in the Matter of I.M., a Juvenile ( 2022 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-22-00273-CV
IN THE MATTER OF
I.M., A JUVENILE
From the 74th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2022-80-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant I.M., who was sixteen years of age at the time he allegedly committed
the offenses for which he was arrested, appeals the trial court’s order transferring his
juvenile case to a criminal court. We will affirm.
Background
The testimony at the transfer hearing reflects that I.M. shot his sister’s boyfriend,
the father of her children, three times. The boyfriend was unarmed, although he had a
history of domestic violence and had allegedly previously physically assaulted I.M.
Some of the shots fired by I.M. went into the victim’s residence, shooting out a
television. I.M.’s sister and her two children, along with another woman, were in the
residence when the shots were fired. The victim’s residence was located on a mainly
residential street, that also had a number of businesses close by.
Video surveillance reflected that the automobile in which I.M. was the front-seat
passenger, maneuvered in front of the victim’s residence so that the passenger side
faced the front of the house where the victim was standing. After the shooting, the
automobile, driven by I.M.’s girlfriend, drove quickly away. I.M. did not deny the
offenses, but claimed he shot the victim in self-defense.
After I.M.’s arrest, the State filed a Petition for Discretionary Transfer to a
Criminal Court, asserting that I.M. committed three offenses that would constitute
felonies if committed by an adult: (1) aggravated assault while in a motor vehicle; (2)
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and (3) deadly conduct.
After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s petition and
noted the following in its order of transfer:
The Court finds that the Respondent is a male child . . . and that he was 16
years of age at the time of the acts upon which the Petition is founded and
is alleged to have occurred. No adjudication hearing has been conducted
concerning such acts. At the present time, the child is 16 years of age. . . .
The Court finds that said acts would be a felony under the penal laws of
the State of Texas if committed by an adult. The Court finds that the
alleged offenses are against a person.
The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the
Respondent before the Court committed the offenses alleged and that
In the Matter of I.M., a Juvenile Page 2
there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment regardless of the youthful age of the said [Respondent}.
The Court finds that the Respondent is of sufficient sophistication and
maturity to be tried as an adult. The Court specifically finds that the
Respondent is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to aid an attorney
in his defense.
The Court finds that because of the record and previous history of the
Respondent or because of the extreme and severe nature of the alleged
offenses, the prospects of adequate protection for the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the Respondent by the use of the
procedures, services, and facilities, which are currently available to the
Juvenile Court, are in doubt.
The Court, after considering all of the evidence and exhibits, including
law enforcement testimony, diagnostic studies, social evaluation, and full
investigation, finds that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to
retain jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, because of the seriousness of the alleged offenses or
the background of the Respondent, the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings. The reasons for this waiver of jurisdiction include
the following:
1. The nature of the alleged offenses show that they were committed
in an aggressive and premeditated manner in that the offenses were
committed with a weapon.
2. At least one of the alleged offenses was against a person.
3. Psychiatric evaluation has revealed that [Respondent] currently has
the maturity to be tried as an adult and that he had such maturity
at the time the offenses alleged were committed.
4. Psychological evaluation has revealed that [Respondent] currently
has the maturity to be tried as an adult and that he had such
maturity at the time the offenses alleged were committed.
In the Matter of I.M., a Juvenile Page 3
5. No adjudication hearing has been conducted to this point
concerning the alleged offenses referenced herein.
...
8. The Court has considered all exhibits entered into evidence.
...
12. The Court has considered the seriousness of the alleged offenses or
the background of the Respondent and finds that, because of the
seriousness of the alleged offenses, the welfare of the community
requires that criminal proceedings proceed in criminal district court
concerning the aforementioned alleged felony offenses and all
criminal conduct occurring in said criminal episode.
I.M. then filed the present appeal.
Issues
I.M. presents the following issues:
I. Whether the order waiving jurisdiction lacks the case-specific findings of fact
required under Moon.
II. Whether there is legally insufficient evidence to support the transfer order.
III. Whether there is factually insufficient evidence to support the transfer order.
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the state’s petition for
discretionary transfer.
Standard of Review
Texas juvenile courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over cases involving
children between the ages of ten and seventeen who are involved in what would be
criminal conduct if committed by an adult. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.02(2)(a),
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51.03(a)(1), 51.04(a). The juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to
the district court for criminal proceedings if, after an evidentiary hearing, it determines
that certain statutory and constitutional requirements are met. Id. § 54.02(a), (c); see also
Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The burden is on the State
to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance of the evidence that transfer of
jurisdiction is appropriate. Matter of A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).
We review a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction and to transfer a
case to the criminal district court using two steps. Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. filed). 1 We first review the juvenile court’s
findings using traditional standards for evidentiary review. Id. The juvenile court is the
sole factfinder in a transfer hearing and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of
the witnesses’ testimony. See Grant v. State, 313 S.W.3d 443, 444-45 (Tex. App.—Waco
2010, no pet.). If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually
sufficient evidence, we then review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision for an
1
It is unclear whether this two-step analysis survives after Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014), the seminal case in juvenile waiver proceedings, was overruled by Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370,
381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (footnotes omitted) (“The Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the method
of analysis and review of orders transferring jurisdiction in juvenile cases, but it is not bound by Moon.
