Shawn Charles Williams v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00020-CR
No. 02-22-00021-CR
___________________________
SHAWN CHARLES WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1513328D, 1612255D
Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Shawn Williams appeals his sentences of eight years’ imprisonment
for the offenses of evading arrest with a vehicle and assault of a family member by
impeding breathing or circulation.1 In a single issue, Williams asserts that his
sentences are grossly disproportionate to the offenses. We will affirm.
I. Background
In November 2017, Williams pleaded guilty to evading arrest with a vehicle, a
third-degree felony. Williams received deferred adjudication and was placed on three
years’ probation.
In November 2019, Williams was indicted for another third-degree felony—
assault of a family member by impeding breathing or circulation. As a result, in
October 2020 the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication on the prior
evading-arrest offense. This petition included seven paragraphs detailing Williams’s
alleged violations of his probation terms. Williams pleaded “true” to three of these
paragraphs, which alleged that he had assaulted a family member by impeding her
breathing, had been arrested for public intoxication, and had consumed alcohol.
Williams also pleaded guilty to the offense of assaulting a family member by impeding
her breathing.
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Each offense was charged in a separate cause number. These separate causes
have been consolidated on appeal.
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At the sentencing hearing, the trial court—based on Williams’s pleas—found
him guilty of both evading arrest with a vehicle and assaulting a family member by
impeding her breathing and sentenced him to eight years in prison for each offense.2
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Williams raises a single issue, arguing that his eight-year prison
sentences are grossly disproportionate to the offenses for which he was convicted.
The State counters that Williams has failed to preserve this issue and, even if it were
preserved, the sentences, which are within the statutory limits, are not grossly
disproportionate. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether Williams
has preserved his disproportionality argument for appellate review.
“It is well settled that almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may be
waived by the failure to object.” Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the
appellant presented a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court stating the
specific grounds for the ruling desired. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Lovill v. State,
319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This rule holds true for a complaint that
a sentence is grossly disproportionate. Russell v. State, 341 S.W.3d 526, 527–28 (Tex.
2
These sentences, which are to run concurrently, are within the prescribed
statutory range of two to ten years’ imprisonment for each offense. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 12.34(a), 22.01(b)(2)(B), 38.04(b)(2)(A).
3
App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Fahmawi v. State, Nos. 02-16-00325-CR, 02-16-00326-
CR, 2017 WL 3081217, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem
op., not designated for publication) (“We have consistently held that [a
disproportionate-sentence] complaint must be preserved for appellate review by first
raising it in the trial court via a timely request, objection, or motion.”). Because
Williams did not object when the trial court sentenced him or file a motion for new
trial raising his disproportionality argument, he has forfeited this issue for appellate
review. See Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“As a general
rule, an appellant may not assert error pertaining to his sentence or punishment where
he failed to object or otherwise raise such error in the trial court.”).
Even if we were to assume—without deciding—that the issue had been
preserved, we still must overrule Williams’s disproportionality argument on the merits.
As Williams acknowledges in his briefing, where, as here, the assessed punishment is
within the statutory limits, it is generally not subject to a challenge for excessiveness.
Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475 (citing Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2005, no pet.)). Indeed, in assessing Williams’s sentence, the trial court had
“essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to impose any sentence within the prescribed
statutory range. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting
Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). Subject only to a very
limited and “exceedingly rare” gross-disproportionality review, a punishment that falls
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within the legislatively prescribed range and that is based upon the sentencer’s
informed normative judgment is “unassailable” on appeal. Id. at 323–24. We see
nothing in the appellate record that would warrant the “exceedingly rare” reversal of a
sentence falling within the statutory limits. Id.We overrule Williams’s sole issue.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled Williams’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: October 27, 2022
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