Monique Nabors v. Copper Grove Owners Association, Inc. ( 2022 )


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  • Vacated and Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 4, 2022.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-22-00018-CV
    MONIQUE NABORS, Appellant
    V.
    COPPER GROVE OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 133rd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2020-40801
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This is an appeal from a final judgment signed December 16, 2021 awarding
    appellee, a homeowner’s association (“the Association”), damages, costs, and
    attorneys’ fees with interest. After appellant filed her notice of appeal, the
    Association filed a full satisfaction and release of judgment. On appeal, the
    homeowner appellant, Monique Nabors (“Nabors”), argues the trial court’s
    judgment should be set aside because she made payments satisfying the amount in
    dispute before the final judgment was signed. The Association urges the court to
    dismiss the appeal as moot. We agree the appeal is moot, dismiss the appeal, and
    vacate the judgment of the trial court.
    Background
    The record reflects the Association sued Nabors for delinquent assessments,
    interest, attorneys’ fees and to foreclose on its lien on the property as provided by
    the declaration governing Nabors’ property. On December 16, 2021, the trial court
    granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment did not
    provide for foreclosure on Nabors’ property. In its appellate brief, the Association
    explains that Nabors made several partial payments toward her delinquent balance
    after the motion for summary judgment was filed, but before the judgment was
    signed. According to the brief, Nabors made a payment three days before the
    December 13, 2021 hearing. According to the Association, Nabors’ payments were
    not sufficient to satisfy the entire delinquency. Additionally, at the time of hearing
    and subsequent signing of the judgment, the Association had not received
    confirmation that the payments had cleared.
    The Association contends that at the hearing, it acknowledged receipt of the
    payments and, in light of the payments, the Association submitted a modified
    proposed judgment accounting for Nabors’ payments and dropping the request to
    foreclose on its lien. The record does not reflect that Nabors filed a response to the
    Association’s motion for summary judgment. In her brief, Nabors argues that she
    had no notice of the summary judgment hearing. This court ordered a supplemental
    clerk’s record reflecting that notice of hearing was filed in the trial court on
    October 22, 2021. That document indicates it was provided to Nabors by registered
    certified mail, return receipt requested.
    The Association states that after the trial court signed the judgment, Nabors
    paid the Association amounts sufficient to satisfy the final judgment. According to
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    the Association, after receiving Nabors’ final payment, it executed and filed its full
    satisfaction and release of judgment. This court ordered a supplemental clerk’s
    record showing that document was filed with the trial court on January 26, 2022.
    The record is devoid of any filing on behalf of Nabors with the exception of
    her notice of appeal, to which she attached copies of the checks she paid the
    Association.
    Mootness
    We must first address the Association’s mootness claim, because mootness
    is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction. See Speer v.
    Presbyterian Children’s Home & Serv. Agency, 
    847 S.W.2d 227
    , 229 (Tex. 1993).
    The mootness doctrine prevents courts from rendering advisory opinions, which
    are outside the jurisdiction conferred by article II, section 1 of the Texas
    Constitution. See Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 
    33 S.W.3d 821
    , 822 (Tex.
    2000). An issue may become moot when a party seeks a ruling on some matter
    which, when rendered, would not have any practical legal effect on a then-existing
    controversy. In re H&R Block Fin. Advisors, Inc., 
    262 S.W.3d 896
    , 900 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). Stated differently, an issue may be
    moot if it becomes impossible for the court to grant effectual relief for any reason.
    See Williams v. Lara, 
    52 S.W.3d 171
    , 184 (Tex. 2001). A controversy must exist
    between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including appeal. 
    Id.
    Generally, when a judgment debtor voluntarily pays and satisfies a judgment
    against him, he waives his right to appeal, and the cause must be dismissed as
    moot. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 
    198 S.W.3d 782
    , 787
    (Tex. 2006); Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso, 
    311 S.W.3d 492
    , 497
    (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet) (release of appellants from portion of liability
    in judgment renders those questions on appeal moot). The rule is intended to
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    prevent a party who voluntarily satisfies a judgment from later changing his or her
    mind and appealing. 
    Id.
     “Voluntary payment ends the controversy, and appellate
    courts will not decide moot cases involving abstractions.” Highland Church of
    Christ v. Powell, 
    640 S.W.2d 235
    , 236 (Tex. 1982).
    If a case is moot on appeal, the appellate court is required to vacate any
    judgment or order in the trial court and dismiss the case. See Reule v. RLZ Invs.,
    
    411 S.W.3d 31
    , 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (vacating trial
    court judgment where appellee released appellant from judgment on appeal),
    citing, Speer, 847 S.W.2d at 228 (vacating judgment of the court of appeals and of
    the trial court and dismissing the case as moot); City of Dallas v. Woodfield, 
    305 S.W.3d 412
    , 416 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (vacating trial court’s
    interlocutory order where controversy became moot during appeal); Thompson v.
    Ricardo, 
    260 S.W.3d 100
    , 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)
    (vacating portion of trial court’s order rendered moot on appeal). The Association
    “wholly release[d] its right to recover pursuant to the said Judgment” in its
    satisfaction and release of judgment. Therefore, a live controversy no longer exists,
    and the case is rendered moot. See Reule, 411 S.W.3d at 32.
    Conclusion
    Because it is uncontested that the judgment has been voluntarily satisfied
    and released by the Association, we hold the appeal is moot. See Goad v. County of
    Guadalupe, No. 04-14-00497-CV, 
    2016 WL 402332
     at *1 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio Feb 3, 2016, pet. denied) (voluntary payment of judgment renders appeal
    moot); F.D.I.C. v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., No. 14-91-00899-CV,
    
    1992 WL 117402
     at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 4, 1992, no writ)
    (voluntary payment of judgment renders appeal moot). Accordingly, we vacate the
    judgment of the trial court and dismiss the appeal as moot. See Marshall, 198
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    S.W.3d at 787, citing, Speer, 847 S.W.2d at 230; Woodfield, 
    305 S.W.3d at 416
    (“If a case is moot, the appellate court is required to vacate any judgment or order
    in the trial court and dismiss the case.”).
    PER CURIAM
    Panel Consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.
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