And decades of case law preceding Moon from this Court and our sister court alike remain as guidance
for the appellate courts.”). We will, therefore, follow the established precedent of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. See Matter of C.A.P., 582 S.W.3d 504, 508 n.1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. denied) (“The Texas
Supreme Court has not addressed the method of analysis and review as explained in Moon, therefore, our
analysis will follow the established precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”).
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abuse of discretion. Id. at 445; see also Matter of C.A.P., 582 S.W.3d at 511 (citing Moon,
451 S.W.3d at 44-45).
Issue One
As noted, I.M. asserts that the trial court’s order of transfer did not comply with
the specificity requirements of Moon. However, as noted, the Court of Criminal
Appeals overruled Moon in Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d at 381. While Moon required
case-specific fact findings to support the reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction, Thomas
clarified the specificity required:
A juvenile transfer order entered after the required transfer hearing and
complying with the statutory requirements constitutes a valid waiver of
jurisdiction even if the transfer order does not contain factually-
supported, case-specific findings.
Id. at 383.
As in Thomas, the juvenile court in this case conducted a transfer hearing, and the
transfer order signed by the juvenile court complied with the statute by listing the
reasons for the transfer. Id. I.M.’s first issue is overruled.
Issues Two and Three
I.M. argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support
transfer.
AUTHORITY
The issue before the juvenile court is whether there is sufficient evidence to
support a transfer to the criminal district court, not the ultimate guilt or innocence of
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the juvenile. See Matter of D.I.R., 650 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.);
see also Grant, 313 S.W.3d at 444.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the juvenile court's findings and disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject it. In re
B.M., [No. 01-18-00898-CV,] 2019 WL 1388561, at *7 [Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)]; see also Faisst v. State, 105
S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.). If there is more than a
scintilla of evidence to support the findings, then the evidence is legally
sufficient. In re B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *7; see also Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at
12. Under a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence
presented to determine if the juvenile court's findings conflict with the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong
or unjust. In re C.C.C., [No. 13-21-00371-CV,] 2022 WL 710143, at *8 [Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)]; In re
B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *7; see also Faisst, 105 S.W.3d at 12.
Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887.
DISCUSSION
The undisputed evidence presented to the juvenile court established the
following:
1. I.M. was age sixteen when the acts giving rise to his arrest occurred.
2. I.M. shot the victim three times, and the shots he fired also entered the victim’s
residence, said acts constituting felonies. The victim identified I.M. as the shooter, and
the incident was captured on video.
3. The shots fired by I.M. entered the victim’s residence and struck the screen of a
television. A police lieutenant testified that the television was tuned to a children’s
show, and he believed that the victim’s children had been watching the television
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shortly before the shots were fired. Two other adults were also in the residence when
the shots were fired. Another bullet was subsequently found in one of the bedrooms in
the residence.
4. I.M. brought the weapon used to shoot the victim with him to the scene, and
fired the shots from the front-seat of the vehicle in which he was a passenger.
Based upon the foregoing, there was legally and factually sufficient evidence for
the juvenile court to determine there was probable cause to believe that I.M. committed
the offenses alleged and that the seriousness of the offenses and the welfare of the
community required criminal proceedings. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(a)(3). We
overrule I.M.’s second and third issues.
Issue Four
I.M. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering transfer
because the only basis for the transfer was the seriousness of the offense. I.M. asserts
transfer was unwarranted because he has no other juvenile history.
AUTHORITY
The juvenile court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably,
without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of
J.G., No. 10-14-00298-CV, 2015 WL 6437829, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 22, 2015, no
pet.) (mem. op.). “By contrast, a waiver decision representing ‘a reasonably principled
application of the legislative criteria’ generally will pass muster under the abuse-of-
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discretion standard of review.” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting In re Z.M., No. 02-21-
00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem.
op.)). “An abuse of discretion does not occur when the juvenile court bases its decision
on conflicting evidence.” Id.In determining whether a transfer is appropriate, the juvenile court should
consider:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property,
with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the
person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services,
and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f).
Any combination of the foregoing criteria may suffice to support a waiver of
jurisdiction. Matter of A.J.F., 588 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,
no pet.). The juvenile court need not find that each factor is established by the evidence.
Matter of C.A.P., 582 S.W.3d at 508; In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
DISCUSSION
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As noted, the juvenile court specifically found that the offenses allegedly
committed by I.M. were offenses against the person, which carry greater weight in the
transfer determination than those against property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(f)(1).
The juvenile court additionally found that I.M. “is of sufficient sophistication and
maturity to be tried as an adult” and “is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to aid
an attorney in his defense.” Id. § 54.02(f)(2). Weighing these factors with the
seriousness of the alleged offenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that transfer was appropriate. We overrule I.M.’s fourth issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled all issues raised by I.M., we affirm the juvenile court’s Order
of Transfer to a Criminal Court.
MATT JOHNSON
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed December 28, 2022
[CV06]
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