contained all but one of the admonishments mandated by
the statute. Moreover, the statute permitted all but one of contemplated admonishments
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to be made either in writing or orally. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(d). 3 So, the
amendment to the “plea papers” effectuated by the court with the agreement of “all
parties” provided the requisite admonishments in relation to both cause numbers 80,542-
E and 80,544-E. Simply put, the admonishments were effectively given appellant in
writing per the amendment and parties’ agreement. And, to the extent that appellant may
suggest the admonishment contemplated by 26.13(a)(4) was only made in writing while
it also should have been given orally, the record reveals that appellant was a citizen of
the United States. So, failing to verbally provide it was harmless. See Gist v. State, No.
07-08-0030-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8034, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 14, 2009,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that when the record
affirmatively shows the defendant is a United States citizen, the trial court’s failure to
admonish him in accordance with article 26.13(a)(4) is harmless).
We do note that one admonishment within the litany expressed in article 26.13 was
missing in toto. It concerned informing the accused that “if placed on community
supervision, after satisfactorily fulfilling the conditions of community supervision and on
expiration of the period of community supervision, the court is authorized to release the
defendant from the penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense as provided by
Article 42A.701(f).” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(6). This omission is of no
consequence, however. As stated elsewhere in the statute, “[t]he failure of the court to
3 The admonishment mentioned in article 26.13(a)(4) must be made both orally and in writing. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(d-1). It pertains to the potential effect of a guilty plea on a non-citizen.
See id. art. 26.13(a)(4) (stating that “the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the offense charged may result in deportation, the exclusion
from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law”).
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comply with Subsection (a)(6) is not a ground for the defendant to set aside the conviction,
sentence, or plea.” Id. art. 26.13(h-1).
As indicated earlier, shortcuts may cause more problems than solutions. Yet, that
taken here did not render a nullity appellant’s conviction upon the charge in cause number
80,544-E. We overrule his issues and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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