Justin Latodd Casselberry v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  • AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 25, 2022
    S  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-22-00014-CR
    JUSTIN LATODD CASSELBERRY, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 196th Judicial District Court
    Hunt County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 33754CR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Schenck, Reichek, and Goldstein
    Opinion by Justice Schenck
    Justin Latodd Casselberry appeals his conviction for the offense of possession
    of a controlled substance, less than 1 gram. In his sole issue, appellant contends the
    trial court failed to comply with Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.07’s
    requirement that, prior to pronouncing sentence, the court ask whether he has
    anything to say as to why sentence should not be pronounced against him. We affirm
    the trial court’s judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this
    memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant was charged by indictment with the felony offense of possession of
    a controlled substance, less than one gram. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
    The case was presented to a jury. The jury found appellant guilty of the charged
    offense and assessed punishment at 2 year’s confinement. In accordance with the
    jury’s verdict, the trial court found appellant guilty of the offense as charged in the
    indictment and sentenced him to 2 years confinement in state jail. The trial court
    certified appellant’s right of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    In his sole issue, appellant claims the trial court violated his statutory right to
    allocution.1 In his argument, in addition to referencing article 42.07, appellant
    references the common-law right of allocution. Thus, we construe appellant’s
    complaint to encompass both the statutory and common-law rights to allocution.
    The State replies, appellant failed to preserve his complaint for review and, with
    respect to the statutory right of allocution, appellant has failed to establish any of the
    statutory grounds for not pronouncing sentence apply to him.2
    1
    The term “allocution” refers to a trial judge’s asking a criminal defendant to speak in mitigation of
    the sentence to be imposed. Williamson v. State, No. 05-17-00411-CR, 
    2018 WL 388025
    , at *3 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas Jan. 12, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Eisen v. State, 
    40 S.W.3d 628
    , 631–32 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref’d)) (quoting A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage
    44–45 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d ed., Oxford 1995)).
    2
    The statutory grounds for prohibiting the imposition of sentence are prior pardon, incompetence to
    stand trial, and mistaken identity. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.07
    –2–
    While the right of allocution is not constitutionally grounded, the United
    States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to allocution is a common-law
    right. Green v. United States, 
    365 U.S. 301
    , 304 (1961). That common-law right
    was recognized in Texas at least until the enactment of section 42.07 of the Texas
    Code of Criminal Procedure. See Clare v. State, 
    54 S.W.2d 127
    , 129 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1932) (op. on reh’g). In 1965, the Texas Legislature codified a statutory-
    version of the right of allocution. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    42.07 (requiring that the defendant be asked, before sentence is pronounced,
    “whether he has anything to say why the sentence should not be imposed against
    him.”).
    Following the enactment of code of criminal procedure article 42.07, the
    questions of whether the statute encompassed the same scope as the former common-
    law practice, or, if not, whether the statute supplanted any potential broader reach of
    the common-law right remained unanswered. See, Hall v. State, No. 05-18-00442-
    CR, 
    2019 WL 3955772
    , at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 22, 2019, pet.
    ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Schenck, J., concurring). As it
    stands, the statute is framed in two parts, with the first appearing to impose no limit
    on what the defendant might say, and the second constraining what the judge might
    act upon, limiting him or her to the enumerated legal bars to the pronouncement of
    sentence. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.07. So read, the statute would only conflict with
    the common law if the common law in fact permitted a judge to act more broadly, in
    –3–
    which case, article 1.27 of the code of criminal procedure may provide for continued
    application of the common-law right. 
    Id.
     art. 1.27.
    We are not postured to answer any of these questions in this case,
    however. The record here shows that after hearing punishment evidence the trial
    court pronounced sentence without first asking appellant if there was any reason at
    law why sentence should not be imposed or whether he had anything to say in
    mitigation of the punishment to be imposed. To complain on appeal of the denial of
    the right of allocution, whether statutory or one claimed under the common law,
    controlling precedent requires that a defendant timely object. See Gallegos-Perez v.
    State, No. 05-16-00015-CR, 
    2016 WL 6519113
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1,
    2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tenon v. State, 
    563 S.W.2d 622
    , 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (panel op.); McClintick v. State, 
    508 S.W.2d 616
    , 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Appellant did not object to the trial
    court’s failure to recognize his right to allocution. Thus, he failed to preserve the
    issue for appeal. Accordingly, we are compelled to overrule appellant’s sole issue.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /David J. Schenck/
    DAVID J. SCHENCK
    DO NOT PUBLISH                             JUSTICE
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47
    220014F.U05
    –4–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    JUSTIN LATODD                                On Appeal from the 196th Judicial
    CASSELBERRY, Appellant                       District Court, Hunt County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 33754CR.
    No. 05-22-00014-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice
    Schenck. Justices Reichek and
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Goldstein participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
    Judgment entered this 25th day of October 2022.
    –5–